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Abstract  
 
Abstract -The Vital nd the Positve: A  Genealogy of the Science of M an 
 
The thesis presents a historical study of the Enlig htenm ent project for a Science of M an which 
takes itperspective from  the 20 th  FHQWXU\SKLORVRSKLFDOµGHDWKRIPDQ¶From  the contem porary 
m ove against hum anistc ideals DVVRFLDWHG DOUHDG\ IURP WKH ¶V H[HPSOLILHG FRQWUDVWLQJ
interpretations over an Enlightenm ent Science of M a n and its am bitons.  ,Q WKH¶V0LFKHO
)RXFDXOW¶VSLYRWDODSSURDFKgave this dispute th e perspective of the µGHDWKRIPDQ,¶which this 
thesis fram es in relation to his reading of K ant. T his form s a perspective from  which to exam ine 
.DQW¶V SRVLWLYH DPELWLRQV, as Foucault saw  them  extending beyond Critque. B ut a second 
perspective is taken up through what G iles Deleuze  ascribed to an  em pircist traditon 
subjugated under a vitalism . This is  indicated by the µDJHRI%LFKDW,¶the French m edical traditon 
which Deleuze contrasted w ith )RXFDXOW¶VµUDUHILHGIRUPRISRVLWLYLVP.¶ A  genealogical history 
of the Science of M an fram es these as alternative m odels to a critque of reason, two perspectives 
derived of the Enlightenm ent project. 
 
7KH µDJH RI %LFKDW¶ LV XQGHUVWRRG DURXQG the French Enlightenm ent discourse on vitalism  
m odeled on a post-Cartesian concept of the body. T his gave the positve am bitons for early 19 th  
century Positvism  explored through 6DLQW 6LPRQ¶V µFRQFHSW RI ODERXU¶ DQG $XJXVW &RPWH¶V
epistem ological critque, intended as ubstiute fo r an older Enlightenm ent m odel. However, thi s 
becom es further com plicated by the new positve par adigm  of experim ental m edicine. The efect , 
during the early Third Republic, was to re -orientate the philosophical perspective on the old er 
project for a Science of M an. This served Henri Ber gson ¶V critque of Positvist historical 
form ations, but also the neo-Positve m odel of  Em ile Durkheim  and the am biton for an 
autonom ous new science that delim its a FROOHFWLYH µRUGHU RI WKLQJV.¶ The dilem m a was 
legitm ating vital norm s in a m odern society. This genealogy situates these as perspectives seen 
through the 18 th  century Science of M an from  which the vital and th e positve rem ain ed  elem ents 
historicaly resistant to being the determ inable ob ject of study. 
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Introduction: The Vital nd the Positve: A  Genealo gy of the Science of M an  
 
From  the theoretical disputes between Structuralism  and Existentialism  leading up to the period 
around 1968, M ichel Foucault saw  the positve scien ces as a m edia driving social processess 
against contem porary hum anism . After 1970, he took up a genealogy serving as a µWUDLQLQJ¶RI
historical conditons which was credited w ith invig orating critcal possibilties w ith the radical 
concept of power, which he later caled his positv e approach. 1 Ithas been claim ed that his 
positvely served new and concrete ways of KRZ³SRZHUSHQHtrates the subject ¶s very body ´and 
gave the ³ELRSROLWLFDO SRWHQWLDO RI D QHZ SDUDGLJP,´ and which saw  Foucault opening ³D
SURPLVLQJ DOWHUQDWLYH WR D FULWLTXH RI UHDVRQ´2 In the 1986 com m entary by G iles Deleuze, 
)RXFDXOW¶Vconcept of power is described as close to an em pir cist radition that was validat ed  
according to an  DHVWKHWLFµRIWKHERG\.¶Yet this appear ed  to  define m ore closely Deleuze ¶V own 
thought. H is com m entary describes )RXFDXOW¶V epistem ological practice as a ³UDUHILHG IRUP RI
SRVLWLYLVP´ which expressly distinguished A rchaeology from  the  concept of power on the basis 
that the later did not pursue a positvistic form  of validation. 3 Rather, the concept of power was 
a positvistic em powerm ent ± som ething which Deleuze subjugated under a vitalis m . Others , 
however, saw  this as  lacking scope for critcal autonom y. Critcal theo ry, for exam ple, which 
associated itself w ith an anti-naturalist intent, s aw  both Positvism  and a vitalism  as inherently 
problem atic. 4  
 
This i a problem  defined in  this thesis through a stance vis á vis an Enlighte nm ent Science of 
M an. During the Enlightenm ent, a Science of M an m ea nt an idea that could be sustained of a 
unifed science that would expand the understanding  RIPDQ¶VQDWXUHWKURXJKWKHDFWLYHVWXG\RI
hum an beings and their world: since science stood a s the creation RIPDQ¶VKLJKHU IDFXOWLHV, a 
                                                          
1
 Foucault (1997a) p124-125, )RXFDXOW¶VFRPPHQWRQDµIHOLFLWRXVSRVLWLYLVP¶LQµ7KH'LVFRXUVHRQ/DQJXDJH¶LQ
Adam s (1986) p162 , Foucault dis FXVVHVWKHEDFNJURXQGWRKLVGHYHORSPHQWGXULQJWKH¶VLQ)RXFDXOW
esp p131f. 
2
 ³%LRSROLWLFDOSRWHQWLDORIDQHZSDUDGLJPRI3RZHU´+DUGW	1HJULS7KHSRVVLELOLW\DFFRUGHGWRDQ
³XQSUHGMXGLFHGDQDO\VLVRIWKHFRQFUHWHZD\VLQZKLFKSRZHUSHQHWUDWHVWKHVXEMHFWVYHU\ERGLHV´DFFRUGLQJWR
Agam ben (1998) p5  
3
 Deleuze (1988) p13 
4
 On anti-naturalistic argum ent see Popper (1961) an d Adorno (1976) p xxxvi, +DEHUPDVµA Critque of H um an 
Reason as the U nm asking of the Hum an Sciences: M ich eO)RXFDXOW¶RULJLQDOO\FKDSWHULQHaberm as (1987) , 
reproduced in Foucault (1994a) 
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Science of M an looked to sustain this through the a m biton for creating a higher language, a 
scientifc form  of discourse adequate to the task o f articulating m an and his world. 5 Such a 
reflexive am biton is , for exam ple, evident in G erm any towards the end o n the 18 th  century, 
where the GULYH IRU QHZ DQG ULFK SKLORVRSKLFDO ODQJXDJHV FXOPLQDWHG LQ .DQW¶V
Transcendentalism . Separated from  the Kantian tradi tion, an  Enlightenm ent am biton in France 
ground ed  general theories of societies a relation to the hi story of science. A t the start of the 19 th  
century, this was an  engagem ent evident in a nascent French Positvism , com m only associated 
w ith Saint-Sim on and August e Com te. This a im ed  at  displacing a scholastic legacy with m odern 
science they folow ed  an am biton that rem ain ed  closely tied to a politcal egacy of the French 
Revolution and its universalising hegem ony. The par adox is that even as the scientifc 
foundations on which they initaly drew disipated through diverging scientifc practices during 
the 19 th  century, the aspirations persisted in various theo retical form s. These give tw in 
perpectives to be taken up as  a problem  of an Enlightenm ent Science of M an 
 
In this thesis, the positve and the vital relate t o the idea of what could be sustained under this 
unifed science of this era. W hen a later Critcal perspective took up a tw ofold stance to such an 
Enlightenm ent project it was w ithout rejecting w hat  it understood as the ideals or am bitons of 
the Enlightenm ent, while also seeking to extend the se as an im pulse through a dialectic. From  
this perspective, it could claim s that )RXFDXOW¶VFRQFHSWRISRZHU could only extend itsdiscourse 
LQ ³D SUHMXGLFHG ZD\.´6 The Critcal perspective liken ed  this to a form  of history sim ply 
grounding D ³QDWXUDOLVWLF WKHRU\ RI VRFLHW\´ it s because is already a problem atic legacy of 
hum anism  in m odern social theory. 7 The controversy which surounded the category of p ower 
em erged from  )RXFDXOW¶Vcritque of anthropocentric thinking, which he pres ented as a form  of 
scepticism  for displacing a µQDWXUHRIPDQ.¶ 8  But Foucault also intended to give agency to  a new  
ethico-politcal discourse which w as seen as an  am biton for giving tools of analysis for 
³FRQWHPSRUDU\GDQJHUV´LQVRFLHW\.9 A  later essay on Kant saw  Foucault relates this to hi s own 
                                                          
5
 See introduction to Fink &  M archand (1979) p1-3 
6
 7KLVZDVDSUHMXGLFHFODLPV+DEHUPDVWKDWIROORZHGWKHIDFWWKDW)RXFDXOW³QHYHUUHWXUQHGWRWKHHSLVWHPRORJLFDO
role of WKHFOLQLFDOJD]H´µ4XHVWLRQV&RQFHUQLQJWKH7KHRU\RI3RZHU¶Haberm as (1987) reproduced in Foucault 
(1994) p85.  
7
 µ7KH&ULWLTXHRI5HDVRQDVWKH8QPDVNLQJRIWKH+XPDQ6FLHQFHV¶+DEHUPDVLQ)RXFDXOW 
8
 ³DSRVLWLYLVWDWWLWXGHZLWKDFULWLFDOFODLP´Haberm as Ibid p83  
9
 'UH\IXVDQG5DELQRZµ:KDWLV0DWXULW\"¶5DELQRZSVHHDOVR%HUQVWHLQLQFoucault (1994) p225 
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interpretation around the legacy of the Enlightenm e nt dispute, and gives one perspectives under 
focus in  this tudy. 10  
 
This perspective is characterised by Foucault ¶VUHODWLRQWRhis own intelectual developm ent and 
two m odels which reached beyond academ ic interests in  WKHSROLWLFDO ³FULVLVRI WKH¶V.´A 
division within French thought hat focusses on wha t in WKH HDUO\ ¶V was introduced by 
Phenom enology but, according to Foucault, this fol owed an earlier division, ³RQHWKDWVHSDUDWHd 
a philosophy of experience, herm eneutics, and the s ubject, from  a philosophy of knowledge, 
rationality, and the concept. ´11 The theoretical signifcan ce  for him  w as in the new  confrontation 
between the new interpretations of psychoanalysis, and a historical legacy of that ³JUHDWSRVWXODWH
of French philosophy from  Descartes to our own tim e ,´ the subject. An em erging Structuralism  
supplem ented with Foucault ¶V reading of N ietzsche gave him  the signifcance of an idea of 
hum an subjectivity as a ³OLPLW-experience, ´ which served as the suitable rupture for the form at ion 
of his own thought. 12 From  the broad context RIWKH¶Vdispute on hum anism , Foucault took 
up a perspective on an Enlightenm ent Science of M an  that folowed the historical im petus in  the 
polarites in French thought hrough the 19 th  century. H is early focus w as derived from  the 20 th  
century French µHSLVWHPRORJLFDO WUDGLWLRQ¶ which analysed autonom ous am bitons behind the 
diverse form s of scientifc reasoning, notably asso ciated w ith m edicine, as they related to the 
progressive project. Science w as understood as the m odern knowledge that could perpetualy 
revise itsown reasoning and substiute erors w ith  the spontaneity of a new  language. 13 From  the 
                                                          
10
 See the essay by Foucault W hat isEnlightenment? F oucault (1997). Also H iley (1998) p110- 114  
11
 On one side, the filation of J ean -Paul Sarte and M aurice M erleau-Ponty; and another  of Jean Cavailès, Gaston 
Bachelard, Alexandre Koyré, and Canguilhem . Foucaul t (1998) p466. The 1985 revised version published i n Revue 
de M étaphysique et de M orale within French philosop hy leads Fouca XOW³PXFKIXUWKHUGRZQWKHWLPHOLQHDVLIWKH
GLYHUJHQWUHDGLQJVRISKHQRPHQRORJ\ZHUHRQO\WKHV\PSWRPRIDGHHSHUIUDFWXUH´2I%HUJVRQKHZULWHV
³GRXEWOHVVWKLVFOHDYDJHFRPHVIURPDIDUDQGRQHFRXOGWUDFHLWEDFNWKURXJKWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\+HQUi 
%HUJVRQDQG+HQUL3RLQFDUp-XOHV/DFKHOLHUDQG/RXLV&RXWXUDW3LHUUH0DLQHGH%LUDQDQG$XJXVWH&RPWH´
Foucault (1994) vol. 2 p764.  
12
 ³:KDWVWUXFNPHPRVWLQ1LHW]VFKHLVWKDWIRUKLPUDWLRQDOLW\RIDVFLHQFHDSUDFWLFHRUDGLVFRXUVHLVQRW
m easu UHGE\µWUXWK¶LWLVLQDSRVLWLRQWRSURGXFH5DWKHUµWUXWK¶LWVHOIKDVDVKDUHLQWKHKLVWRU\RIGLVFRXUVHDQGLQ
VRPHZD\KDVDQLQWHUQDOHIIHFWRQGLVFRXUVHDQGRQDSUDFWLFH´ Foucault (1991) p62, also p55- 56. For Foucault, a  
new historical perspect LYHRQVFLHQWLILFPDQHPHUJHGDORQJZLWKWKHKLVWRULFDORULJLQVRIDVFLHQFHWREH³IRXQG
SUHFLVHO\LQWKLVUHFLSURFDOJHQHVLVRIWKHVXEMHFWDQGREMHFW´,ELGS 
13
 &DQJXLOKHP¶VVXJJHVWLRQLQ5DELQRZS-89 
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legacy of A lex Koyré, G aston Bachelard, and Georges  Canguilhem , Foucault folowed a critcal 
evaluation of an  em erging history of shiftng norm s. 14  
 
Foucault characterised the se  two m odels as ultim ately reaching WKH SROLWLFDO ³FULVLV RI WKH
¶V,´ and the first chapter focus es  RQWKHµGHDWKRIPDQ,¶EURXJKWLQWRVKDUSIRFXV)RXFDXOW¶V
1966 The Order of Things. 15 But his is read as a perspective on an Enlightenm ent Science of 
M an giving the m odes of knowledge which Foucault sc rutinised through an idiosyncratic reading 
of Kant. This i a fram ework through which the earl y Foucault describ es  3RVLWLYLVP¶VVWDWXVDV
em erging from  pre-critcal thought fueling perpetu al controversy extending behind European 
thought in the 19 th  century, a failure was sum m ed up an  aspiration to be a technical philosophy 
extending to general functions in society. H is nar ative disrupts he ground for the socio-politcal 
projects drawn from  a French m edical experience dur ing the early 19 th  century and this chapter 
VKRZV ZK\ KH UHIOHFWHG RQ WKH OHJDF\ RI WKH µQHZ Sositvi WLHV¶ WKURXJK DQ HSLVWHPRORJLFDO
analysis. As a critcal perspective this  served a w ider historical dispute on m an as it app ear ed  in 
its  contem porary form . /DWHU KLV µIHOLFLWRXV SRVLWLYLVP¶ served a special epistem ology for 
conceptualising PDQ¶VZRUOG through )RXFDXOW¶VFRQFHSWRISRZHU and later technologies of the 
self. 16 The positve and the vital, however, give a geneal ogy which does not exactly corespond 
WR)RXFDXOW¶VPRGHOV 
 
The context for the positve and the vital folows the later com m entary by Giles Deleuze which 
notes the contradictory role that Positvism  occupi es for )RXFDXOW¶V HDUO\ $UFKDHRORJ\. He 
identifes Xavier Bichat as the notable distinction  inform ing a dynam ic m ode of thought 
em erging around the life sciences. In 'HOHX]H¶V FRPPHQWDU\ %LFKDW¶V SUDFWLFH largely 
functioning as a substiution for the neo-Kantian e lem ents that he saw  in the epistem ological 
Foucault. 17 Foucault singled out Enlightenm ent physiology as  becom ing truly transform ed in the 
                                                          
14
 2XWOLQHGE\)RXFDXOWLQµ/LIH([SHULHQFHDQG6FLHQFH¶)RXFDXOWSWKHPRGLILHGIRUPRIWKH
introduction to Canguilhem  (1989) p9 
15
 7KLVµFULVLV¶IROORZVWKHWKHPHRIWKHLQWHUYLHZVZKHUH)RXFDXOWGLVFXVVHVKLVRZQGHYHORSPHQWGXULQJWKH¶V
in response to a wider social clim ate, Foucault (19 91) p58, p78, p88- 92.  
16
 Foucault (1997) p124- 125  
17
 Deleuze (1988) p127 the curious reading of The Bir th of the Clinic in which Deleuze aligns Xavier Bic hat with 
Spinoza. Ibid S%LFKDWLVDOVRSLYRWDOLQ*HRUJH&DQJXLOKHP¶VLQIOXHQWLDOWH[WThe Normal and the Pathological 
9 
 
m odern era and The Birth of the Clinic indicates Bi chat as initating an epistem ological shift n 
French thought at he start of the 19 th  century where pathological anatom y gave a determ in able 
m easure for the historical concept of the life. Thi s was understood to m ark a lim it o naive 
epistem ologies of an Enlightenm ent Sciences of M an.  In France, the naive Positvism  was 
HFOLSVHGDIWHUWKH¶V, notably w ith the experim entalism  of Claude Bernar d who gave the new  
paradigm  for physiological thought. But )RXFDXOW¶V later positve approach looked back at he 
Enlightenm ent Science of M an as a signifcant paral lel appears during the 20 th  century around 
the new genetics in  serving to give a new context for how biological d ebates could be oriented 
wider social rgum ents hrough an open concept of l ife sustaining and integrating eror.  
 
The first chapter explores how )RXFDXOW¶V theoretical perspective on an Enlightenm ent Scienc e of 
M an is  derived fro m  an  HDUO\UHDGLQJRI.DQW¶VAnthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. It  
looks beyond his reading of the µdeath of m an ¶ as Kant served as the original pproach for his er a 
by giving the critcal reflection on PDQ¶V ZRUOG. Foucault also held this perspective on the 
dissolution of the Enlightenm ent am biton, when he developed an alternative m odel to a critque 
of reason through the socio-politcal form s of a concept of power. It  folows .DQW¶V positve 
am biton beyond the Critques. By contrast, G iles Deleuze identifed a dispersion o f an  
Enlightenm ent Science of M an from  within the French  m edical discourses folowing WKHµHUDRI
politcal constiutions. ¶ This gives a diferent orientation with respect o  a µFHUWDLQ LGHD¶ which 
Deleuze interpreted as  Fouc DXOW¶Vµm icropolitcs ¶18  
 
The them e of the positve and vital indicates a kno wledge that straddl es  the dissolution of the 
18 th  century discourse on the physical and the m oral. I n this respect, he m edical sign was a 
radicalism : both Foucault and D eleuze f ROORZHG1LHW]VFKHLQD³EHOLHILQWKHERG\LVPRUHWKDQD
fundam ental belief in the soul, ´ but this distinguishes itself around interpretatio ns of early 
Positvism . 19 W hat Deleuze saw  in Sensationalist epistem ology be hind Enlightenm ent m edical 
practices, wa s a technical use of the sign for a phenom enology of life which he linked to a 
specifc interpretation of vitalism . Bichat represe nted th is  m odern struggle for the concept of lie 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
$XJXVWH&RPWHDQGWKH%URXVVDLVHIIHFW¶&DQJXLOKHPS-62 where Bichat functions in the sim ilar way as he  
GRHVLQ)RXFDXOW¶VThe Birth of the Clinic, which isnot the context i ndicated by Deleuze. 
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that looked historicaly to physiology for the know ledge to serve civilsation. H is rational 
physiology took a dom ain of nature as  the µVXP RI WKH IXQFWLRQV¶ atributed to life for a res 
extensa w ere the function of the sign was to indica te what constiuted vital and positve 
phenom ena. The function of the sign w as that w hich Deleuze associated w ith his own µGHOLFDWH
SUREOHP¶of constiuting the positve concept. 20  
 
As a philosophical problem , Deleuze was looking to distinguish between an em pircal 
conditoning and an  epistem ological conditoning. But his also define s w hat was at stake for a 
Scie nce of M an that drew  on the practice of physiology: it  distinguished itself from  a 
m etaphysics of subjectivity as the 18 th  century concept of the µRUJDQLF PDFKLQH¶ brought into 
question what constiuted a sign of the vital. D uri ng the early 19 th  century the physiological 
m odel served to ground Positvist am biton s in  m apping a dom ain of knowledge whose 
legitm ate evaluation could extend to socio-politc al theories. W hat was historicaly constiuted 
under the values of the positve and the vital was disputed in the 19 th  century folowing the 
legacy of an Enlightenm ent Science of M an and le ft  an  inherent instabilty evident in late 20 th  
century and leading to WKHµGHDWKRIPDQ.¶ 
 
The second chapter explores a perspective on an  Enlightenm ent Science of M an as itappears 
through reading of Kant. This fram es the Science of  M an as a project derived from  Renaissance 
hum anism , understood in the Enlightenm ent as drivin g the developm ent of new philosophical 
and scientifc languages as the creation of m a Q¶VKLJKHUIDFXOWLHV. Christian W olf was ignifcant 
in this regard, and after 1740 itwas the Berlin Ac adem y that w as engaged with a series of 
extended debates on such am bitons. A long with the problem s introduced by Locke and Hum e 
this gave K ant he im petus that developed as his tr anscendental philosophy. This chapter w il 
look at the transcendental am biton IURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI.DQW¶V late Anthropology since it was 
central to Foucault alternative m odel to a critque  of reason. 21  
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A Science of M an relates to .DQW¶V transcendental am bitons of relating a concept of r ational 
m etaphysics to an 18 th  century m otif of power. But ialso led to his div ided strategy. H e 
question ed  earlier am bitons for establishing a legitm ate sc ience function to sustain a scholastic 
psychology through concepts of sensibilty, while a lso expressing an alegiance to its broader 
am bitons. 22 By questioning the HSLVWHPRORJLFDOµPRGHVRIWKLQNLQJ¶that distinguish ed  betw een 
m etaphysical and philosophical foundations in  a dom ain of experience, he gave conditonality 
the dissym m etry that extend ed  to the very possibilty of a Science of M an. But his also gives 
.DQW¶Vbroader am bitons for a general m etaphysics een as  the µLQGLVSHQVDEOHVHUYLFH¶of giving 
legitm acy beyond conditonality and substiut es  for an  earlier am biton for a Science of M an.  
 
.DQW¶V HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK D 6cience of M an  was defined by the epistem ological problem s of 
UHSUHVHQWLQJPDQ¶VZRUOGDVDORJLFDOV\VWHPRIFRQFHSWV. This i the context in which the late 
Opus Postumum m aps out shiftng relations w ithin co ntem porary life sciences of the era. From  
this Kant distinguished two m odes of what the conce pt of nature hoped to apprehend; it  defined 
an experience of organic nature under an  interpretation of vitalism , but also the broader 
phenom ena that m ade living nature evident as a worl d-system . Opus Postumum explored these 
epistem ologicaly as a synthetic capacity to theori se the natural world phenom enologicaly. Kant 
folowed this by hypothesising the µLGHDODUFKHW\SHRIPDQ¶whose em pircal dispositon could 
think this transcendental world conceptualy. 23 Opus Postumum gave a transcendental system  as 
a way of thinking the physical and the m oral concep t united in one dom ain, but this com plicated 
his earlier oppositon of nature and freedom  from  t he critcal perspective. 
 
This fram es the late Kant and inform s the Anthropol ogy. This  perspective on PDQ¶V ZD\s of 
being now took this as an engagem ent w ith social, p olitcal and historical elem ents in the world. 
A lthough evidently excluded from  an anthropological  dom ain, this is )RXFDXOW¶V UHDGLQJ of 
.DQW¶VFLWL]HQ, folowing the cosm opolitan archetype whose engage m ent w ith a world-system  is 
dom inated by history and culture. This took the com plicated transcendental perspective of  Opus 
Postumum, but in Anthropology m an  could only µE\ ULJKWV¶ EHFRPH FRQVFLRXV RI the system . 
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This deliberately left a tension between m oral and the technical practices for an em pircal 
consciousness and the transcendental idea was judge d as tem poral µSULnciple of the future. ¶This 
is what paralels the displacem ent of a Science of M an in  the post-critcal Kant. 24 Anthropology 
introduced a world-concept which could only be brou ght into play historicaly in an em pircal 
dom ain of com peting discourses on the physical and the m oral : this appears as what he French 
Enlightenm ent tried to define this around the posit ive of the vital. 
  
The third chapter then depart fom  the categorical thinking of Kant o exam ine how the French 
Enlightenm ent looked to constiute a Science of M an . The positve and the vital w il now define 
a separate genealogy. This draws on the signifcanc e for this era of the progressive anatom ical 
studies in its relation to the 18 th  century discipline of physiology as itm ediat ed  the dom ain of 
m edical knowledge. Physiology folowed a philosophi cal debate w ithin French m edical circles, 
notably around the M ontpelier school of m edicine, where a neo-Hippocratic dynam ism  served 
the study of vital phenom ena. By the late 18 th  century, this was supplem ented by the technical 
discipline influenced by &RQGLOODF¶VLogic, understood as the successful m ethod for deve loping 
logical functions in a progressive way. 25 In this sense, the sign aim ed to approxim ate sensi ble 
origins as a naturalism  put under the test of exper ience. This sem iotic practice, rather than a 
doctrine of thought, w as an influential practice fo r scientifc disciplines during this era, notably 
for a historical doctrine of physiology which exten ded to a Science of M an and its social and 
politcal discourses.  
 
The chapter shows how new anatom ical studies confro nted the physiological discipline and its 
historical idea of living being. This also folows the VLJQLILFDQFHRIHPSOR\LQJ&RQGLOODF¶Vsign 
as the post-Cartesian theory m ediating the understa nding of sensible phenom ena according to a 
visible m ean. It is exam ined in what Ideologue Jean  Piere Cabanis took to extend wider 
discourse on the physical and m oral, but i s Xavi er Bichat who had the signifcance of 
developing a rational discourse of the body to  ground the synthesis of a new localised anatom y. 
H is rational physiology was subject o interpretive  difculties in delim itng a natural state. 
%LFKDW¶VGLVWLQFWLRQFDPHIURPusing the technical use of sign through the observa tion of disease 
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to aid interpretation and to ground what constiute d the positve and legitm ate knowledge of life.
A lthough rational physiology was theorised accordin g to purely physical conditons, its  aim  was 
explaining the fluctuating sum  of vital powers that  necessitated a reasoned living norm . %LFKDW¶V 
concept of the habituated body w as seen under a con stant struggle for a µm ean ¶ and had a 
signifcant im pact on a revolutionary era Science o f M an  in France. Bichat grounded an  idea that 
m odern society could delim it certain functions arou nd the µVWDWH RI FLYLOLVDWLRQ,¶ through a 
concept of distinct physical powers that µSUHVLGHRYHUH[WHULRUERGLHV.¶This was a m odel which 
also had a signifcant im pact on early French Posit ivism . 26  
 
A t the start of the 19 th  century, Bichat exem plifed the relation between a n investigating 
anatom ist and the synthesizing physiologist. The fo urth chapter describes how this grounds early 
French Positvism : firstly in Saint-Sim on ¶Vam bitons for a new Science of M an  understood as 
the necessary synthesis inform ing a provisional and  relative understanding of the forces of 
history on society, secondly in  Auguste Com te, whose Positvism  stood against friv olous 
defenders of an outm oded Enlightenm ent Science of M an. Both saw Bichat ¶VSK\VLRORJ\DVthe 
m odern knowledge legitm ately delim itng forces HYLGHQW LQ OLIH¶V FDSDFLW\ IRU RUJDQL]DWLRQ. 
Positvism  grounded itself through this distinction  of ELRORJLFDO EHLQJV IURP µPHUH¶ REMHFWV, 
despite epistem ological m odel derived of vitalism  l ost itatus during the early years of the 19 th  
century. 
 
The central problem  appears in %LFKDW¶V 1801 text, Reserches physiologique sur la vie et l a mort. 
Here Bichat w as establishing the nature and lim it o f the force of organisation. Signs of the vital 
gave the paradig m  fam ously describing life as  µWKH VXP RI IXQFWLRQV E\ ZKLFK GHDWK LV
resisted ´27 The sign m ade evident he µnDWXUDOUHODWLRQ¶WRVXFKH[WHULRULW\QRWDVDTXDQWLWDWLYH
or physical analogue of force, but as an  index to functional stabilty in the conceptual m e an . 
Pathology served the m ethod of analysis by extending subjective techniques over the legacy of  a 
historical physiology -to rationalised l LIH¶VIXQFWLRQDOFDSDFLW\ according historical interpretation 
of signifcant phenom ena m eant Bichat w as look in g to M ontpelier vitalism , and its neo-
Hippocratic dynam ism , to  uphold the heuristic values of m edicine, rather in sisting on an  
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apodictic new science. In this way, the Sensational ist sign serves to  rarefy values atributed to 
life, while pathology delim it ed a new positve knowledge - less as knowledge of m an than 
function of living. But this was inherently problem atic since its  observational practice was 
lim ited to  historical understanding of vitalism  and itsdispu ted explanations of life.
 
The chapter takes the µDJHRI%LFKDW¶to m ean the vitalism  as practiced in the m edical di sciplines 
whose intrinsic values w ere the positve and the vi tal a priori to the sign. Itis a practice which 
influenced early Positvism  despite the fact it was  m oving beyond the physiological debate. After 
1814, Saint Sim on look ed  to re -invigorate a Science of M an  for the socio-politcal crisis of the 
tim e , but his was prim arily taken up as an aesthetic c oncern m ediat ed  through the language 
debate of Louis de Bonald. Saint Sim on was also looking to the sciences of the day which now 
saw him  describe society as facing forces that FRXOG µSOXQJH WKH KXPDQ VSHFLHV EDFN LQWR WKH
state of nature. ¶28 This w as im plicated by the new anthropology with t heories of anim ality, 
GHJUDGDWLRQDQGµDERULJLQDOGLIIHUHQFH¶which open ed  the central ontological problem s of innate 
diference in  early 19 th  century biological VFLHQFHV6DLQW6LPRQ¶Vnew am bitons for a Science of 
M an took the form  of a synthetic knowledge that cou ld relate to forces dom inating history, an 
idea which was prim arily a socio-politcal concern.  It  becom es clear after 1814 that his concern 
to uphold these am bitons becam e overtaken by the µLQGXVWULDOYDOXHV¶that could express PDQ¶V
inner drives, now  becom e a class truggle. The se  values now appear as a µconcept of labour ¶ and 
describe excessive m aterial force, som ething psychi c, against which idlers seem s destined to 
enfeeblem ent and death. 29  
 
The contention is that Saint Sim on ¶V concern w ith the concept of labour was to support c ore 
values understood of a Science of M an . But %LFKDW¶V SK\VLRORJ\ equivocated betw een a 
progressive theoretical stance and its am biton s as  a discourse on the body. This becam e 
superceded after 1916. On the one hand, M aine de Bi ran was directly critc al  of Bichat ¶V
physiology for giving a m isleading account of subje ctive functioning of the ego, a psycho-
physical paralelism  that assum ed  naturalistic functions as  a positve knowledge of m an. 30 On the 
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other hand, Auguste Com te took up his Positvism  t hrough an epistem ological analysis to avoid 
spurious philosophi cal  claim s to a Science of M an. Cours de philosophie p ositve contends that 
Bichat ¶V am biton to constrain knowledge to regions µproper to living bodies ¶ and was a µtruly 
philosophical ¶ revolution. 31 However Cours re veals a curious relation to Bichat ; he is seen as 
exem plary in the field of m ethod, but leaving an µLQFRPSOHWH3RVLWLYLVP¶ open to a regressive 
m etaphysics. 32 According to Com te, %LFKDW¶Vvitalism  was lacking because it was prem ised on a 
concept of resistance rather than a concept of inte gration. This identifed the historical role of 
physiology as folowing the hierarchical perspectiv e on anatom ical studies to which &RPWH¶V 
Positvist enterprise was a µPDSSLQJ.¶ It  dem onstrat es  a structural thinking that overtook the 18 th  
century debate over a Science of M an . But he paradox of &RPWH¶VPositvism  is it polem ical 
intent of urthering an  ethico-m oral project through the new biological sc iences having displac ed  
%LFKDW¶V pathological perspective and its doctrinaire equiv ocation of the sign along with its  
TXHVWLRQ RI YDOXHV 7KLV ZDV VRPHWKLQJ &RPWH¶V philosophical agenda avoided, despite 
rem aining close to an 18 th  century Science of M an in m any other ways. 
  
The last chapter w il finaly consider the im pact o f a new  experim ental m edicine in France on the 
period after 1870. Claude Bernard gave the new posi tive paradigm  that clearly distinguished 
between m edical practice and determ inable science. The signifcance for French philosophy in 
the Third Repub lic  was that this fuly distinguished scientifc m edic ine from  a philosophy of lie 
w ith an im pact on both spirtualist and rationalist  philosophical traditons. The chapter looks at 
how François M agendie re -RULHQWHG SK\VLRORJ\¶V central problem  of apprehe QGLQJ µWUXH
IXQFWLRQ¶in the study of the living. This am biton was to di splace an older m edical knowledge of 
life which also appears as a µSDUDGR[LFDO OLQN¶with Bichat ¶V m ethod. To focus on the delicate 
nature of the experim ental procedure as  true function now m eant rethinking µFRQGLWLRQV RI
H[LVWHQFH¶for a concept that could afirm  only functions atr ibuted to life. M agendie redefined a 
phenom enology of living function, avoid LQJ%LFKDW¶V pathological perspective and substiut ed  his 
observational m ethod with an experim ental conditon ing. The lim ited dom ain of an  inner living 
environm ents, internalised positve and vital value s w ithin a separate and autonom ous dom ain of 
physiology. 
                                                          
31
 Com te (1893)p298- 299  
32
 Ibid p299 
16 
 
 
W ith no ideal notions of norm al and pathological st ates, and radicaly separated from  the 
historical physiology, this chapter exam ines an  assessm ent by Henri Bergson who noted this 
experim entalism  was folowing Aristotle ¶Vpositve m ethod for internalising alterity in  the logic 
of nature w ithin the understanding of m an. Physiolo J\¶V autonom y accords w ith the line of 
thinking that privileges phenom enal relations derived  from  em pircism  prior to historical 
discourses. Bergson saw Positvism  as  the failure to retain this em pircal perspective o n scientifc 
problem s, but the late ess ay  w riten for a conference on Claude Bernard describ es the 
H[SHULPHQWDOLVW¶V GLVSRVLWLRQ as a suppress ed  vitalism . 33 This m eant not separating em pircal 
observation from  itsheoretical synthesis. The sig nifcance of %HUQDUG¶VDQWLFLSDWLYHLGHD is that 
thi s was undertood to represent he positve and vital e lem ents that Bergson held necessary of 
em pircal activity in its orientating function. Bot h Bergson and Bernard aim ed for particular 
precision in their m ethods but his chapter concide rs Bergson ¶V focus on an  adaptation between 
positve experience and vital inteligibilty as  the basis of his theory of psycho-physiological 
states. By reintroducing the problem  of the norm al and the pa thological, through distinguishing 
EHWZHHQ µQRUP¶ DQG µUHDO,¶ he returns to the evolutionary paradigm  of the day for the w ider 
philosophical context. This confronts Positvist his torical form ations w ith a true or false 
divergen ce  and served a critque of post-Enlightenm ent scienc e seen as carying the deeper 
im plications of an older practice around Science of  M an. 34 
 
%HUQDUG¶VLQWHULRUPLOLHX gave the ideal m odel w hich was also the starting p oint for constiuting 
the ³new way to a Science of M an ´ in  Em ile Durkheim ¶V VRFLRORJ\35 'XUNKHLP¶V social 
form ations equated to an  autonom ous dom ain of free and independent life, th rough eviden t 
loosening m etaphysics of the past, and upheld the p ossibilty of determ inable relations of the 
alterity intrinsic of a social logic. But the quest ion is whether Durkheim ¶V QHR-Positvism  
folowed a break which Bernard efected with vitali sm ? Through the conditons of existence that 
substiuted social fabric for the historical idea, he looked to m ap possible origins of an 
associative function. This serves his account of hi storical order through evidence of  an earlier 
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lack. An objective synthesis express ed  as a colective order of things, folowed the pote ntial 
presuppos ed  of pre-scientifc form s of logic. These were open to the intervention according to a 
special positve reasoning, notably distinct from  a n individual ¶V logic. Durkheim  identifed this 
w ith a prim ary categorisation of the sacred and the  profane; the potential for autonom y 
represent ed  the vital capacity to invest and positvely ground  new norm s.  
 
Durkheim  identifed the system  of signs and itspot ential w ith what an earlier epoch ¶s protected 
under a notion of the theological, nd later a phil osophical project, and this reflected 'XUNKHLP¶V
am biton to folow the perspective through relation s to an Enlightenm ent project identifable in 
the notions of the positve and the vital. In the c apacity for µfluid ¶ form s of inteligibilty which 
was held evident behind the phenom ena of dérèglem en t and anomie has the signifcance 
appearing through treating sacred representations a s profane and vice versa. Here it ishe loss of 
positve knowledge that indicated the YLWDOSUREOHPRIµQRUPs¶for m odern societies. Durkheim  
described social assem blages w ithout stabilsed and  definite knowledge of the norm al type , but 
that could, if  SURSHUO\LQWHUSUHWHG³WHOO XVWKHVHFUHWRIWKHIXWXUH´36 This was the open am biton 
to constiute a functional knowledge extended beyon d scientifc m ethodology while taking its  
perspective from  an Enlightenm ent project for the c onstiution of a Science of M an . This chapter 
shows how this was no sim ple hum anism  but had links  to the post-Cartesian practice which had 
no clear idea of what m an was. 
 
The thesis gives this genealogy as a perspective on  what he late 20 th  century atack ed  as stable 
notions of m an, and is pivotal for a co ntem porary thought understood of the µdeath of m an. ¶ 
Foucault dism antled this as a progressive ideal in  The Order of Things, but his was already 
under dispute from  the ¶V. Positvism  was already the target of Critcal the ory which is 
exem plifed by co ntrasting interpretations over an Enlightenm ent Sci ence of M an. Positivism  in 
this era m eant a range of practice, from  a reconstr uction of scientifc languages developed as a 
broader linguistic philosophy, to the broader theor etical approach to  science and itsm ethod s,  to 
be incorporated into socio-politcal thought. 37 'XULQJWKH¶V th e Critcal dispute focussed on 
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what he Positvist legacy failed to account for in  socio-politcal practices by claim ing that its  
critcal horizon was substantialy restricting a do m ain of m odern knowledge. In this way, the 
claim  was that it was not true to the Enlightenm ent  am bitons. 38 This tudy gives a genealogy of 
the Science of M an that does not start from  a hum an ism  but hrough delim itng values which 
were historicaly resistant o being the determ inab le object of study. This m oves in paralel to 
what was fram ed as  the 19 th  century µdeath of m an ¶ through constiuting its  field around the 
positve and vital. 
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Chapter 1 $³5DUHILHG3RVLWLYLVP´ 
 
Introduction  
 
The chapter takes ittle from  Giles Deleuze des cription of M ichel )RXFDXOW¶VHDUO\ZRUNthe 
HDUO\ HQJDJHPHQWZLWK WKH µFULVLVRI WKH¶V¶39 The ³UDUHILHG IRUPRI3RVLWLYLVP´ refers to 
)RXFDXOW¶V interpretation of a historical dispute over the le gacy of an Enlightenm ent Science of 
M an. In this chapter, )RXFDXOW¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ is contrast ed  w ith what Deleuze caled the 
µGHOLFDWHSUREOHP¶RIFRQVWLWXWLQJDSRVLWLYHFRQFHSWIn  Deleuze ¶V com m entary on Foucault, this 
was associated w ith a historical event descr LEHG DV µWKH DJH RI %LFKDW¶ DQG the chapter w il 
outline how these two contem porary discourses took their perspectives from  an interpretation of 
what an Enlightenm ent Science of M an intended. This  w il constiute the basis for the historical 
work in subsequent chapters.   
 
)URP WKH HDUO\ ¶V )RXFDXOW¶V HSLVWHPRORJLFDO DQDO\VLV VHUYHG WKH FULWLFDO IXQFWLRQ RI
hum anistc discourses. After 1970, a self- GHFODUHG µIHOLFLWRXV SRVLWLYLVP¶ GHYHORSHG D FRQFHSW
with which to describe socio-technological orders o f power. The chapter reads )RXFDXOW¶V
positve am bitons from  the perspective of KLVHDUO\UHDGLQJRI.DQW¶VAnthropology fram ed as  
the theoretical context for an original approach to  an Enlightenm ent Science of M an at the end of 
the 18 th  century. This also se rved )RXFDXOW¶V The Order of Things seen as narating the 
dissolution of Enlightenm ent am bitons for positive  knowledge through a critcal reflection on 
the legacy of the hum an sciences. The chapter m akes  the connection between what Foucault 
absorbed f URP.DQW¶VRULJLQDODSSURDFKDQGKLVODWHUXVHRIWKHFRQFHSWRISRZHUIRUQDUUDWLQJ
socio-politcal discourses. In this w ay, what iso  be understood as a Science of M an isdelim ited 
WKURXJK )RXFDXOW¶V perspective on the dissolution of the 18 th  century am biton. H is  positve 
am biton in later works ubstiutes for this and th is chapter w il relate this to his biopolitcs. The  
consideration of populations sees Foucault im plem en t he concept whose autonom y rem ains 
close to Kant ¶V positve am biton, nam ely re lating a universality of knowledge, intended as a 
freedom  from  socio-hegem onic contexts.  
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A  second perspective appears by exam ining Giles De leuze com m entary on Foucault. H e claim s 
µDFHUWDLQ LGHD¶KDXQWHGDOOKLVZRUN, H[WHQGLQJDQ LGHDEHKLQG)RXFDXOW¶V m icropolitcs of the 
sign, which he LGHQWLILHG ZLWK WKH µDJH RI %LFKDW.¶40  This  claim  that Deleuze m akes of the 
µ%LFKDWHYHQW¶also indicates the w ider am bitons to legitm ate so cio-politcal concepts. But his 
is centred on the am biguity of m edical physiology , the dispute over vitalism  and its  am biton to 
apprehend true function. Deleuze relates this WR1LHW]VFKH¶VµGHOLFDWHSUREOHP¶RIFRQVWLWXWLQJa 
positve concept hrough an em pircal conditoning. 41 The chapter draw s out he context of 
%LFKDW¶VPHGLFDl vitalism  as  folowing techniques of evaluation posited of the sign. These relate 
to the distinctly post-Cartesian practice atribute d to Condilac.  
 
In this w ay, the them e of the positve and vital w i l diferentiate a know ledge that straddl es  the 
dissolution of the late 18 th  century discourse on the physical and the m oral . This question fram es 
the am bitons of an Enlightenm ent Science of M an. I n this sense, ;DYLHU %LFKDW¶V SK\VLRORJ\
opened a dom ain of nature to a logic of m an; a res extensa as sum  of the functions of lie. To 
constiute positve phenom ena of life was a questio n of m ethod and signifcantly %LFKDW¶V
vitalism  was not a m etaphysics of subjectivity but related to the 18 th  century concept of an 
µRUJDQLFPDFKLQH¶It is also signifcant hat B LFKDW¶VSK\VLRORJ\left a historical egacy for 19 th  
century French Positvism . Hence the vital and the positve give the term s that delim it an  
inherited dispute from  an Enlightenm ent Science of M an, explored in this chapter as  perspectives 
on WKHµFULVLV¶ RIWKH¶V. Both Foucault and Deleuze shared Nietzsche idea t hat D³EHOLHILQ
the body is m ore than a fundam ental belief in the s oul, ´42 but by questioning what constiutes 
phenom ena of the body in Xavier Bichat, Deleuze is seen as presenting a historical paralel to the 
theory of knowledge derived from  Kant.  
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Archaeology as a µ5DUHILHG3RVLWLYLVP¶ 
 
:KHQ*LOOHV'HOHX]HGHVFULEHG)RXFDXOW¶VHDUO\ZRUNDµUDUHILHG3RVLWLYLVP¶it was intended as 
a double edged critque; the negative sense of a transcen GHQWDOVWDQFHRIDQ³urdoxa. ´43 But it 
also im plicat ed  certain positve am bitons as deeper form ulations of conceptual thought hat his 
com m entary would reveal. According to Deleuze, this  only becam e apparent ZLWK )RXFDXOW¶V
revaluation of the norm ative aes WKHWLFVµRIWKHERG\.¶His early Archaeology w as confused in its
am biton, a QHJDWLYHSUDFWLFHWKDWVLPSO\IHOOVKRUWRIDQ\µWUXHFULWLTXH¶44 Deleuze could define 
µWUXH FULWLTXH¶ as  the m easure of conditons for knowledge, rather th an of the conditoning of 
knowledge which he specifcaly identifed w ith sci entifc epistem ology. This distinction was 
m ade explicit in his own idiosyncratic reading of T he Order of Things which he subjected to his 
RZQ1LHW]VFKHDQµV\PSWRPDWRORJ\¶RIth  century practices. In the original text of The Ord er of 
Things the central problem  is  posited through itsurvey of relations betw een be ing and language 
which serves to question as a historical a priori, the subject of knowledge. But )RXFDXOW¶V
subsequent ransiton, notably folowing a history of populations, also appears in his am biguous 
relation to a philosophical anthropology; -
³DQWKURSRORJ\FRQVWLWXWHVSHUKDSVWKHIXQGDPHQWDOGLVSRVLWLRQWKDWKDVJRYHUQHG WKHSDWK
of philosophical thought from  K ant until our own da y. This arangem ent is essential since 
LWIRUPVSDUWRIRXUKLVWRU\EXWLWLVGLVLQWHJUDWLQJEHIRUHRXUH\HV´45  
W hat he m aintained through subsequent analyses of t he constiutive conditons under which 
subjects could be form ed and m odifed, was the exte nsion of these conditons into a socio-
politcal dom ain through an analysis of pow er. 
 
)URP WKH HDUO\ ¶V )RXFDXOW XVHG HSLVWHPRORJLFDO DQDO\VLV DV WKH FULWLFDO UHIOHFWLRQ WKDW
WDUJHWHG D FRQFHSW RI PDQ¶V ZRUOG E\ IRUHJURXQGLQJ D KLVWRULFDO VWXG\ RI GLVFRXUVH. The 
Archaeology of Knowledge GHVFULEHVWKLVDVDUDWLRQDOLVLQJSURFHVVIURPZKLFKDQµXQWKLQNDEOH¶
KDGEHUHPRYHG$UFKDHRORJ\ORFDWHGDVSHFLILFSUREOHPDURXQGWKHGLIILFXOW\RIWKHµVXEMHFWRI
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NQRZOHGJH¶DQGGHYHORSHGLWVPHWKRGE\IROORZLQJHSLVWHPRORJLFDO³FRQWLQXLWLHVWRGHILQHWKHLU
GLVFRQWLQXLWLHV´46 7KHVLJQLILFDQFHRI WKHVH³SRVLWLYHHOHPHQWV´JDYHhis analysis of history its 
intended break with continuous history. Continuous history w as equated with the ³IRXQGLQJ
IXQFWLRQ´RIVXEMHFWLYLW\, a  function understood as indexing an origin w ith its  necessary im age of 
developm ent, serving to exclude dissociation and di ference. A  dynam ic analysis of structural 
form ations in the history of ideas was, therefore, to exclude an idea of origin 47 Foregrounding 
discontinuites served to inform  a theory and m etho d that positively aim ed to distnguish 
knowledge from  an intuiton. 48 
 
)RXFDXOW¶V discourse studies aim ed  to elide both socialy determ ined and autonom ous 
individuality. By suppressing this µDQWKURSRORJLVLQJ IXQFWLRQ¶ DV WKH WHQGHQF\RI WKH HPSLULFDO
field, discontinuity events indicate the spontaneit y of new concepts. 49 The basis for this was that 
the ego functions to hide the synthetic activites of the subject. The im age of transcendental 
history that em erges is  of dispersive and divergent series of knowledge. S pontaneity isassociated 
w ith transcendental understanding in its polem ical function which displac es  an anthropological 
style discourse. A  polem ical strategy batles again st an LGHRORJ\RI³SUHFRQFHStions, resistances 
obstacles, ´ to  give a perspective on the constiution of subjecti vity through discourse. 50 The 
Archaeology of Knowledge w as folowing an epistem ol ogical m ethod developed under 
A lexandre Koyré and Gaston Bachelard. Itwas the la ter to which Foucault atributed the study 
of epistem ological thresholds through which scienti fic praxis appears as the signifcant product 
of conform ation of hum an logic to a concept of the world. 
 
In this ense, Foucault took up his perspective fro m  within French intelectual history by drawing 
on the early w ritngs of Bachelard. Bachelard ¶V m otivation was explicitly against he legacy of 
%HUJVRQLVPDQGWKHRQWRORJLFDOVWDWXVRIGXUDWLRQWDNHQDVµUHDO¶WLPH51 Bachelard identifed a 
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philosophical task as bridging two elem ents between  which Henri Bergson had drawn a 
distinction; philosophy and positve science, or th e intuiton and the instant. Here was a gap into 
which Bergson had introduced his idea of duration. The reason for this was that, Foucault 
reflected Ba FKHODUG¶VSKLORVRSKLFDODPELWLRQ WRRSSRVHDQRQWRORJLFDODSSURDFK WRSKLORVRSK\
Three points historicaly situate the A rchaeologica l strategy in its am bitons of extending the 
rigorous function of the concept. 
 
- The prim ary critcism  that Bachelard hel GZDVRI%HUJVRQ¶VFRQFHSWLRQRI µQRWKLQJ¶7KLV LV
DUWLFXODWHGLQ%HUJVRQ¶VCreative Evolution. - 
³7KHSUREOHPRINQRZOHGJHLVFRPSOLFDWHGDQGSRVVLEO\PDGHLPSRVVLEOHE\WKHLGHDV
that order filsa void and that itspresence isu perim posed on it virtual absence. W e go 
from  absence to presence, from  void to the ful, in  virtue of a fundam ental ilusion of 
RXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´52  
Bachelard com m ents that by the pansychism transform ed into a panchronism, a sim ple 
continuity between states of Being avoids any threa t of true nothingness, nam ely the void. 
%HUJVRQ¶V SRVLWLYH PHWDSK\VLFV ZHUH DQ ³LQJHQLRXV WKHRU\ RI QHJDWLYH DWWULEXWLRQ´53 which, 
according to Bachelard, flatens positve possibili ties for higher hum an thought. Bergson saw in 
m em ory the possibilty of unifying discontinuites in knowledge; Bachelard insisted that bringing 
the possible and the probable into an idealistic co ntinuity did not necessarily bridge a gap in 
Being. Rather, an undisputed positve value atribu ted to a plurality of life represented a 
frivolity. 54 In this sense, Bachelard characterised the danger of m isrepresenting the functional 
QDWXUHRIDFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQZRUGVDQGWKHLUWUDQVODWLRQLQWRDµODQJXDJHRIDFWLRQ¶WKHVLJQ
and its idea. 55 A  truly negative action m eans a non- fu nction and im plies the possibilty of 
extinction, while a positive function atributed to  thinking plenitude behind the intelect, takes on 
the ontological value of a true function in general . Archaeology opposes this. 
 
It opposes itbecause this was the passivity that B achelard atributed to thinking a continuous 
history. The problem  of  such passivity was caried in an  idea, into w hich his epistem ology 
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introduced conceptual lack. A gainst this, he atrib uted active construction as necessary for 
productive new functions in knowledge. New  concepts  were understood to be intelectual 
products by Bachelard who folowed a scientifc dis positon to m ake a claim  on the world by 
GHYHORSLQJH[SHULPHQWDOLGHDV+LVUHDVRQIRURSSRVLQJ%HUJVRQ¶VIRUFHRIWKHXQFRQVFLRXV, was 
LWV RQWRORJLFDO EDVH )RXFDXOW¶V GLVFXUVLYH GLVFRQWLQXLWLHV LQKHULWed  this oppositon in the 
discourse of negative atributions, particularly in  undisputed positve values atributed to a 
plurality in  a concept of life.
 
- Secondly, Bachelard foregrounded an idea of an ob jective synthesis. One justifcation for this 
was from  H enri Poincare who claim ed that m athem atic s had reinvented itself. Itwas, he wrote, 
³PDNLQJ LWVHOI RYHU«E\ PHDQV RI D UHYROXWLRQ«LQ VRPH VHQVH WKH RSSRVLWH RI WKH
Cartesian reform . Before Descartes, chance alone, o r genius, m ade possible the solution 
to a geom etric problem . After Descartes we were in possession of infalible rules for 
REWDLQLQJUHVXOWV´56 
$V D QHZ DFWLYH µPHWKRG RI GLVFRYHU\¶ WKLV VXEVWLWXWHG IRU D VSHFXODWLYH SRVitng; Bachelard 
FDOOHG WKH ODWWHU D µPHWKRG RI VROXWLRQ¶ 3RLQFDUp ZDV SURSRVLQJ WKDW D QHZ PDWKHPDWLFV RI
com plexity could present new synthetic concepts to that surpassed a prim itve science of spatial 
PHDVXUHPHQWDQGUHQHZHGWKHDPELWLRQVIRUDWUXHµVFLHQFHRIUHODWLRQV¶%DFKHODUGWRRNWKLVDV
extending a critcal dom ain of scientifc objectif cation and Foucault ook this up as a technique 
of critcal historicism . 
 
- 7KLUGO\ %DFKHODUG IROORZHG 3LHUUH -DQHW¶V ODWHU FULWLFLVP RI %HUJVRQLDQ µSV\FKRORJ\¶ -DQHW
RSSRVHGWKHµSOHQLWXGH¶ZLWKDµSV\FKRORJ\RIFRPPHQFHPHQW¶7KHLPSRUWDQFHZDVSODFHGRQ
WKHHYHQWRIFRPPHQFHPHQWLQWKRXJKWWROLPLWLWVHIIHFW%DFKHODUGFRXOGLQWXUQZULWH³ZHQHHG
the concept of the instantaneous in order to unders tand the SV\FKRORJ\ RI EHJLQQLQJ´57 The 
SV\FKRORJ\ RI EHJLQQLQJ GUHZ RQ -DQHW¶V LGHD RI PHPRU\ EHLQJ D µVRFLDO¶ IXQFWLRQ DLPLQJ WR
µWULXPSKLQJRYHUDEVHQFH¶PHPRU\KHOGDFRQWLQXLW\ZKHUHWKHUHLVQRUHDOLW\DVVXFK58 Janet 
m aintained that the idea of m em ory m anifests he hi gher functions when given through the word, 
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³WKHILUVWSRSXODWLRQVZHUHGHOLJKWHGE\DOO WKHVHDFFRXQWVE\YLFWRULHVDQGRIGHIHDWV
they were afected; its the third period of the m em ory, the period that we caled 
IDEXODWLRQ´59 
The power of abulation extends m em ory and captivates  through literature and poetry. Itgives 
m em ory power, not o be understood as form s of the spirt, ather as a power of construction. 
This distinction leaves hum an knowledge - its objec ts, people, space and tim e ± in need of a 
transcendental perspective on its  constructions, although this represents a departur e from  an idea 
DWWULEXWHG WR QDWXUH LQ JHQHUDO )RXFDXOW¶V GLVFRXUVH VWXGLHV IROORZHG D KLVWRULFDO LGHD DV WKH
fabulation or construction, but these representerd an epistem ological object to any evident deeper 
nature of m an and his concept of world. 60 
 
Through questions of function, m ethod and power, )RXFDXOW¶V VWUXFWXUDO DQDO\VLV folowed a 
strategy that drew on the radical shift n the psyc hology of scientifc thinking. Bachelard had 
GHVFULEHGFRQWHPSRUDU\VFLHQFHVDVWUDQVIRUPLQJWKHRULHQWDWLRQRILWVµHSLVWHPRORJLFDOYHFWRU¶D
QHZ RULHQWDWLRQ PRYLQJ IURP WKH LGHD WRZDUGV WKH µUHDO¶ This paradigm atic shift looked to 
bridge realistic and rationalistic m odes of thought  and represented a signifcant break with earlier 
Positvist m odels that assum ed  D VXP RI H[SHULHQFH RI WKH µUHDO¶ ZRXOG PRYH WRZDUGV D
transcendental idea of nature. A  new realism , lim i ted to the products of scientifc experience, is
ilustrated, for exam ple, by the physiology of Claude Bernard who distinguished  his concept of 
scientifc epistem ology from  that of Auguste Com te.  Bernard accepted diferent m odes of hum an 
understanding while refusing an interpretation that  viewed these as historical progress. H e 
refused this on the basis that science w as necessar ily stood as a distinct form  of knowledge from  
philosophy; this was a distinct break with a histor icaly rationalising form  of science. He 
characterised this as two ways of writng history; firstly, an internalising way, accum ulative or 
scholastic, and secondly, a functional way, externa lising an im m anent perspective on the activity 
that produces it.Through his own m ethod, Bernard s aw the new task as  freeing hum an 
knowledge from  the ideological tendencies of a hum a n m ind encysted in system s of thought. 61 
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The polem ic of the epistem ological m ethod aim ed at a corective to narow ideologies by 
opening these system s to a critcal reflection. 62 
 
7KH FULWLFDO WDVN RI )RXFDXOW¶V $UFKDHRORJ\ ZDV, by extension, an  analys is  of the utilty of 
ideational structures. The philosophical dispositio n was that of an ethics that would actively hunt 
diversity beneath identiy opening thought o the a utonom ous concept. 63 The reflection that 
appears in The Order of Things brought his out fro m  the point of view  where new  rules of 
discourse com e into play, and whose function extend s through a history of the sciences of m an. 
This was an analysis aim ed at the internal econom y of scientifc discovery. Itserved to im plicate, 
DV)RXFDXOWODWHUVDLG³ZKDWKDVHOXGHGFRQVFLRXVQHVV´- 
³ >LW@GHVFULEHV WKHXQFRQVFLRXVRI VFLHQFH WKHQHJDWLYHVLGHRI VFLHQFHDV WKDWZKLFK
resists it, deflects itand disturbs it. W hat I wou ld like to do, however is to reveal a 
positve unconscious of knowledge: at a level that eludes the consciousness of the 
scientis yet ispart of scientifc discourse, inst ead of disputing itsvalidity and seeking to 
GLPLQLVKLWVVFLHQWLILFQDWXUH´64 
The deeper signifcance of the hum an sciences, behi nd their rules of form ation, was in the 
constiution of a historical practice of subjectivi ty. This brought out a paradox, the question 
which Foucault described as ³RIWHQKLJKO\ em barassing ´QDPHO\of accounting for this higher 
FRQGLWLRQDOLW\RIPDQ¶VZRUOGat  th e conceptual level. 65  
 
The Concept of Power as  the µ5DUHILHG3RVLWLYLVP¶ 
 
In the texts D iscipline and Punish and The W il to Knowledge Foucault took a diferent approach 
to such conditonality. By introducing a shift n focus to non-discursive disciplinary pract ices 
from  a broader social perspective, he focussed on h istories of hum an bodies engaged with a 
³PDFKLQHU\ RI SRZHU´ Describing a distributed network through an analysi s of power gave 
Foucault a social perspective delim it ed  through a norm alising judgem ent. 66 D iscipline and 
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Punish LQWURGXFHVDµPHFKDQLFVRISRZHU¶WRGLVWLQJXLVKKRZQHZFRQGLWLRQVfor the life of the 
body are explicitly related to Enlightenm ent issues  of social and politcal reflection on a positve 
knowledge of the individual. 67 The W il to Knowledge describ ed  µFU\VWDOLVDWLRQV¶ HPHUJLQJ WR
sustain a dom ain of strategic investm ents. Notably these displaced stricter determ inable m odels 
of law in the account of shiftng social form ations  that gradualy becom e invested with an order 
of politcal power. 68  
 
Foucault accounts for the profound transform ations in  the m odern era through a socio-politcal 
ordering of lie where a FRQFHSWRISRZHUVHUYHVWKHSURGXFWLYHDVSHFWVVHHQRIDIRUFHµZLWKLQ
LWVHOI¶69 The concept of power distinguished what ZDVHDUOLHUDWWULEXWHGWRDµFRPPHQFHPHQW¶in 
the epistem ological m odels. The externalised sponta neous form  of knowledge has a corelation 
to an  internal capacity of a concept of power. But his appears on the social evel and m ade 
evident by what Foucaul W UHIOHFWHGXSRQDV³ULJKWVRIGHDWK.´H e claim ed  that m assacres were 
vital to a politcal m odernity, as the counterpart of orces exerting a positve influence over life. 70 
This indicates that power becom es increasingly the determ inable elem ent in the em pircal 
dom ain, and the concept of power can dem onstrate an  em erging representational capacity that 
IXQFWLRQVDVDPHFKDQLVPWRDSSUHKHQGµELRORJLFDOGDQJHUV¶WKURXJKDSURGXFWLYHGLVFULPLQDWLRQ
This concept internalises the lim its of productivit y atributed both to m ovem ents of lie and the 
SURFHVVHVRIKLVWRU\)RXFDXOW¶VDPELWLRQ for the concept of power was therefore to capture a n 
essential function at the level of societies.  
 
From  the discursive perspective, it isnotable that  Foucault was reflecting on the new genetics in 
the context of such a bio-logic in the period up to  1970. H LV UHYLHZ RI )UDQoRLV -DFRE¶V The 
Logic of Life described the new genetic discourses that defin ed  chance as an  internal im it o a 
concept of lie. 71 This lm it appeared as an internal fault and gave a new concept of life which no 
longer caried fundam ental postulates of continuity . In the transcription of codes, erors, 
om issions and inversions, life had a new concept h at was disruptive of the legacy of older 
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concept of lie in their elation to cosm ological i deas of nature; a new  discourse on inform ation 
ZDV RI D SURJUDP ZKRVH µQDWXUH¶ SUHVHQWHG WKH QHZ HSLVWHPRORJLFDO FKDOOHQJH WR WUDGLWLRQDO
:HVWHUQGRFWULQHVRIµPDQ¶DVDEVRUEHGZLWKLQWKHKXPDQVFLHQFHV7Ke new technical discourse 
IRFXVHG RQ µFRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶ DQG WKH DUELWUDULQHVV RI D JHQHWLF OLPLW72 It subordinated any 
individuals term s of natural growth or possibiltie s for tansm issions and intensifcation of vital 
µIRUFH¶ DV FRPSHQVDWLRQ IRU WKH QHJDWLYLW\ RI GHDWK an d gave a signifcant re-m odeling of a 
FRQFHSWRIµQDWXUH¶such as those upheld by a 19 th  century Positvist discourses on energetics. 
 
7KH FRQVHTXHQFHV IRU GLVFRXUVHV RQ VXEMHFWLYLW\ ZDV WR SUHVHQW WKHP ZLWK D ³ILHUFHQHVV RI
UHSURGXFWLRQ´DVa negativity w ithin the very notion of subject. 73 Inserting random ness into the 
knowledge of living system s m oved away from  debates  absorbed from  the 19 th  century 
physiological era; genetics had a signifcance for our epoch which diferentiated a new dom ain 
for life fundam entaly reflecting a potential for a bsence. The analysis of living being, from  the 
SHUVSHFWLYHRIDSURJUDPZDVOLPLWHGWRWKHµHQFRGHG¶DQGFRQVWUDLQHGZLWKLQIL[HGPDUJLQVRI
the organism . By situating a possibly inert order a t he heart of the living, Foucault pictured an 
ego as consulting a program  from  a lim ited perspect ive, m erely translating a code against he 
order of the given. Here was an intrinsic lim it o any speculative bio-logic in contending with 
arbitrariness, conversely it  ofered Foucault certain possibilties for expandi ng philosophical 
elem ents around a concept of life.There are two sp ecifc points, -
  
- This displaced the axiom atic that saw  therm odynam ics overtake categories of vitalism  in the 
early 19 th  century debates on life. In the im age of lie, a n egative notion of entropy becam e a 
m easure of disorder from  the point of the whole, th is subordinat ed  a lack of knowledge of 
internal structure. But the genetic analysis of liv ing system s gained inform ation at the local level, 
to com pete statisticaly w ith the concept of equil brium  in the im age of the whole. Such 
com peting ways of thinking about the nature of life , one an inversion of the other, had 
consequences for the statistical genetics in displa cing any absolute argum ents over general 
definitons of life. Thhis substiute the scientif c discourse on energetics w ith the focus on 
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biological-history studied as integration of increa singly abstract functional elem ents whose 
efects rem ained to be determ ined at  higher level .74  
 
- By introducing the logic of reproduction, and int ernalising the concept of the genetic pool, a 
com peling new dynam ism  appears in the com plexity o f biological system s. Grounded by an 
apparently natural concept, he w ider perspective o n a genetic com m unication places the 
LQGLYLGXDO SURJUDP ZLWKLQ WKH ZLGHU FROOHFWLYH FRQYHUVHO\ DQ LQWHUQDOLVHG µQDWXUDO¶ GHDWK
im plicates individual genetic death has the necessi ty atributed to the w ider functions of an 
evolution of the general code. This ofers a broadl y naturalistic perspective to an idea of 
evolution lim ited only to term s of the expression o f the pool; in this respect, any ideas of general 
conservation of lie com pete against he perpetual revolution within param eters given under the 
notion of selection. A  logic of the genetic program , of which nothing specifc is understood, 
necessitates the interpretation that ascends though  various levels of living system s; from  genetic 
elem ent in the individual, to cultural, m oral, soci o-politcal, econom ic, and religious codes. It  
lends a philosophical privilege to the interpretati ve power that can situate such knowledge with 
respect to any wider discourse; its interpretation is open to confrontations w ith com peting 
accounts of histories of the world since the w ider nature now efectively appear buried in 
unknown internalised principles, and isexpressed o nly in a social space. 
 
The FRQFHSWRIPDQ¶VZRUOG at the level of populations fram es the new confron tation between an 
µHFRQRP\RIPDQ¶DQGDQµHFRQRP\RIQDWXUH¶75 But it  reverses an idea of lie now  subordinated 
to the concept of a µQDWXUDO¶HYROXWLRQ. Georges Canguilhem  w as content o describe this a s the 
great gulf em erging with the curent inform ation th eories of organisation and the explanatory 
system s of the past. 76 But Foucault akes a philosophical departure throu gh this m ethod of 
interpretation at levels of the ego, the social, po litcal etc, which extends through a concept of 
power. 77  
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History of Sexuality folows th is  as a positve concept grounding the conditons of existence as 
they w ere historicaly developed through D GLVFRXUVH RQ IRUFHV WKDW ³FRXOG EH PRGLILHG«DQG
GLVWULEXWHG LQ DQ RSWLPDO PDQQHU´78 From  a ³WKHRU\ RI VLJQV LGHDV DQG VHQVDWLRQV´ DV WKH\
appeared in the early nineteenth century, cam e a di scourse that faciltated tools of analysis to 
describe socio-politcal processes of lie -to whi ch a socio-politcal order derived itsperspective 
of control. 79 Here the concept of power could serve as counter-f unction to a dispositon for 
juridical form s of knowledge to apprehend power w it hin a socio-politcal order; Foucault m eant 
this counter-function to delim it functional criteri a atributed to social order by m ediating what a 
bio-logic fundam entaly internalised ; the counter-function opens to philosophical interpr etation 
around the concept of world at the socio-politcal level. 
 
Focussing on what this bio-logic internalises for its  GLVFRXUVH RQ OLIH¶V SRWHQWLDO VHUYHG
)RXFDXOW¶V DPELWLRQEHKLQGWKHFRXSOLQJRIµSRZHUNQRZOHGJH¶VWUXFWXUHV7KHFRQFHSWRISRw er 
explains DQ³DJHQWRIWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIKXPDQOLIH´E\H[WHQGing a dom ain for life in a positve 
sense. 80 ,W VHUYHG D ³SRLQW RI DWWDFN´ RSHQ WR D VXEVWLWXWLRQ UHYHUVLQJ WKH DFWLYLW\ RI MXULGLFDO
discourses. Foucault em ploys this for constiution of subjective relations w ithin the social 
dom ain, a positve am bition identifed w ith his soc io-politcal project. 81 Internal ack in a bio-
logic m ade itpossible for a concept of pow er to ex tend a dom ain of knowledge, to harness a 
coupling of pow er/know ledge se en as DQDJJUHVVLRQRI³HJRLVP WXUQHGDJDLQVWRQH DQRWKHU´82 
He fram ed this as a historical struggle for know ledge  and would later return to categories of 
subjectivity. 83  
 
)RXFDXOW¶V ODWH UHWXUQ WR VXEMHFWLYLW\ took the perspective from  an analysis of the rules of 
discipline in  constiuting a self. A lready in 1970, Foucault ind icated that Genealogy was working 
RQWKHµVLGHRIGLVFRXUVH¶WKURXJKWDNLQJSRZHUWRFRQVWLWXWHWKHGRPDLQRIREMHFWVE\IROORZLQJ
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D ³IHOLFLWRXV SRVLWLYLVP´ to achieve his positive am bitons. 84 W hat m otivat es  this shift can be 
understood by exploring )RXFDXOW¶V HDUO\ UHDGLQJ RI .DQW¶V Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point of View. Here the HWKLFDOVXEMHFWZDVDOUHDG\ LGHQWLILHGDVD µGRXEO\¶GHWHUPLQHGREMHFW
under both juridical rules and under a universal m o ral lw . Itisa text that has been recognised as 
the pivotal perspective on The Order of Things whic h in turn can be seen as describing the 
dissolution an Enlightenm ent Science of M an. 85   
 
Foucault 5HDGLQJ.DQW¶V3RVLWLYH$PELWLRQ 
 
,Q WKH HDUO\ WH[W )RXFDXOW WUDFNHG .DQW¶V SRVLWLYH DPELWLRQV WKURXJK WKH ³WKUHH IXQGDPHQWDO
questions enum erated in the Transcendental M ethod ´ ZKLFK KH WRRN WR GLFWDWH WKH JHQHUDO
RUJDQLVDWLRQ RI .DQW¶V &ULWLTXHV86 These am bitons were repeated in his later Logic a nd 
VXSSOHPHQWHGE\ WKHTXHVWLRQ µZKDW LVPDQ"¶ Foucault saw  this serving an  µRUGHURIGHVFHQW¶
from  historical am bitons from  a mathesis universal is n the 18 th  FHQWXU\WKURXJKµDQWKURSRORJ\
PHWDSK\VLFVPRUDOLW\DQGUHOLJLRQ¶LQZKLFK.DQWpre-em pted problem s of representation of 19 th  
century. $UFKDHRORJ\WDNHVLWVUHODWLRQLQWKLVVHULHVDVWKHµSUDFWLFHDPRQJVWSUDFWLFHV¶RSHQLQJ
an alterity under a concept of nature. 87 Archaeology of Knowledge m apped the adm ixture of 
disciplinary knowledge and ideology, indicating rel ations between em pircal rules and 
transcendental structures, to identify an open lim i t hat specifed where an em pircal function 
cam e into play. This indicated an active struggle o perating at the level of the externalised 
concept. Foucault often gives N ietzschean term s to this struggle, the power extending its 
dispositon for tansform ation of values, but his t arget ishe internalised qualites of the concept 
that ppear at the lvel of disciplinary practices. 88 
   
These internalised qualites gave the context for a  them atic exploration of an objective synthesis 
that culm inat es  ZLWKKLVZRUNRQ VXEMHFWLYLW\)RXFDXOW¶V ,QWURGXFWLRQ WR.DQW¶VAnthropology 
from a Pragmatic Point of View describes a text fol lowing a central am biton of m apping a life 
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of logic. 89 This am biton avoids discussions of intuitve essen ce which coresponding to 
)RXFDXOW¶V IRFXVRQHSLVWHPLFNQRZOHGJH+RZHYHU.DQW¶VAnthropology was also understood 
as m apping an actuality explored under questions of  desire and prudence. This pragm atic 
elem ent behind the evident strategies of knowledge presuppose what becom e apparent hrough 
WKHµQHWZRUN¶RIKXPDQDFWLYLW\: it im plicates undisclosed intentions behind the c onstiution of a 
system  of the world. In this way, K DQW¶V Anthropology folowed the strategy that deliberatel y 
targets positve diference betw een the concept of nature and an inteligible idea of natural 
m an.90  
 
W hat was inteligible of such an idea w as the centr al problem  of the Anthropology. The evident 
objectivity that ppears as natural m an, can be dis tinguished into diferent em pircal life practices 
and seen DVGLIIHUHQW³SRVVLEOHXVHVRIUHDVRQ´)RXFDXOWVKRZVWKDWVXFKDQµREMHFW¶UDWKHUWKDQ
KDYLQJDQLQWXLWLYHµSV\FKRORJLFDO¶QDWXUHLVWKHSURGuct of m ultiple logics which necessitates a 
principle that distinguish es  the diverse epistem ological m odes that an inner-se nse can expresses 
as the possibilties of its world. A lthough Foucaul t found nothing in the text o indicate what 
kind of principle accounted for this diference, An thropology revealed a ³SURJUHVVLYH
LQYHVWPHQW´ RI PDQ DQG KLV ZRUOG ZLWK DQ ³LPSHULRXV VRYHUHLJQW\´ ZKLFK )RXFDXOW
speculatively took as oriented towards the them e of  Geist. 91 
 
The elem ents of this ensibilty are form ed betw een  the folowing,- 
- Foucault understood G eist served ultim ately as th e function of a universal perspective from  
ZKLFK DOO DQWKURSRORJLFDO H[SHULHQFH RI WKH ZRUOG ZDV SUDJPDWLF DQG WR ZKLFK D µQDWXUH RI
UHDVRQ¶ FDQQRW EH IXOO\ GHWHUPLQDEOH 7KLV VLJQLILes a crucial apophatic elem ent hroughout 
Kantian thought, which necessitated Critque servin g to regulate any positve sensible 
determ inations, i.e. any concepts produced and posi tively constiuted were to be m easured 
DJDLQVWWKLVWUDQVFHQGHQWDOµQDWXUH¶of m an. 92 
- But this concept was itself the product of subjec tive freedom . This positve source of 
representation draws potential from  the Gem üt o ex tend itself and give a transcendental im age 
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DV LWVYLUWXDO µSRWHQWLD¶+RZHYHUVLQFHAnthropology excludes any transcendental perspectiv e, 
describing only how em pircal faculties folow dive rgent lines, these individual freedom s also 
have the concrete negative atribute of being open to the possibilty of frivolity and eror. 93 
%HFDXVH.DQWQHFHVVLWDWHG³VRPHWKLQJDSULRUL LQ WKHFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIRXUH[LVWHQFH´ WKDWFDQ
orientate this potential towards the transcendental  them e of G eist, Foucault identifes an  evident 
power of organisation with the anthropological dom a in as  itspositive horizon of conditonality. 
This conditonality delim its an anthropology to bei ng WKH ³VSDFH RI WKH UHVHDUFK RI SRZHUV LQ
YLUWXDOLW\´94 Itindicated the historicaly positve sense of a G em üt com ing to an awareness of a 
concept that can be positvely constiuted through its own self-representations. 
 
.DQW¶V transcendental concept cover ed  a dom ain that included al possible predicates, bu t since 
the Anthropology lacked such transcendental possibi lity, its  necessity appears from  the em pircal 
perspective as  what could lim it self unde U D µQDWXUDO¶ NQRZOHGJH )RXFDXOW IXUWKHU FRUUHODWHG
WKLV ZLWK ZKDW .DQW¶V Opus Postumum extended through the w ider speculativ e source of 
possibilties. 95 From  this, a natural concept m eant a norm ative kno wledge of the world which 
folows from  the existential conditons w ith which any pragm atic idea m ust contend. Foucault 
caried this over into his own research as  the conceptual possibilties of positve determ ina tions 
subordinated by the historical world of m an.  
 
The historical lim it has itrelation to KaQW¶V critcal context, as Foucault puts i, by ofering  the 
³LQWHUURJDWLRQ RI WKH LQWHUURJDWRUV WKHPVHOYHV´96 Its signifcance is located in a distinction 
between difering approaches to tim e consciousness in Anthropology and Critque; the 
anthropological perspective leaves tim e as no longe r intuitvely given but as the dispersive 
negative elem ent to which the w ider synthetic com bi natory m ust work against. The com binatory 
KDV WKH QHFHVVLW\ RI IXQFWLRQLQJ DJDLQVW HUURUV RU µVOLSSDJH¶ LQ ORJLF EXW FRQYHUVHO\, its 
dispersive nature alows, in an inverted w ay, an in trinsic space of possibilties to be atained in 
WKHIXQFWLRQLQJRISRVLWLYHSUDFWLFHVZRUNLQJDJDLQVWQDWXUDOµVOLSSDJH¶97  
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This gives values to practical disciplines as the f orm  of the freedom  atributed to the knowledge 
adopted to avoid its own dissolution. But Anthropol ogy took this as a positve functional 
knowledge whose pow er was atained from  the success ful reciprocation of phenom ena through 
the exchange of signs. 98 Strictly speaking, an Anthropology saw such this f unction neither in 
strictly in term s of a historical traditon nor an extended theoretical technique, but as an  open 
GLVFLSOLQHGHILQHGRQO\E\LWVVXFFHVVIXOH[WHQVLRQWKURXJKWKHµORJLFRIDQLOOXVLRQ¶%HFDXVHWKLV
depended on an µDUW RI LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶ WKH IXQFWLRQ UHDFKHV EH\RQG DQ\ ORJLFDO SULQFLSOH DV LW
appeared as a natural concept. Since the anthropolo gical dom ain lacks any transcendental 
perspective, the context for such a power is the ex change of signs that em erges only through a 
com petion of disciplinary practices. W hat becom es  historicaly conditoned by com prom ise and 
negotiation under an interpretation of the given in ternalises this disciplinary power, but rem ains 
open to a progressive investm ent whose positve pot ential for tansform ation takes the form  of a 
real determ ination. 
 
There are two ways to read how Foucault contextuali ses the Anthropology text; one where 
positve em pircal practices m ap an orientation as an idea of world whose transcendental 
knowledge has the noted in the FRUUHODWLRQ WR .DQW¶V Opus Postumum . But secondly the re  
appears a relation to what Foucault later indicated  with WKH UHDGLQJ RI .DQW¶V W as ist 
Aufklärung? 99 Kant w as seen as taking the function of reason as upholding a predispositon in 
hum an nature revealed through the concept hat exte nds through successive ruptures in social 
IRUPDWLRQV )RXFDXOW FDOOHG WKLV WKH µPRUDO¶ SUHGLVSRVLWLRQ WR DYRLG ZDU EHKLQG SROLWLFDO
constiutions and social form ations, which appears in the dispositon behind spontaneous 
ruptures of socio-politcal form ations. 100  7KLVVWDQGVDV)RXFDXOWXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI.DQW¶VµGHHSHU
understanding of a philosophical task em bodied of a n ethos. The signifcance for the early 
reading of Anthropology is what Foucault caried ov er a practical task, evident as  orienting the 
new concept hat em erges across historical breaks, constiutes autonom ous ubjects and through 
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ZKDW)RXFDXOWODWHUXQGHUVWRRGRIWKHGLVSRVLWLRQWRRSHQD³OLPLWDWWLWXGH´RU³IURQWLHU´101  Here 
was the im portant elem ent that later saw  a return t o discussing subjectivity. The historical 
perspective becom es evident during the 18 th  FHQWXU\ HYHQW DV D µVLJQXP SURJQRVWLFXP ZKLFK
µKDXQWV¶ th  FHQWXU\ WKRXJKW ³LI QRW DOO PRGHUQ SKLORVRSK\´102 ). This should be taken as  
reflecting the positve am bitons that form  a FRQWLQXRXVHOHPHQWLQ)RXFDXOW¶VZRUN and give his 
perspective on the Enlightenm ent am bitons.   
 
Ideology and Critcism  in the Enlightenm ent Science  of M an  
 
This historical break gives the particular context that is fram ed as an internal confrontation 
identifed w ith the legacy of the 18 th  century Science of M an. It  DSSHDUV LQ )RXFDXOW¶V
Introduction to  .DQW¶V Anthropology but also inform s what is m apped in Th e Order of Things 
under the expansion and disintegration of the unif ed am bitons for a m odern knowledge of m an. 
This  confrontation with the em erging Positve sciences from  the start of the 19 th  century leaves 
this text as instructive for understanding how Fouc ault im plem ents his positive am bitons. 103  The 
narative of The Order of Things distinguishes thes e am bitons on the basis of two departures 
from  the 18 th  century paradigm . 
 
- Firstly, the Ideological m ethod which is given th rough sensationalist techniques of 
representation. These folowed aspirations for a ne w and positve scientifc language by a 
m ethod derived from  the classical dom ain of represe ntation; it analysed through a 
phenom enology of signs intended to apprehend a new objective knowledge. This was dependant 
and lim ited by the com binatory techniques that grou nded a subjective practice, notably em pircal 
observation. 104   
- Secondly, the approach that was folowed by .DQW¶V&ULWLTXHUHDFKHGEH\RQGVLPSOHUHDOLVP
Kant foregrounds questions of subjective appearance s as  the basis of judgm ent. Through 
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reflective detachm ent from  physiological specifcit ies of the com binatory, Kant could question of 
the status of a dom ain of reason through itscondit ionality. 105   
 
Foucault was looking to delim it his to a dispute a round the specifc nature accorded to the 
conditoning of positve experiences w ithin the pra ctice of representation. Both approaches had 
am bitons for a universal necessity but he issue w as whether sensationalist echniques could 
sustain a new language as a positive concept; his pivots on whether they sim ply translated 
em pircal scientifc practices into system atised so cial-politcal practices. On the other hand, 
.DQW¶V&ULWLFDODSSURDFKLVDWWULEXWHGZLWKEULQJLQJRXWWKHGLIILFXOWµQDWXUH¶RIWKHFRPELQDWRU\
by reference to the negative concept. This caried a necessary conditonality a prior to a problem  
posed of any posited knowledge.  
 
Foucault m akes two particular points; 
- Kant ook m etaphysics itelf as a functional conc ept. The Critque of Pure Reason draws this 
sharp distinction between spatial and dynam ical rel ations by localising analogical relations in  a 
specifcaly Cartesian style physics. This exposed the physiological lim its to the scientifc 
paradigm  of day. Critque therefore initated a GHSDUWXUHIURPWKHµQDwYHPRGHO¶RIWKHSRVLWLYH, 
identifed as  the m etaphysical dim ension of 18 th  century thought. Archaeology interogated 
discourses that naïvely extending derivative concep ts into social or m oral discourses. The critcal 
reflection on hum an sciences displaced this for a d eeper easoning; these reasons folow what 
Kant initaly sought to m obilse in his Critique. 106   
 
- The am biton which is central to The Order of Thi ngs pivots around the discussion of what an 
HDUOLHU6FLHQFHRI0DQGLVWLQJXLVKHGEHWZHHQµKXPDQQDWXUH¶DQGµQDWXUH¶ LQgeneral. 107  In the 
em erging discourses of the Enlightenm ent, a new  fun dam ental oppositon around what orders a 
history, and what disrupts it. New scientifc disco urses took on the philosophical function of 
representation which had earlier served to reconcil e a split betw een discourses on nature and 
m an. These gave the positve am bitons w ithin class ical knowledge. A t he turn of the 19 th  
                                                          
105
 µ$QWLFLSDWLRQVRI3HUFHSWLRQ¶.DQWCPR %µ3ULQFLSOHRISHUPDQHQFHRIVXEVWDQFH¶$%µ3ULQFLSOHRI
VXFFHVVLRQ¶$% Kant (2003) p212, 201, 224) 
106
 Foucault (1970) p245- 246  
107
 µ7KHOLPLWVRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶,ELGS 
37 
 
century, scientifc disciplines were lim itng deter m inable nature to a designated dom ain that 
could contain the specifc elem ents of knowledge. T he legacy for an Enlightenm ent Science of 
M an at he beginning of the 19 th  century w as to restrict legitm ate representationa l possibilties. 
This becam e the positve field which analysis exter nalised in its relations to m an and initates 
what Foucault describes as the analytic of initude .108   
 
.DQW¶VDQDO\WLFWKDWEURXJKWLQWRIRFXVthe conditonality of th is  conceptualy positve dom ain as 
it becom es separated from  a philosophicaly positv e discourse. It addressed the dispute by 
introducing a new necessity for distinguishing w hat  constiuted a transcendental concept from  a 
transcendental style of understanding of an em pirc al experience. Th is  new necessity folowed a 
devaluing of m etaphysics which em erged as the real problem  around an  Enlightenm ent Science 
of M an. 109  The devaluing of m etaphysics initaly folowed fr om  the am biton for the positve 
knowledge to substiute for a discursive history ac ross a range of positvistic disciplines. This 
am biton was to define a transcendental style of kn owledge, dependant on what could be 
positvely defined around a knowledge of m an. An em erging Positvism  in the 19 th  century 
extends this am biton through freeing itself from  a  m etaphysical practice of 18 th  century, but 
faced the dilem m a of a double system  of reference; this m eant ilm ited its transcendental 
perspective w ith respect o the positve contents o f an em pircal dom ain. Foucault shows how  
VXFK µQHZ positvites ¶ RSHQed  the problem  of a necessary em pircal com pensation, nam ely, a 
dispute over what concept could posit a knowledge i n relation to its hum an object. The 
Ideological m ethod extending through new form s of P ositvism  im plicated a series of practices 
whose objectivity sustained an anthropological ilu sion. 110  )RXFDXOW¶V KLVWRU\ VDZ .DQW¶V
epistem ological break as m aking possible the invers e problem , giving the transcendental 
am biton of extending a question over the nature of  m an philosophicaly. 
 
It ishe failure to folow this philosophicaly wh ich had the reductive consequence that appear in 
the lgacy of the 20 th  century hum anites. In The Order of Things, the de nse history of these roots 
of analytic of experience finds a categorical probl em  as it appears around a priori principles of 
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coexistence in their elation to 20 th  century discourses. Foucault later explained that the text was 
intended as a polem ic DJDLQVWWKH3KHQRPHQRORJLFDOPHWKRGZKLFKXSKHOGµVFLHQWLILF¶DPELWLRQV
without restricting itself to pre-grounded data. 111  3KHQRPHQRORJ\ GLG QRW IROORZ 3RVLWLYLVP¶V
am biton of reeing itself rom  m etaphysics, and th erefore considered itsam bitons positve in a 
diferent sense; it was to be positve in the sense  of taking a dom ain of experience as the reality 
to substiute for the lim ited science of nature. Th is strategy w as pursued through Edm und 
+XVVHUO¶V epoche by taking experience of the world as a natural ground ing for presenting 
H[SHULHQFHVDVµUHDO¶112  Husserl gave an innovative description of evident logic and itspositve 
categories of m eaning that could delim it a Cartesia n style res extensa over ego-experiences . 
Because this was considered detached from  a broader  world of consciousness itelf, its values 
indicated the activites of object-constiuting w ho se reality was grounded as  a form al and 
positve concept. 113  This gave renewed potential for the rarefaction th at m oved towards what 
Kant held of a transcendental a priori. +XVVHUO¶VSKHQRPHQRORJ\ZDVDEVRUEHGLQ)UDQFHIURP
WKH ¶V EXW IURP )RXFDXOW¶V SHUVSHFWLYH it  avoided the consequences of the difcult 
anthropological question over m an. 114   
 
Anthropology and the Concept of the Positve  
 
:ULWLQJ LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH ¶V )RXFDXOW VDZ Phenom enology ¶V latent intent o redefine 
discourse on the rational anim al through im plicatin g an intrinsic reason. 115  Archaeology opposed 
such LQWULQVLFUHDVRQDVDµWKRXJKWRIWKHVDPH¶VHHQWRODFNWKHSKLORVRSKLFDODPELWLRQVRI.DQW
questioning the lim its of universalising science an d The Order of Things proposes that a m odern 
Cogito is JURXQGHGLQDQHWZRUN³WKDWGRHVQRWWKLQN´116  Foucault distinguishes a m odern Cogito 
in its fundam ental confrontation with the dissim ila r, discontinuity and diference, initating a 
VKLIWWRDQDO\WLFSRVVLELOLWLHVDWWULEXWHGWRUHIOHFWLQJRQDQµXQWKRXJKW¶-  
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³HVWDEOLVKHG IDU UHPRYHG IURP ERWK &DUWHsianism  and K antian analysis, a form  that 
LQYROYHVIRUWKHILUVWWLPHPDQ¶VEHLQJLQWKDWGLPHQVLRQZKHQWKRXJKWDGGUHVVHVunthought 
DQGDUWLFXODWHVLWVHOIXSRQLW´117  
The discursive m odel that The Order of Things track s, m oves historicaly from  WKH µnatur al ¶ 
origins that sustained 18 th  century thought hrough itsstrategies of history and culture, through 
the start of the 19 th  century and the divergence of QHZKXPDQVFLHQFHV,QDQHUDRI3RVLWLYLVP¶V
expansion, the dissolution of discursive possibilt ies for an  Enlightenm ent Science of M an w ere 
com pensated for through legitm ised form s of pseudo -VFLHQWLILF FRQFHSWV DWWULEXWHG WR PDQ¶V
natural being. D espite redefining the concept of th e natural, Foucault saw 20 th  Phenom enology as 
stil being im plicated in this. 118   
 
The am biton behind the Enlightenm ent sciences rem a ined som ething that he w ider eaches of 
Positvism  had hoped to discover. For an Enlightenm ent Science of M an, the am biton for a 
natural function of the subject hat could displace  a historical-m etaphysical concept, had lent 
itself to a particular facet of the Kantian am bito n for the transcendental concept during the 19 th  
century. The Order of Things atributes to this the  lim ited form s of a m eta-psychology that 
inform ed hum an sciences form alised through a partic ular com bination of m athesis, cience and 
philosophical reflection. 119  From  this perspective Foucault echo es  0DUWLQ+HLGHJJHU¶VHVWLPDWLRQ
WKDW .DQW µVKUDQN EDFN¶ IURP DFNQRZOHGJLQJ WKH SRZHU RI UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ DV DQ µLQGHSHQGHQW¶
power, ¶an d The Order of Things IROORZV+HLGHJJHU¶VOLQHRIWKRXJKWDURXQGWKHFRPSURPLVHRI
H[WHQGLQJD&DUWHVLDQDSSURDFKLQWRPDQ¶VZRUOG 120  A  dispute w ithin an  earlier Science of M an 
was about constiuting a legitm ate horizon that co uld account for both a sensibilty and the 
rational thought in m an: Heidegger identifed an  independent power in Critque of Pure Reason 
with a m etaphysical analytic whose µSXUHV\QWKHVLV¶ was account ed  for by power of im agination. 
This unity of tim e was understood to open the space  of possibilty for the transcendental 
knowledge, i t derived itsroot concept from  this and serv ed  to  account for latency in al actions 
and reaction atributed to hum an reason, as w el as  the finitude in the transcendental horizon. 
+HLGHJJHU¶VREMHFWLRQZDs that K ant left his pow er of im agination suppress ed within the second 
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editon of Critique of Pure Reason, displaced in fav our of the power of an understanding. For 
Heidegger, WKHWKHRUHWLFDOSRVVLELOLWLHVRIDµSXUHVHQVLELOLW\¶LQWKHVXEMHFWZDVGRZQSOayed by 
Kant for an em phasis on lim its of hum an understandi ng. 121  
 
The function of this pow er w as in reproducing tim e in the im agination w here it gave the space of 
play for LQQHUVHQVH+HLGHJJHUFRQWHQGHGWKDW.DQWµZDQWHGWRVD\¶WKDWWKHFRQFHSWRIWLPHZas 
produced under lim its of this broader tanscendenta l horizon of sensibilty, a self-afection that 
accounted for lim its of what could be atributed to  the power of representation. But by 
SULRULWL]LQJ D WUDQVFHQGHQWDO WLPH RYHU KLV PHWDSK\VLFV .DQW ³MXVt develops into the positve 
problem  of showing that, like tim e, space, in a cer tain sense also belongs to the self as om ething 
ILQLWH«´122  .DQW¶V WUDQVFHQGHQWDO KRUL]RQ EHFRPHV WKHUHIRUH ³HVVHQWLDOO\ VSDWLDO´ VHUYLQJ
m erely to em phasize its status as th H SURGXFW RI µVRPHWKLQJ HOVH¶ 7KH TXHVWLRQ of what his 
excludes as the source atributed to a root concept  of any positve transcendence, is the 
µXQVSRNHQ¶ IXQFWLRQ EHKLQG WKH SROHPLF RI WUDQVFHQGHQWDO ILQLWXGH 7KLV VRXUFH VWDQGV DV WKH
power behind an LGHDZKLFK³VKLQHVIRUWKPXVWGULYHDQGJXLGH«´123  It  becom es the basis for 
the problem  taken up in Being and Time which saw He idegger looking beyond conditonality, to 
the positve sense given in term s of a fundam ental ontology. 
 
.DQW¶VAnthropology also had a signifcance for Heidegger in  dem onstrating how the em pircal 
dom ain had an evident lack of pure reason. Anthropo logy opens an  im portant dissym m etry for 
any transcendental logic that folows the w ider am b itons of the Critque. The account of 
transcendental power as delim ited according to a tr anscendental ogic m eant that Kant was 
opening the reverse question - ZKDWFRQFHSWFRXOGDFFRXQWIRUWKHµQDWXUH¶RIWKLVSRZHU",QWKLV
sense, .DQW¶V&ULWLTXHcould be seen as the original approach within the a m bitons for a Science 
of M an to  considering two dom ains, of pure and em pircal rea sons; $QWKURSRORJ\¶V signifcance 
was that hese dom ains converge encom passing the sp ace of com peting form s of reason. W hat  
Heidegger characterised of an  Enlightenm ent Science of M an was itfram ing of th e question of 
constiuting a rational psychology around this em pi rical field of m an. These were the tw in 
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intentions of both grounding philosophical practice s w ithin an em pircal dom ain, and upholding 
the question of a fundam ent DO QDWXUH RI PDQ¶V DFWLYLWLHV ZLWKLQ WKH ZRUOG124  As broader 
philosophical problem s, these extend behind the am b iton for a special concept hat could unite 
both explicit and latent reasons around disciplines  of psychological, biological, sociological etc. 
%XW VLQFH WKH REMHFW RI DQWKURSRORJ\ UHPDLQV FRPSOHWHO\ PLUHG LQ LQGHWHUPLQDF\ .DQW¶V
Anthropology only highlights how  an Enlightenm ent S cience of M an becom es lim it ed  in its 
am biton by approaching an em pircal Science of M an  in term s of a rational psychology. 125   
 
The am biton to apprehend a contem porary situation of m an ¶VDFWLYLW\LQ WKHZRUOG extends the 
lim its of any positve interpretation as  the IXQGDPHQWDOSUREOHPDURXQGPDQ¶VUHDVRQ to a socio-
politcal discourse. Transcendentaly critcal ques tions avoided this original problem  derived of 
an  Enlightenm ent Science of M an. Heidegger form ulates  his philosophical question around what 
positve concept such transcendental knowledge woul d depend on? He conceives of positve 
NQRZOHGJH DV D µSRVLWXP¶ WKDW ³VSrings forth from  the pre-conceptual understanding o f 
%HLQJ´126  This  isa Being that positvely presents ielf as elf -evident, but whose question isof 
the relation between what is self-evident and that which gives itconcept -what can be held to 
exist behind the drive directing constancy of hum an  understanding? This i what exist despite 
.DQW¶V ILQLWXGH. Original positvity is defined by Heidegger as th is constancy, prior to any 
positve horizons and beyond strict distinctions of  inner and outer determ inations. 127  H istoricaly , 
it s the positivity of the sign that accounts for a power projecting an idea onto what is self-
evident in tim e. This gave the tem poral horizon tha t defined the WHUPVRI$ULVWRWOH¶VOHJDF\for 
the history of m etaphysics; here constancy m eant h e idea that could sustain the natural concept. 
Heidegger thereby characterises .DQW¶VFULWLFDOOHJDF\DVWKHUHWXUQRIan  original finitude for the 
m odern world, but WKURXJKEULQJLQJPDQ¶VSV\FKLFVWUXFWXUHVLQWRYLHZDVPDQ¶VDFWXDOUHODWLRQV
to his general existen ce.  
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The m ain signifcance of Kantian finitude is in UHYHUVLQJ$ULVWRWOH¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQRIthe positve 
sign of nature. A  pow er of self-afection projects,  as a positve concept, hat which Critque 
constiuted negatively as  the constancy of a norm . But Heidegger also places  this legacy within 
WKHGLVSXWHRYHUDQ(QOLJKWHQPHQW6FLHQFHRI0DQDQGZKHQ.DQWµVKULQNVEDFN¶IURPWKHSRZHU
of im agination in the later Critque of Pure Reason  he restricted this to a dispute over the power 
of representation. Foucault closely folows this le gacy in The Order of Things from  the 
perspective of the status of a Science of M an durin g the 19 th  century. 
 
The Anthropological-Critcal Reflection  
 
Foucault draws his own signifcance from  $QWKURSRORJ\¶V account which folows from  his 
reading of the Opus Postumum. This text is understo od as aim ing to  explain how a 
transcendental knowledge could link a positve know ledge to the universal experience of the 
world. Such a relation to appearances of the w orld is  derived from  the logical judgm ent of 
relation, and folows an exhaustive deduction of th e scholastic tri-partie schem e of subject, 
predicate, copula. But it also left the necessity o f the conceptual link betw een the subject and its
predicate at the lvel of an aesthetic activity. 128  
 
%RWK WKH WKLQNLQJVXEMHFWDQG LWV³FKDQJLQJSRZHUVRI VHQVDWLRQ´DUHKHUHGHVFULEHGXQGHU WKH
µconcepti subjecti, ¶ which is a dom ain of subjective activity becom ing p ositvely grounded, 
despite any particular logic concerning itself only  w ith the distinction of identiy and 
diference. 129  Beyond the strict logic of identiy and diference , positve values are afirm ed by 
the repetive actions as experienced in the world.  Im portantly, the positve experience of the 
world necessitates an a priori opening of the crit cal reflection on the source of its  activity in 
order to give it transcendental m eaning. This i the questioning ref lection that Opus Postumum 
folowed through an originary principle atributed to the Gemüt, which was excluded from  any 
transcendental thought. 
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However, Foucault did not read this as as  a transcendental resolution to the problem  left by th e 
Critque. Rather it  served a theoretical concept in isvirtual form ; the possible understanding of a 
transcendental dom ain of m an and his w orld. Kant al ways m aintained as problem atic the actual 
lim it n  PDQ¶V UHODWLRQ WRKLVZRUOG EXW WKLV WH[W reversed the possibilties of the Gemüt in its 
m etaphysical function. This distinguishes his appro ach from  Heidegger. The function folows 
from  a necessity that Foucault atributed to K ant n ot taking a naturalist perspective. This aw  the 
Gemüt provide a transcendental stance as  the m eans to instigate what a Science of M an could  not 
lim it to an em pircal knowledge of the world. 130  Such a stance folows f URP.DQW¶VFRQFHUQIRUD
disciplinary perspective whose higher am bitons wer e in developing the self-awareness 
necessitated by subject becom ing an object of an em pircal world. 
 
Foucault also understood Kant as wanting to difere ntiate what w as subjectively conditoned 
over tim e through a distinction between soul and Ge müt. The subject ¶s positve knowledge 
relates to an inner sense as m odes of em pircal kno wledge and the Gemüt could account for the 
DQLPDWLRQEHKLQGWKH³ZRUNRILGHDV´,W³RIIHUVOLIHWKHUealm  of the possible orientating towards 
DYLUWXDOZKROH´ as  an  account of objective possibilties in the power of  reflection. This was what 
Foucault noted in his Introduction as m apping a dis tinction betw een the transcendental and 
em pircal perspectives. 131  
  
- In transcendental thinking, the Gemüt serves the m etaphysical function which was negative 
since the principle is necessarily absent from  any positve structures of knowledge ± these are 
accounted for by the spontaneity of the im agination . However, in an em pircal observation, the 
principle accounts for evident functional diferenc es w ithin knowledge and thereby given to a 
conceptualy positve structure.  
- $OWKRXJKDQ\SRVLWLYHIXQFWLRQLQNQRZOHGJHFDQEHµVHOI-HYLGHQW¶LQWKHHPSLULFDOILHOGZKHQ
exposed to a regressive analysis this reveals a des cent - m oving from  an ideological form  of 
naturalism  to the philosophical possibilties aroun d the originary principle. Because the em pircal 
field does not folow the com m on Kantian distinctio n of receptivity and spontaneity in an 
understanding, the positve function appears as con tinuous to the relation of the power of 
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knowledge in its adm ixture of ireducible possibil ties. Conversely, an em pircal analysis 
QHFHVVLWDWHV DQ H[LVWHQFH RI VXFK ³VHHGV RI SRZHUV´ D SULRUL WR DQ\ FRQVWLWXWLRQ RI D SRVLWLYH
concept. 132   
 
:KDW GRHV )RXFDXOW XQGHUVWDQG RI VXFK µVHHGV RI SRZHU¶" +HLGHJJHU¶V RQWRORJ\ SXWV WKH
conditoning of inner sense a priori n accordance with the m etaphysics of initude. This also 
works through t he TXHVWLRQVIROORZHGE\.DQW¶VLogic to arive at he fundam ental question of 
m an. But by folowing the dialectic of Critque of Pure Reason, the idea of nature did not 
succeed in constiuting nature as a theatre of livi ng organism s; the a priori system  of N ewtonian 
physical aws m eant abandoning an intrinsic relatio n between logic and life. It is Critque of 
Judgement hat revisit this through the regulative  idea, an  abstract concept introduced as the 
transcendental horizon that akes the form  of a con ceptual viewpoint hat delim its an idea of 
nature. 133  But Foucault distinguished the relation of anthrop ology to the Critcal logic as  
µLQWHUURJDWLQJ¶ WKH FULWLFDO VWDQFH. Rather than relating to the Critque of Pure Reas on, by 
IROORZLQJ.DQW¶VH[SORUDWLRQV LQ the Opus Postumum which concerned itself w ith fund am ental 
SUREOHPV RI SKLORVRSKLFDO UHIOHFWLRQ WKH µVHHGV RI SRZHU¶ SRLQW WR WKH DFWLYLW\ E\ ZKLFK
synthetic thought unifes its world-view  according to its powers of transcendence. 134  The 
im portance that Foucault atached to this was throu gh reading K ant as having µUH-LQVHUWHG¶ the 
exploration of inner sense in the dom ain of Anthrop ology. This gave a reflection structured 
around a traditonal logic as  it extended behind both a rational psychology and a ra tional 
physiology.  
 
Here is a reflection that gives the perspective on an  µXQWKRXJKW¶ :KLOH WKH G emüt KDV µQR
ODQJXDJH¶The Order of Things atributes m eaning to  a FULWLFDOUHQGHULQJDSDUWRIPDQ¶VZRUOG
from  its historicaly positve concept ± nam ely, the FRQFHSW RI PDQ 0DQ¶V ZRUOG LV WKLV
em pircal projection inherently lacking a transcend ental concept, which is em phasised by 
)RXFDXOW¶VUHDGLQJRIAnthropology. The HPSLULFDOSHUVSHFWLYHIROORZVWKHµFKDQJLQJSRZHUVRI
VHQVDWLRQ¶ LQ D ZRUOG that is extended by a reflection on individualised logic. Foucault could 
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further point out that Anthropology m akes no textua l relation to the Critques, rather it was now  
folowing a function of em pircity which puts tim e at he root. 135  Therefore an  anthropological-
critcal reflection gives positve m eaning to such a concept of world as a perspective on inner 
sense. The em phasis on the functional aspect derive d of the Gemüt at  the fundam ental evel of 
m an em bodies this radical root, but at he transcen dental evel it  grounds his concept of world -
which is necessarily positve. But positve m eaning  wil ultim ately be indeterm inate because 
sensibilty isdistributed internaly at the difer ent levels that em body a com plex of necessity and 
freedom . From  this, Foucault concludes that the HPSLULFDO GRPDLQ RI .DQW¶V Anthropology 
depicts a system atic projection of a general em pir cal principle across tim e, to which any positve 
concept w il necessarily retain an  adm ixture of reason and praxis. Furtherm ore this c oncept w il 
only becom e evident hrough a functional relation o f m an to world, although the theoretical 
cohesion folows from  what he Opus Postumum explor ed as a self-determ ination that giv es  
positve content o an experience in general. But he particular signifcance in relation to an 
Enlightenm ent Science of M an, w ith its  am biton of discovering a legitm ate birthplace fo r a 
universal signifcation, leaves the positve concep t as internalising em pircal diferences in 
favour of an account of hum an dispositons in the w orl G7KLVQR ORQJHU IROORZV.DQW¶V VKDUS
distinction between positve reason and existence i n general and Foucault could extend this to his 
concept of power. 
 
,Q.DQW¶VHUD, a m etaphysical dim ension inform ed Enlightenm ent hought, to which he took up 
the non-naturalistic positon. Foucault ¶V Archaeology folowed a sim ilar approach against h e 
philosophy of the subject, but after 1970 his posit ive am bitons folowed a transiton against an 
DEVWUDFW ³GHQLDO RI WKH ERG\´136  This m eant constiuting the basic epistem ological function 
whose perspective on historical discourses could fo low a continuity w ith the natural function 
m ediating the foundations for life through a geneal ogy. W hen he develop ed  the criteria of a 
concept hrough the study of non-discursive practic es, it was to introduce the perspective for a 
KLVWRULFDO QDUUDWLYH )RXFDXOW EURXJKW LQWR SOD\ WKH µIHOLFLWRXV SRVLWLYLVP¶ WKDW m aintained a 
philosophical perspective on the em pircal world of  m an; from  the anthropological-critcal 
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UHIOHFWLRQ RQ WKH µPDWter of logic, ¶ he m oved to an engagem ent w ith an em pircaly posit ive 
discourse behind evident form s of hum an experience.  This was already identifed w ith what 
.DQW¶V Opus Postumum  H[WHQGHG WKURXJK GHJUHHV RI ³FKDQJLQJ SRZHUV RI VHQVDWLRQ,´137  and 
inform ed Anthropology with the practical m eans for m an to define his concrete world. )RXFDXOW¶V
shift beyond strict historical conditonality, w as through the discourse by w hich positve content 
was given for a self-determ ination. From  the readin g of Opus Postumum, this was described by 
the world-concept as a positve dom ain of existence, but which rem ains a v irtual hybrid of 
freedom  and necessity and retains actual possibilt ies to be explored around a tri-partie schem e 
of source, dom ain and lim it.  
 
Biopolitcs as  a Science of M an  
 
Foucault ¶V historical discourses constiute a genealogy that gives his perspective on the core 
dispute around an Enlightenm ent Science of M an. 138  W hat is signifcant in  his analysis of bio-
power orientates itelf at he level of the sociolo gical and anthropological, through a practice of 
knowledge whose HIIHFWLV³PRGLI\LQJVRPHWKLQJLQWKHELRORJLFDOGHVWLQ\RIWKHVHULHV´139  This 
is particularly evident in the texts RI)RXFDXOW¶VOHFWXUHVHULHVSecurity Territory Population and 
The Birth of Biopolitcs, which folows the theory of state as capitalising on an em erging concept 
of its  m ileu from  the 17 th  century onwards. M ileu is conceived as a dom ain o f action and 
reaction where a m ultiplicity of individuals are bi ologicaly bound to a m aterial world w ithin 
which they live. The biological species caries the  FDSDFLW\IRUD µVHFRQGQDWXUH,¶ to  which the 
social m eans an  artifce that functions as a concept to be interve ned into by a power; the concept 
of power delim its what constiutes this knowledge o nly to pragm atic structures. 140   
 
Folowing a history of  the 18 th  century discovery of homo economicus, a biopower u nfolds from  
³WKH SROLWLFDO DFWLRQ WKDW LW SURSRVHV,´ a narative of new techniques of power. 141  Homo 
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economicus integrates the self-disciplines of m odes  of conduct of a production, paralel to that 
which Enlightenm ent politcal thought looked to und erstand as a physics. In  this era, physics had 
a relation to a Science of M an in the sense of bein g a dom ain of nature potentialy open to a 
unifed knowledge. But this aspiration, which Fouca ult now distinguishes from  an ideology, was 
based on a politcal sense of what nature signifed  in  relation to a population. 142  For a 
contem porary idea of population, the new question a lso paralels a Science of M an but breaks 
w ith negative politcal m odels of sovereignty. Popu lation in itself serves the new  positve 
concepts as they extend theoreticaly to the m echan ism s of power through an art of 
governm ent. 143  Biological discourses on populations contend w LWKD³PDVVRIMXULGLFDOSROLWLFDO
DQG WHFKQLFDO SUREOHPV´ DW WKH FRQIOXHQFH RI D VHULHV RI H[LVWLQJ GRPDLQV RI NQRZOHGJH
Population supersedes m odels of sovereignty, the su bstiute for m an who did not exist. It  inform s 
governm ent w ith its positve content in the form  of  statistics, which Foucault identifes as the 
m ater for a new science of state. From  this perspe ctive, the analysis of econom ic power m eans 
that population is always excessive: population is a heterogeneous knowledge open to be 
³JRYHUQPHQWDOL]HG´144   
 
)RXFDXOW¶V SKHQRPHQD RI ³JRYHUQPHQWDOLW\´ serves a knowledge as disciplinary m odel. A  
disciplining of population derived its  ideal function from  a m odel of the Greek m agistrat e 
applied as  a typology of m an. W hile Philosophy ofered critc al m odels, the positve m odel is  
DWWULEXWHGWRWKHDUFKDLF&KULVWLDQSDVWRUDWHZKRVHSRVLWLYHIXQFWLRQZDVWRDSSO\DQ³HFRQRP\RI
VRXOV´ EHDULQJ FRPSDULVRQ ZLWK WKH GRFWRU The signifcance of this practice is  afirm ing 
diference for psychic structures, a reflection on the O ther, which produces the new pow er, 
nam ely, the subject of com m unity. The product is an  understanding w hich is the prelude to 
governm entality. 145  However, fom  the perspective of a Science of M an,  the true signifcance 
appears through what D escartes philosophy proposes as  representing a power to be rationalised 
according to a dom ain of scientifc practices and p rinciples. Foucault akes this as a subject 
continuous w ith the world of scientifc principles which lent he central politcal problem  of the 
Classical age. In the am biton for an open practice  of governm ent, the public dom ain of m an 
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lacks a m odel, hence the question for the Classical  epoch of its principia naturae. Italian 
hum anism  could provide a provisional answ er as the basis for a r DLVRQ G¶HWDW which was the 
concept of m an. 146  One can see the paralel w ith intuiton and unders tanding, the two stem s 
which in IRUPHG.DQW¶VGRPDLQIRUD6FLHQFHRI0DQ 
 
Foucault later lectures insert an  anthropological m ultiplicity into this dom ain, rat her than 
questioning the unity of its objects. R DLVRQ G¶HWDW has to contend with a blur of positve and 
QHJDWLYHDWWULEXWHV³LWKDVEHFRPHDGRPDLQDVHWRIREMHFWVDW\SHRIRUJDQLVDWLRQRISRZHU´147  
Organisation isom ething to be constiuted from  th e re flective practice of DµVHFRQGQDWXUH¶EXW
the dispute over the anthropological dom ain wil e ave the state w ith only one perspective. 
Hence, as a Science of M an, its a UHIOHFWLRQ RSHQ WR D QHZ IRUP RI SROLWLFV ³SROLWLFV LV QRW
som ething that fals w ithin the form  of legality or  a system  of law. Politcs i som ething else...it 
LVFRQFHUQHGZLWKQHFHVVLW\´148  One understands w hy the question of politcal free dom  is what 
Foucault contends ithe pure form  of reason extend ing intrinsicaly to violence. Populations are 
central to this knowledge com posite and any technic al pow er that serves a practice of 
governm ent needs to resist revolutions and tem poral  cycles w ith the distribution of intrinsic 
resources, individual interests, and com petion wi thin populations, whose specifc problem s are 
dynam ic. This why an Enlightenm ent politcal sci ence, like the sciences of nature, isproposed 
DURXQGDSXUH³QRWLRQRIIRUFH´149  
 
This second dim ension lends itelf to the theory of  balance in the m ultiplicity of orces in the 
interiority of the population. Foucault proposes th at historicaly G erm an y has served as the 
³PLFURVWDWH ODERUDWRU\DQG D VLWH RI H[SHULPHQW´ IRU GHYHORSing the theory of population 
through Polizeiwissenschaft. 150  This was an anthropological system atic that appear ed  from  the 
beginning of the 17 th  century as a regulatory concept of state, but he excessive nature of an 
anthropological dom ain transcends itm echanism s of  power and efectively dism antles a police 
state and any concept of right hat it can propose. By the 18 th  century, the concept of nature 
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serves to displace a traditonal cosm o-theology, giving politcal scienc e its  definitve break with 
the past. W hile a new cosm opolitcs rem ained to be theorised, its criteria were understood to 
require a, -
³QDWXUDOQHVVVSHFLILFWRPDQ¶VOLIHLQFRPPRQWKDWHFRQRPLVWVXOWLPDWHO\EULQJWROLJKWDVD
dom ain, a field of objects, a possible dom ain of an alysis, knowledge and intervention. 
Society as the field of naturalness specifc to the  naturalness of the m any wil be caled 
civil society, em erges vis-à- YLV´S 
W hen the concept of m an em erges at the level of a scientifc phenom ena during the 
Enlightenm ent, the signifcance appears as a proble m  of governm ent in relations to its 
population. Here, Fouca XOW¶V biopolitics turns to a concept of power for a genealogy of the 
m odern state. 
 
Biopolitcs, V italism , Positvism  
 
The contem porary problem  on which his biopolitcs f ocuses atributes the power of constiution 
over society to the m arket, and is the specifc for m  of liberalism  theorised in Germ any around 
WKHPLG¶V. But according to Foucault ¶VµJHQHDORJ\RIHFRQRPLFVW\OH,¶ this in turn folows 
from  a 19 th  century idea and m arks an im portant schism  with an  earlier understanding of 
liberalism . The neoliberal form  no longer takes µQDWXUH¶ to indicate a circulation and exchange 
values, but a notion of com petion. This is specif icaly identifed w ith social and econom ic 
discourses from  DURXQG WKH ¶V, an  analysis of processes which took a principle of 
FRPSHWLWLRQ LQ LWV µSXUH IRUP¶151  The m arket was no longer predicated on equivalence  but on 
inequality and diference. This historical developm ent no longer took itsm easure according to a 
naive naturalism  of the 18 th  century, but was form alis ed  and extend ed  as a new style from  certain 
FRQVWLWXWHG UXOHV RI SUDFWLFH LGHQWLILHG ZLWKLQ WKH PDUNHW ³&RPSHWLWLRQ LV DQ eidos ´ VD\V
Foucault. 152  Itdevelop ed  an internal ogic that it form alised. The m arket w as a power taken as 
productive of society and itstate, under certain conditons. These are conditons, ³FDUHIXOO\DQG
DUWLILFLDOO\ FRQVWUXFWHG´ to  be a PLOLHX RI µSXUH FRPSHWLWLRQ¶ The m arket now serves as  
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confluence of diverse dom ains of knowledge under th is com posite concept of m ileu ± the 
reverse of how 18 th  governm ents orientated policy towards a hybrid con cept of natural m ileu. 
 
Foucault cals this rarefied concept of m arket com p etion a µSRVLWLYH OLEHUDOLVP.¶ This intends 
governm ent to be m aster of econom ic developm ent, th rough a concept no longer concerned with 
separate dom ains of knowledge. These becom e subordi nated under an integrated m ultiplicity of 
knowledge constructed as a ³JRYHUQPHQWDO VW\OH,´ whose com posite dom ain serves for an 
intervention into social structure, and acts to  elim inate archaic phenom ena, KLVWRULFDOO\³IRUHLJQ
WRWKHHFRQRPLFSURFHVV´153  From  a theory of com petion com es the dynam ic who se threshold 
requires a vigilant intervention necessitated of a neo-liberal art of governm ent: it appears against 
a pathology of historical anom alie s that run contrary to an idea of pure com petion. I ts schem a, 
or m echanism  of com petion, is  constructed around a new concept of labour.  
 
This  was the concept of labour that Foucault saw develo ped during the 19 th  century. As a 
concept, it was not a return to 18 th  century laissez faire econom ics, but a 19 th  century idea that 
folowed from  what a contem porary vitalpolitk took  as  form ative pow er for society from  an idea 
of enterprise. Vitalpolitk historicaly em erged fr om  a debate on econom ic theory after the 
¶V: Foucault identifed this w ith the crossroads of t he critcism  of the hom ogenised and 
standardis ed  societies that extended behind the 19 th  century concept of labour inform ing both a 
politcs of left and right. 154  The critque shifted to an energetic of labour for its  analysis of 
population, as  the HQWHUSULVH XQLW QRZ OHQW LWVHOI WR D WKHRU\ RI KXPDQ FDSLWDO )RXFDXOW¶V
FRQWHQWLRQ LV WKDW DIWHU WKH ¶V WKLV VHUYHG a genealogy for D µZD\ RI WKLQNLQJ¶ D ³JHQHUDO
style of thought, analysis and im DJLQDWLRQ´ZKLFKKLVWRULFDOO\JDYH the new econom ic-juridical 
couplet o be constiuted through the concept of la bour. 155  The com petive enterprise unit lent a 
historical specifcity to an em erging politcal sty le as point of view. 
 
In The Birth of Biopolitcs, Foucault relates the t heory of hum an capital to an older concept of 
labour precisely because classical econom ics w as un able to analyse labour in its  qualitative 
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DVSHFWV ³,W ZDV D EODQN SDJH D JDS RU YDFXXP LQ LWV WKHRU\ WKDW D ZKROH SKLORVRSK\
anth URSRORJ\DQGSROLWLFVRIZKLFK0DU[ZDVSUHFLVHO\ UHSUHVHQWDWLYH UXVKHG LQ´156  Foucault 
returns to this am biton for a special epistem ology  over the dom ain of com peting ends, the 
am biton for a politcal science of hum an behaviour  over PDQ¶V activity, or internal rationality, 
that accounts for the strategies of individuals fro m  the perspective of an econom ic efect. Itaim s 
to encom pass DOO WKH ³SK\VLRORJLFDO DQG SV\FKRORJLFDO´ IDFWRUV ZKLFK FRQWULEXWH WR EHLQJ DQ
enterprising, hum an capital, a ³PDFKLQH IRU JHQHUDWLQJ DQ LQFRPH VWUHDP´157  Labour and the 
concept of hum an capital, give the intrinsic elem en ts to be theorised positvely. For exam ple, 
when genetics lent iself to an  analysis around the elem ents of risk, it  served to convey its  
positve knowledge over the future of hum an capital . Hum an capital also serves to bind itself 
culturaly to an  extended dom ain through its investm ents around its  conditons of life. It  
em bodies a principle of order that previously fel to dom ains of physiology, psychology, 
an thropology, etc.  
 
For Foucault, the concept of labour also justifes a perm anent politcal critcism  of any 
aspirations to ³HFRQRPLFSRVLWLYLVP´)URPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIDQµHFRQRPLFWULEXQDO,¶the idea of 
hum an capital w il em barass juridical adm inistrati ons by ofering the negative perspective on 
any juridical concept of right. 158  This i the paradox of m icropolitcs as  ideological inflation of 
knowledge within the activity of the subject. Throu gh questions of conduct and acceptance of the 
reality of the m ileu, it  opens up a concept o behavioural techniques of go vernm entality, but 
)RXFDXOW¶VHPSKDVLVRQKXPDQFDSLWDOis  as  ireducible, unconditonal elem ent as it appeared in 
the 18 th  century, not susceptible to regressive analysis. T he return, through his concept of pow er, 
is to the perm anent conditoning of the positve sy stem  that m ust accept a certain negativity for 
the constiution of itsworld. Hum an capital exists  w ithin a dom ain that cannot be totalised, only 
open ed  to the calculation which accords to the idea inser ted into its reality, which is the 
positvity of PDQ¶VZRUOG.  
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W hat is his dea? In the 18 th  FHQWXU\LWZDVQDWXUHZKLFKUHPDLQHGWKH³WKHRORJLFDOFRQFHSWLRQ
RIQDWXUDORUGHU´EXWZKRVHSRVVLELOLW\ZDVRIWKHSRLQWRIYLHZRYHUDOOWKe dispersed interests 
WKDW UHPDLQHG FRXSOHG WR WKH HPSLULFDO ³3ROLWLFDO SRZHU LV QRW WR LQWHUIHUH ZLWK WKLV G\QDPLF
QDWXUDOO\DVFULEHGWRWKHKHDUWRIPDQ´159  The idea of nature served to resist he sovereign state 
as  paralogism  of politcal totality; this was also an  idea atributed to m an, -
³+RPR HFRQRPLFXV LV WKH RQH LVODQG RI UDWLRQDOLW\ SRVVLEOH ZLWKLQ DQ HFRQRPLF SURFHVV
whose uncontrolable nature does not chalenge, but  instead founds the rationality of 
DWRPLVWLFEHKDYLRXURIPDQ´S 
This dea guaranteed the world of m an was constiut ed from  m ultiple points of view, to which an 
econom ic discipline rem ained an aesthetic, lacking totality. The juridical problem  for the 18 th  
century was form ed around such intrinsic diference , a heterogenous powe r that precisely eluded 
a founding of positve law and natural right. The O rder of Things identifed this w ith the 
dispersion of an Enlightenm ent Science of M an. 
 
The problem  of politcal econom y in the 20 th  century w as the converse problem  - the 
im possibilty of constiuting a positve Science of M an m eant hat Enlightenm ent li beral theory 
rem ains an exam ple of a science that could no longe r lays claim  to governm ent rationality. As 
politcal theory it m ust co -exist w ith in  a dom ain represented by civil society, an  assem blage or 
m ultiplicity of practices that exists only as a tra nsactional reality, and subject to the dynam ics of 
governm ental reasoning. 160  Itishere the pre- FULWLFDOVWDWXVRIWKHµ]RRORJLFDOVLQJXODULW\¶RIThe 
Order of Things folowed Foucaul W¶V positve am bitons through the concept of pow er as the 
practice whose open dispute was the status of m an. 161   
 
*LOOHV'HOHX]HDQGWKHµ5DUHILHG3RVLWLYLVP¶ 
 
'HOHX]H¶V fam ous works w ith Guatari also folow the ³IXQGDPHQWDO SUREOHP RI D SROLWLFDO
philosop K\´in the productivity of social structures but this s explicitly distinguished as a theory 
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³QRWRISRZHUEXWRIGHVLUH´162  This distinction m arks 'HOHX]H¶VRZQLGHDRIFULWLFDOIUHHGRP
often related to his work on Spinoza inspired by Ni etzsche. 163  But in his book on Foucault, he 
points to divergent interpretations of early 19 th  century practices around the em ergence of 
Positvism  that highlights WKH µDJH RI %LFKDW¶ 7KLV IROORZV KLV FODLP WKDW )RXFDXOW GHYHORSHG
sym bolic values while Deleuze was indicating a form  of vitalism  understood in a functionaly 
diferent w ay.  
 
)RXFDXOW¶V µIHOLFLWRXV SRVLWLYLVP¶ FDSWXUHV LQ KLV RZQ ZRUGV WKH LQYHVWPHQW WKDW IROORZHG D
³GRXEOHPRYHPHQWRIOLEHUDWLRQDQGHQVODYHPHQW´164  Transcending historical concepts w ith the 
functionaly positve concept was legitm ated by an  abstract principle that folow ed  from  .DQW¶V
Gemüt. It  WRRN3RVLWLYLVP¶VSRZHUin  the form  of a w il to truth but folow ed the Kanti an sense of 
subject becom ing an object. The µIHOLFLWRXV3RVLWLYLVP¶VHUYHVHfective m ode of subjectivation 
XQGHUVWRRGKHUHWKURXJKWKHFRQWH[WPDSSHGRXWIURP.DQW¶VAnthropology and itsconcern w ith 
knowledge was vital ³LQ VR IDU DV LW LV SKLORVRSKLFDOO\ UHOHYDQW WR WKH VHOI.´165  It  m eant he 
QHFHVVDU\ HWKLFDO µHTXLSPHQW¶ IRU D OLfe -struggle in the em pircal dom ain. H istory serves t his 
value as  am biton, dispositon or drive behind any positve  knowledge, but is critcal test, or 
practice, rem ains explicitly related to what D escar tes defined paradigm aticaly, i.e. an  dom ain 
open to a universality of knowing, in as far as it serves the vital function freed from  any socio-
hegem onic context.  
 
For Foucault, a naive Positvism  was im plicated in shortcom ings of its own universalising 
am biton, and necessitated the anthropological-crit ical function to return em pircal actuality. 
However G iles Deleuze DWWULEXWHGWKLV WR)RXFDXOW¶VDQWL-naturalistic stance and the distinction 
appears in  what Deleuze claim ed as intrinsic values of the si gn. 166  In his com m entary on 
Foucault he explains how intrinsic values specifca ly serve to re-orientate em pircaly positve 
practices,-   
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³7KHUH DUH RQO\ SUDFWLFHV RU SRVLWLYLWLHV ZKLFK DUH FRQVWLWXWLYH RI NQRZOHGJH WKH
discursive practices of statem ents or the non- GLVFXUVLYHSUDFWLFHVRIYLVLELOLWLHV´167  
This conflation of positve practices m arks Deleuze ¶V fundam ental distinction with an 
epistem ological project which pivots around a Carte sian problem  of universalising inteligibilty. 
Deleuze thought this already displaced intrinsic el em ents of em pircal sensibilty and this 
FDSWXUHVWKHWHQVLRQHPERGLHGLQKLVFRPPHQWWKDWWKHHDUO\)RXFDXOWIROORZHGD³UDUHILHGIRUP
RISRVLWLYLVP´168   
 
%\FRQWUDVW LQKLVRZQ WH[WRQ1LHW]VFKH'HOHX]H¶VDZWKHµGHOLFDWHSUREOHP¶RISURGXFLQJD
positve concept as foregrounding the them e of posi tivity and objectivity around the signifcance 
of a com binatory. This indicates a diferential tha t accounts a priori for constiutive tendencies 
w ithin an em pircal sensibilty. 169  W hen 'HOHX]H GRZQSOD\HG )RXFDXOW¶V ³QHR-.DQWLDQLVP´ it 
was for the specifc aesthetic activity of constiu ting m eaning from  the sign. 170  Power m eant an 
active faculty of synthesis of m eaning, rather than  an explanatory concept. In his discussions of 
the function of the sign, Deleuze distinguished rep resentational norm s from  objective 
DSSHDUDQFHVVSHFLILFDOO\DJDLQVWWKHOHJDF\RIµQHR-.DQWLDQLVP¶VLQFH'HOHX]HVDZWUXHFULWLTXH
as the form  of practical philosophy that distnguis hed itself rom  an account of orm ative power. 
 
The underlying them e of the Foucault text is how a w ider analytic process conceptualy 
substiut es  ideas, rather than being conditoned under a histo ry. D eleuze presents this inverted 
use of history as  justifed by the lim itations held of the Critcal Kant,- 
³.DQW KDG WR LQYRNH D WKLUG DJency beyond the two form s that was essentialy 
m ysterious and capable of taking account of their c o-DGDSWDWLRQDVWUXWK´171   
.DQW¶V WKLUGDJHQF\ZDVQHFHVVLWDWHGE\ ERWK DWWULEXWLQJSRZHU WR LPDJLQDWLRQDQGFRQYHUVHO\
excluding it a priori fom  schem atics. This left Ka nt displacing a ³KLGGHQDUWDWWKHGHSWKVRIWKH
KXPDQ VRXO´172  for the function reflected through the Gemüt as a pow er of judgem ent. The 
question of sensible apprehension folows from  a pr iori tanscendental principles grounding an 
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understanding, which was what Critque of Judgement  took to inform  an aesthesis accord ed  to 
the norm ative idea. 173  In this account, an im age isdrawn against the m ul tiplicity of an em pircal 
im agination had a necessity explained by a doctrine  of m ean representation a priori. W hen 
Critque of Judgement explored this, t was through  an  ideational organisation taken up through 
basic principles given to teleology. 174  Because this was centred on a norm  constiuted und er an 
ideal schem atics, Deleuze did not see WKLV DV µWUXH FULWLTXH¶ ,QVWHDG, the issue was the 
com binatory power which delim its certain positve f unctions atributed to reason; this becom es 
the central question inform ing his own aesthetics. W hen he gave this the context for a reading of 
The Order of Things in the Foucault WH[W'HOHX]H¶VDHVWKHWLFVDUHLQVHUWHGZLWKLQDFRQWH[WRI
)RXFDXOW¶VVRFLR-politcal dom ain. 
 
Deleuze and the Question of Power/Knowledge  
 
In the Foucault ext, Deleuze takes a com binatory a s delim itng certain positve functions in the 
relation between knowledge and power. The question of power now denotes a relation betw een 
forces, but considered as active categories of powe r w ith a prim acy over the passivity of 
knowledge. Knowledge m eans form alised functions, ob jects of seeing and speaking, stratifed 
and archivised. By contrast, power is an  active function which orders and com poses, leaving  the 
m ark of force. Deleuze designates the diagram  as th e particular feature in  the distribution of 
strategic power which he relates to the practice of  a m icropolitcs. 175   
 
KQRZOHGJHLVQRORQJHUDQH[SODQDWRU\EXWPHUHO\DQDWWULEXWHRIDSRZHU¶VRULHQWDWLRQ and what 
constiutes this dom ain rem ains under a w ider efec t of the com binatory. Itis he activity of the 
com binatory by which Deleuze avoids a transcendenta l perspective since pow er no longer 
depends on an ideal capacity to function. This lustrated explicitly in the pivotal fourth chapter  
of the Foucault WH[W µ6WUDWHJLHV RU WKH QRQ-6WUDWLILHG 7KH 7KRXJKW RI WKH 2XWVLGH 3RZHU¶
which im pacts on F RXFDXOW¶V µDQDO\WLFRI ILQLWXGH¶ Deleuze inverts the historical relation with 
force as it appears during the 19 th  century, -
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³,QRUGHUIRUPDQWRDSSHDUDVDVSHFLILFFRPSRXQGWKHIRUFHVWKDWFUHDWHKLPHQWHULQWR
a relation with new forces that evade that of repre sentation, even to the point of 
GHSRVLQJLW´176  
In )RXFDXOW¶V WHUPV OLIH ODQJXDJH DQG ODERXU, are finite forces that im pose history on m an. 
However a substiutive com binatory is an  activity that evades ubordination to representati on and 
gives a loss of perspective that appears as  the legacy of the 19 th  FHQWXU\ VFLHQFH 'HOHX]H¶
substiutive history gains the particular signifca nce that,-  
³PDQUHSODFHGOLIHDQGWKHVXEMHFWRIODZWKHPRPHQWKLVLPDJHZDVFRPSRVHGRIYLWDO
forces during the po OLWLFDOHUDRIFRQVWLWXWLRQV«EXWWRGD\ODZKDVDJDLQFKDQJHGVXEMHFW
because even within subjects, he vital forces are entering into new com binations and 
com posing new figures...in this way producing efec ts not of universality but of 
WUDQVYHUVDOLW\´177   
CRUUHODWHG WR WKH 6FLHQFH RI 0DQ ZKLFK ORVW LWV XQLYHUVDO SHUVSHFWLYH µWUDQVYHUVDOLW\¶ gains a 
new object of a science through the NQRZOHGJHRI µYLWDO IRUFHV¶ in com bination ZLWKµZKDW WKH
ZLOOZDQWV¶7KHVKLIWLVparalel to the advent of Positvism  and the m ove f rom  a critque of law  
to the description of the status of the vital.  
 
The paralel shift also DSSHDUVLQ'HOHX]H¶VERRNRQ1LHW]VFKHHere determ inable reason relates 
to the diferential typology where the diferential  has the status of the third elem ent. 178  
According to Deleuze, N ietzsche looked beyond Kanti an paralogism s and, reading The Order of 
Things, SXWV WKLV DFWLYHSDVVLYH RSSRVLWLRQ ZLWKLQ )RXFDXOW¶V VRFLR-politcal space. Itserves to 
relate what Nietzsche &  Philosophy had already em ph asised around the diferential elem ent and 
what Deleuze took as the qualitative determ inations , XQGHUVWRRG WR EH EHKLQG 1LHW]VFKH¶V
intention in On The Genealogy of M orals. This disti nguishes the question of an orientating 
principle around the w il to power ather than a su bjective capacity for feedom . In the Nietzsche 
text, this appears in  the VXUSOXV IRUFHRI DELQDU\ RSSRVLWLRQEHWZHHQ WKH VLJQRI WKH µPDWHULDO
ERG\¶DQGWKHLGHDRIWKHµZLOOWRSRZHU¶179  
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)RXFDXOW¶V FRQFHSW RI SRZHU IROORZHG D KLVWRULFDOO\ constiuted socio-politcal dom ain but 
'HOHX]H¶ GLIIHUHQWLDO HOHPHQW WUDQVIRUPV VXFK D GRPDLQ LQWR DQ µRSHQ ILHOG¶ E\ DYRLGLQJ
specifying hum an relations. In the open field, powe r is associated w ith an idea of positve 
categories in general, -
³ZHFDQWKHrefore conceive of a necessarily open listof varia bles expressing a relation 
EHWZHHQIRUFHVRUSRZHUUHODWLRQVWKHVHDUHWKHFDWHJRULHVRI3RZHU´180  
Positve categories presuppose a general theory of relations and 'HOHX]H¶V µGLDJUDPRISRZHU¶
gives an  idea of positve categories that drew on an interp retation from  Nietzsche and Philosophy 
which defines genealogy as specifcaly aim ing to r adicalize Kantian critque. W hen Deleuze 
constiutes this as a problem  of the µWUXH¶ PHDVXUH RI YDOXH LQ Nietzsche &  Philosophy the 
radicalisation of critque becom es the prim ary task  of HYDOXDWLRQRINQRZOHGJHDVµIRUFH¶181  This 
served D eleuze by distinguishing two types of critcism ,-   
- ILUVWO\ D FULWLFLVP LPSOLFDWHGRI WKH DUFKDHRORJLFDO)RXFDXOWZKR µVWRRGEHKLQG¶ D critque of 
knowledge. This distinction folows what Deleuze ha d already earlier described as the problem  
ZLWK.DQW¶VWUDQVFHQGHQWDOSKLORVRSK\ 
³WUDQVFHQGHQWDO SKLORVRSK\ GLVFRYHUV ZKDW UHPDLQV H[WHUQDO WR WKH FRQGLWLRQV
Transcendental principles are the principles of con ditoning, but not of internal 
JHQHVLV´182   
- DVHFRQGFULWLTXHUHODWHGWR1LHW]VFKH¶VDPELWLRQWRDFFRXQWIRUSULQFLSOHVRIDVXEVWLWXWLRQLQ
reason rather than of principles to account for ea sons in them selves. 183    
 
In the Foucault ext, Deleuze ¶V reading of H istory of Sexuality focuses on the cru cial concept of 
bio-power for another distnction in his nterpreta tion;-  
³,VQRWWKHIRUFHWKDWFRPHVIURPWKHRXWVLGHDFHUWDLQLGHDRIOLIHDFHUWDLQYLWDOLVPLQ
ZKLFK)RXFDXOW¶VWKRXJKWFXOPLQDWHV",VQRWOLIHWKLVFDSDFLW\WRUHVLVWIRUFH´184   
In  WKHLGHDRIµOLIH¶RIWKHµHUDRISROLWLFDOFRQVWLWXWLRQV¶'HOHX]HLQWURGXFHVWKHTXHVWLRQRIDQ
(QOLJKWHQPHQW6FLHQFHRI0DQE\IRUHJURXQGLQJDµFHUWDLQYLWDOLVP¶7KHFoucault ext folows 
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the central dispute behind The Order of Things but opens this as a YLWDOLVP ZLWKLQ )RXFDXOW¶V
histories through the question of the practice of t he physiology in Xavier Bichat. 185   
 
The reading of The Order of Things pivots on the ev ent which a history of m odern thought 
QRUPDOO\ DVVRFLDWHV ZLWK .DQWLDQ FULWLTXH %XW 'HOHX]H UHIHUUHG WKLV WR DQ HYHQW DV ³WKRXJKW
through and lived out in the m ultiple deaths in the  m anner of Bichat. ´186  This event appears as 
the SRWHQWLDOWRµDSSUHKHQG¶IRUFHVRIILQLWXGHµZLWKLQWKHERG\¶and is paralel to the dispersion 
of the Enlightenm ent Science of M an around life, la bour and language. Likewise, the epistem ic 
shift hat appears in The Birth of the Clinic aroun d a new m edical Positvism  at he start of the 
19 th  century. The particular signifcance derives from  the role of pathological anatom y for new  
positvistic discourses as a death becam e coextensi ve w ith life. Foucault atributed this as  the 
basic function of psychoanalysis indicating a conce pt of norm ativity derived from  a 
physiological understanding of the body as itbecom es lim ited to psychic structures and their 
expression. 187  But in The Birth of the Clinic, Positvism  in itse lf rem ained a negativity. 
 
However, Deleuze sees this event as having a w ider signifcance beyond any ensuing new 
PHGLFDOIXQFWLRQLWKDV³PXFKZLGHULPSOLFDWLRQV´IRUWKHUH-centring of a history of the subject 
- LWH[SUHVVHGWKHµQHZD[LV¶188  7KLVD[LVKHFODLPV³KDXQWV´DOO)RXFDXOW¶VWKRXJKWDV³DFHUWDLQ
LGHD´189  W hen Deleuze pursued the signifcance of this SUDFWLFH LGHQWLILHG ZLWK WKH µDJH RI
%LFKDW¶it gave the context for his Foucault WH[WDURXQGWKHµPLFURSROLWLFVRIWKHVLJQ¶190   
 
Signs of Diference  
 
Deleuze ¶V departure from  Kantian critque is m apped out in D iference and Repetion with a 
question; ³LQ what sense does K antian reason, in so far as it  the faculty of ideas, pose and 
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FRQVWLWXWHSUREOHPV"´191  H e intends to separate this from  the constiution of infinite nature that 
Kant proposed to elim inate, as wel as ideal condit ions of a Kantian tim e and space. The prim ary 
concern for Deleuze w as the sign and its evaluation  as atributed to a positve production of 
FRQFHSWV$OWKRXJK.DQW¶VDXWRQRPRXVYDOXHVZHUHDWWULEXWHG WRDQHPSLULFLVWEDVH'HOHX]H¶V
question is ZK\.DQW¶VFRQGLWLRQDOLW\DSodicticaly avoids the em pircism  of such activity,  while 
paradoxicaly taking an em pircist nature as explan atory for a necessary transcendental function. 
7KLV ³FXWV WKH DHVWKHWLF LQ WZR SDUWV´ DQG PDNHV H[FHVVLYH WKH HOHPHQW WKDW FRQVWLWXWHV
em pircism . This ZDVZKDW'HOHX]HXQGHUVWRRG&ULWLTXH¶VFRQGLWLRQDOLW\VHUYed  to negate. 192  
 
)RXFDXOW¶V The Order of Things distinguishes between Critque and a pre-critcal Ideological 
analytic, as a prim ary division in  narating the history of dissolution of the Scienc e of M an. The 
Ideological m ethod, rooted in the series and its re petion, was derived from  a Sensationalist 
epistem ology of an idea-sign; D iference and Repeti tion identifed this specifcaly w ith respect 
to the critcal problem . The idea-sign is seen as r em oved from  hypothetical conditoning and 
thereby altogether em oved from  Kantian dificultie s of predication in  transcendental experience. 
Deleuze relates this to  David Hum e ¶V naturalism  where a double articulation of the sign  held up 
DQ ³LUUHSODFHDEOH VXEWOHW\´ ZKHQ IROORZLQJ D GHVFULSWLRQ RI DQ µRSHQ YDULDEOH¶193  The 
6HQVDWLRQDOLVWPHWKRGVLPLODUO\SUHGLFDWHGFHUWDLQHOHPHQWVZKLFKFRXOGEHµQDWXUDOO\¶H[WHQGHG
as actualites and the idea-sign was understood to index a grounded synthesis prior to any 
subsequent synthetic activity. Itis a µVHQVLEOHV\QWKHVLV¶m eaning a general grounding both for 
physiological possibilties of organic com positon,  and repetive functions of psychology and its  
dom ain of m em ory- a phenom enal field for integratin g what w as signifcant in  inteligible 
com positon. 194  
 
The problem  for Deleuze is  to constiute a µQDWXUDOLVP¶ from  the atributes of the sign. In this 
respect, D iference and Repetion also invokes, w i th a single claim , WR EH ³IROORZLQJ
Condilac. ´195  This indicates the context understood of grounding  an artifce as a tem poral 
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synthesis from  elem entary habits. Habits predicated  on prim ary experience of the world, are the 
historical root of the Sensationalist idea-sign, wh ose m ethod served to FRQVWLWXWH D µVHFRQG
natu UH¶RUVLJQ, that could extend the articulation of em pircal n ature. The sign, stood a priori as 
aid to m em ory, grounds an understanding and Deleuze  saw its particular im portance for 
FRQVWLWXWLQJDµV\QWKHVLVRIWLPH¶in the sense understood of an em pircal conditonin g a priori of 
the thinking activity. Such synthesis accords w ith a virtual idea a priori to sensible com positons 
but whose lim it unfolds a double articulation of a com binatory. It  also FRUUHODWHV WR%HUJVRQ¶V
problem  of synthesis where the µSRZHU¶RIYLUWXDOLW\should be understood as the technical m ode 
WKDWDOORZHG'HOHX]H¶WRGLVWLQJXLVKa m ethod from  the Critcal philosophy. 196  
 
This distinction extends over what Kant opposed in autonom ous wil w ith the power of being in 
a state spontaneously. A  pure power and its concept  of freedom  were held as the com pletely 
transcendental idea. However, the Kantian w il coul d also becom e pathologicaly afected by 
sensuous or anim al m otives such as desire which was  deem ed the contrary or negative to the 
ideal concept of hum an wil. 197  7KLVLVZKDW'HOHX]HFODLPV³FXWVWKHDHVWKHWLFLQWZRSDUWV´DQG
RIIHUVWKHGLIIHUHQWLDODQDO\VLVRIWKHVLJQDWWULEXWHGWRDµZLOOWRSRZHU,¶ whose technical m ethod 
is related to D YLUWXDO LGHD 'HOHX]H FRXOG FODLP WKDW ³ZH necessarily afirm  som ething of the 
REMHFWRIDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQZKLFKLVQRWFRQWDLQHGZLWKLQLW´198  and the virtual gives an  alternative 
m odel to the division between sensuous and ideal w i ls. This also explains the historical context 
in which Deleuze invo NHV WKH µ%LFKDW HYHQW¶ DV FODLP WKH RYHUFRPLQJ RI D KLVWRULFDO YLWDOLVP
while retaining the tchnical function of evaluatio n in the idea-sign. 199  
 
The Vital nd the Positve  
   
%RWK'HOHX]HDQG)RXFDXOWIROORZHG1LHW]VFKH¶VEHOLHILQWKHERG\DV³PRUHWKDQD fundam ental 
belief in the soul, ´ but interpretations of ;DYLHU %LFKDW¶V SK\VLRORJ\ LOOXVWUDWHs how  
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Enlightenm ent vitalism  serv es  a conceptual narative on the Science of M an. 200  Bichat represents 
the form  of vitalism  that conceived of the vital as  evidence RI µIRUFH¶ It  was understood as 
coextensive w ith a possible knowledge of the body a nd atributed to the positve categories of 
life. But vitalism  also stands for a historical ser ies of physiological m odels that folowed the 
am biton to naturalise the im age of the living body  and its lim it by understanding the basic 
functions apprehend ed  as a proportionate response between an active orga nism  and its m ileu. 
This im age served the m edical account of disposito ns in life to change and express an 
orientation towards the lim its of the positve cate gories of lie and accounted for as constiutive 
norm s of vital function. In this sense, it  gave the positve criteria as guiding norm s for 
physicians, m oral philosopher, educator and statesm an. Rational physiology anticipated certain 
values as coextensive in the possible relations for  a general concept of life. But positve 
categories had a visible finitude through the study  of pathology. The radicalism  that Deleuze 
atributed to the idea-sign was of the m ethodology that could relate this to the am bitons for an 
Enlightenm ent Science of M an. In this era th is  stood as a standard for the m icropolitcs through 
extension to the physical and the m oral. 201   
 
During the early 19 th  century Xavier Bichat was of a generation not look ing to the past but 
towards developing a new scientifc language. Bicha t represents he new clinical m edicine being 
developed from  a rational physiological theory. H e described two inner lives in a binary relation 
that relates a w il to its passions, the struggle b etween spirt and body rarely in evident 
equilbrium . 202  The new physiology integrated an organic base as t he dissociated form  of visible 
life to which an anim al state was the organised com plex higher order w ith evident regularity to 
be accounted for ationaly. The later inform s a n orm ative im age coresponding historicaly to 
vital ideas of lie. Bichat understood the patholog ical as a contrary pow er at the lim it of the idea 
to which his rational physiological synthesis was o riented around delim itng the historical 
concept of life. The Birth of the Clinic describes the practice of pathological anatom y as 
preceding the epistem ic shift rom  which em erges Fr ench m edical Positvism  at he start of the 
                                                          
200
 N ietzsche (1967) sect 491. This ection also centr al for Heideg JHU¶VUHDGLQJRIQLKLOLVPYROS 
201
 Deleuze (1988c) p121 
202
 Bichat (1827) 1:6:4. 
62 
 
19 th  century. 203  The signifcance for D eleuze was in the claim  of B ichat as first m odern 
interpretation of death. Bichat functions in the Fo ucault ext as a substitution, whose m ethod 
contrasts w ith abstract principles such as the Gemü t or tanscendental concepts that divide a 
µQDWXUDO¶ORJLFIURPDQLGHDRI life.
 
;DYLHU %LFKDW¶V YLWDOLVP ZDV DPELJXRXV .DQW¶V DEVWUDFW WUDQVFHQGHQWDOLVP JDYH
unconditonality as  negative, serving real positvity in  representation. By contrast, %LFKDW¶V
em pircal horizon of vital function takes the sign as  upholding an objective standard as  an idea of 
life. By delim itng a universal concept of reason this avoi ds a m etaphysics of subjectivity 
through substiuting a historicaly derived idea of  the body and its soul for a physiology of 
anim al reasoning, m ethodicaly unfolded in the form  of the organic m achine. Rational 
physiology would explain what phenom ena could be at tributed to vital force and give the 
conditons for a debate to which %LFKDW¶V SK\VLRORJ\ PDUNs the lim its of a project for the 
universalising values in  m odern knowledge. Universality was initated for m odern tim es w ith 
Descartes 6 th  m editation which gives the interpretation of natur e as the concept grounding the 
Cogito sum  and opening a positve horizon to develo pm ent hough a physiological knowledge. 
The Cartesian am biton grounds both an idea of the vital and itspositve sense ± as m easure and 
conditoning of the sign. The paralel is w ith Desc artes 4 th  m editation for distinguishing the true 
and the false. 204  In this sense, %LFKDW¶VYLWDOLVP LV D WHFKQLTXHRI WKH Ldea-sign that relates the 
historical idea of the body to a logic of life.
 
H istoricaly vitalism  could explain properties atr ibuted to life. But m edical vitalism  also has 
origins in the H ippocratic idea where reading the s ign served the conditoning of nature. The sign 
had this power held w ith respect o vital activity to sustain idea of lie. It  was a necessary 
conditoning of possible phenom ena of life accordin g to an intrinsic understanding of 
signifcance in the living which is distinct from  a  concept of right or an archaic concept of the 
good. The sign surveys and values a priori of a m ed ical intervention. In this ense vitalism  m eant 
the value of the sum  of em pircal conditons consti tuting a perception to which the idea-sign 
atributes possible signifcance. H istoricaly, the  m edical sign atributed this to an energeia, but 
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%LFKDW¶VYLWDOLVPWRRNIRUFHDVFRPSRVLQJDQLPDJHRIWKHERG\which gave the radical concept 
of lie for his epoch. He looked to pathology to de lim it this econom y of lie w ithin the series of 
interm ediary states between life and death. 
 
The pathological diferential brings the sign of th e vital to the idea of lie which is inherently 
ontological. 205  But he sign also m akes possible the event where t he idea itself becam e eclipsed 
an d therefore functions to separate the sign from  a g eneral ontology. The sign gives positvity, 
but vitalism  gives unity to an idea of lie. The id ea of lie m eans the term s of possible predicates 
for a concept of the body and governs the articulat ion of itsm etaphysics a priori to constiuting a 
new physiological synthesis. The atributes of lie , both tem poraly and in order of com positon , 
use the diferential w hich necessitates an em pirca l aw areness and vigilance w ithin its 
constiuting order to com pose or ationalise a new  concept of lie. In this ense, vitalism  gave the 
perspective an order of priority: this i not a con cept in the K antian sense, but he idea of what 
was to be ordered in the world; not idealistic but as determ ining value. 
 
The signifcance istwofold; in the Birth of the Cl inic this nitated a new m edical Positvism  for 
the 19 th  FHQWXU\%XW%LFKDW¶VPHWKRGRILQWHUSUHWDWLRQGHULYHGRI&RQGLOODF¶VHPSLULFLVPJDYH
the m edical sign an intrinsic lim it in the constiu tion of values of lie. In this ense it corelates  to 
the basic philosophical problem  articulated in D if erence and Repetion which looked to 
distinguish an em pircal conditoning from  an epist em ological conditoning. 206  The philosophical 
problem  for D iference and Repetion isposed arou nd the activity that delim its positve function 
as a problem  of the vital. The activity of the sign  has to account for the internalised coordination 
of value and lim its of signifcance for a cognitve  function. This is the function of the 
com binatory as itextends to a positve dom ain to d escribe a series of phenom enal events; 
Deleuze cals this the delicate problem  of constiu ting a positvity from  m inim al identiy. The 
product isthe concept of the understanding and the  lim it of itsapplication. 207   
 
                                                          
205
 Heidegger points o this as established in Germ any  from  t KH¶VE\/HLEQL]LDQUDWLRQDOLVW&KULVWLDQ:ROIIWKLV
LVZKDWZDVVSHFLILFDOO\DWWDFNHGDQGVXSSUHVVHGE\.DQW¶V7UDQVFHQGHQWDOSKLORVRSK\XQWLOUHLQYLJRUDWHGDVD
subject of philosophical enquiry by Heidegger. (198 7) Vol.4 p154n 
206
 Deleuze (1994) p13-16, p98. Also Deleuze &  G uatar i (1994a) p161 where Bichat isthe specifc exam ple . 
207
 Deleuze (1994) p95 
64 
 
Diference and Repetion PDNHV D FHQWUDO SRLQW DURXQG ZKHWKHU +HLGHJJHU¶V WXUQ EH\RQG
m etaphysics w as truly disengaged from  a subordinati ng relation in identiy of representation. 208  
Deleuze understood these as being the term s for dis placing the naturalism  of sign that folows 
1LHW]VFKH¶V µRYHUWXUQLQJ3ODWRQLVP¶+HLGHJJHU¶V UHDGLQJRI3ODWRQLVPGHILQHG WKHSUREOHPRI
m ethod as drawing the distinction between the sensu ous and the true. 209  To displace a value 
atributed as true m eant overturning an a priori ideal im age, to which representation was 
necessarily held as sim ulacral. Identiy in the sig n denied or blocked prim ary distinctions of 
original or copy. For a positve aesthesis, the sta tus of the sign was to be co-extensive w ith both 
senses intended, both true and sensuous. These are the criteria that serve to converge m ultiple of 
points of view within an objective dom ain of the si gn to which the function of afirm ation serves 
lived reality. The problem  of the com binatory is fo regrounding the vital ordering of 
representations, and its this ordering that gave a philosophical problem  for the natural sign 
which becam e FHQWUDOWRDQ(QOLJKWHQPHQW6FLHQFHRI0DQ,QWKLVUHVSHFW&RQGLOODF¶VLGHD-sign 
VXEVWLWXWHG IRU µQDWXUDO IXQFWLRQ¶ WKURXJK GLVWLQJXishing signifcant diferences from  external 
resem blance.  
 
The function of the sign is therefore to reproduce the qualitative divide between m odes of 
resem blance and diference in the idea. Deleuze use s the exam ple of the Platonic sign that 
prioritses po VLWLYHLGHQWLW\RYHUGLIIHUHQFHZKLFKKHXQGHUVWRRGWREH3ODWR¶V³PRUDOYLVLRQ´RI
the world. This was because the sign specifcaly a ddressed an idea of ordered life of the soul to 
be governed by concepts of reason rather than a pas sionate life. 210  In this sense, vigilance over 
diference was held as the em pircal criterion for ataining a m oral point of view. But he 
im plications for a m icropolitcs of the sign are th at rue function of the sign is in the activity of 
selection, m aking possible the evaluation or test hat serves to orientate em pircal ideas in their 
purposive acts. This i a necessary m ethod of orien tation in a chaotic world to which em pircal 
function of diferentiation of ideas can be conside red a vital production. The diferential process 
caries an unstated ontological necessity atribute d to the cognitve idea. 211   
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H istoricaly, Sensationalist m ethod prioritsed ana logy, but the new m edical pathology 
represented a re-evaluation within the conceptual p riorites of the sign. Pathology brought he 
problem  of diference w ithin the phenom enal series around an idea of lie but since death could 
not itself an object of representation with the ser ies of lie, the pathological sign served as lim it 
to the transcendental idea of life.The pathologica l sign separated the historical idea from  itsvital  
atributes in what constiuted the living. Deleuze culm inated his reading of The Order of Things 
ZLWKDGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHµPDQ-IRUP¶DVWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIµIRUFHVRIWKHRXWVLGH¶ZKLFKPDUNV
the distinction from  Kantian orthodoxy and the anal ytic of initude. The new historical idea was 
now characterised as  WKHµDJHRI%LFKDW¶ZKLFKhe claim s opened a new fundam ental am biton 
for the positve categories of life incarnate with the 19 th  century turn in knowledge.  
 
7KHµRXWVLGH¶FDUULHVan  im plication associated w ith the legacy of an Enlig htenm ent Science of 
0DQ LQ WKH VHQVH XQGHUVWRRG DV HPERG\LQJ WKH µDQWLFLSDWLRQV¶ IXQGDPHQWDO IRU WKH QHZ
conditons of lie. Deleuze claim s that Foucault id entifed a new m an -form  that appear ed  by 
incorporating the death of m an; but his was not h e loss of sovereign, nor described against a 
PHWDSK\VLFVRIGHDWKEXWDJDLQVW%LFKDW¶V WHUPVRIYLROHQWGHDWK. A  re -organisation of lie had 
historical im plications for the m icropolitcs of li fe. 212  The signifcance of the Positvist turn was 
RI DQ µLQQHU FRPPLWPHQW¶ WR 3RVLWLYLVP¶V WUXWK which 'HOHX]H KHOG LQ UHODWLRQ WR 1LHW]VFKH¶V
social values. This m eant a confrontation of the pr oblem s of Positvism  with the physiological 
style diagnosis around the degeneration or strength ening of the species. This is a conceptual 
point associated w ith the 19 th  century thought which Nietzsche and Philosophy saw  as an internal 
power, dispersing al value-giving schem atics and t he im portant diferential elem ent behind 
1LHW]VFKH¶VµZLOOWRSRZHU¶It  also explains the central tsk behind what Deleuze  understood of a 
Genealogy. 213  The JHQHUDO LPSHUDWLYH RI DQ XQFRQGLWLRQHG µZLOO WR WUXWK¶ JDYH the dispositon 
held to be constiutive of the new system atic of va lues. Therefore, from  the dispute over the 
Enlightenm ent Science of M an which is central to Th e Order of Things, the historical context 
was provoked by the am biton to delim it a legitm ate birthplace of  the sign. A t he start of the 
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19 th  century thi s was a dispute over the positve and the vital and g ave dual possibilties for e-
constiuting an am biton for a Science of M an in a new form . 214   
 
Conclusion  
 
7KHµUDUHILHG3RVLWLYLVP¶GHOLPLWs an original problem  around an Enlightenm ent Scien ce of M an. 
FoXFDXOWIROORZHGZKDWKLVUHDGLQJRI.DQW¶VAnthropology as  an em pircal perspective on how  
the positve concept was historicaly brought into play. This chapter has contended that there was 
ERWKDFULWLFDOLPSHWXVLQ)RXFDXOW¶V$UFKDHRORJ\DQGDIWHU gave the positve am bitons for 
constiuting the concept m ediating juridical power.  Beyond the epistem ological discourse, 
)RXFDXOW¶V positve am bitons extended through socio-politca l discourses w ith a philosophical 
OHJLWLPDF\LGHQWLILHGZLWK.DQW¶VOHJDcy  which the critcal function w as integrated within a w ider 
horizon of the felicitous Positvism .  
 
Another perspective has been described in G iles De leuze. This focus was on m edical discourses 
LGHQWLILHGZLWK WKHTXHVW IRU WUXH IXQFWLRQ LQ WKH µDJHRI%LFKDW¶This identifed Sensationalist 
epistem ology as inform ing the m icropolitcs and H[SODLQHG'HOHX]H¶V UHDVRQLQJ IRU DWWULEXWLQJ
intrinsic values to the m edical sign to  a vitalism . The µ%LFKDWHYHQW¶H[SODLQs discourses on the 
physical and the m oral to  which Deleuze atributed the dissolution of an 18 th  century dispute. 
The delicate problem  around of values of 18 th  century vitalism  centred on constiutive norm s 
IROORZLQJ&RQGLOODF¶VLGHD-sign to which Deleuze saw m edical Positvism  as a radicalism . 
 
The original problem  for an Enlightenm ent Science o f M an has been characterised in its 
am biton to delim it a legitm ate birthplace for the  sign. The m edical sign caries values both 
positve and vital and this w il serve to constiut e the field for a genealogy of a Science of M an 
during the 19 th  FHQWXU\ LQ VXEVHTXHQW FKDSWHUV 7KH QH[W FKDSWHU ZLOO ORRN DW )RXFDXOW¶V SRVW-
FULWLFDO .DQW WR DFFRXQWLQJ IRU WKH µELIXUFDWLRQ¶ LQ D SUDFWLFH DURXQG WKH 6FLHQFH RI 0DQ
subsequent chapters folow what he considered a p re -FULWLFDOFRQWH[WHPHUJLQJIURPWKHµDJHRI
%LFKDW¶ 
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Chapter 2 .DQW¶V$QWKURSRORJ\DQGWKH6FLHQFHRI0DQ 
 
Introduction  
 
The last chapter focuss ed  on the debate that invigorat ed  )UHQFKWKRXJKWGXULQJWKHµFULVLV¶RIWKH
¶V. This was fram ed as  a historical dispute over an Enlightenm ent Science  of M an. This 
chapter identifes this w ith what em erges from  a Re naissance Hum anism  and was taken up as an 
Enlightenm ent project. The context for understandin g what was m eant of an Enlightenm ent 
Science of M an takes itnital perspective from  t he new philosophical and scientifc languages 
debated in the Berlin Academ y from  around 1740. Fro m  the work of Christian W olf, along with 
the epistem ological problem s introduced by Locke an d Hum e, this gave the Enlightenm ent 
debate whose context cam e to GHILQH.DQW¶VDPELWLRQV 
 
The previous chapter described the particular signi ficance that M ichel Foucault atributed to 
.DQW¶V Anthropology in relation to an Enlightenm ent Scienc e of M an. This chapter exam ines 
.DQW¶VGLYLded strategy for ataining a rational m etaphysics i n relation to an 18 th  century m otif of 
power. The transcendental m otif questions the am bit ion for tue and legitm ate function of power 
at he core of a Science of M an. But .DQW¶V earlier alegiance to the Enlightenm ent project sa w  
him  VXEVWLWXWH µPRGHV RI WKLQNLQJ¶ RI DQ HDUOLHU SV\FKRORJ\ IRU a distinction between 
m etaphysical and philosophical foundations in the d om ain of experience. In this way, Kant gave 
an asym m etry that extend ed  into the very possibilty of a Science of M an. 
 
As an am biton of a Science of M an, this chapter ex plores .DQW¶V WZR UHVSRQVHV ILUVWO\ WKH
QHFHVVLW\ IRU D JHQHUDO PHWDSK\VLFV DV µLQGLVSHQVDEOH VHUYLFH¶ IRU JLYLQJ OHJLWLPDF\ EH\RQG
conditonality in m oral philosophy. Secondly it fol lows what he addressed as an original problem  
for a Science of M an through a special epistem ology . Foucault LGHQWLILHG .DQW¶V DPELWLRQ WR
constiute positve ground for inner sense w ith the  late Opus Postumum. This hypothesised 
transcendental possi ELOLWLHVIRUUHSUHVHQWLQJPDQ¶VZRUOGDVDORJLFDOV\VWHPRIFRQFHSWVOpus 
Postumum further distinguished two m odes of what  concept of nature could hope to apprehend; 
firstly, a system  of phenom enal experience understo od through contem porary interpretations of 
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anim al powers; secondly, a w ider dom ain of force ph enom enaly evident in the totality of a 
world-system . W hile .DQW¶V transcendental system  of representations looked to  a totality of such 
em pircal observations, by folowing a historical problem  of seeking legitm a cy for a Science of 
M an the Opus Postumum is also understood as the WUDQVLWLRQ EHWZHHQ µPRGHV RI EHLQJ¶ WR
µPRGHVRIWKLQNLQJ,¶serving the hypothesising of the µLGHDODUFKHW\SHRIPDQ¶ZKRFRXOGWKLQN
th e world.  
 
.DQW¶V FLWL]HQ RI WKH ZRrld also appears in the Anthropology. This is .DQW¶V ODWH text seen as 
folowing his cosm opolitan ideal of the citzen req uired think the world. But this now entails an 
engagem ent w ith the social, politcal and historica l elem ents as  sustaining evident practices in 
the world and Anthropology isrooted in the difcu lty for accounting for a diversity of em pircal 
practices. K ant ook his perspective on what PDQµRXJKW¶WREHFRPHFRQVFLRXVRI in this world 
µE\ULJKWV¶The transcendental doctrine of Opus Postumum explor ed this extended possibilty as 
a world-concept, but Anthropology excludes such a uni fied perspective and returns the central 
difculty of constiuting the idea behind practice s that diferentiate the world. The world concept 
is dom inated by history and culture and has an evid ent lack of unity. Anthropology is shown to 
leave this  as an idea to be judged by the µSULQFLSOH RI WKH IXWXUH¶ and taken to prefigure the 
destabilsation of a unifed Science of M an. Ita p roblem  identifed w ith the positve practices 
historicaly brought into play and the paralel is drawn with the historical em ergence of organic 
theories and their am bitons to apprehend inner exp erience of sym ptom s, desires, and evident 
external purposive forces in Opus Postumum. W hen Fo ucault fram ed a narative of the 
dissolution of an Enlightenm ent Science of M an thro ugh the ideologies seen as an adm ixture of 
positve and vital, this was a dom ain of em pircal practices which served his study of the 
epistem ic shift associated w ith French Positvism . This w il be taken up in the next chapter. 
 
Renaissance Anthropology and Enlightenm ent Science of M an  
 
The Renaissance w as an era self-conscious of openin g a new cycle in history, a new approach to 
negotiating forces of history in which m an could pl ay a part. In this context, Anthropology w as 
an em erging discipline that lent itself to a body o f knowledge branching out from  a philosophical 
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discourse. But he new  perspective did not originat e w ith the observations of contem porary 
diferences, rather, from  the study of Rom an and Gr eek antiquity and the cultural contrast 
distinguishing between past and the present. This w as the achievem ent of the Italian renaissance; 
its efect was a renew ed interest in the ancient wo rld that inspired the study of contem porary 
cultural diferences. By taking the past as the m ea sure of the present, a dynam ic reform  
m ovem ent could distinguish in hum an beings a creati vity that grounded itshared activites as a 
unifying force. In the second half of the 18 th  century, the contem porary concept of m an 
em bodied the idea that subjects were capable of bei ng enlightened. 215   
 
In the Enlightenm ent, Anthropology stood between th e range of hum an knowledge; for exam ple, 
psychology as the discourse on the rational soul, a nd its counterpart in the body to which 
anatom y reveal the structure of m an. Anthropology a lso ofered aspirations for a new science 
extending a view as social anthropology historical y paralel w ith an anatom y of the polis. This 
dissection of the body politc m eant hat an Enligh tenm ent Science of M an could transform  
argum ents on body and soul into a science of m ind/b ody relations, beyond earlier eservations 
about the values of Cartesian m echanism . 216   
 
From  the early 18 th  century, anthropology stood as a natural history o f hum an nature folowing 
the im petus for an enlightened science which drew o n a broad psychology, a m etaphysics of soul 
and extended m edical practice. The search for a nat ural unity led anthropological practioners, 
through the analytical approach, to a division of h um anity into races, sexes, tem peram ents. 
Fueled new intelectual fascinations w ith w ild chi ldren, the blind, orang-utans, exotic races etc , 
this developed into a batleground of ideas . By the early 19 th  century, the im petus behind such a 
Sci ence of M an had the paradoxical efect of dispersin g the system atic approach initated by 17 th  
century thinking. The expansive and fluctuating ran ge of intelectual activity lost he earlier 
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sense of unity. Yet in the 18 th  century, a Science of M an can be taken as dom inate d by a 
IXQGDPHQWDO LGHD WKH VHQVH WKDW VFLHQFH DQG UHDVRQ FRXOG EH WDNHQ WR GHILQH PDQ¶V KLJKHU
faculties. 
 
Two Approaches to an Enlightenm ent Science of M an  
 
In the early 18 th  century, two strong im petuses for a Science of M an  can be characterised through 
the philosophical m ethods of John Locke and David H um e.217   
 
/RFNHV¶V 6HQVDWLRQDOLVP RIIHUHG WR H[WHQG D PHWKRG WR IUHH WKH KXPDQ ERG\ IURP GRJPDWLF
thinking. Locke w as a physician and his An Essay Co ncerning Human Understanding of 1690 
tr DFHG µV\PSWRPV¶ ODLG RXW DIWHU DQ DQDWRPLFDO IDVKLRQ WKDWJURXQGKLV LQWHQGHGSUDFWLFH IRU D
Science of M an. 218  M oving beyond Descartes break with scholasticism , the prim acy was given to 
an epistem ology that fram ed a history of hum an unde rstanding and im plied transform ing the 
PHWDSK\VLFDOGLVFLSOLQHLQWRDSV\FKRORJ\/RFNH¶VVHQVDWLRQDOLVPRIIHUHGDQHPSLULFDOGRFWULQH
of knowledge as base for a new rationalistic theory  of the real. This was lim ited only by hum an 
faculties and their abilties to m akes em pircal de ductions. The question was of progressive 
adaptation,- 
³7KHILUVWVWHSWRWRZDUGVVDWLVI\LQJVHYHUDOHQTXLULHVRIWKHPLQGRIPDQZDVYHU\DSW
to run into, was to take a survey of our own unders tandings, to  exam ine our own 
powers, and see to what th LQJVWKH\FRXOGEHDGDSWHG´219   
Being a physician m eant an awareness of interpretiv e difculties as the problem  of total 
com prehension of the data of sensation. 220  The physician em phasised practical skils of 
observation, using experience as the basis for judg em ent, but Locke w as also looking for the 
possibilties of m oving beyond an aporetic m etaphys ics. Being a N ewtonian, despite shiftng 
away from  a science of certainty, m eant the progres sive am biton towards a deduction that could 
forge a world whose m easure w as m an. H istoricaly, the m easure of the m an drew on a 
physiological discourse for a natural explanatory s chem a, but the new anthropology also 
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introduced new possibilties for analysing represen tations according to the necessarily elem ental 
and successive orders of language. This was an idea , especialy influential in France where 
Etienne Bonnot de Condilac set out o redefine m et aphysics as the study of m ental operations 
H[WHQGHGWKURXJKGHJUHHVRIFHUWLWXGHWRZDUGVDµQHZODQJXDJH¶+LVLQLWLDWHGLQfluential projects 
WDNHQXSXQGHUWKHEURDGGHILQLWLRQRIDµ6FLHQFHGH/¶KRPPH¶GXULQJWKH)UHQFKUHYROXWLRQDU\
era.  
   
Another exam ple from  this epoch was David Hum e. H is  1739 Treatise on Human Nature 
upholds the central prem ise that l sciences are d erived from  their elation to a hum an nature, -
³7LV¶HYLGHQWWKDWDOOWKHVFLHQFHVKDYHDUHODWLRQJUHDWHURUOHVVWRKXPDQQDWXUHDQG
however wide any of them  seem  to run from  it hey s til return back by one passage or 
another. Even m athem atics, natural philosophy and n atural religion are in som e 
m easures dependant on a science of m an: since they lie under the cognizance of m an 
DQGDUHMXGJHGE\WKHLUSRZHUVDQGIDFXOWLHV´221  
The pivotal question was the a priori atributed to  the principle of causality +XPH¶VHPSKDVLVRQ
the practical nature of ideas was in their values b eing distinct from  theoretical ideas, he 
concluded that synthetic reason could be m erely gen eralised belief and given through natural 
LQVWLQFW7KLVPHDQWWKDW+XPH¶VVFHSWLFLVPOHIW³KXPDQQDWXUHDVWKHRQO\6FLHQFHRI0DQ´222  
As a program m atic approach to a philosophy that ZDVDOOLHGWRDPHWKRGPRYLQJ³IURPDNLQGRI
VFHSWLFLVP WR NLQG RI SRVLWLYLVP´223  which would not be uncharacteristc of later schoo ls of 
Positvism  in itsntention to turn a polem ical cut ting edge to both realist m etaphysics or eligious 
GRJPDV +XPH¶V FHQWUDO FULWLFLVP DURXQG WKH RULJLQDU\ FRQFHSW RI FDXVDOLW\ ZDV LQWHQGHG WR
question the judgem ent concerning perceived qualit es but also served to underm ine anythin g 
atributed to divine orders in nature. Such sceptic ism  towards the a priori not only underm ined 
proofs of God but also any existence of order in na ture from  which rational principles could be 
derived. By displacing the possibilty of infering  the infini WH IURP WKH ILQLWH+XPH¶V WKLQNLQJ
can be considered positvistic in another im portant  sense; itdoes not advocating against an 
afirm ative judgm ent but rather strategicaly bring s negative judgem ents o bear on every kind of 
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m etaphysical reality. 224  Here is the paradoxical anti-positvist polem ic wh ose efect was of 
clearing the way of m etaphysical concepts, but whos e polem ical destruction of any finite of 
NQRZOHGJHSRVLWLYHO\LPSOLHVDSRVVLELOLW\RIµWUXH¶NQRZOHGJHQRWXQOLNHD³FRPSHOOLQJSRZHU´
of the infinite. 225   
 
W hat a later Positvist spirt akes from  Hum e was the rejection of the absolute legitm acy of 
induction in favour of the question of values in th e relationship between experience and 
knowledge. The question of value produces, unsurpri singly, a variety of often contradictory 
responses; for exam ple, by uncovering a concept of m an, firstly from  a physiological approach 
and secondly, through a pragm atic approach, m ay inf orm  with difering values. The strong 
connection with an em erging anthropology during the  18 th  century gave such disputes another of 
+XPH¶VOHJDFLHVWKHUHODWLRQWRDSROLWLFDOWKRXJKW+XPH¶VHPSKDVLVRQDQLPPDQHQWSUDFWLFDO
approach, upheld as qualitative concepts over quant itative sciences, inform s his particular 
approach to a Science of M an. This atem pt ed  WR YLHZ PDQ¶V QDWXUDO SK\VLFDO DQG VRFLDO
environm ent w ith the positve am biton of transform ing concrete conditons of hum an existence 
through the accum ulation of pragm atic knowledge. He re he foreground ed  a specifc task behind 
the program m atic study of the hum an needs. The prag m atic m ethod overlaps w ith the system atic 
PHWKRGRIIHUHGE\/RFNH¶VHPSLULFLVP and appears therefore that both are anti-positvis tic in one 
sense and positvistic in another. This is a parado xical characteristic w hich is often also the 
feature of later Positvist thought. 
 
,QERWK LQVWDQFHVZKDWZDV LPSRUWDQWZDV WKDWPDQZDVKHOG WRKDYHD IXQGDPHQWDO µQDWXUH¶
'DYLG+XPHH[SUHVVHG WKLVDV³LW LVXQLYHUVDOO\DFNQRZOHGJHG WKDW WKHUH LVDJUHDWXQLIRrm ity 
am ong the actions of m en, i al nations and ages, and that hum an nature rem ains the sam e, in its
SULQFLSOHVDQGRSHUDWLRQV´226  $QG/RFNHZURWH³0HQ , WKLQNKDYHPXFKWKHVDPHIRUQDWXUDO
HQGRZPHQWV LQ DOO WLPHV´227  By the m id 18 th  century this concept of hum an nature crucialy 
revolved around what could be atributed to this un iversality. In this era this was underpinned by 
the influence of N ewton, Bacon and Descartes, but a lso what anthropology looked to sustain 
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through its exploration of the increasing varieties  of custom s and instiutions indicating the 
diversity of the world appearing through increased travel outside of Europe.  
 
To this end, whether itwas atributed to pragm atic  powers of reason or pursued through a 
question of sensible experience, the diverse strand s of an 18 th  century Science of M an pursued 
this as a com m on question of what could be positive ly upheld as a µWUXWK¶ of m an. The question 
of truth focussed on the notion of PDQ¶Vorigins. In 1762, Johann Gotfried  H erder atending a 
lecture in Königsberg, could note that Kant underst ood this as a m ethod which,-  
³LQRUGHUWRGLVWLQJXLVKZKDWLVDUWIURPZKDWLVQDWXUHZHPXVWSXVKWRZDUGVWKHRULJLQMXVWDV
we are accustom ed to distnguish traditonal belief s from  certainty. W e would beter need to 
study the consciousness of prim itve tribes and thi s ifar beter than ours which isa product of 
DUW5RXVVHDXKDVH[DPLQHGLW´228   
The pursuit of origins w as a m ethod of enquiry by which a Science of M an could proceed and a 
device for interogating concepts of hum an nature. By specifying constancies as  the positve 
elem ent, as both necessary and conjectural, this co unter ed  assum ptions of divine origins. This 
was understood by the m ore philosophicaly inclined  early researchers. Rousseau, for exam ple, 
noted as m uch in his econd discourse,-  
³7KHUHVHDUFKHVWKDWZHPD\HQWHULQWRRQWKLVVXEMHFWPXVWQRWEHWDNHQDVKLVWRULFDOWUXWKV
but m erely as hypothetical and conditonal reasonin g, designed m ore properly to throw light 
upon the nature of things rather than showing us th e actual origin, like the reasoning our 
SK\VLFLVWVHQJDJHLQDOOWKHWLPHLQWKHIRUPDWLRQRIWKHZRUOG´229   
Hence, when Rousseau atributed this to a diferenc e between m an and anim al, he intended a 
sharp distinction between the m oral and the physica l. By placing an idea of m an above nature it 
HPSKDVLVHG PDQ¶V FDSDFLW\ to create artifcial worlds or the second nature. This folowed 
Condilac, who also im plied as m uch grounding his l ater Logic (1780) through his earlier Essay 
on the Origin on Hum an Knowledge (1746). But in the orising this as a sharp distinction, 
Rousseau was particularly influential for K ant in c onfronting the legacy of Christian W olf and 
his folowers. M oving against a system atic approach  developed around a Science of M DQ.DQW¶V
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approach folowed a positve am biton to m odify 17 th  century ideas on psychology and 
anthropology through epistem ological practices that  characterised 18th century debates. 
 
The Science of M an in K ant  
 
Locke and Hum e are indicative of the epistem ological  problem s around an  analytic of sensation 
and sensibilty as pursued by a Science of M an in t he 18 th  century. The broad intersection this 
WKRXJKWKDGDQLPSRUWDQFHIRU.DQWIURPWKH¶VThis appears as a confrontation of values 
derived from  18 th  century aesthetics in relation to a system atised l ogic; the problem  of a priori or 
a posteriori knowledge.  
 
Later, Critque of Pure Reason described /RFNH¶V DPELWLRQ IRU D UDWLRQDO VFLHQFH FRH[WHQVive 
ZLWKWKHUHDOPRIWKHµUHDO¶DVEHLQJGHSHQGDQWRQDµWUXHPHWKRG¶230  Kant took /RFNH¶VPHWKRG 
DVSURQH WR WUDQVFHQGLQJ OLPLWVRIH[SHULHQFHRSHQLQJ WRD ILFWLWLRXV³JHQHDORJ\´DQGJLYHQ WR
new dogm atism s or even indiferentism . 231  2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG .DQW WRRN +XPH¶V VFHSWLFDO
m ethod as belon JLQJWR³DVSHFLHVRIQRPDGGHVSLVLQJDOOVHWWOHGPRGHVRIOLIH«´232  However, 
earlier when Kant pursued the broad them es of a Sci ence of M an  in  the reflective essay 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and th e Sublime (1764), he intended a contribution 
to the general analysis of eelings and their value s, grounded in a reflective historical observation 
rather than a strict philosophical enquiry. Here K a nt was folowing the w ider m otifs and ethical 
thinking of the tim e in his discussion of ideas of tem peram ent discerns relations between 
aesthetic feelings and social order. H is considerat ion was how aesthetic feelings can constiute a 
principle, Observations finds, 
 ³DVDFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIIHHOLQJWKDWOLYHVLQHYHU\KXPDQEUHDVW«WKHIHHOLQJRIEHDXW\
an GWKHGLJQLW\RIKXPDQQDWXUH«ILUVWDVDJURXQGIRUXQLYHUVDODIIHFWLRQ«VHFRQGDVD
ground for esteem «2QO\ ZKHQ RQH VXERUGLQDWHV KLV RZQ LQFOLQDWLRQV WR RQH VR
expanded can our charitable im pulses by used propor tionately and bring about the 
charitable being that isnaoble virtue. ´233    
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The grounds for this universality of eeling and it s status as a principle of virtue, was folowing 
his wel docum ented enthusiasm  for Rousseau during this period. Observations accounts for a 
turn away from  scholarly elitsm  th URXJKD V\PSDWK\ZLWK5RXVVHDX¶VFDOO IRUSKLORVRSKHUV WR
becom e educators of m ankind. Kant w as folowing an Enlightenm ent ethos, later to be expanded 
as the basis for his m oral philosophy. The notes m a de in his own copy of Observations describe 
Rousseau a VSURSRVLQJWKHFRQFHSWRIµQDWXUDOPDQ¶DVWKHPHWDSK\VLFDOLGHDOIRULQIHUULQJZKDW
was wrong with civilsed m an. K ant com es to underst and this as the synthetic procedure which 
can be taken in the sense of the regulative idea, b ut defines his own strategy against his, 
although retaining itsprinciple aim . 234   
³5RXVVHDX Ke proceeds syntheticaly and begins from  the natura l hum an being. I 
SURFHHGDQDO\WLFDOO\EHJLQQLQJIURPWKHFLYLOLVHGKXPDQEHLQJ´235   
In this way, Kant understood both analytic and synt hetic approaches as diverse strategies aim ed 
at he concept of the civilsed m an. It  also m arks the division for Kant between a practic al 
philosophy derived from  an observational science, a nd the theoretical needs for a speculative 
m etaphysics.  
 
This the sense in which Kant w ent on to pursue d iverging strategies: firtly, he lim its a concept 
RI µQDWXUDO PDQ¶ E\ WUDQVSRVLQJ 5RXVVHDX¶V SROLWLFDO FRPPXQLW\ LQWR D WUDQVFHQGHQWDO ZRUOG
where the free-wiled individual can be given ful autonom y. This stance stays close to 
5RXVVHDX¶VFRQFHSWRIIUHHGRPLQWDNLQJDQHWKLFDOVHOIDVJLYHQWRSRVVLELOLWLHVRILQWHUYHQWLRQ
through a categorical im perative. Rousseau had give n Kant an alternative m odel of intelectual 
practice in relation to the w ider curent of the En lightenm ent. In the Critques, this appears as the 
com m itm ent o an ideal im it of hum an reason by def ining a transcendental concept of the 
thinking subject o be conditoned by the m aterial world, yet whose pow er is logicaly prior to 
the senses. 236   
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The second strategy has been GHVFULEHG E\ )RXFDXOW DV D µUHVHDUFK LQWR WKH *HPW¶ and 
DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK .DQW¶V ODWHU Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. 237  This saw  Kant 
GHSDUWIURPµREVHUYHGIDFWV¶RIObservations while retaining the possibilties of r epresentation as 
a com m unicable and sociable activity. This general field of representation was conditoned under 
a concept given to a w ider anthropological consciou sness; its  µVSHFLDOHSLVWHPRORJLFDOVWUXFWXUH¶
that st ood behind both Critque and Anthropology as genera l conditons for a determ ining 
subject. This gave a general problem  for any Science  of M an. W hile Critque places a 
transcendental freedom  as the speculative concept a  priori both to a concept of nature and the 
concept of the thinking ethical subject, Anthropolo gy did not see an ethical subject as a thinking 
and unifed being of the Critque. In Anthropology,  like in Observations, the classifcation of the 
anthropological dom ain gives an observed of network  of hum an tensions which is atributed to 
the Gem üt. The special epistem ological structure st ands as a principle of lim ited freedom , the 
schem a m ediating both a concept of nature and a con cept of reedom . 
 
W hile the VSOLWLQWKHWKLQNLQJRIWKHFRQFHSWRIµQDWXUDOEHLQJ¶can be identifed as early as the 
¶V, it ishe late Anthropology where K ant succinctly  distinguishes the division between an 
intelectualy system atised knowledge and an actual ised knowledge. 238  He associated this with 
two types of research,-  
³3K\VLRORJLFDO NQRZOHGJH >ZKLFK@ aim s at what nature m akes of m an, whereas 
pragm atic knowledge aim s at what man m akes, can, or  should m ake of him self as a 
IUHHO\DFWLQJEHLQJ´239    
The later division appears in Critque as practica l reason, and isdesignated through a relation to 
an im perative. But Anthropology retains the earlier  notion of artifce or device through the 
Gem üt. Itishis division that produces the two cr ucialy diferent perspectives; a analytic of the 
LPSHUDWLYHV RI UHDVRQ RI WKH µ, WKLQN¶ DQG a concept of the synthetic network preceding the 
subject.  
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Kant introduces Anthropology in term s of an activit y of the citzen of the world develop ed  under 
WKHµQDWXUH¶RIFRVPRSROLWLFDOERQGVthrough the possibilties of an inner sense. 240  But Critque of 
Pure Reason m aintains this as a problem atic that ca nnot be justifable as a pure reason. Here 
.DQWORRNHGWRDIXWXUHVFLHQFHIRUWKH³HVWDEOLVKPHQWRILWVRZQLQDFRPSOHWHDQWKURSRORJ\WKH
SHQGDQW WR DQ HPSLULFDO GRFWULQH RI QDWXUH´241  7KLV SUREOHPDWLF µQDWXUH¶ ZDV LQ WKH ODWHU 
Anthropology, strategicaly restricted to a question of an em pircal Science of M an. H e retaine d 
DOOSRVVLELOLW\RIPDSSLQJ³WKHFRQVFLRXVQHVVWKDWPDQH[SHULHQFHV´WKDWDUHFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIWKH
FRVPRSROLWLFDO µREMHFW242  But while the am bitons of the dialectic in  the Critque displaced 
em pircal experiences, Anthropology rem ains such an  adm ixture that ofers only successive 
possibilties for knowledge available to the object  on the em pircal level. 
 
As two intelectual strategies derived of the probl em  of a Science of M an, these can be seen to 
PRYHDSDUWLQ.DQW¶VWH[WVDURXQG-1780. On the one hand, there is the interogation of the 
µ, WKLQN¶ WKH V\QWKHWLF IXQFWLRQ RI WKH &DUWHVLDQ HJR DQG LWV ORJLF RQ WKH RWKHU TXHVWLRQV RI
evident ypes in an anthropological dom ain, appeari ng as evident repetions in a world system . 
This left he possible uses of reason aligned only w ith the aspirations for a Science of M an and 
shifted the debate to a dispute over m etaphysics. 
 
Newtonians and W olfians: The Dispute in 18th centu ry M etaphysics  
 
Kant began his career as a student of the Leibniz-W o lfian philosophy. The fundam ental 
divergence from  folowers of Christian W olf em erge d through the Newtonian approach, which 
particularly fuel ed  a conflict at he Berlin Academ y of Science during  the years 1740 to 1760. 
Under the directorship of French Newtonian, Piere- Louis de M aupertuis, the debates urounded 
the nature of W olfian m etaphysics, as a system  ext ending a schem atic idealism  into historical, 
philosophical nd m athem atical branches of hum an kn owledge. 
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:ROII¶V SKLORVRSK\ held a status as a national intelectual product, subordinating other fields 
w ithin a fram ework that sought to encom pass Germ an religious and politcal thought. ,W¶V 
system atic considered N ewtonian philosophy as scien tifcaly narow in a sense not worthy of a 
general philosophy. In 1740, Fredrick Iof Prussia  wanted to appoint M aupertuis and W olf joint 
leaders at his Berlin academ y, they represent ed  two opposing brands of scientifc philosophy. 
W olf declined the ofer and, in the event, the Swi ss m athem atician and Newtonian sym pathiser 
Leonhard Euler gave the academ y itsNewtonian ground ing. Subsequently this cam e into conflict 
w ith the W olfian system  with its theological and p olitcal im plications. Even within the 
academ y, alegiances of itsm em bers were divided. F rom  1745, the first of the fam ous series of 
essay com petions began to explore this division a nd M aupertuis initated these through an 
invitation to discuss the controversial topic of M o nads. Itinitated a long running and heated 
debate around a N ewton-W olfian controversy. 243  
 
Kant entered this debate in 1756 with the essay on Physical M onadology which was his atem pt 
to redress the am biton of Leibniz/W olfinan m etaphy sics in the light of N ewtonian natural 
philosophy. Its central division was betw een non-sp atial and non-tem poral m onads, whose status 
was determ ined by internal principles of active for ce, as contrasted w ith Newtonian absolute 
space-tim e extending continuously as an external fr am ework for al aws of interaction. The 
im plications of Newtonian science were exem plifed by the paradigm  of universal gravity, i.e.
m oving m athem aticaly from  phenom ena to principles of natural bodies. K ant was arguing for a 
revised m etaphysics which needed to be subordinated  to certain results of the exact sciences. H e 
addressed the prize question of the Berlin academ y in 1764 with Enquiry Concerning Clarity of 
the Principles of Natural Theology and Ethics as  a supporter of WKHµ1HZWRQLDQ(XOHU¶SRVLWLRQ
of a synthetic m athem atics. This m oved against any general analytic m etaphysics that proceeded 
from  obscure concepts and originary notions of nece ssity and freedom , body and tim e, tc. K ant 
was aim ing at avoiding such a priori definitons, a nd instead looked to establish a regressive 
m etaphysics advancing only from  established concept s delim ited by exact sciences. 
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A m ore specifc diferentiation appeared in Negativ e M agnitudes (1763). This distinguished two 
uses of m athem atics in philosop hy and was aim ed particularly against he W olfians. Kant now 
presented a m odifed Newtonism  which found itskey idea in taking the certainty of experience 
to inform  the µPDWHULDOSULQFLSOHV¶RIKXPDQUHDVRQ¶244  By folowing the basic laws of dynam ics, 
this was to express a schem a of universal coexisten ce that constiut ed  a dom ain of derived 
properties that related to a schem a of a general in telect or understanding. This schem a w as 
im portant in a new sense; space and tim e w ere prese nted as ideal, nd given through two distinct 
principles of hum an cogniton: an intelectual facu lty of understanding and one of sensibilty 
which form ed the two branches of hum an knowledge. A gainst such ideality, the lim it of 
subjective knowledge could be brought into question  and given as om ething that would only be 
securely grounded by exact science. This dom ain had  radicaly revised conceptions of space and 
tim e, which brought into question the interplay of intelect and intuiton: the form al ogic of 
understanding confronted m etaphysical relations to an actuality which was lim ited by subjective 
finitude. 
 
The signifcance in  defining this lm it m arks .DQW¶V departure from  a general analytic tendency 
of the day. K ant now held a logical negativity agai nst he afirm ative of an originary given a 
priori. In this respect, it ishis Negative M agnitu des essay that m akes the crucial new distinction 
between a logical nothing and a physical nothing,-  
³,QQHU IHHOLQJ WHOOV XV WKDW GLVSOHDVXUH LV PRUH WKDQ D QHJDWLRQ ODFN LV QRW D
disple DVXUH«EXW D SRVLWLYH VHQVDWLRQ«SRVLWLYHO\ RSSRVHG WR SOHDVXUH«D SRVLWLYH
ground which wholy or in part cancels itout. On t he other hand a lack of pleasure is 
caled indiference, whereas the oppositon between  pleasure and displeasure is caled 
equil EULXP´245  
In  distinguishing betw een an absolute notion of indif ference and a relative notion of an 
equilbrium , Kant leaves only the second as negatio n proper, while the form er indicates only an 
absence. By proceeding from  this relative notion, he could w it h certainty claim  that al real 
oppositons m ust have real predicates, and that i is only these predicates that can be taken as 
positve.  
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Real predicates m ean both a positve desire for an object and its oppositon, the feeling of 
aversion in  its opposite, a positve displeasure. B RWKDUHTXDOLWDWLYHDVSHFWVDQGH[LVW³EHFDXVH
pleasure connected with it, ishe ground of desire  being satisfied. ´246  Itis he relativity of this 
ground that serves to delim it he distnction from  the perspective of absolute understanding and 
is contrasted w ith the am bitons pursued by the ana lytic practice of the era. This leaves K ant 
asserting that he law of identiy and diference h as only a relative relation to real ground which 
can be given only through speculative concep WVDQGWKHUHIRUH³FDQLQQRZLVHEHMXGJHG´247   
 
W ith this Kant introduced the notion of a logical h orizon. G URXQGDSSHDUVDVDµORJLFDOKRUL]RQ¶
by distinguishing itself from  real ground in the abso lute sense. This defines the concept as a 
logical expression, rather than as an absolute,- 
³WKHUHODWLRQRIUHDOJURXQGWRVRPHWKLQJZKLFKLVQHLWKHUSRVLWHGQRUFDQFHOOHGRXWE\
LWDQGFDQQRWEHH[SUHVVHGLQDMXGJHPHQW«RQO\H[SUHVVHGLQDFRQFHSW´ 
It is because speculation is the source of hum an er ror, and eror m arks the finitude of 
understanding, that the concept operates only throu gh logical contradiction. A lthough Kant finds 
that his concept can be regressed through logical analysis, the positvity of the whole, is  ³WKH
single unanalysable concept of a real ground, the r elations of which cannot be rendered distinct 
at al. ´248  Therefore, the distinction that defines the order of positve afirm ation in the dom ain of 
predicates, i the negative -as a second order af irm ation ± and this gives an active disjunctive 
EHWZHHQD FRQFHSW¶VQHFHVVLW\ DQG LWV FRQWLQJHQF\ 7KHGLVWLQFWLRQ LV EHWZHHQ WKH UHDO JURXQG
and its logical ground. It  restricts the interpretive judgem ent o a logic, w hile its  positvity is 
what the concept m aintains through the am biton to conditon a given dom ain. 
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Scepticism  in  .DQW¶VLogic  
 
This is the separation that appears in the Transcen dental A esthetic of Critque of Pure Reason 
where sensibilty gives both an intuiton and its o bject. 249  The doctrine was that sensation 
am biguously retains som ething as a psychological ef fect, whose real elem ent he transcendental 
judgem ent aim s to m ake distinct. 250  This inform s the central difculty behind Critqu e of Pure 
5HDVRQ¶V DLP IRU PRUH µSRVLWLYH¶ YDOXHV given as concepts of the understanding, which are t o 
account for both aesthetic experiences and a rational knowledge. However, Kant notably lim ited 
YDOXHVRIVHQVLELOLW\DWWKHVWDUWRIWKH7UDQVFHQGHQWDO$HVWKHWLFIROORZLQJWKH³DERUWLYHDWWHPSW
PDGHE\%DXPJDUWHQ´IRUGHILQLQJDFRQFHSW that isntegrated under an aesthesis. 251  
 
Kant m ade his radical distinction by bringing the c ritcal treatm ent of judgem ent under ational 
principles of logical analysis which distinguished a system atic form al logic from  a general 
aesthesis. W hen Alexander Gotlieb Baum garten us ed  the word aesthetics to m ean taste or 
µVHQVH¶RIEHDXW\he gave the word in itsm odern usage; earlier aesth esis refered to an abilty to 
apprehend according to bodily senses and w as D µVHQVLWLYH NQRZOHGJH,¶ JLYHQ DV VRPHWKLQJ
µLQGLVWLQFW¶252  %DXPJDUWHQGHILQHGµWDVWH¶DVPHDQLQJan  abilty to judge according to the senses, 
rather than intelect. H istoricaly aesthesis drew on feelings of pleasure or displeasure, but 
Baum garten ¶V science of aesthetics would ofer the deduction of rules or principles of an 
LQGLYLGXDO WDVWH 7DVWH ZDV WKH GRPDLQ ³IXVLQJ WRJHWKHU RI HOHPHQWV´ RI FRQIXVHG SHUFHSWLRQV
whose status was beyond the reach of the concept an d a pure logic. Y et, this ensitve knowledge 
RIWKHµGDUN¶DQGWKHLQGLVWLQFWFRXOGEHEURXJKW XQGHUDKLJKHUUHDVRQWKURXJKµSRZHUVRIWKH
soul, ¶ which Baum garten subsum ed under a Leibnizian fram e work taken to express a vita 
cognitonis, or D µOLIH RI NQRZOHGJH.¶253  But he Critque of Pure Reason opposed taking thi s 
speculative dom ain of sensibilty as the basis of p ure knowledge. K ant had already explored in 
Observations how feelings constiuted a principle o f virtue and aesthetics values, by relation to 
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DQµLPDJHRISHUIHFWLRQ¶B\WKH¶VKLVLogic lectures reveal how Kant was taking a m ore 
rigorous approach to what could be atributed to se nsibilty and experience. 254   
 
Firstly, this PHDQW DSSO\LQJ DQ DFWLYH QHJDWLYH GLVMXQFWLYH DV WKH µGLVWLQFWQHVV¶ DV WKH ORJLFDO
cogniton) which served to separate itfrom  an orde r of aesthetic feeling (Baum JDUWHQ¶V OLYHO\
µLQGLVWLQFWQHVV¶255  $OWKRXJK.DQWKDGHDUOLHU FRQVLGHUHG%DXPJDUWHQ WKH ³H[HPSODU\ DQDO\WLF
WKLQNHU´ E\ LQVLVWLQJ RQ WKLV UDGLFDO GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ DQ DQDO\WLFDO ORJLF DQG DQ DHVWKHWLF
sensibilty - a diference in kind rather than dif erence by degree - he m akes the distinction 
EHWZHHQ ³PDNLQJ RXU FRJQLWLRQV ORJLFDOO\ SHUIHFW >DQG@ DQRWKHU WKDW PDNHV RXU FRJQLWLRQ
DHVWKHWLFDOO\ VR´256  A lthough K ant rejected his aesthetic theory, he m a intained as  µH[HPSODU\¶
%DXPJDUWHQ¶VDPELWLRQ, which was to be pursued beyond this sharp divisio ns of a logic and an 
aesthesis.   
 
This is  ilustrated already as  an  am biton evident in his Logic OHFWXUHVRIWKH¶V%ORPEHUJ
lectures). 257  Kant w as taking the apprehension of an aesthesis i n term s of an active intuiton, 
whose possibilty w as in PDNLQJ D SURGXFWLYH GLVWLQFWQHVV ³WKH GLVWLQFWQHVV ZKHQ ZH FDQ
GLVWLQJXLVKZHOO WKHPDUNRIZKDWZH LQWXLW´ A esthesis presented the possibilties of positve 
values in relation to a judgem ent beyond a purely l ogical on e - ³w e achieve distinctness in 
intuiton through m ore atention per synthesin ´ The activity of aesthesis gives sensation its  
action of µPDNLQJGLVWLQFW¶rather than just a passive afection, or som ething sim ply given to a 
concrete sensation, and was an activity that m akes a judgem ent possible. However, Kant defered 
any elaboration on how aesthesis could provide such  conditons of possibilty to logical 
judgm ent on the grounds that this was beyond the li m its of a strict logic. 258   
 
Beyond the radical distinction evident in the logic  lectures, Kant retained an  am biton for 
producing this positve qualitative diference. But  he em phasised the need for abstraction and 
active com bination of elem ental data, to be HIIHFWHG WKURXJK µFRRUGLQDWLQJ PDUNV¶ ZKLFK
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them se OYHV FRXOG FRQVWLWXWH D FRPPXQLFDEOH µGLVWLQFWQHVV¶ WKHVH FRQVWLWXWHG WKH XQLYHUVDOLW\
which Kant regarded as the necessary purpose of a l ogic. Coordinating m arks relate, in a relative 
way, to a PRUHSRVLWLYHNQRZOHGJH LQ WKH/RFNHDQVHQVH³/RFNHPDGHDQ efort o show  that 
QRQHRIRXUREMHFWVRIH[SHULHQFHFDQHYHUEHDEVROXWHEXWFRPSOHWXGRFRPSDULWLYD´259 ).  
 
However, since Kant also held that cogniton of exp erience could becom e profound only when 
subordinated to logical rules, his focus w as on the  subordinating action of judgem ent whose 
activity gives approval, w ithdraws approval, or w it hholds of approval. Kant accords this to 
positve, privative, or negative. An afirm ative ju dgem ent can increase our cognitons and are 
thus positve, while the negative serves to avoid e ror. 260  The im portance of the coordinating 
m arks was to GLVWLQJXLVK D ORJLF IURP ZKDW SUHYLRXVO\ ZDV DFFRXQWHG IRU E\ µWDVWH¶ RU ZKDW
Baum garten was delim itng under laws of sensibilty , and defined by DQµHPSLULFDOSV\FKRORJ\.¶ 
Laws gave judgem ent is logical relation betw een sub ject and predicate, the im portance of 
defining this aesthetic activity through its logica l ink, or copula, extends to the dom ain of the 
µconcepti subjecti ¶261   
 
This dom ain now accounted for the positvely ground eG µPDUN¶ LQ LWV QDWXUDO UHODWLRQ WR
distinctness. The Logic was concerned only w ith the  distinction of identiy and diference, yet 
beyond these values, what the copula derives from  i ntuiton introduced the problem s of 
purposive reflection. Reflection was an afirm ative  action by which Critique of Pure Reason 
introduced its  discussion of concepts of reflection em ployed in t he act of judgm ent. 262  But these 
no longer have a direct reference to the object but  are concepts used for orientation and applied 
to both understanding and intuitons for a judgem en t held prior to, and guiding, an action. 
 
It is because Kant sees hum an reasoning as essentia ly m etaphysicaly, functioning to conditon 
an  anim al existence, that the prim ary conceptual dif iculties arose from  what was earlier 
express ed  in  the Logic (Blom berg). The signifcance for Critqu e of Pure Reason was that both 
negative and positve form s appear as two lines of thought that appear behind the Transcendental 
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Dialectic. Further on, in the A rchitectonic of Pure  Reason, K ant left he nature of th is  relation 
between an indistinct idea of the unconditoned and  its lim ited rational expression, only as a 
³SHFXOLDUXQLW\´263  However, it was specifcaly diferentiated from  a n anthropology, which he 
later eturned to as a research into inner sense, a s the nature of the Gemüt. However, in Critque 
of Pure Reason the specifc problem  was a m etaphysi cs that hinks how objects of outer space 
relate to the concept of the Cartesian subject. Thi s subject is  the peculiar a priori XQLW\RIWKH³,
think, ´and Kant left he nature of this a priori as the ta sk for a future m etaphysics to study. 264  
 
Aesthetics and Power in .DQW¶V0HWDSK\VLFV 
  
The Critque of Pure Reason also proposed m etaphysi cs as  the study that could distinguish itself 
from  an em pircal psychology. The later was the pr actice that belonged to a rational m etaphysics 
³QRPRUHWKDQHPSLULFDOSK\VLFVGRHV´265  Aesthetics presented the particular difculties f or the 
study of consciousness and this can also be traced to WKHHDUO\¶V through .DQW¶VOHFWXUHVin 
psychology. H ere a rational psychology took its am b iton in  accounting for an intelectual 
DFWLYLW\DWWULEXWDEOHWRDQLQQHUVHQVHDQGJLYHQWRWKH&DUWHVLDQ³,WKLQN´which was contrasted 
w ith what em pircal ps \FKRORJ\WRRNDVµ,SHUFHLYH¶:RUNLQJIURP%DXPJDUWHQ¶VM etaphysica 
as a textbook, Kant aught hat an outer sense was clearly distinct from  the thinking principle, 
and which com es together through the soul. Itis h is perception which describes ³DNQRZOHdge 
ZKLFKEHORQJVWRPH«DUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIP\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV«DVHOISHUFHSWLRQ´266  which Kant 
took as the apperception inform ing a rational psychology. Rational psychology was the st udy of 
inner cognitons as they far as they can be given a s concepts of reason to the thinking subject. 
 
Kant ¶V Lectures on M etaphysics show him  diferentiating th e active representations of the 
senses, from  an em pircal psychology which m eant pa ssive afectivity. This had itsparalel w ith 
what Logic distinguished between the distinct or in distinct. But he signifcant diference is  that 
M etaphysics fram es its  discussion in term s of higher or lower functions o f the soul. In the se  
earlier lectures this function was understood as a power which was either self-active or passive; 
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higher functions of the intelect are active, while  sensibilty isthe passivity of the lower function . 
It is a distinction which has a signifcan t relation to what Logic excludes from  its  discussion of 
the thinking consciousness as an aesthetic sensibil ity . In his psychology, he holds that sensible 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVFDQ³HLWKHUEHJLYHQRUPDGH´WKURXJKWKHDFWLYLW\RIWKHWKLQNLQJFRQVFLRXVQHVV
or atributed to the VSRQWDQHLW\ RI D ³IRUPDWLYH SRZHU.´ Such a pow er is not he sam e as the 
power of logical understanding; a ³IRUPDWLYH SRZHU´ is atributed to both higher and low er 
functions of the soul. 267  As such, power here accounts for a relation to an  indistinctness, and 
appears as an unconscious of perception. The signif icance of this form ative power is that Kant 
thereby avoids a relation of equivalence to the m at erial doctrine of pure sensation.   
 
However, the difculty of such an unconscious powe r introduces a converse problem , that of 
µVXEUHSWLRQ¶268  Subreption m eant a reflection of an em pircal habi t that confuses sensible 
intuiton with som ething from  a dom ain of discursiv e logic: this is  no longer a distinct cogniton. 
On this basis, a distinction becam e dependant on th e question of judgm ent. This was the m easure 
discussed under powers of the soul, and historical y atributed to the drives of pleasures and 
desires, both basic but diverse powers. But he not ion of a psychological soul, by definiton a 
unity of such powers rather than a distinct princip le, relat ed  WKHVHGLYHUVHSRZHUVWRWKHµ,WKLQN¶
of the Cogito which dem onstrated a m ore basic power  that arose from  the determ inations of 
conceptual thought. The M etaphysics lectures do not  show Kant elaborating on this; the question 
of this unity was again retained as a IXWXUHWDVNRIDSKLORVRSK\³VRIDUDV LWLVSRVVLEOH´ 269   
 
These earl y lectures in Logic and M etaphysics indicate what he  Critque of Pure Reason was 
bringing together under a m ore specifc goal, delim itng what could be unders tood of the peculiar 
unity through a problem  of form al logic. The Transc endental D ialectic relates this as two 
fundam entaly opposed form s of knowledge, one a con stiuted finitude of the Logic, another the 
unconditoned but creative intelect, understood as  retaining the 18 th  century m otif of power. This 
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was the infinit \WKDWDQµLQWXLWLYHLQWHOOHFW¶LPPDQHQWDQGIRUPDWLYHFDUULHVLQLWVDPELWLRQIRU
knowledge which .DQWSOD\HGRXWEHWZHHQWKHµQDWXUDO¶DQGµLGHDO¶DVSHFWV270   
 
Power/Knowledge: Transcendental Analytic and Synthe tic Judgem ent  
 
In the critcal context, his relates to a distinct ion between the m odes of judgem ent which 
distinguished the transcendental doctrine of knowle dge. W hat the Critque of Pure Reason 
pursued as the possibilty of a rational m etaphysic s, w as the am biton for a transcendental 
knowledge which gave m eaning to an analytic judgem e nt reproduced in grounded concepts. 
Judgem ent selects by defining itsubject-predicate  under the relation to a particular concept. Its 
HPSLULFDOQDWXUHGHILQHGE\DHVWKHWLFDFWLYLW\XQGHUWKHGRPDLQRIDµconcepti subjecti, ¶XSKROGV
its positve reason by relating the ground of the c oncept to possibilty of the judgm ent. But while 
a general ogic gives this transcendental ground, t he power to constiute the judgm ent becom es 
the question of transcendental principles. Kant sai d that he analytic judgem ent hinks only 
according to the concept, but his was not a true o bject of experience. Rather, the distinction 
between the analytic and synthetic was understood t hrough what the negative separates concepts 
out by virtue of identiy w ithin reproducible conce pts ; the analytic judgm ent can be given only 
by such identiy. But identiy was grounded by posi tive diference, whose relation was to the 
indeterm inate. In this sense, the negative was not concerned with m etaphysical principles but 
w ith the reasoning which distinguishes a priori fo m  a posterior knowledge. 271   
 
It is im portant o distinguish an em pircal ogic f rom  what was ofered by scientifc knowledge . 
This is because the positve sciences were exem plary in  being universalised dom ains that 
separate historical adm ixtures into a constiuted a  prior knowledge. One could see the am biton 
for a Science of M an in  giving a transcendental perspective on an em pirca l dom ain in general:  
transcendental ogic as a general ogi c.  In this sense it aim s at both a transcendental kno wledge 
and a transcendental power. But he question that K ant brought o an Enlightenm ent Science of 
M an was delim ited to legitm ate unity beyond the pa rticularity of subject-predicate relations. 
W hile a rational m etaphysics studies the functional  knowledge that could relate the inner 
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experience of outer possibilties, the transcendent al principles gave the objective for a Science of 
M an m erely because such principles were posited as grounding itsrue and legitm ate function. 
 
The problem  of em pircal knowledge was precisely th is historical adm ixture given according to 
diverse principles. Because science w as taken to di splace an analytic knowledge with a new  
synthetic knowledge, the am biton for transcendenta l logic was of the substiution of an 
em pircal analytic for a pure synthetic understandi ng. 272  The difculty of a new synthetic 
knowledge is that idraws on the problem atic princ iples given to the source of such synthetic 
judgm ents beyond the logical horizon of the grounde d concept, -
³But in synthetic judgem ents I have already advanced  beyond the given concept, 
viewing as in relation with the concept som ething a ltogether diferent from  what was 
thought in it.This relation isnever either a rela tion of identiy or contradiction; and the 
judgm ent, aken in and by itself, the truth and fal sity of the relation can never be 
GLVFRYHUHG´273  
%HFDXVH .DQW¶V DPELWLRQ IRU D SXUH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ UHTXLUHV WKDW ³WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI WKH
possibilty of experience in general re the sam e a s the conditons of the possibilty of the objects 
RI H[SHULHQFH´274  he prem ised conditonality on m athem atical princip les of N ewtonian 
dynam ics. Im portantly, this was not axiom atic in it self: the issue was rather that he w as 
folowing th is  as the principle by which a pow er giv es  unity in representation through concepts 
of understanding. This power was the function of un derstanding, of organising according to 
positve categories of experience. 
 
7KHSRVLWLYHFDWHJRULHVIROORZIURP.DQW¶VWable of judgm ent. (A80/B106). This characterised a 
faculty of rules for defining the inner nature of h um an understanding and the unity brought 
WRJHWKHUDFWLYHO\WKURXJKWKH³,WKLQN´$:KLOHWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDODFWLYLW\RIWKHWKLQNLQJ
µ,¶ XVHV FRQFepts that derive their power of understanding from  a claim  on a reality, its the 
positve categories that delim it a dom ain of consta ncy as  D VFKHPDWLVP RU µDUW¶ It is this 
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categorical function that ultim ately rem ains hidden .275  The question of the activity of a pow er to 
relate sensation - DVWKHµPDWWHURIDSSHDUDQFH¶ - WRLQQHUVHQVHE\DFRQFHSWXDOµILOOLQJRXW¶RU
reduction to nothing as  the continuous production of states that could ind ex a relation to Being 
itself. (A20/B34) This m eant that while the form ati ve power of synthesis determ ined the 
m agnitudes of space as wel as ittem poral qualit es, along with their elations and m odalites, 
yet the conceptual succession and coexistence of su ch a priori determ inations in this tm e-series 
was also neces VDULO\OLPLWHGDQGXOWLPDWHO\UHWDLQHG³QRRWKHUSRVVLEOHHPSOR\PHQW´RWKHUWKDQ
the em pircal. (A146)  
 
This gives the schem atism  the power of conditoning  a purely logical unfolding of reason, while 
WKH ³SHFXOLDU XQLW\´ RI WKH DUFKLWHFWRQLF ZDV the em pircal elem ent which Critque of Pure 
Reason GHVFULEHGDV³GXHWRVHQVLELOLW\´276  In this ense, the problem  for .DQW¶V Science of M an 
was that it  retained the legacy derived from  of 18 th  century aesthetics, which he had earlier 
characterised in Baum garten as DQµDERUWLYHDQDO\WLF¶DUDZLQJRQWKH³PHUHO\HPSLULFDO´which 
was a theory of taste derived from  the historical d octrine of pleasure and pain, Kant did not think 
could furnish apodictic laws in term s of the scienc e of the day (A21n). However, its in the 
Critque of Judgement where Kant shifts his perspec tive on this am biton. The am biton was to 
UHIOHFW RQ µVRPHWKLQJ¶ WKDW QHFHVVDULO\ PXVW EH DFFRXQWHG IRU DQG LQ WKLV KH UHWXUQHG WR
conceptual possibilties of perception through cons idering the tw in FRQFHUQVRIµDUW¶DQGµRUJDQLF
IRUP¶ 7Kis  return w as also to the DPELWLRQ RI GLVFRYHULQJ WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI µD QDWXUH¶ EHLQJ
judged under a power of judgm ent. It  m eant he am biton of discovering principles behin d 
positng the natural concept.  
 
The Critque of Judgem ent extended the problem atic idea derived of an 18th century Science of 
M an into the account of an evident capacity at he origins of the positive categories of an 
understanding. K ant now  m ade a new distinction; a d eterm inate form  that caries a concept into 
the determ ination of the particular, and the concep t of reflection on the particular, to which a 
UHIOHFWLYH MXGJHPHQW LV µFRPSHOOHG WR DVFHQG¶   7KLV is the reflective judgm ent seen as 
inseparable from  the particularity of aesthetic exp erience of pleasure and Kant hereby gave 
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sensibilty a new reflective role for the em pircal  art of schem atism  which related to the 
experience of the body. (§ 6)  
 
The Concept of N ature and a Technics of Power  
 
The Critque of Judgement m oved away from  questions  of predication and logic towards 
reflective techniques of knowledge. This study was of the power that underlies concept 
production and the categories for ordering the worl d at the level of anthropological 
consciousness. It m eant he em pircaly positve fu nction of m ediation of hum an experience 
WKURXJKDFULWLFDO UHIOHFWLRQRQ WKH µPDWWHURI ORJLF¶RU LQWXLWLRQ7KLV µPDWWHU¶DSSHDUHGHLWKHU
under the schem atic of an understanding or under th e sym bolic m ode of analogy, to which the 
later gave the reflection which stood for an indir ect intuiton accounted for through the 
im agination. 277   
 
The m ediation of im agination through feelings of pl easure and displeasure was a power which 
VHUYHGWRJURXQGWKH³LQQHUSRVVLELOLW\´RIFRQFHSWVLQWKHLUSUDFWLFDOapplication. Itfolow ed the 
concerns of a Science of M an in the sense that is erved a positve distnction of functional 
FRQFHSWV IURP³WKHQDUURZ ORZ OLIHRI DQLPDOV´ 7KHVH UHTXLUHG WHFKQLTXHVRI UHIOHFWLRQ
prior to any expressions of desire as they ofered the possibilty of reasoned transform ation of 
habituated m oral interests. But his also looked ba ck to an earlier conception of pleasure and 
displeasure for itspositve source, r HIOHFWLRQZDVWRDFFRXQWIRUWKHSULQFLSOHVDVFULEHGRQO\WR³D
fHHOLQJ RI OLIH´ by which Kant indicated the µYLYDFLW\¶ LQ UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ in its relation to a 
historical concept of the living. (§1)  
 
The dispositon that life took up in itspurposiven ess was driving the teleology which appears in 
the second part of Critque of Judgement. Kant asso ciated the positve predispositons of our 
cognitve faculties w ith the orienting of what w as conceptualy apprehended of an external order. 
This was m oving beyond the strict divide of reason and experience and served his positve 
am bitons for explaining an evidently conditoned n ature,- 
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³7RGLVFRYHULQQDWXUHDQLQWHOOLJLEOHRUGHU«GLYLGHLWVSURGXFWVLQWRJHQHUDDQGVSHFLHV
through a principle of explanation and interpretati on, and, out of m aterial com ing to 
hand in such confus LRQWRPDNHDFRQVLVWHQWFRQWH[W´278   
This is  the technic of nature to which reflection gives th e consistent context of DQµXQGHVLJQHG
SXUSRVLYHQHVV¶in  the logical order evident behind the power of conc ept production (§72). Kant 
SURSRVHGWKDWµLPDJLQDWLYH LGHDV¶SUHGLFDWHGWKHSUDFWLFDOQHFHVVLW\RIWKHFRQFHSWthis grounded 
WKHVXEMHFW¶VIUHHGRP,Walso m eant hat ranscendental philosophy could loo k beyond a narow  
understanding of schem atics by adopting som ething b eyond a conditoned necessity. It is this 
speculative freedom  that gives the µURRW RULJLQ¶ WR VXEMHFWLYH UHDVRQLQJ EH\RQG LWV HPSLULFDO
nature.  
 
:KDWFRQVWLWXWHGWKLVSUREOHPDWLFVRXUFHIRUDQ\LGHDVRIUHDVRQLQWKHµIHHOLQJRIOLIH¶now also 
constiuted the positve principles in the concept of subjective physical ends. Despite the fact that 
.DQW¶V WHOHRORJ\ ILQGV VXFKXQLYHUVDOLW\ FRPSURPLVHGE\ZKDW VXEMHFWLYHQHFHVVLW\GUHZ IURP
objective reflection, (§77) he m aintained that unde rlying possibilties for transcendental 
knowledge was to be discovered som ething to be acco unted for by techniques of representation. 
These efects appear in  the conform ation of aculties. (§77) Because these  relate the pow er of 
synthesis to a higher source of inality (even an o riginary cause of the world, §78), itwas the 
causality which could only find its expression only  through a positve notion or heuristic 
principle, that ccounts for an orientation of the concept of life in the concept of nature. 
 
Kant returned to an anthropological predispositon in understanding for such a positve notion. 
Paradoxicaly, he also DWWULEXWHG WKLV WR D VSRQWDQHLW\ WKDW WKLQNV ³GLIIHUHQW IURP WKH KXPDQ´
(§77) This predispositon to diference w as aligned  with what Critque of Pure Reason gave as 
the possibilty of ataining a pure intuiton throu gh the account for new elem ent beyond any 
constiuted finitude. Itdrew on a com pletely trans cendental concept, no longer focussed on the 
nexus of intuiton and understanding, but explained  by the am biton to account for predicates of 
judgem ent. This was a power underlying any possible  representation or discursivity. 279  
Transcendental theorising refered this problem  to an anthropology through its account of 
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vivacity as positvely relating pleasures to  a predispositon of our cognitve faculties; but he 
SUDFWLFDOQHFHVVLW\RIPRUDOSHUVSHFWLYHRQRXU ³FRQVFLRXVO\YDLQGHVLUHV´JDYH WKH µQDWXUH¶RI
this relation between pleasure and desire. 280  From  th is  perspective, .DQW¶V HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK D
Science of M an  was exploring a doctrine of nature that pointed to  the dom ain of em pircal 
psychology. As a doctrine of nature, this converged  with the particular dificulties of legitm acy, 
to which CPR dem anded the apodictic certainty of a science. 
 
Extending the Legitm ate Grounds for a Doctrine of Nature   
 
The 1785 text, M etaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, saw  Kant folow a natural 
description of objective knowledge of bodies to the  lim it  given as apodictic science. H istoricaly, 
a doctrine of nature w as the ontological ground of knowledge in  general expanded as  a natural 
science. W hen Kant extended a µPHWDSK\VLFV RI ERGLHV¶ GHULYHG IURP 1HZWRQLDQ G\QDPLFDO
principles it was to see how far they served a m ode rn m etaphysics. 281   
 
In Critque of Pure Reason, the foundational relati on is given in the Transcendental D eduction: 
LQ WKH µJHQHUDO QRWHV RQ D V\VWHP RI WKH SULQFLSOHV¶ Kant indicates the am biton to  delim it 
VFKHPDWLFDOO\ DQ REMHFWLYH UHDOLW\ JLYHQ WR µRXWHU LQWXLWLRQV,¶ LQ VR IDU DV WKH\ FRQWDLQ WKH
³FRQGLWLRQVRISRVVLELOLW\RIUHDOUHODWLRns of action and reaction, and therefore the possib ilty of 
FRPPXQLW\´282  For an  em pircal thought of outer intuiton to be com preh ensible as m ovem ent of 
points in space, this m plicated successive existen ces of an inner self in diferent sates. Critque 
of Pure Reason VWDWHV WKDW³VSDFH DORQH LVGHWHUPLQHGDVSHUPDQHQWZKLOH WLPHDQG WKHUHIRUH
HYHU\WKLQJLQLQQHUVHQVHLVLQFRQVWDQWIOX[´283  From  this assertion, Kant went on to state that, 
³DOO DOWHUDWLRQ SUHVXSSRVHV VRPHWKLQJ SHUPDQHQW LQ LQWXLWLRQ, an d through an inner sense no 
SHUPDQHQWLQWXLWLRQLVPHWZLWK´284  In this way, an afirm ative succession of inner se nse caried 
the am biguity of perm anent causality into al the w ider em pircal sciences. 
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However, Critque of Pure Reason also looked to obj ectivity as upholding the positve am bitons 
that folowed from  the categorical approach to repr esentation. This m eant the possibilty of 
synthesis that serv es  the two folowing points;  
- Firstly, itstates LQ µ7KH5HIXWDWLRQRI ,GHDOLVP¶ WKDW the positve am bition was to ground the 
Transcendental Aesthetic. This was the central task  of giving m eaning beyond what was 
dogm aticaly denied to positve content in the obje ctive relations of subjective representations. In 
WKLV VHQVH .DQW¶V 7UDQVFHQGHQWDO ,GHDOLVP defines itself against what could be considered a 
sceptical pproach, i.e.t does not com pletely exc lude an em pircal possibilty at som e lvel. 
 
By denying both an absolute transcendental realism  as wel as an em pircal idealism , Kant leaves 
the path open to what can be considered under the p ositve content of an em pircal 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ 7KH µ5HIXWDWLRQ RI ,GHDOLVP¶ OHDYHV WKLV WR WKH FRPSRVLWH RULJLQ RI H[SHULHQFH
which Critque of Pure Reason indicates in space an d tim e, considered in term s of an intuitve 
com posite which is open to the transcendental dom ai n of representation. However, since this 
excludes the em pircal positon which takes tim e an d space as im ply given, or the real in it-self 
as an independent sensibilty, Kant retained a com p lexity in experience itself. This had positve 
value as an objectivity beyond a sim ple em pircal i ntuiton. 285  
 
- Secondly, by folowing a science of natural descr iption, Kant points to the determ inations of 
outer nature as im plicating the positve dom ain. Th is dom ain caries the am biton of true 
representation of the transcendental concept. Itne cessitates invoking a certain theoretical notions 
of what a positve dom ain could express about actua l states of afairs which, in turn, im plicates 
the principle of causality behind al positve dete rm ination of nature, since this dom ain extends 
towards a w ider em pircal nature. 286    
 
The question of such a dom ain was folowed in Crit que of Pure Reason through possibilties 
required of a perspective on the general doctrine o f ERGLHV7RWKLVHQGLWZDV.DQW¶VµWDEOHRI
FDWHJRULHV¶ WKDW JDYH WKH LPSRUWDQW WKHRUHWLFDO DSSURDFK WR EH IROORZHG E\ transcendental 
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philosophy, this supplies WKH³LQGLVSHQVLEOH´SODQIRUthe science which is a com plete theory of 
knowledge. If one folow V WKH µWDEOH RI FDWHJRULHV¶ one finds that im oves from  a synthetic 
m athem atics by analogicaly extension into a dynam i c science and Kant indicates that while the 
form er can stand as fuly constiutive, the later could only be the regulative for a w ider 
system atic knowledge. The paralel is  for the progression of any speculative science as projected 
LQWR.DQW¶VJHQHUDOV\VWHPDWLFRIKXPDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ287   
 
By taking WKH OHJLWLPDWHJURXQGRI1HZWRQLDQG\QDPLFV DVDJHQHUDO µPHWDSK\VLFVRIERGLHV¶
the Critque of Pure Reason m erely pointed to as po ssibilties around an expanded analogical 
thinking. But M etaphysical Foundations of Natural S cience considers these by degrees of 
determ ination of the senses from  a pure m athesis. T his is a progression that folows from  the 
determ inable kinem atics, through the dynam ical aspe cts of a m echanics and extends to a general 
phenom enology of m ater. This phenom enology relies increasingly for itsdeterm ination through 
the reference to a m ode of representation by the se nses, and thereby depends on a power of 
representation generaly. So the progression from  t he m ost form alised to the least form al opened 
increasingly to an em pircal practice of concept pr oduction. 288  On the one hand, degrees of 
determ ination relate the dynam ical concept to the d ata of intuiton, but on the other, this relation 
gave laws of thought as they appeared from  the pers pective of an em pircal finitude as it chas es  
an exhaustive determ ination. The im portant point of  this schem atic was to indicate that m or e 
em pircal sciences, as built up through observation  and experim ent, appear as open to the 
³LQILQLWHPDQLIROGRILQWXLWLRQV´and ultim ately leaves their explorations in an infi nite regress. 289   
 
W hat were the specifc am bitons of M etaphysical Fo undations in seting out principles of 
constructing concepts on this scale? W as it o give  legitm ate grounds to a w ider schem atic that 
relat ed  to a Science of M an with a natural scientifc concept of nature at itsfoundat ion? Or did it  
show what w as unfolded through phenom enal by degree s of em pircism  under the law of 
reciprocity was actualy a lim ited axiom  of the real in as far as itofered s uficiency? By 
suficiency, K ant m eant to distnguish his thinking  from  Leibnizian system  which had a 
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presupposed notion of pre-established harm onies to accounting for principles of discursivity. 290  
This notion returned the problem  of knowledge as a concern of com m unity, and Kant 
em phasised this in WKH µ3RVWXODWHV RI (PSLULFDO 7KRXJKW¶ %II +HUH D SULQFLSOH RI
discursivity worked within the laws of space and ti m e for which reciprocity suficed as long as it 
is not aken as noum enal existence. It m erely ofer ed possible conceptual relations as they 
extended experience. But such knowledge alw ays suf ered from  the danger of confusing of 
subjective experience w ith an objectivity. 291   
 
The later could not give apodictic certainty from  the Newtonian perspective. This was a 
perspective whose legitm acy folow ed  a principle of inertia in m ater and Kant further qualifed 
this as a passive dom ain. In turn, this passivity m arks the distinction from  speculative 
internalised principles w hich, although lacking suc h apodictic certainty, he atributed to concepts 
of life,-
 ³/LIH PHDQV WKH FDSDFLW\ RI D VXEVWDQFH WR GHWHUPLQH LWVHOI WR DFW Irom  an internal 
principle, of a finite substance to determ ine itsel f to change, and of a m aterial substance 
WRGHWHUPLQHLWVHOIWRPRWLRQRUUHVWDVFKDQJHRILWVVWDWH´292  
Because such internalised principles do not conform  to a Newtonian view of m ater, 
M etaphysical Foundations was therefore also arguing  that natural science gave natural im its of 
knowledge in relation to a universal doctrine of ex perience. This w as an em phasis on lim its 
which now appear as essentialy philosophical, rath er than sim ply em pircal or m athem atical. 
This left the positvity of experience as defining a special dom ain whose specifcity in relation to 
sciences of hum an reason, was upheld thorugh philos ophical am bitons for a general doctrine of 
w isdom . This m eans that M etaphysical Foundations ul tim ately indicates what m athem atical 
sciences lacked between giving m etaphysical and phi losophical foundations to the 
anthropological dom ain of experience. Itisan asym m etry that extends to the Science of M an and 
al w ider dom ains under the influence of natural hi story, physiology and anthropology, etc. 
These now necessitated a special epistem ology to give  the w ider philosophical grounding. 293  
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Distnguishing Betw een Physics and Phusiologia   
 
The need for the new epistem ology w as at he lim it to what M etaphysical Foundations and 
Critque of Pure Reason derived from  the paradigm  d eveloped under an argum ent for universal 
gravitation and its law of inertia. In %RRN ,,, RI 1HZWRQ¶V Principia, the inertial concept of 
m ater is understood as em pircal to the extent ha t it depends on the perceptions and actions of 
the senses. In Critque of Pure Reason, The Analogi es of Experience folowed this as em pircal 
reasoning about causal relationships w ith an em phas is on the power of application of an 
understanding. 294  ,QH[SDQGLQJ1HZWRQ¶VFRQFHSWLRQVRQPRYLQJIRUFHVWRDQHPSLULFDOOLPLWWKH
M etaphysical Foundations ilustrated the distinctio n between a natural science and a broader 
philosophy of nature: the regressive analysis of Ne wtonian principles pushed this  point o a 
phenom enology which necessitated a physiologicaly grounded concept of nature accounted for 
by the senses. 295  
 
W hat isignifcant of an  HSLVWHPRORJ\JURXQGHGE\1HZWRQ¶VPDWKHPDWLFVZDVWKDWDFRQFHSWRI
m ater was externalised force and notably opposed t o an idea of hylozoism , the doctrine of 
m ater atributed to an internalised force. 296  During this era, the expansion of new  em pircal 
sciences w as opening wider conceptions of what coul d constiute legitm ate foundations under 
which specifc forces of m ater could be apprehende d by natural scientifc speculation. For 
exam ple, in the 1724 w ork by H erm an Boerhaave, Elem enta Chemiae, he described s pecifc 
phenom ena in particular bodies through a speculativ e understanding although did not assum e 
these as universal principles. W hile these were not  taken as a priori, Boerhaave and others - 
notably the im portant contem porary, the chem ist and  physiologist Georg Ernst Stahl - held 
unanim ously that he Newtonian paradigm  presented t he ideal of experim ental philosophy. The 
chem ist Georg Stahl, often associated w ith the theo ry of the virtualy weightless substance 
known as phlogiston, is also associated w ith a vita listic system  in the field of m edicine. But h e 
notably opposed the m aterialism s of Boerhaave and a lso the physician and physiologist Friedrich 
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Hofm ann. 297  Folowing an  ideal science m eant discovering what new relations  could be 
established for phenom enal thought hrough the disc iplined m ethod of em pircal observation. 
This m eant folowing the analogical m odel by which N ewton derived the universal aw  of 
gravitation.  
 
Kant w as w el grounded in the 18 th  century sciences and fam ilar w ith the discussions  of such 
forces and other new ideas em erging to account for the science of specifc bodies. These were 
being understood, not begining with natural definit ions or general theories such as the universal 
and generic forces of gravity, but addressed throug h epistem ological questions becom ing 
necessary in  justifying new physiological views of the body. Ka nt shared th is  view of 
introducing a priori concepts as  hypothetical representation of the body to account  for intrinsic 
powers evident in living organism s. 298  It had a signifcant bearing on his progressive 
philosophical am bitons that folow ed  a transiton between a natural scientifc concept and the 
SK\VLFLDQ¶VFRQFHSWRIQDWXUHThis appears m ost developed in .DQW¶VODVWXQILQLVKHGZRUNWKH
Opus Postumum, which was m oving away from  discussio n of eelings and reflective judgem ents 
of Critque of Judgement and has been identifed w i th the am biton for exploring purposiveness 
w ithin the experience of the body. 299   
 
Extending a concept of the vegetative body through its experience of orce gave a signifcance 
that em erg es  around what Kant considered an im portant estim atio n in understanding positve 
activites in other bodies. A  speculative concept o f vegetative body and its experiences could 
ofer the possibilty for new form s of science, -
³ZH H[SHULHQFH RUJDQLF IRUFHV LQ RXU RZQ ERG\ DQG ZH FRPH E\ PHDQV RI DQDOogy 
with them  (with a part of their principle), to the concept of the vegetative body, leaving 
RXWWKHDQLPDOSDUWRISULQFLSOH´300   
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The Critque of Judgment already conceived of the h um an as the highest exam ple of a biological 
organism , the anim al as elf-m oving m achine w ith th e possibilties for giving subjective ends to 
itself under a concept of nature, 301  Opus Postumum describes an experim ental science of  the self-
m oving m achine as opening the possibilties to a wi der experience of nature, - 
³KHFDQDQG Ls entiled to, introduce a priori organic m oving fo rces of bodies into the 
FODVVLILFDWLRQ RI ERGLHV LQ JHQHUDO«DOWKRXJK RQO\ LQGLUHFWO\ DFFRUGLQJ WR DQ DQDORJ\
ZLWKWKHPRYLQJIRUFHRIWKHERG\DVPDFKLQH´302   
The context for exploring the w ider possibilties f or a system  of thought was already m apped out 
by the architectonic of Critque of Pure Reason. Ka nt indicated the future science of m etaphysics 
ZDV GLYLGHG EHWZHHQ WKH µPHWDSK\VLFV RI QDWXUH¶ DQG D µPHWDSK\VLFV RI PRUDOV¶303  The later 
found itsfulest expression in the WH[WRIZKLOH.DQW¶VUHTXLUHPHQWIRUDQHZHSLVWHPRORJ\
beyond the infinite regress of M etaphysical Foundat ions indicat es  the ful m etaphysics of nature 
that never appeared.  
 
Bowever the Architectonic gave a sketch of what was  int HQGHGRIVXFKµPHWDSK\VLFVRIQDWXUH¶
Kant subdivided a general science of nature into, ontology, rational physiology, rational 
cosm ology, rational theology ; beyond this a further division of rational physiolo gy com prised of 
rational physics and rational psychology. 304  This classifcation was presented as a progressive  
program  of study for the physics that would becom e the m etaphysics of bodies in general. A  
natural system  of thought was an am biton for his t ranscendental project, he phenom enology 
that necessitated a physiologicaly grounded concep t of nature of the senses. It  addressed two 
specifc problem s; 305   
- Firstly, the positve dom ain of a rational physic s as the ultim ate goal of a general m etaphysics 
proper: M etaphysical Foundations could only give th e lim ited form ulation, faling short of the 
am biton of ataining a reasoned knowledge beyond t he boundaries of experience w ith regard to 
al bodies.  
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- 6HFRQGO\VLQFH WKHJHQHUDOPHWDSK\VLFVRIQDWXUHZDVFRQVLGHUHGDQ³LQGLVSHQVDEOHVHUYLFH´
for giving rational sense beyond conditonality, its  am bition was JLYLQJ SRVLWLYH µVHQVH DQG
PHDQLQJ¶ WR D IXWXUH VFKHPDWLFV that constiuted a phenom enological basis for the i nner sense 
and its tim e determ inations. Itaim ed at an epistem ologicaly basis for a com plete Science of 
M an.306   
The M etaphysical Foundations was not intended to pr ovide such a general concept of nature, as 
its positve content was excluded by the relativity  of the dom ain. However, it  m arked the lim it 
for advancing through identiy and diference. By d iverging from  sim ple relations of observable 
physical diferences, it indicated the necessity in  the w ider philosophical program  for exploring 
latency in a phenom enal knowledge of nature. The wi der system atic investigation of nature 
would look to a transiton grounded by new  concepts  of m oving forces which was converging 
with the life sciences. 
  
.DQW ZURWH DQ DSSHQGL[ WR 6DPXHO 7KRPDV 6|PPHULQJ¶V Uber das Organ der Seele (1796). 
Söm m ering was an encyclopaedic anatom ist and one of  the m ost experienced and renowned 
neuro-anatom ists of the late eighteenth century. H i s description and ilustrations of the brainstem  
gave an early classifcation of cranial nerves (cir ca 1778). These representations of structure and 
function was understood as hypothetical, but Söm m er ing was convinced that m ental faculties 
were executed by certain brain regions which his tr eatise gave as localized functions of the soul 
w ithin cerebrospinal fluids in close contact w ith p resum ed nerve endings w ithin wals of 
ventricular cavites. This atem pt at  synthesising anatom y and m etaphysics fueled conte m porary 
discussions around epistem ological egitm acy. Söm m ering placed the organ of the brain at he 
centre of a debate central to a Science of M an with  far-reaching consequences for the w ider 
discourses on m an wel into the 19 th  century. This provoked a com plicated picture that w as 
unfolding under a Science of M an which em erged arou nd the inherent confusion between what 
constiuted the positve and the vital concepts of life. 307  Another exam ple discussed by K ant in 
The Conflict of the Faculties ZDV &KULVWRSK :LOKHOP )ULHGULFK +XIHODQG¶V M akrobiotik, a 
contem porary work on preventive m edicine that engag ed with contem porary scientifc thinking. 
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Hufeland took an organizing principle as  the lebenskraft, he vitality as conception of liv ing 
force which could be weakened or strengthened throu gh external influences, This concept of lie 
was legitm ated on the basis of a theory of m oral a nd physical health from  which Hufeland 
advanced theories on the ethical ife. .DQW¶V com m m entary, however, saw  him  em phasise the 
powers of m ind, as carying the norm alising judgem e nt over a concept of the body along with its
conditons of m astery. 308   
 
The wider experience of the system  of nature w as th eorised in Critque of Pure Reason as the 
µ6\VWHPRIDOO3ULQFLSOHVRI8QGHUVWDQGLQJ¶309  It  aim ed to constiute a priori knowledge for the 
relations to sensibilty through a system  of experi ence under a broader physiological system  ± to 
which physics only represented a narow relation. I n Opus Postumum, K ant folowed the µWDEOH
RI MXGJPHQW¶ ZLWK a transcendental am biton of converging the system  of observations as 
survey ed  in the new form al elem ents through their progressi on from  axiom s of intuition to an 
experience in general. This am bitous system atising  of a w ider dom ain of orce alongside the 
contem porary interpretation of anim al powers, and m eant heorising from  the perspective of 
afectivity, to the possibilty of thinking phenom e naly, as constiuting a world-system . 310  
 
The New Life Sciences and the Scientia Natura  
 
The kind of a world-system  that Kant was discussing  in the Opus Postmum is exem plifed by 
(UDVPXV 'DUZLQ¶V Zoonomia. 311  In 1796, Darwin system atised zoological phenom ena into a 
dynam ic im age of em pircal progression according to  a non-m aterial principle of living force 
FRQVLGHUHG ³HIIHFWLYH DFFRUGLQJ WR SXUSRVH´ RI H[SODLQLQJ D ZRUOG-system . 312  This progression 
folowed from  an organic system  of nature derived o f observable nervous forces of general living 
being (excitabilty), to reactive forces (irtabil ity), forces of conservation between the two, and 
then intergrated as a description of organisational  forces in the whole. 313  This  system atic 
                                                          
308
 Christoph W ilhelm  Friedrich Hufeland (1762-1836). H is M akrobiotik isdiscussed by Kant in (1993b) p31 5. See 
also Foucault (2008) pp48- 49 
309
 Kant A148, also Prolegomena §24.  
310
 Kant (1993a) p106, 22:320 
311
 Ibid p108, Zoonomia, or the Laws of Organised Life , (1794-1796) 2 vols. London 
312
 Ibid p109 
313
 Kant (1993a) pp102-105, 22:298- 310  
100 
 
description defered specifc epistem ological difc ulties in the elem ents for a relation to 
representation in the whole on the basis of what c cords w ith the apparently natural system .  
 
.DQW¶Vam biton was also in justifying rational experience  in general as  possible experiences of a 
system  of nature beyond the division betw een the Tr anscendental Aesthetic and the 
Transcendental Analytic . This is despite the natural division between the lo gical aspect, (he 
HOHPHQWVRIDVFLHQFHRIUHODWLRQVDQGDSSHDUDQFHRIRUJDQLVDWLRQTXDOLWLHVRIVHQVLEOHµPDWWHU¶
(experienced as the distributed system  of nature). W hile only the form er suficed under 
Newtonian principles, the later appears in  the progressive apprehension of a dom ain of 
experience, phenom enaly apprehended and thought of  as positve for purposes of producing a 
positve representation. 314   
 
.DQW¶V VWDQFH LQ WKH 7UDQVFHQGHQWDO 'LDOHFWLF HPSKDVLVHV QHJDWLYH SULQFLSOHV SXUSRVHIXOO\
avoiding the naturaly given (ontologia ). 315  However, in the Architectonic, he also treats a 
physiology of pure reason as a µQDWXUH¶ LQ WKH VHQVH of being principles subjectively given as 
elem ents of a logical system  of concepts, in as far  as they accord with em pircal representations, 
- ³DOWKRXJKRQO\rationalis. ´316  In this w ay, the com posite of experience aim s to i ndicate the sum  
of objectivity address HGDVWKHµPDWWHU¶RIH[SHULHQFHLQ LWVDHVWKHVLV317  The Critque m easures 
afective experience against the constiuted m athem atical knowledge dem anded of the 
Newtonian concept, but Opus Postumum returns to see ing objectivity in term s of the aesthetic 
capacity for the given. This erves .DQW¶VSKLORVRSKLFDODPELWLRQVin itspositve reasoning.  
 
Opus Postumum takes this capacity as derived from  a n aesthesis prior to an analytic and is 
K\SRWKHWLFDOO\ MXVWLILHG E\ .DQW¶V LGHDO DFFRXQW RI KRZ WKH DQLPDO-m achine can distinguish 
passively through organic sensitvites, itexperi ence of orce. 318  The a priori determ ination of 
such a capacity gives the determ inative m ode of thi nking which accounts for an underlying 
em pircal experience of objectivity in m oving force s .DQW¶V ZLGHU DPELWLRQV IRU D scientia 
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natura was to envelope both objects of inner and ou ter sense as necessitated by the 
phenom enological representation of the system  of se nsations. This posit the dom ain that could 
EHFRQVLGHUHGDVDµQDWXUDO¶V\VWHPthat m ust accord with dem onstrable concepts experie nced a 
priori and is a problem  of defining the concept of a logical system , w hich could sustain the 
experience of living being. 319   
 
It is im portant hat Opus Postumum takes this capac ity as theoreticaly apprehending em pircal 
sensibilty by folowing the principles that scienc e em bodied historicaly as a philosophical 
SUREOHP .DQW GHILQHG KRZ WR FRQFHSWXDOLVH WKH ³SULPLWLYHO\ PRYLQJ PDWHULDO´ WKURXJK D
system atisation of individual cases. 320  The paralel would be in the physician judging the  
HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI KLV DFWLRQ WKURXJK D OLYLQJ ERG\¶V UHDFWLRQV WR SOHDVXUH DQG SDLQ321  This 
historical em phasis brings out the progressive dif iculty of understanding how general aws 
operate in particular concrete situations, and whos e historical context was of constiuting this a 
positve science. As a historical problem  of knowle dge, this i evident in what Plato praised in 
H ippocrates, and inform s the concept hat notably f inds a universal extension in Timaeus as the 
picture of an ideal living being. 322  But further progress of the general notion of  this com posite of 
vital function was advanced on the level of organis ed sensation, and corelates to what Aristotle 
XQGHUVWDQGV DV D µFDSDFLW\¶ WR UHVSRQG ZLWK SURSRUWLRQ DFFRUGHd to an internal dispositon. 323  
This i the FDSDFLW\WRFRQVWLWXWHWKHG\QDPLFUHVSRQVHLPSOLFLWRIDQµDIIHFWLYHVRXO¶ZKLFKLQ
Aristotle, finds itapplication extended to ethics  and politcs.  
 
Opus Postumum unfolded a series of ether proofs to give the determ ination that extends the 
WKHRUHWLFDO DSSURDFK WRZDUGV D FRQFHSW RI ³K\SRVWDVLVHG VSDFH LWVHOI´ It  identifes a m aterial 
posited as caloric :KLOHWKHGHPDQGIRUSK\VLFDOSURRIFRXOGEHDUJXHGRYHU.DQW¶VIRFXVZDV
only on the hypothetical positon in that it could be related to pure intuitons of tim e and spa ce; 
these were understood to lack actuality but given t he philosophical status of a virtual ground. 324  
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Since any sensory experience finds it legitm acy o nly through intuitve corespondences, this 
historicaly related to the positon that no experi ence of orce ispossible in a void, and any given 
possible experience requires a priori sensation of som ething. 325   
 
,WUHPDLQHGDQRSHQTXHVWLRQZKDWXOWLPDWHO\JURXQGHGVXFKDQHPSLULFDOµIDFW¶HPEHGGHd in the 
intuitve m anifold. But .DQW¶Vintuitve m anifold was by definiton a self-unifyin g capacity given 
to the objective account of organic space. It  w as also a unity in  the conditons of possibilty 
which was axiom atic for Kant. In this way, this int uituive capacity ultim ately gives the unity to 
outer experience in general. 326  Opus Postumum takes this axiom atic as the problem  of knowledge 
that necessitat es  the virtual m aterial m ediating a capacity for dedu ction of any categoricaly 
given. As with the historical problem  of know ledge,  it  looks to the system atic relation with 
contem porary physiological discourses. 327  But .DQW¶V aim  was not psycho-physical paralelism , 
nor sim ple m echanical proof, but a m ediate fram ing of w ider possibilty in the problem  left o f 
Critque of Pure Reason. This problem  was character ised as the ³XQLW\RIFRQVFLRXVQHVVRI WKH
PDQLIROG VXFFHVVLYHO\ LQWXLWHG DQG UHSURGXFHG LQ UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´328  In this was the virtual 
m aterial gives certain possibilties for a transit on to fulfiing .DQW¶V SRVLWLYH DPELWLRQV for a 
transcendental philosophy. 
 
The Root Concept and itsTranscendental Reflection  
 
The Critque of Pure Reason is split betw een em pir cal and transcendental form s of 
consciousness which defines is problem  of inner pos sibilti HV EXW WKH HPSLULFDO µIDFW¶ LV WKDW
REMHFWV RI H[SHULHQFH UHSUHVHQW VXFFHVVLRQ WKURXJK D µSHFXOLDU XQLW\¶ LQWXLWHG DV REMHFWLYH
totality. Taken as an objectivity accorded an a pri ori capacity, this lends the em pircal horizon its
possibilties to be transcendentaly constiuted. 
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7KHµ6HOEVWVHW]XQJVOHKUH¶RIOpus Postumum sees this as the synthetic capacity t hat folows the 
progression expanding the m odal functions of the co ncept. Through an intuiton of a fundam ental 
m aterial, s the inherent unity of the given, this opens the power of representation to be m ediated 
through an analytic propositon. But intuiton is a lso a pow er of synthesis prior unfolding the 
concept. This, ays Kant, is som ething that no scep tic can take issue w ith, since this is not a 
debate about space or tim e as such, but is derived from  som ething against which the m anifold 
takes itdeterm ining positon. 329  
 
The Critque of Pure Reason relates that such pure concepts of understanding are enabled by the 
categories which define the objectivity of possible  experiences. 330  In the Transcendental Doctrine 
of Judgem ent, these are the positve categories tha t give valid relations to objectivity as such, 
while equaly their origins are grounded in the sub jective aspects of experience. 331  Because the 
subjective aspect of experience gives unity to the stem s of sensibilty and understanding, its 
positve categories determ ine the root concept whos e legitm acy com es from  what a subject 
DSSUHKHQGVDVLWVµUHDO¶UHODWLRQV332   
 
The Opus Postumum understands that here is only on e space and tim e. But his is no longer 
form aly given, rather it  isgiven by a sensible progression that folows fr om  an afectivity in  the 
m anifold of intuiton. It  necessitates som ething subjectively posited as tem poral notions of an  
unconditonal unity of space and tim e, which transc endental philosophy takes as the concept o 
be progressively grasped.- 333   
³VSDFHLVDTXDQWXPZKLFKPXVWDOZD\VEHUHSUHVHQWHGDVSDUWRIDJUHDWHUTXDQWXP ± 
hence infinite, and given as uch. Progress in this  quantum  isnot to be regarded as given; 
WKHSURJUHVVLRQKRZHYHULV´334   
The concept of the quantum  becom ing determ inable th rough principles of a com positon 
(axiom s, anticipations, etc) is the logical functio n that Kant is developing on the basis of the 
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existence of an ultim ate reality which he defers WR³FHUWDLQODZV´335  In Critque of Pure Reason 
this transcendental concept was held w ith respect t o what an inner faculty related to a noum enal 
world and ascribed through relations to be discover ed throug KD³PDUYHOORXVIDFXOW\ZKLFKWKH
PRUDOODZILUVWUHYHDOVWRPH´ 336  Here the em phasis was on the VXEMHFWµSRVVHVVHGRIIUHHGRP¶
The Critques em bodied the positve power of intel ectual principles as the capacity to conform  
to the negative laws of nature; but he Opus Postum um took the root concept as retaining a 
determ inable aspect, hrough its capacity to synthe sise possible dom ains for the theoretical 
world. This folowed from  the power to represent sp ace and tim e objectively and, according to 
Kant, req XLUHV D FRQFHSW RI H[SHULHQFH DV ³LQILQLWHO\ SRVLWLYH´ DQG ³QRW PHUHO\ D WKLQNDEOH
ZKROH´337  Because this thinkable whole derives from  the tota lity experienced, the objectively 
given rem ains the secondary act of em pircal determ ination, which accords w ith the a priori 
positve categories (quantiy/quality, etc) - Opus Postumum left a further dificulty as to the 
QDWXUH RI VXFK D URRW FRQFHSW VLQFH LW DSSHDUV SRVLWHG LQ WKH GRPDLQ ZLWK ³WKRURXJKJRLQJ
UHODWLRQRIPHDQVWRHQGV´which isascribed within the very possibilties of outer experiences. 338    
 
This shows how Kant was distinguishing a logical do m ain of possible predicates under the 
concepti subjecti. The wider doctrine of scientia n atura necessitated the transcendental 
perspective on a dom ain for inner relations to expe rience in general. But while Critque of 
Judgement lim ited this to sym bolic content under a capacity of purposiveness, Opus Postumum 
held the thinkable totality as drawn from  a sum of possibilties experienced. A  purely 
theoreticaly concept could be posited and this lea ds to the question of what theoretical 
foundations Kant was drawing on?  
 
Opus Postumum ofers repeated references to the var ious organic theories looking to encom pass 
inner experience of sym ptom s and desires as wel as  what isevident externaly as purposiveness 
in forces of the phenom enal world. 339  These are a paralel to the sum of possibilties t hat Kant 
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proposes to distinguish by folowing two m odes of w hat he concept of nature could hope to 
apprehend;-  
- Firstly, the concept being atributed to the phen om enal forces evident in the study of anim al 
instincts and self-preservation,  
- Secondly, the concept of totality of a dom ain of possible experience by anim al and vegetable 
life. 340   
The thought of such concepts precedes the possibil ty of DQ\ FDWHJRULFDO WKLQNLQJ RI OLIH¶V
activity. The paralel isw ith the origins posited of categorical intuiton and its  unity understood a 
prior legitm ate grounds. From  this theoretical uni ty, the Opus Postum um can state that an 
intuiton m ust folow the tw in aspects of a product ion; a transcendental system atic of sym bolic 
connections folowing positve analogies of experie nce, and a tem poral system atisation which is
em pircaly derived from  a progressive or cum ulativ e aspect of a world- ex perience.  
 
The Opus Postumum therefore address es  both the possibilties derived of reflective judgm ent as 
wel as the perspective that m oves from  this em pir cal capacity towards a transcendental 
perspective on a world-experience. By extending the  concept of world-system , form ed of the 
sum  of diferent m odes of lived experience, a WUDQVFHQGHQWDO SHUVSHFWLYH GHVFULEHV ³D WKLUG
elem ent...the foundation of appearances as ifestab lished in im m ovable solid ground. A  justifed 
SRVVHVVLRQ´But his µMXVWLILHGSRVVHVVLRQ¶is a positve dom ain which O pus Postumum folows 
progressively from  its m etaphysical function toward s its  possibilties for a transcendental 
philosophy. Conversely its also constiutive of t he concept hrough w hich the subject binds 
itself a priori to an objective horizon. 341   
 
Technical Concepts and M oral Power  
 
M ichel Foucault identifed the Opus Postumum as exp loring a function by which m an defined his 
FRQFUHWH ZRUOG WKURXJK GHJUHHV RI WKH ³FKDQJLQJ SRZHUV RI VHQVDWLRQ´342  Such a function 
determ in es  the possible ways in which a subject appeared to i tself as an object am ong objects but 
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which also required the originary concept grounding  representational identiy in the self, along 
with extending the possible transcendental freedom s . The earlier contention was that Foucault 
saw  this as lending the historical perspective that  served the representing subject by extending its
future possibilties for transcendence; the signif cance of Opus Postum um was seen as this 
transiton from  the historical problem  of a rationa l physics, to the transcendental problem  
necessitated of constiuting a grounded subjectivit y. 
 
In this respect, the paralel isw ith what the Tran scendental D ialectic worked through as given to 
WKHVXEMHFWDV³WKHPHUHLGHD´QDPHO\as predicates that need to be conditoned. 343  A gainst he 
LGHD.DQW¶VSROHPLFDOplaces em phasis on our present m ode of knowledge: h e took the sceptical 
positon held in relation to the source w ithin ours elves which folowed the scholastic m axim  of 
unity, as the fundam ental property to which any log ical principles are subordinated. The logical 
PRGHV RI D WUDQVFHQGHQWDO SULQFLSOH DUH D ³PHUH LGHD´ WKDW KDV EHHQ DW ³DOO WLPHV HDJHUO\
VRXJKW´344  The Critque of Pure Reason therefore looked to m o dern science as  a disciplinary 
practice in  which a concept of nature, delim ited under identi y and diference, could be 
legislative for certain regions of knowledge and fr om  which the concept that gave a true 
representational function in general should proceed .  
 
The problem atic relation, w ith respect o a Science  of M an, appears since the transcendental 
QRWLRQ RI µWUXH IXQFWLRQ¶ ZDV H[FOXGHG IURP UHDVRQ ZLWKLQ LWVHOI 7KLV OHIW WKH TXHVWLRQ RI
legitm acy as a principle of unction, which w as ne ither strictly logical nor hypothetical, but as 
what appeared to experience itself as the legitm at e claim  to a reality. W hat appears through the 
µPDQLIROG RI HIIHFWV,¶ as the self-grounding m axim s of reason and as  an em pircal concept, 
already functions to give the possible experience o f diference in nature. Critque of Pure Reason 
em phasised subordinating these experiences to logic al concepts, as a regulatory function, since 
em pircal concepts have a fundam ental lck from  the  transcendental perspective. 345  The necessity 
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for the analogue was as an orientating rule or prin ciple, ultim ately serving to give em pircal 
UHDOLW\WKH³KDUPRQ\´ZLWKLWVHOI346   
 
The am biguity arises in Critque of Pure Reason bec ause Kant also takes reason in-itself as a 
m etaphysical faculty for analysing concepts of expe rience while em pircal concepts are also 
synthetic and constiutive expressions of experienc e. This is atributed to a positve source 
³EH\RQG WKH OLPLWV RI H[SHULHQFH´347  Itis because these are beyond lim its that ransce ndental 
reason takes its  practical function from  the power of knowledge as necessary for achieving 
practical ends. On the other hand, this also atrib utes to an  em pircal function of the w il, the 
power of co-ordinating sensuous experience against which the transcendental reason im plem ents 
a necessary prudence with respect o natural aw . Thi s serves a purpose of m aintaining itsown 
freedom . 348  U ltim ately this is a concept of reedom  that alow s Kant o extend ethical aws of 
conduct o the world. But his is the PRUDO µHTXLSPHQW¶ HQDEOHG E\ WKH desire for freedom  to 
accord with its transcendental concept, and was pur sued as  synthetic reason. It is the 
transcendental concept that serves the necessary sy nthesis of em pircal concepts from  a practical 
SHUVSHFWLYHRQKRZWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJµRXJKW¶WRfunction. This therefore that gave the dificulty 
of the transcendental concept since it ZDVERXQGXSZLWKWKHYHU\³JURXQGRUFRQVHTXHQFH´RI
subjective conditons in the practical sphere. 349    
 
This leaves the PRUDO µSDUDGR[¶ RI DQLPDO UHDVRQ IRU &ULWLFDO thought. 350  How such a 
transcendental function could inform  rules of condu ct as  extended to an em pircal world w as the 
m oral problem  that Kant explored in Critique of Pra ctical Reason through its  relation to the 
historical concept of the summum bonum. But h LVHTXLYRFDWHGEHWZHHQDµFRQFHSWRIWKHJRRG¶
and the concept of w el-being as the intrinsic conf lict of the sensible world. W hen the paralel 
appears in the sym bolic m odes of understanding in C ritque of Judgem ent, the transcendental 
perspective is  rem oved from  any im m ediate experience, in order to  account for its directing 
                                                          
346
 Ibid A665/B693  
347
 Ibid A795/B823  
348
 Ibid A800/B828 
349
 Ibid A802/B830  
350
 Kant (1997b) 5:62-3 
108 
 
towards particular ends. 351  Likewise, Religion W ithin the Limits of Reason Alo ne gave the 
VXEMHFWLYHJURXQGDVREMHFWLYHRQO\WKRXJKDSUHGLVSRVLWLRQRIUHIRUPLQJPDQ¶VVHQVXRXVQDWXUH: 
WKLVDFFRXQWRIPDQ¶VSURSHQVLW\EHKLQGDQ\V\PEROLFUHSUHVHQWDWLRQWRSRVLWLYHGRFWULQHVVHUYHd 
RQO\³LQpotential. ´ 352  7KHPRUDOSKLORVRSK\GHULYHGIURPWKLV LWVXQLTXHSULQFLSOH³VR IDUDV
WKLV GLVSRVLWLRQ GLVSOD\V D YLWDOLW\ LQ DFWLRQV´ ZKLFK ZDV WKH theoretical notion prem ised on 
KDUPRQ\ZLWKLQWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHZRUOG¶VKLJKHVWJRRG353  
 
The am bitons of Opus Postumum are justifed under the dom ain of a scientia natura. This now 
diferentiates the transcendental concept as derive d from  a technical-practical capacity given 
through a theoretical approach to a transcendental schem a. By folowing the synthetic principles 
for the production of concepts, Kant was looking to  express an objective capacity for world-
being as the concept hat folows from  the phenom en ological progression that converg es  on a 
m oral-practical dom ain with itsconcept of reedom . 354  Opus Postumum therefore diverged from  
what he Critques m aintained as opposed pow ers of nature and freedom . Itfolows a transiton 
from  an em pircal capacity for the concept, to the transcendental perspective, which starts from  
the speculative am biton to apprehend conceptual de term inations in causal conditons. The 
paralel isw ith the m axim s of conduct which are di scursively held a priori to sensuous intuitons 
for the practical reason to which m oral thought uph eld a concept of reedom . 355   
 
In Opus Postumum, the world-concept is theoretical y extended through both perceiving and 
thinking the grounds of experience. The transcenden tal am biton for the perspective from  which 
a concept of reedom  could distinguish itself rom  the divisions of the negative, folows from  the 
presupposed unifed world. In this ense, transcend ental reason constiutes an  equivalent of what 
WKHZLOOV\QWKHVHVIURP³UHDORSSRVLWLRQ´356  A lthough in Critque, the transcendental perspecti ve 
ZDVJLYHQWRLQGLYLGXDOVDV³DPHUHLGHD´an  objective freedom  isexpressed in Opus Postumum 
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as  a technical capacity to apprehend the world. It is  the extension to the m oral-practical 
reasoning which KaQW¶VSRVLWLYHDPELWLRQVopen to  the transcendental philosophy in relation to 
em pircal experience of the transcendental system  a s it encloses a dom ain of synthetic 
knowledge. 
 
The synthetic knowledge constiutes the transcenden tal concept hrough a dom ain that folows 
from  practical aspects of the self-steering subject . A  phenom enal w il acts through its 
m oral/technical system atic which FDUULHV³WKHQRXPHQDOSRLQWRIYLHZ´DVLWDSSHDUVSULRUWRDFWV
of consciousness. 357  By m aking the world objective through the copula o r link between a 
universal idea and itsconcept of world, the concep t isgiven to experience through the axiom atic 
principle by which consciousness extends its natura l capacity for constiuting the system  of 
ideas. It herefore presents a constiutive picture  of organic being as itdraws on the super-
sensible idea, theoreticaly upheld ± only as long as itaccords w ith its own synthesis of the 
architectonic of the world. 
 
In t KHRULVLQJ WKH RUJDQLVPV µYLUWXDO¶ SULPDU\ DFWLYLWLHV, Kant gives the technical-practical 
im peratives of a drive which is paralel to a trans cendental principle by which the concept can 
conform  to dem onstrable experiences of the w orld. 358  The practical concept appears as an 
RUJDQLVP¶VKLJKHUSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKHUHDOLW\RILWVnatura bruta, EXW.DQW¶Vreal m otivation here 
ZDV WR GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU ³DQRWKHU ZLOO LV WKLQNDEOH LQ SODFH RI WKLV RQH´ 7KLV LV WKH
WUDQVFHQGHQWDOWKHPHWKDWGUDZVRQDQHWKLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHHYLGHQWZLWKKLVGHPDQGIRUWKH³LGHDO
archetype of m an adequate to GXW\´359  In looking to such an inner capacity, as the theor etical 
constiutive for a transcendental system atic of ide as, the transcendental function m eans a 
synthetic capacity for constiuting the m oral conce pt. A  transcendental system atic of nature now  
becom es the perspective from  which the concept im po ses on m an his em pircal world of 
experience, but whose inner capacity gives transcen dental possibilties in  constiuting the 
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positve concept of the world. Here was the theoret ical perspective which Foucault ook as 
inform ing the anthropological research into what m a n actualy produces out of him self. 360  
 
The W orld-Concept and the Science of M an  
  
It is only by im plication that Foucault related Opu s Postumum to Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View. In t HUPVRIDQWKFHQWXU\GHEDWHRQD6FLHQFHRI0DQ.DQW¶V ODWH
Anthropology states its am biton to be the investig ation of how m an pragm aticaly m akes his 
world as revealed through activites of lie. W hat is notable is that his no longer aspires to a 
sc ientia natura delim ited under a unifed logic: anth ropology w as seen as a difcult practice in 
relation to the doctrine of nature. The difculty w as the synthetic reasons behind the 
anthropological dom ain , as  faculties that describe a µVHOI-VWHHULQJ¶ in m an that an em pircal 
VXUYH\ FRXOG RQO\ WDQJHQWLDOO\ DSSURDFK .DQW GRHV KRZHYHU UHIHU WR DQWKURSRORJ\¶V LGHDO
archetype, as fram ed as the citzen of the world, a nd com m entators have related this to what Kant 
was redefining through his anthropology lectures du ring 1780-1790. 361  These becam e 
increasingly concerned with social and cultural, po litcal and historical elem ents, as the 
HPSLULFDOO\SURGXFWLYHDVSHFWVRID³VHFRQGQDWXUH´It was this that displaced notions of natural 
µSV\FKRORJ\¶ZKLFKJDYHD6FLHnce of M an itsearlier orientation from  the beginni ng of the 18 th  
century. 362   
 
In this respect, Anthropology opens w ith a D idactic  which describes an extended field of possible 
practices encroaching on a WUDGLWLRQDO µFRQFHSW RI WKH JRRG¶ It is a survey of possible 
dispositons and drives for a m oral aw  in as far as they are legitm ated by obse rvations in an 
em pircal world. 363  Such practices are no longer specifed in relation  to the negative conditoning 
of reedom  and nature as Critque of Judgement wher e aesthetic play was through an equivocal 
µOLYHOLQHVV¶ 5DWKHU Anthropology WDNHV DV µSUDJPDWLF¶ ZKDW it  observes as  the em pircal 
                                                          
360
 Foucault (2008) p44, Kant (1993a) esp p253-254, 21 :91-21:94 
361
 CPR Bxxxi Reinhardt Brandt sees this as dependant  on a Leibnizian optim ism . Brandt in Jacobs (2003) p90, p96 
362
 M any com m entator have described this, notably Fouc ault (2008) pp108-124, Jacobs in Jacobs (2003) p111  
363
 observation of interior forces and discussions of m etal health. Anthropology §4f popular psychology from  §7f, 
whose com parison converges around §45-59 on the qua lites and ailm ents of the soul. 
111 
 
perspective on the phenom enal and necessarily synth etic interpretation of itsworld. 364  The sum  
of synthetic interpretations constiutes $QWKURSRORJ\¶V second part,  Characterisation, which is a 
typology categorising sensible beings as they accor d to an activity under the cosm opolitan law .  
 
Since this em pircal dom ain is lim it ed  to the pragm atic perspective, any citzens of this  w orld are 
given only through this concept of the world. This concept is a m easure, distinct from  the 
polem ical rational physics, but also from  the w ider  term s of a rational physiology, so im portant 
for Opus Postumum. Like a historical scientia, this  concept w il now ground what extends both 
to physics and psychology as an  idea of natural reason. However, as a relation bet ween the 
corporeal nature and thinking nature this is now se lf-contained under principles a priori of the 
knowledge of the world. 365   
 
.DQW¶V task was JLYLQJDQLQQHUSHUVSHFWLYHRQZKDWKH³FDQRUVKRXOG´PDNHRIKLPVHOI, as the 
object of this world that characteris es  the rational elem ents of m an. 366  But this leaves a 
cosm opolitan perspective to be derived only from  th e distribution of anthropological types as 
what actualy constiutes this dom ain. It  downplays the strict division of Critque precisel y 
because of the difculties of inner sense and the problem s associated w ith an em pircal 
psychology in  its  legitm acy as  distinct reason. This was the problem atic dom ain t hat Critique of 
Pure Reason VRXJKW WR ³EDQLVKHG IURP WKH GRPDLQ RI PHWDSK\VLFV´ RQ WKH JURXQGV WKDW LW LV
excluded by the very idea of science. This is what reappears, after a fashion, as  an  
anthropological dom ain behind the survey of a fragm ented reason, as the evident nature of the 
em pircal world. 367   
 
W hat does the anthropological dom ain show? Kant had  dislodged any em pircal perspective on 
rational m etaphysics through finitude in knowledge.  Equaly he characterised as a transcendental 
problem  what was m ade evident in the need for pract ical principles in the world. In this sense, 
anthropology returns to an  adm ixture of desire and prudence for the explorati on of negotiati ng 
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natural im pulses which were historicaly associated  w ith ethical techniques folowing 
transcendental goals. 368  Observations in  this dom ain inform  of how  citzens in the world re lates 
their powers of representation to m odes of em pirca l sensibilty: this power characterises a 
PLQG¶VZD\VRIWKLQNLQJLQUHODWLRQWRWKe knowledge derived from  the em pircal counterpart,  the 
m odes of perception of the world. Such a binary giv es a diferent perspective from  the dualism  
between nature and freedom . It  m akes apparent a substiution for the concept of reedom  when 
there are only practical principles to atribute to  an inner sense. 369  Against he problem atic 
relation betw een the intuiton and its understandin g, the anthropological dom ain m akes 
LQWHOOLJLEOH HYHQWV WKDW ³HPEDUUDVVHV XQGHUVWDQGLQJ´ - $QWKURSRORJ\¶V didactic finds tha t 
sensibilty and com m on sense introduces a sensus co mmunis as a SURGXFWLYH MXGJHPHQW ³QRW
IRUPDOO\ EURXJKW WR WKH WULEXQDO >EXW DUH UDWKHU@ SURFHHGLQJ GLUHFWO\ IURP LQQHU VHQVH´370  The 
anthropological concept of world m akes this nteli gible through necessitating a concept of PDQ¶V
anthropological existence which isneither the conc ept of good nor a concept of nature. 
 
W hat Kant observes as the constiutive qualites of  a cognitve theory, elsewhere associated w ith 
a sensibilty , is now an em pircal fact. Itisalso a capacity for  the world-system  of m an justifed 
³EHFDXVH KH LV KLV RZQ XOWLPDWH SXUSRVH´371  The transcendental perspective of the Opus 
Postumum GHVFULEHGWKLVµZRUOGFRQFHSW¶DVthe sensu cosmic, the knowledge giving unity of the  
ends of reason. Critque of Pure Reason drew on a s cholastic concept of unity for this 
knowledge. 372  But he world-concept which is diferentiated in t he later Logic notes (Jäsche) is  
the system  of reasoning which now  appears under an anthropological dom ain. This the world-
concept distinguishes itelf rom  a cosm ic concept,  since any system atic unity is sustained only 
under an em pircaly com m on world. 373   
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In the Logic, Kant fram ed the task for philosophy i tself through the idea that it can show this as 
an ultim ate end. On the one hand, the world-concept  stood IRUWKH³KLJKHVWPD[LPRIWKHXVHRI
UHDVRQ´ZKLFKXQLILHVKLVFRVPRSROLWDQSKLORVRSK\, but the Logic lim its his through the question 
of m an. This the question of m an that points o Anthropology and the binary of being/thinking 
whose dom ain put he pragm atic m axim  in place of tr anscendental reflection. Itis constiuted 
IURPDQ µXQWKRXJKW¶K\EULG in  the world-concept. 374  Because this is inherently problem atic for 
DQ\SXUHGLVFLSOLQH.DQW¶VHPSLULFDOUHVHDUFKLQWRZhat m an m akes of him self eaves this as the 
SHUVSHFWLYHRQPDQ¶VVHOI-knowledge which isparalel to his capacity for w o rld-being.  
 
A lthough it was only by im plication that Anthropolo gy points to the discussion of world-being 
from  the system atic perspective of Opus Postum um, t his text describes the world-concept as  the 
FRPSOH[RIVHQVLEOHEHLQJV³LQVRIDUDVWKH\DUHDWOHDVWFRQVFLRXVRIWKHPVHOYHV´DQGFRQVWLWXWHD
people acting, m aking, producing over tim e and givi ng rights and duties to each other. 375  But the 
signifcant diference in 2SXV 3RVWXPXP¶V world is that iextends the source of ideas to a 
determ ination of the totality. In the heterogeneous  dom ain of Anthropology this capacity is 
reversed, as what WKHSHUVRQRQO\µE\ULJKWV¶RXJKW WREHFRPHFRQVFious of in the whole. This 
delim its the subjective ground as a productive dom a in for th e objective world, a dom ain of 
world-beings whose em pircal ground cannot fuly be  extended beyond a description of an 
anthropology existence.  
 
An em pircal understanding is lm ited to a system at ic of rules that converge on an adm ixture of 
habituated activites. Precisely such uncertainty w ithin al conscious activites gives the problem  
WRZKLFKDOOSRVLWLYHVROXWLRQVDUHXOWLPDWHO\µSUDJPDWLF¶W hen Kant balances this uncertainty 
ZLWKWKHSKLORVRSKLFDOWDVNDFFRXQWHGIRUE\³LQWHQWLRQDOLW\´it serves to sustain when apparent 
QDWXUH ³UHIXVHV WR KHOS D IUHHZLOO´376  Anthropology is only an  evaluation of hum an activites 
contained under the concept of purposes w ithin them selves, and evidence of these diverse m odes 
of em pircal understanding which becom e diferentia ted into m oral and technical logics w ithin a 
world-system . A  system atic task therefore draws on the w ider conflict w ithin positve knowledge 
                                                          
374
 )RXFDXOW¶VSKUDVHS 
375
 Kant (1993) p211, 22:51 
376
 .DQWSIIµ2QWKHFKDUDFWHURIWKHVSHFLHV¶ 
114 
 
as an individual activity, and diferentiates a phi losophical tsk under such em pircal conditons. 
W here Anthropology converges on the world dom inated  by history and culture, the 
WUDQVFHQGHQWDO SUREOHPV RI WKH UDWLRQDO DQLPDO EHFRPHV FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ WKH µFDSDELOLW\ RI
reason ¶ Elem ental repetions in a transcendental history s how  them selves only through self-
awareness of its situation at he phenom enal evel,  while the pragm atic perspective m eans that 
such phenom enal existence draws on a world-concept,  whose progressive organisation indicates 
.DQW¶VFRVPRSROLWLFDOZRUOG377   
  
Anthropology can only im plicate such SURFHVVHV LQ WKH DSSHDUDQFH RI D µPHUH LGHD¶ 7KH
transform ation of hum an nature by social and histor ical forces is equaly equivocal. Kant ¶V 
positon isthat, -
³QDWXre has planted in the species the seeds of discord,  and that nature has wiled that he 
hum an species, through itsreason, to turn discord into concord, or at least create a constant 
DSSUR[LPDWLRQRILW´378   
The world-concept cannot herefore be a transcendental given, but a concept w ithin which  the 
possible world is a dom ain under the evaluation of a reason. Both technical and m oral reasons 
com pete in this adm ixture, chalenging any transcen dental ilusions through em pircal necessity. 
The im portance of the w orld-concept is in ofering the chalenge to any transcendentaly given 
concepts  ,Q WKLV GRPDLQ GHVSLWH WKH IDFW WKDW PDQ ³HUUV´ .DQW LGHQWLILHV a productive play 
between m ultiple understandings and the act of exch ange which draws on the m oral/technical 
adm ixture. B XW WKHVH DUH ³QHLWKHU QDWXUDO QRU DUWLILFLDO´ EXW VRPHWKLQJ ZH EHFRPH IRUFHG WR
accept as real. 379   
 
Precisely what legitm ates this concept as reciproc ated under this lusion beom es the question of 
how m an acquires his world from  values freely com m u nicated in a form al exchange. 380  The 
order of the world is paradoxical, seem ingly lackin g in reason. Anthropology ascribes 
tem peram ent o such inner values beyond any apparen t nature of m an, which itsupports only 
WKURXJKDµ&KDUDFWHULVDWLRQ¶RIKRZthe w il accords itprudence to the faculty of des ire as  µZD\V
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RIWKLQNLQJ¶LWVHQGV.381  W hile this lacks a philosophical perspective, it  does diferentiate m oral 
and technical reasons WKDWFDQQRWIXOO\NQRZWKHLUZRUOGDVYDOXHVFKDUDFWHULVLQJPDQ¶VPRGHV 
being which RIIHUV.DQW WKHPHDQV WR MXGJHD µVWUHQJWKRIVRXO¶382  Such strength is the power 
which gives m an his place in the system  of world an d the purposiveness of character taken that 
indicates the m odes of rational being. In the coali tion of a cosm opolitan society, the dom ain of 
synthesising activity under the world system  condit ions the succession of hum an activites 
through the cohesive entiy established under the w orld-concept. But as a natural dispositon, this 
can only be presupposed according to a principle of  the future. 383  
 
From  the perspective of the earlier am bitons for a  Science of M an which a system atic 
philosophy develop ed  as an µLQGLVSHQVLEOH VHUYLFH,¶ it  now departs from  the dem ands of a 
Transcendental M ethodology where a philosophical tas k was of producing transcendental 
coherence . Anthropology leaves this as a tension in this natural relation between corporeal 
existence and a thinking nature as activity of the world. But it isconceived of as a necessarily 
positve form  of what he critcal form  could only express negatively ± which is necessary 
because the pre-critcal form , an analytic of finit ude, initated the dissolution of unifed 
am bitons in an Enlightenm ent Science of M an.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has given an account of K ant ¶VHQJDJHPHQWZLWKa contem porary Science of M an 
from  the 1760 ¶V. Firstly, itexplain ed  why a critcal front was developed against extendi ng 
aesthetic criteria w ithin a dom ain of rigorous enqu iry. Secondly, this defined the transcendental 
am bitons for a Science of M an as the conditons of  a general m etaphysics. This chapter then 
showed how such a question of inner sense w as being  system aticaly laid out by the Opus 
Postumum as  theoretical possibilties for a logical system  of concepts. Th e im plication was that 
Anthropology gave this the m easure of the world. It  world concept ofered a perspective on a 
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unifed m oral and theoretical world as the logic of  m an, but had its  paralel in  the 
epistem ological problem s that were em erging through  the natural sciences.  
 
But Kant ¶V cosm opolitan ideal of the citzen of the world was  the engagem ent w ith social, 
politcal and historical elem ents evident in Anthro pology. It  highlight ed  conflicting m oral and 
theoretical aspects of the world which this concept  expressed. Rather than a universal concept, 
this suggests WKDW.DQW¶V later am bitons for a Science of M an look ed  to the form al exchange of 
values to  justify an idea of reason, as a world-concept whos e m odes of rational being w ere now  
brought into play historicaly, and to  be judged by a µSULQFLSOH RI WKH IXWXUH.¶ This related to 
)RXFDXOW¶V SHUVSHFWLYH RQ ideological thinking and the m edical Positivism  as pre-critcal 
practices inform ing politcal theories in the era o f the French revolution which is the subject of 
the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3: The Science of M an and the M edical Revol ution  
 
Introduction  
 
,QWKHODVWFKDSWHU.DQW¶VFDWHJRULFDOWKLQNLQJZDVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHHSLVWHPRORJLFDOGHEDWHVDW
the Berlin academ y after 1740. This chapter w il fo cus on the Science of M an developed in 18 th  
century France as a general science characterised b y the am biton to unify individual sciences 
under new considerations of the hum an species in an  em erging relation to the study of nature. 
Inspired by wider Enlightenm ent hem es , the Science of M an wil now be associated w ith th e 
reform  of French m edicine and the explicit task beh ind a transform ation in  the m edical sciences. 
The r HQRZQHGDQLPDODQGKXPDQDQDWRPLVWDQGSK\VLFLDQ)HOL[9LFTG¶$]\Uhas be en  credited 
w ith m otivating m edical reform s by broadening the scope of their investigations to in clude 
environm ental factors, uch as m eteorology, water q uality, public sanitation. But m edical theory 
also represent ed  a µFHUWDLQ PHWKRG¶ IURP ZKLFK D SURSHU SHGDJRJLFDO PHWKRG ZRXOG Qaturaly 
folow which was atractive to the politcaly m ind ed physicians in Paris. 
 
During the late 18 th  century, a progressive anatom ical practice presented a chalen ge to the 
historical role of physiology in m edicine. Physiolo gy determ ined relations of m an and his world, 
and a physiological debate struggled between m echan istic and spirtualistic ideas. However, both 
approaches shared the Cartesian am biton of overcom ing Scholastic and Galenic notions 
em bedded in m edical history. In  French m edical circles an expanded knowledge of m a n was 
developed through a neo-Hippocratic dynam ism . Equal ly successful for revolutionary era 
sc ie nces was &RQGLOODF¶VLogic seen as the positve approach to approxim atin g the threshold of 
VHQVLEOH RULJLQV IRU D SRVVLEOH µQDWXUDOLVP¶ This sem iotic practice aim ed at form alising 
H[SHULHQFHEXW&RQGLOODF¶VVLJQZDVDOVRunderstood as an intelectual tool for an individua l to 
m ark discourse w ith the strength of m em ory and powe r of im agination. Condilac ¶VLogic w il be 
shown to have historic links to earlier debates at the Berlin A cadem y and the chapter w il m ake 
this the starting point before exploring how this nfluenced the m edical disciplines in overcom ing 
a historical physiology and inform  a revolutionary era Science of M an.  
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CoQGLOODF¶Vsem iotic stood as a post-Cartesian practice that co uld serve the m edical discipline in  
evaluating a physiological vitalism  understood as t he activity of life that accord ed  to a concept of 
norm s. The Ideologist Jean Piere Cabanis aw this as the new frontier for a Science of M an and 
for interpretation of relations of the physical and  m oral. But he specifc m edical problem  of th e 
era was how a progressively localising anatom y coul d inform  the new  rational physiology. H ere 
it s Xavier Bichat who represent s a physiology that delim its relations between anatom ical 
practice and the m edical discipline through atribu ting vital properties to  a taxonom y of tissues. 
V ital propert ie s and the H ippocratic dynam ism  gave the tw in perspe ctives to  which Condilac ¶V
sign was used to evaluate a new rational physiology  serving a knowledge of life.
 
The chapter shows how this knowledge pictured habit uated bodily actions under the fluctuations 
of vital powers and delim it ed  such a concept of lie through physical power VWKDWµSUHVLGHRYHU
H[WHULRU ERGLHV¶ %LFKDW H[HPSOLILHG the relation between investigating anatom ist and 
synthesizing physiologist for his era, and also em b odied a progressive idea that m odern society 
FRXOGµFDOOIRUWK¶FHUWDLQQHZIXQFWLRQVDVDUHVXOWRIWKHµVWDWHRIFLYLOLVDWLRQ¶This hows what a 
rational physiology m eant for an  am biton for a Science of M an. Bichat gave a gene ral concept 
of lie an  im age of a constant struggle for a m ean. In the re volutionary era, physiology was 
delim itng such a concept w ith a signifcance that relates to early French Positvism  which is 
explored in the next chapter. 
 
Condilac and the Idea-Sign  
 
In late 18 th  FHQWXU\)UDQFHWKHSURJUHVVLYHWKLQNHU(WLHQQH%RQQRWGH&RQGLOODF¶VLogic stood as 
a hugely successful m ethod for producing an analyti c theory of signs. As a tool of ideas this had 
litle value to a narow  physics, however itlent i tself readily to what was pursued under a 
Science of M an. Condilac died in 1780, the year hi s Logic was published, but his text had a 
legacy of particular im portance for the years of th e D irectoire (1795-1799). W hen the 
UHYROXWLRQDU\JRYHUQPHQWHVWDEOLVKHGWKH(FROH1RUPDOHLQ&RQGLOODF¶VLogic was w idely 
distributed and extensively influential despite dif fuse interpretations. 384  Even beyond the 
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im m ediate Ideologue circles of Destut de Tracy, Pi ere Joseph Cabanis and M aine de Biran, the 
Logic influenced m ajor works as the theoretical bas is for those looking for a m ore positve 
approach through a science of sensation and thes e form ed m any precursors for the positve 
sciences of the 19 th  century. 385  
 
Condilac developed his Sensationalism  on the basis  of the source of sense data being 
inseparable from  abstract pure thought and consider ed this in its capacity for tansform ation. 
W hile Kant folowed a FDWHJRULFDODSSURDFK&RQGLOODF¶VHPSKDVLVZDVRQWKHWUDQVLWLRQIURPa 
VSHFXODWLYHµQDWXUDO¶ZLOOSXWXQGHUDSUDJPDWLFIXQFWLRQRI UHDVRQ; a µODQJXDJHRIDFWLRQ¶was 
open to a higher understanding articulated as a new  language. Its focus w as on em pircal values 
DWWDLQHG WKURXJK µPRGHUQ¶ REVHUYDWLRQDO VFLHQFHV and its am biton was overcom ing the 
shortcom ings of older analytic practices.  
 
Condilac is often associated w ith a Locke-N ewtonia n positon, fore-grounding sense data 
produced through fundam ental operations of the m ind  and its system  of thought. This view is 
notably associated w ith Treatise on Sensation which  consider ed  the perspective of the perceiving 
m ind in itsrelation to various m odifcations to se nses/organs as transform ing a series of data into 
the richer and m ore diferentiated form s. But his text was underpinned by afective dynam ic 
principles, uch unease and need, notably described  in Treatise on Anim als. Broadly speaking, 
this OHQWLWVHOIWRµDQDWXUDOKLVWRU\RIWKHVRXO¶UHIOHFWHGas  a theory of the m ind. But its  theory of 
signs also gave the theoretical background which de veloped as the influential textbook on 
m ethod in the form  of a Logic. 
 
A  dilem m a surounds &RQGLOODF¶V HDUO\ DVVHUWLRQ in the 1746 Essai sur l'O rigine des 
Connaissance Humaines: these signs were arbitrary, m erely expressing the prejudices of the 
com m unity, and were the shorthand for perceptions a nd a rem edy for m em ory. This was taken to 
im ply that using signs for a practice of analysis o f perceptions had an inherent potential for 
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confusing the order of judgm ent hence GLVUXSWLYH RI DQ RUGHU RI µWUXH¶ VFLHQFH386  This was a 
problem  of rivolity, inherited from  Locke  and Leibniz, and was a central concern for the earl y 
1746 Essai sur l'O rigine des Connaissance Humaines.  In this text, Condilac takes the 
conjectural origins of language to explore what cou ld function as a logical principle, 387  and here 
is a surprising paralel w ith an essay that he subm ited in favour of the doctrine of M onads to the 
Berlin A cadem y com petions in 1747. Condilac ¶V subm ission was caled Les M onades,  388  and 
the second part of this Berlin essay, after clearin g the way of anachronistc m etaphysical notions, 
atem pted a positve m onadic schem a of his own. It has been noted that his stands in close 
FRPSDULVRQWRWKHSV\FKRORJLFDOIRUPVIRXQGLQYDULRXVRI&RQGLOODF¶VRWKHUZRUNVDOWKRXJKWKLV
is often not explicit n the later texts. 389  
 
The continuity between the early M onad debates and what should be atributed WR&RQGLOODF¶V
signs i a puzzle in  Condilac legacy. The relatively recent discovery of this entry to the Berlin 
debates seem s at odds w ith m uch of his later work a nd would represent an anachronism  for the 
avant-garde of Paris ntelectual circles ince the y sought to chalenge such 17 th  century system s 
with the new anti-m etaphysical Newtonian approach. Here the em phasis was on the 
psychological or epistem ological m odes of explanati on, but Les M onades ofers an im age of 
Condilac actualy working against Lockean dualism  and gives a new perspective on the role of 
his signs. The possibilty w as of prelinguistic tho ught and the unlikely sym bolic aspect in Les 
M onades sees Condilac upholds a m etaphor of Proteu s, the sea-god, appearing in the m any 
form s of an al pervading logic behind the reality of a m ind whose faculties ultim ately can only 
be reduced to sensations. 390  Such a pan-logism  behind both psychological or epi stem ological 
m odes of explanation, appears to predicate appearan ces given to sensation as the condensation of 
an idea of prim ary m aterial diference under form s of identiy in the sign. 391  Seen from  this 
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perspective, the discussion in Treatise on Sensatio n sees the idea-sign as displacing 
µPHWDSK\VLFDO SKDQWRPV¶ RI VXEVWDQFH LQILQLW\ VSDFH DQG GXUDWLRQ ZKLOH FRQGHQVLQg al 
predicates into sim ple ideas as elem ents of a w ider  psychological reality. Here is the 
epistem ological im portance behind Condilac taking a positon that sensations cannot be 
LQKHUHQWO\ µZURQJ.¶ The legacy of discovery and invention is reducible only to process of 
organising our ideas and this fundam ental to his  later works The Art of Thinking (1775), Logic 
(1780), Language of Calculus (1798).  
 
The Logic: How Signs Function as Second Nature  
 
This produces an analytic driven by a decom positon  of successive physical orders of sensibilty 
prior to recom positon as a psychologicaly sim ulta neous chem a. 392  Condilac presents his as a 
naturalism  in the sense of a practice that aim s at a natural judgm ent in the face of practical 
necessity. This distinduishes itelf rom  IURP.DQWZKRKROGVWKHUHLVµQRFRQFHSWLRQZLWKRXWD
concept: ¶393  Condilac foregrounds through sensation, a ³ILJXUDWLYH H[SUHVVLRQ´394  whose 
potential is for a new relational order beyond the µQDWXUDO¶ RUGHU RI QHHG But a dispersive 
tendency in sensible expressions m eans a higher µQHHG¶ FRXQWHUEDODQFHs arbitrary, absurd and 
³VWUDQJH DEXVHV RI WKH JHQHUDO LGHD.´ The figurative regularity of  bodily m ovem ent gives the 
ground for this need, 395  and this regulates the analysis of sensible experi en ces ; the Logic takes 
this repetive value as preserved by the brain. For Condilac, the brain is,-   
³FRQWLQXDOO\DJLWDWHGE\WKHVHQVHRUJDQVUHVSRQGVQRWRQO\WRWKHLPSUHVVLRQVWKDWLW
receives im m ediately, but to al the m ovem ents whic h this first im pression m ust 
SURGXFH«JRLQJE\KDELWIURPPRYHPHQWWRPRYHPHQW´ 396  
The figurative therefore expresses the language of a ction as derived from  the series of 
im pressions of the senses: m easured against the ser ies of ideas this is a µGXDO VRXUFH¶ RI
im pression and habituated thought. Because these ar e ultim ately divorced from  any first 
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SULQFLSOHV LW LV WKHUHIRUH³YHU\LPSHUIHFW´ZKLFKLVZK\DSULPDU\FRQFHUQIRU&RQGLOODFLV LQ
the tchniques of knowledge that function against f rivolous m etaphysical speculation. 397  
 
U ltim ately, the Logic WDNHV WKHHOHPHQWVRI LWVDQDO\WLFDVRULHQWDWLQJ WKH³FRQIRUPDWLRQRI WKH
RUJDQV´398  These im pressions, along with its habits, are fuse d into D µQDWXUDO RUGHU RI QHHG¶
µ1DWXUDO¶RUGHUPD\EHDPELJXRXVEXWVKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRGWRFRQWUDVWZLWK³DOOWKHYLFHVRIDQ
unregulated im agination. ´399  These SURGXFHµQDWXUDO¶YDOXHVH[SUHVVed  as  functional signs. -
³LIZHKDYHPDGHRXUREVHUYDWLRQVZHOOWKHXVHRIZKLFKZHPDNHRIWKLQJVFRQILUPV
WKHP ULJKW DZD\«LI WKH\ KDYH EHHQ EDGO\ PDde then the sam e destroys them  just as 
TXLFNO\´400   
Confirm ation produces habit and VWDQGV DV D ³VHFRQG QDWXUH.´ %XW EHFDXVH PRVW SHRSOH DUH
VXEMHFW WR WKH ³ZKLPV RI FXVWRP´ - the social reality of the sensus com munis - to wh ich the 
frivolous appears as a negativity. Therefore sensibilty requires a disciplined second nature that 
subsum es values of good and bad habits through the diferential analysis of the µODQJXDJH RI
DFWLRQ¶ 7KH µODQJXDJH RI DFWLRQ¶ KDV its  relation to the corporeal body with particular 
signifcance to  expressing rudim entary practical principles that p recede LGHDV VLQFH µVHFRQG
QDWXUH¶ VXEVWLWXWHV QRW IRU DQ LGHD RI QDWXUH EXW IRU a µODQJXDJH RI DFWLRQ¶ it  indicates the 
productive capacity to w hich analysis specifcaly acts in  the reciprocation of the im pression. 401  
Ideas internalise a problem atic status encapsulated by a diferential relation between the 
µODQJXDJHRIDFWLRQ¶DQGDµVHFRQGQDWXUH.¶The power of analysis extracts that value held of t he 
representative sign.  
 
The µlanguage RI DFWLRQ¶ LV RSHQ WR D SKHQRPHQDO SUREOHP ZKLFK ORVHV UHOHYDQFH IRU IRUPDO
sciences, such as physics and chem istry which can b e m aintained through m athem atical 
precision. As WKLVSUHFLVLRQGRHVQRWH[WHQGWRDSURMHFWRIDJHQHUDOVFLHQFH&RQGLOODF¶VLGea -
sign was developed at he threshold of the dom ain o f ideas, WKH µXQUHILQHG ODQJXDJHV¶ ZKRVH
threshold had questionable values which could appea r as the deploym ent of arbitrary, frivolous 
                                                          
397
 Ibid p185 
398
 Ibid p189 
399
 Ibid p199 
400
 Ibid p195 
401
 Ibid p213-215 
123 
 
or negative thought. This context ook the idea-sig n as proposing proxim ity to sensible origins 
through the value subjected to the prim ary needs. T hus m DQEHFRPHVZKDWKHDOUHDG\LV³SXUHO\
by nature, ´ as afirm ed  in WKH µODQJXDJH RI DFWLRQ:¶ such naturalism  put under the test of 
experience is paradoxicaly intended to exclude the  frivolity of language, since it isfrom  within 
instiuted discourse that frivolity can proliferate .402   
 
The proliferation of language diverges in two direc tions for Condilac; firstly, an organic 
FRH[LVWHQFH JLYHQ WKURXJK D ³FR-PLQJOLQJ´ ZLWKLQ Hconom ies that m erely risk em pircal 
arbitrariness. 403  Secondly, the other direction that appears intele ctualy as the ³PDQLD IRU
definitons, ´ H[WHQGLQJ IDOVH VLJQV as  accord ed  with inherent values. This was what Condilac 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKH³FHOHEUDWHGZULWHUV´RIWKHPort-Royale Logic (1662) whose epistem ological 
legacy w as both of analysis and synthesis, consider ed as diferent but equivalent m ethods of 
unfolding epiphenom enal representation. 404  By FRQWUDVW&RQGLOODF¶VLogic insists hat analysis 
retained both under a µODQJXDJHRIDFWLRQ¶DQGIRUits habituation as econd nature. 405  The central 
problem  therefore w as frivolous ynthesis at the ro ot of unregulated recom bination.  
 
This dispersion relates back to the earlier Essay o n the Origin of Human Knowledge (1746) and 
its  discussion of the successive transform ations of si gns by which knowledge passes into 
understanding. 406  Condilac grounds hum an understanding through a si ngle principle which rest 
on his argum ent derived from  the origin and progres s of language. Language isan em pircal but 
pragm atic knowledge, lim ited by itspositve functi onal success over tim e. This the m ovem ent 
that distnguishes itelf rom  a Kantian form  of ru le based dialectic. 
 
:KDW&RQVWLWXWHVWKHµ:HOO0DGH/DQJXDJH¶ 
 
The later Logic derives from  the earlyb Essay this m odel of linear developm ent of speech as 
figurative im ages decom posed into unitary signs. Si gns reflect he µODQJXDJHRIDFWLRQ¶ERWKDV
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an epistem ological construct and as an aesthetic fi gure (even an apperception); this notion of the 
µODQJXDJHRIDFWLRQ¶VWDQGVa prior a determ ining wil. 407  By diferentiating such m an-m ade signs 
IURP DQ µDQLPDOLW\¶ &RQGLOODF GLVWLQJXLVKHV a productive aspect of hum an existence under a 
principle which im plies a higher technical capacity  and constiutes the general gram m ar that can 
lend itself to a Science of M an.  
 
The Essay describes the practical aspects of langua ge DV³RSHUDWLRQVRIWKHVRXO;´EXWDQDWXUDO
history of signs shows ito be DQ µHFRQRP\¶ divided as under a tripartie division of natural, 
accidental or conventional. 408  Conventional signs are instiuted in accordance wi th the higher 
qualites of m an to present ideas clearly and disti nctly so as to be extended to a judgm ent. 409  The 
conventional sign has a sim ple repetious function , through its  power of recal reinforcing 
m em ory and itsrem iniscence. Here isa prim ary func tion that needs protecting from  the frivolous 
syntheses that appear as heightened form s of an exc essive im agination. The idea-sign serves a 
problem  of balance while avoiding rigid and schem at ising universals VXFKDVWKHµVFDIIROGLQJRI
SULQFLSOHV¶that can equaly conceal the way to a true discovery. 410  
 
Condilac theorises that a positve language developed from  the PXWXDO JURXQG RI ³FULHV RI
passion to pe UFHSWLRQ´caries this m plicate necessity into the sign as econd nature. This can be 
recaled to m ind at w il and extends operation of t he soul. Language, therefore, links diferences 
of tem peram ents under a generalised second nature d eveloped through habituated signs, it  
transform s relation betw een the m ental and physical  through a substiution efected under a 
power of recom bination. However, variations in disc ourse, in VW\OHDQGWKHUHIOHFWLYHµIRUFH¶RI
language gives a vivacity as power of an idea th at m ake the signs function in practice. This not  
DSRZHURILPDJLQDWLRQEXWD³SRZHURYHUWKHLPDJLQDWLRQ´PDNLQJVLJQVIXQFWLRQLV therefore 
am biguously atributed to an insensible link that s ubstiut es  for a form al understanding in  the 
em pircal dom ain of a µODQJXDJHRIDFWLRQ¶411  
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The Essay describes the dom ain of language as m ovin g in two directions; firstly the natural drift 
atributed to geography, clim ate, the socio-politc al, or an anthropology. But language is also 
conditoned by the gifted individuals who can efec tively m ark language through a strength of 
m em ory and the power over im agination. The later i s the characteristic of genius; individuals 
both lim ited by language yet to whom , reciprocaly,  language ow es a debt for itsparticularity,  
³EHLQJERXQGE\UXOHVZKLFKUHVWUDLQWKHP WKHLU LPDJLQDWLRQVWULYHVZLWK LQFUHDVHG
efort, thus of necessity create new expression. In deed sudden progress of a language 
always occurs in the age of a great poet, philosoph ers cary it o perfection only m uch 
ODWHU´412  
Here is the m ovem ent between im agination and itsan alysis, as polarites acting as two distinct 
languages; firstly the µQDWXUDO¶ synthesizing function of im agination and secondly, a function 
ZKLFK³SUDFWLFHVDQDO\VLVILHUFHO\´DJDLQVWDQ\IUivolity. An inherent problem  of language is it
proliferation into m ediocrity, triviality, and bad m etaphysics contam inating any true art and 
science. 413  7KLVGHILQHV WKH WDVN IRU&RQGLOODF¶V µZHOOPDGH ODQJXDJH¶ for his era and explains 
why a prim arily analytical tsk isem phasised. 414   
 
The Speechless Statue: W hat D istinguishes Sensation  and Idea  
 
W hat distnguishes the two texts, he early Essay a nd the late Logic, sees Condilac clarifying 
this analytic task around developm ent of the m ental  life. Treatise on Sensation (1754) initates 
the break from  the Essay by introducing the fam ous im age of the speechless statue in order to 
H[SORUH D FDSDFLW\ RI µQHHG¶ DV VHOI-preservation in the individual. 415  By relating m em ory to 
present im pressions, Treatise on Sensation develops  an im portant distinction is between 
³VHQVDWLRQ-DFWXHOOH´ DQG ³LGpH-LQWHOOHFWXHOOH´416  This diference is between the passive 
m echanism  of a sensualism , and the active im pressio ns which m ental phenom ena wilfuly 
com pare signs.  
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However, this distnction also OHDGV WR WZR UHDGLQJV RI &RQGLOODF¶V WKRXJKW depending on 
whether his conjectured statue is understood as a r eceptor of natural sensations or epresents a 
psychological past o w hich the present hought, h rough m em ory and its heightened form  of 
im agination, m ust actively com pare. This leaves a f urther am biguity that extends to whether the 
idea-sign relate to successions of nature or succes sions of language. Condilac seem s to have 
been aware of this interpretive point around the 17 54 editon of Treatise on Sensation since he 
m odifed the later editon included in his Oeuvres which was published posthum ously in 1798. 417  
This clarifed the original argum ent in  DVHFWLRQ µ2ILGHDVZKLFKWKHKXPDQEHLQJFDQDFTXLUH
ZKHQ OLPLWHG WR D VHQVH RI WRXFK¶ w ith the later em phasis on the distinction from  se nsual 
LPSUHVVLRQVRIIHULQJ WRNQRZOHGJHD³OLJKWZKLFKJXLGHV LW¶V PHUHO\ LQVWLQFW´7KH IXQFWLRQRI
idea- VLJQZDVWRDEVWUDFWWKDWZKLFKH[LVWHGµQDWXUDOO\¶but taken up by a m easure of language; 
³,W¶V[the statue] m ethod in acquisiton is to observe in  succession, one after the other 
the qualites that it rbutes to objects: i ana lyses naturaly but it has no language. But 
DQDQDO\VLVZLWKRXWVLJQVFDQRQO\JLYHDOLPLWHGNQRZOHGJH«DQGVLQFHLWKDV not been 
possible to put hem  in order the colection m ust b e very confused. Thus when Itreat 
what he statue acquires, Ido not m ean to say that  ithas knowledge of which itcan 
render an exact account of itself, itonly has a pr actical knowledge [...] To acquire a 
knowledge its necessary to have a language: for t he ideas m ust be classifed and 
determ ined which presupposes igns em ployed accordi ng to m easure. See the first part 
of m y Grammar or m y Logic ´418  
This distinction between purely instinctual knowled ge and a theoretical knowledge, clarifes the 
values of language explored in the earlier Essay. W hen this is taken up in the Treatise on 
Animals (1756) itdem onstrates how qualitative dif erences in signs divide m an from  anim als. 
This distinction efectively divides the specifcal ly hum an psychology into two m odes; WKHµVHOI¶
RIKDELWDQGDµVHOI¶RIUHIOHFWLRQ -this re -opens a dom ain beyond the statue and the anim al by  
virtue of the artifce of the instiuted signs of l anguage of m an. Therefore both texts, he Treatise 
on Sensation and the Treatise on Animals refers bac k to the Essay and both pursue distin ct  
aspects of a fundam ental problem  that Condilac at ributes to m odes of synthesis of knowledge -
hum an nature and the artifce of language. The qua litative diferentiation that appears as  the 
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idea-sign supports the thesis of the earlier Essay and defin es  a m ethodological basis for the 
legacy that reached the revolutionary era through t he Logic. 
 
The Idea-Sign Retains the Twin Disciplines of Thoug ht  
 
&RQGLOODF¶Vlegacy for a Science of M an was notably em phasised during the 19 th  century through 
the speechless statue of Treatise on Sensation rath er than looking back to the Essay. This 
lobsided view UHIOHFWVWKHZD\&RQGLOODF¶VZRUNZDVWDNHQXSLQWKHSost-revolutionary period, 
an era associated w ith the intelectuals of the D ir ectoire, am ongst hem  Destut de Tracy and 
Jean-Piere Cabanis. 419  7KHUH ZDV D SROLWLFDO GLPHQVLRQ WR SXEOLVKLQJ &RQGLOODF¶V Oeuvre 
Complete in 1798 whose am biton was for founding a radical educational program  alied to the 
project of a Science of M an. Later, the reaction aga inst he Ideologues after the dem ise of the 
D irectoire and the revolutionary legacy during the early years of the 19 th  century, served to focus 
on the perceived intelectual problem s often atrib uted to dangerous am bitons of 18 th  century 
WKRXJKW&RQGLOODF¶VFDVH served a condem nation that focus ed  on the specifc understanding of 
Sensationalism  as a m aterialism  which had left a particularly negative im pression on the 19 th  
century m ind. To see Sensationalism  as a system  of logical signs pursued through a rule based 
m ethod downplayed the debate on the dynam ics of lan guage and itsexpressive qualites in active 
life. In the 19 th  century, an em erging Positvism  was struggling to define an idea of history 
through its am biton for a m ore precise knowledge, but his was contending with a rom antic 
reaction. Both had a tendency to dism iss the subtle ties of a conjectural m ethod of thinking 
practiced by 18 th  century thought in which the debate over origins o f language was pivotal. 
 
In this respect, the subtile of Logic µWKHDUWRIWKLQNLQJ¶UHIOHFWVERWKLWVKLVWRULFDOUHODWLRQWRWKH
Port Royal Logic, and also m arks out is am biton i n giving the new disciplinary m atrix as an 
am biton of conceptualy extending a general knowle dge, an am biton m otivated specifcaly by 
a Science of M an. The nature of this discipline was  not som ething sim ply engaged with by the 
XQLQLWLDWHG ,W ZDV DQ µDUW¶ ZKRVH VWDWXV OLNH DQ\ VSHFLILF GLVcipline, w as to be understood in 
relation to this core identiy. The aim s and subjec t m ater to which it was em ployed, conveyed a 
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com plicated legacy of a discourse on a Science of M an at WKHURRWRI&RQGLOODF¶VRHXYUH. Itcan 
be argued, that what w as taken up by its praction ers engaged with &RQGLOODF¶V suppressed 
Protean vision  6HQVDWLRQDOLVP¶V SDQ-logical possibilty was a legacy not always expres sly 
writen down; yet this caried over into various pr actices and contem porary disciplines what was 
historicaly understood of a Science of M an in &RQGLOODF¶Vera.  
 
'HVSLWHWKHVHVSHFLILFUHODWLRQVEHLQJEOXUUHGRYHUWLPH&RQGLOODF¶VLogic ofered a disciplinary 
practice -rather than a specifc doctrine of thoug ht ± whose em phasis was derived from  the core 
aim s of an earlier debate over the values of langua ge. The exam ple of Les M onades shows how  
this internalised a thought which was prom oted in r evolutionary era as a Science of M an, 
FRQQHFWLQJ &RQGLOODF¶V VLJQ WR WKH ZLGHU DPELWLRQV RI Enlightenm ent thought. Prem ised on 
VRPHWKLQJOLNHWKHHPSLULFDOµH[LVWDQW¶that w as V\PEROLVHGE\&RQGLOODF¶VHDUO\HVVD\, the w ider 
disciplinary objective for the diverse practices ar ound a Science of M an derived conjectural 
possibilties that extended beyond associative or f unctional form s of knowledge. To understand 
how the idea-sign influenced the w ider field of dis ciplinary practices of the day, one can 
specifcaly exam ine how  this nteracted with the h istorical doctrine of physiology. 
 
Physiology as the D iscipline of the Body  
 
Prior to 1800, what w as understood as the natural s cience of the body drew on two distinct 
disciplines, anatom y and physiology. A t the start of the 19th century these converged. The  two 
disciplines were earlier considered to be separate branches of knowledge, diferentiated between 
a science and an art, and pursuing their own system s of practices and activites. There was a 
hierarchical relation between them  with the higher status given to physiology which w as 
considered the scientifc discipline pursued in a p hilosophical fashion; anatom y stood as the 
m anual art and held the lower status. 420  During the politcal, social and intelectual uphe avals of 
the revolutionary era, anatom y, and its alied surg ical practice, chalenged for the status of a 
science. In a contem porary sense, the term  physiolo gy brings together the theoretical and the 
m anual aspects of the experim ental science of  phy siology, but until the early 19 th  century the 
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physiologist was closely alied to the natural phil osopher through a shared enquiry into the order 
of nature. 421  %RWK UHWDLQHG KLVWRULFDO OLQNV ZLWK $ULVWRWOH¶V VFLHQFH LQ LWV H[WHQGHG JHQHUDO
NQRZOHGJHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUGHILQLQJDQµDQLPDOHFRQRP\¶DQGWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRIVRXO 
 
The historical practice of physiology gave a sense im plied of itstatus as a disciplina. This was 
what a discipulus folow ed as the branch of knowledge to b e learnt and pursued by a system  of 
rules for its active practice. In this sense, the d iscipline m eans the counterpart o a doctrine 
upheld as what one should think. The discipline des cribes what one should do or how  one should 
behave, and is necessarily connected for the discip ulus through the disciplinary m atrix; this 
em bodies the knowledge practice handed down through  history which it extends as reproducible 
discourse. The specifc relationship between a disc ipline and its doctrine gives the status of its
knowledge which can be m odifed over tim e. In the c ase of physiology, the status of its  
knowledge had to  function as  a nature of m an, his place in the world, which had  historicaly 
aim ed to cary a divinatio. 422  W hat was condensed therefore into the physiologica l discourse had 
a confluence with the debate on origins to which Co ndilac engaged with through language, the 
original problem  of the body that was driving both a scientifc study and m edical practice. The 
idea-sign lent iself to a central branch of this a  project WR ZKLFK D µQHZ ODQJXDJH¶ JDYH WKH
specifc context under which the third m eaning of t he discipline becom es apparent, nam ely µWR
discipline. ¶ This indicates the corective accorded to the rules  of practice that extends to 
theological and politcal spheres of thought. This was im portant for the am biton for the Science 
of M an. 
 
The new context em erges in paralel to what an earl y m odern era physiology has as its core 
identiy. Jean Fernel (1497-1558) is credited w ith defining a m odern physiologists discipline, 423  
and its worth looking at an exam ple from  his Seve n Books on the Natural Part of M edicine 
(1542). Itsets out a data of the body acquired fro m  an anatom ical practice and dissection and 
gives a perspective for a physiology whose work loo ks beyond its structural anatom y to the 
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 The form ulation a history of m odern physiology is atributed by Cunningham  to the work of Claude Bern ard, 
notably Introduction to the Study of Experimental M edicine (1865)  
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 A  paralel to the trm inology in Foucault (1970) p 59 
423
 Georges Canguilhem  takes )HUQHO¶VPhysiologia in Universa M edicina (1554) as detailn g the outline of the 
discipline. Cangilhem  (1994) p91 
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discourse on the nature of m an. This is a philosoph ical discourse, a scientia, that lays out a 
schem a of knowledge beyond what could be observed t hrough evident em pircal phenom ena. 
The discipline of the body served a higher task tha t the m anual based anatom y which w as lim ited 
WRDQDUW3K\VLRORJ\FDUULHGDQDEVWUDFW LGHDO³WKHQDWXUHRI WKHKHDOWK\PDQRIDOOKLs forces 
DQG DOO KLV IXQFWLRQV´ DQG WKLV QHFHVVLWDWHG D VFKHPD IRU WKH XQLYHUVDO VFLHQFH RI KXPDQ
nature. 424  The physiologist, drawing on lim ited anatom ical da ta, presented prim arily a theoretical 
discourse and needed a philosophical base. Jean Fer nel took SKLORVRSK\DV³WKHPRWKHURIDOOWKH
DUWV´ DQG LW LV ZRUWK TXRWLQJ LQ VRPH OHQJWK ZKDW KH SURJUDPPDWLFDOO\ XQGHUVWRRG E\ D
philosophical nalytic on which a m odern physiology  relied, and by im plication what it excludes.  
³7KHWUXWKRIWKDWUHDVRQLVWKHlight of the m ind. Those who disdain it can neither  grasp 
the causes of things, nor investigate what isrue in anything, nor distnguish truth from  
falsehood. Deprived of that special ilum ination al l their lfe iswasted in useless efort, 
they are dragged back and forth in and rash blind e fort. - >«@ By contrast are those 
who, anim ated for philosophy by an adm irable ardour  enter into the path where so 
m any m en of genius have left heir footprints. Havi ng first received the knowledge of 
the thing which fal under the senses, they are lit tle detained by the basic contem plation 
of those things but having advanced beyond them  by an efort of m ind, they then reach 
the point from  which, as from  preceding causes, the  things of sense them selves appear 
to have taken their own origin. From  this point he y wil gradualy ascend higher, and 
finaly they wil atain by thought he regions whe re the m ind, fulfied, reposes in the 
ultim ate. Since the hum an body has now broken down then anatom y into parts 
accessible to the senses, from  these we now need to  pass on to those things which are 
learnt by thinking alone [nam ely a physiology] and w e need to investigate, at a higher 
level, from  what elem ents each part ism ade, what i s the m ixture of the elem ents, what 
is their tem peram ent, which virtues lie within the parts, by what spirt and heat they are 
m aintained. W hen al this has been discovered and u nderstood by analysis, then, by the 
m ethod of com positon, it w il becom e clear what ar e the causes that bring everything 
ab out, which hum ours are produced by these causes, wh at functions are of the 
particular parts, and what is he natural ofice of  everything. This i the way of doing 
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physiology which establishes the natural account of  m an by the power of 
GHPRQVWUDWLRQ´425  
Phy VLRORJ\¶V V\VWHPDWLF GRFWULQH IRU LOOXPLQDWLRQ RI WKH JURXQG RI D QDWXUDO DFFRXQW RI PDQ
looked to the anatom ical analytic to expand a philo sophical understanding of natural m an. W hen 
Fernel m oves from  an anatom y to a physiology by the  extension of the low er analytic to its 
higher synthesis, t ijustifed from  the perspect ive of this task of the higher discipline which is a 
truth for the natural philosophy.  
 
)URPWKLVFRUHDPELWLRQRWKHUQRWDEO\µJRRGSUDFWLWLRQHUV¶ZHUH5HQp'HVFDUWHVDQG$OEUHFWYRQ
Haler, both of whom  folowed a sim ilar m ethod to e stablish units of the body delim itng sources 
of m otion (of soul, spirt) from  which to com pose t he schem a of explanation of the nature of 
m an. In René D escartes Treatise on M an (1662) his d iscourse draws on the sub-visible structures 
of the body in its workings beyond the m echanics of  the body in looking to the functions of 
bodies in general. But it isA lbrect von Haler who  is held to have introduced to physiology the 
specialised training that could distinguish itfrom  a general m edical practice. By repeatedly 
insisting that good physiological practice w as grou nded in anatom ical experim ents, he intended 
to determ ine WKH µIDEULF¶ RI WKH ERG\.426  He gave the innovative perspective to which his 
anatom ical program  took the cadaver as  lim ited in use and looked instead to experim ent on  live 
DQLPDOV 6LJQLILFDQWO\ WKLV GLYLGHG WKH RSLQLRQV RI FRQWHPSRUDULHV LQ +DOOHU¶V YLHZ
experim entation through vivisection m eant that, -
³DVLQJOHH[SHULPHQWKDVUHIXWHGWKHODERrious figm ent of m any years [of work]. This 
cruelty benefits rue physiology m ore than alm ost a l other arts by the joint harm ony of 
ZKLFKWKLVRXUVFLHQFHWKULYHV´ 427   
+HQFH H[SHULPHQWDWLRQ ZDV JLYHQ D XQLTXH VWDWXV DQG +DOOHU FDOOHG LW KLV ³XQLTXH RUDFOH´428  
Recourse to studying the living body m eant that an  anatom ical art of intervention could support a 
w ider physiological discipline in its production of  the general physiological discourse on m an. 
Haler m aintained this discourse in itseparate an d synthetic aspect. -
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 7UDQVODWLRQIURP-HDQ)HUQHO¶VSeven Books on the Natural Part of M edicine from  th e txt of Figard (1970) p49-
50, cf Cunningham  (2002) p647 
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 Canguilhem  (1994) p92. see Cunningham  (2002) p652,  also John E. Lesch (1984) p20- 22.  
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 Haler cf Cunningham  (2002) p652. 
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³The whole of physiology isa naration of the m otio ns by which the anim ated m achine 
LVPRYHG´ 429    
Haler ¶V w as a m odern analytic which he characterised as  DQµDQLPDWHGDQDWRP\.¶This m pressed 
PDQ\ FRQWHPSRUDULHV LQFOXGLQJ D \RXQJ µDVVRFLp DQDWRPLVWH¶ RI WKH Académie Royale des 
Sciences LQ ¶V FDOOHG )HOL[ 9LFT G¶$]\U who reflected on this am bition for a progressive 
science associated with the disciplinary task. Later  he wrote, -
³$W WKH EHJLQQLQJ RI WKLV >th ] century, Physiology was no m ore than a vain 
assem blage of system s; it isHaler who dispeled t hese; he has laid the foundations for 
a science which has no m ore in com m on with the old science than the nam e. Let us 
ofer to the great m an the hom age of our ecognito n, and let us show him  our espect 
E\IROORZLQJLQKLVIRRWVWHSV«´430   
Seen as the foundations of a new science, the centr al im portance was felt in grounding the 
disciplinary m atrix that physiology aspired to. H is torical physiological m odels ooked to various 
sources, chem istry in Paracelsus or m echanism  in Fr iedrich Hofm an or hydrostatics in Stephen 
Hales, but what was im portant was establishing from  known anatom ical facts the physiological 
discourse which could stand as a nature of the body  and itsextension to a Science of M an. No 
GRXEWWKLVGLVFLSOLQH³UHPDLQHGLGHRORJLFDO´431  until the advent of experim ental physiology in the  
WK FHQWXU\EXWGXULQJ WKLV WLPH WKHDLPVDQG JRDOVRISK\VLRORJ\¶V VRFLR-politcal uses was 
also undergoing a radical shift paralel to what wa s earlier envisioned as the extended horizon of 
the the physiological disciplina. 
 
The Physiological basis of the M edical D ebate  
 
The physiological disciplina was closely tied to a m edical discourse on the status of what kind of 
knowledge was appropriate for the study of the livi ng body. This w as defined around the basic 
argum ents of the m echanist-vitalist debate which em erged in the m id 17 th  century. Georges 
&DQJXLOKHP VXFFLQFWO\ VXPPHG XS LWV IXQGDPHQWDO GLVWLQFWLRQV LQ ³WR DFW LW LV QHFHVVDU\ WR
local LVH´432  he m eant hat pursuing an efective m edicine was d ependent on a localisation that 
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 Haler 1757-1766, Vol.1, cf Cunningham  (2002) p655  
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 9LFTG¶$]\U9ROSS-4, cf Cunningham  (2002) p657.  
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 Canguilhem  (1988) p54- 55 
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 &DQJXLOKHP¶VRXWOLQHRIµWKHSUREOHP¶LQThe Normal and the Pathological p39- 40 
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could defines an efective hierarchy of disease. Ca nguilhem  describes how until contem porary 
germ  theory appeared in the 19th century, early m od ern physicians of the 17th and 18th centuries 
em ployed diverse ontological m odels as the basis fo r exploring the nature of sickness from  the 
physiological point of view. For early m odern m edic ine, it needed to contrast itelf w ith a legacy 
left of G reek m edicine, which was not localised as such, but used the dynam ic or holistic nature 
of m an judged through an evident equilbrium  whose nature grounded a general theory of health 
DQGGLVHDVH7KLVG\QDPLVPZDVFRPPRQWR$ULVWRWOH¶VSUHGHFHVVRUVDQGJDYHWKHLPDJHRIWKH
body com pos HGRIFRPSOH[RIHOHPHQWDOSRZHUVEHLQJRSSRVHGWR³DQRWKHUE\UHDVRQRIEHLQJ
ZKDWLWLV´433  The balance of the four hum ours was an equilbrium  that could sustain variation up 
to a point, oscilating around a m ean. Ancient m edi cal theory looked towards the m ean as the 
threshold where disease appeared as a reaction to t he disequilbrium  in the econom y of the body 
through itsrelation to nature; m edicines basic aim  was the techniques of restoring this balance as 
far as possible. Like language, m edical knowledge wa s an artifce, but one which specifcaly 
aim ed at im itate natural forces and, therefore, req uired an understanding of nature. M edical 
representations of disease, whether as foreign subs tance or the oppositon of orces, require an 
acquaintance w ith th is  natural state which norm al ife looked to regain. The functional role of 
physiology w as to give this grounding; in turn phys iology extended itsknowledge to a theory of 
disease only by delim itng it toa field of diference prior to en gaging in efective m edical action.  
 
W hat distinguished m odern m edicine by the start of the 18th century w as that both m echanists 
and vitalists could relate to Descartes dualism , si nce al approaches shared the struggle to 
overcom e the scholastic and Galenic notions em bedde d in m edicines history. Both Descartes 
philosophy and the m echanics of Galieo inform ed th e rise in iatrom echanism  even prior to 
1HZWRQ¶VSXEOLVKLQJRIPrincipia (1687). 434  Iatrom echanism  ascribed m ovem ents of the m achine 
to a soul or psyche m uch as Aristotle or G alen held  a spirtual, vital or rational principle; it
considered al m ater to be passive. By the 18 th  century the Cartesian physician Friedrich 
Hofm an (1660-1742) could describe a m odern nature of the body as a m echanism  but w ith God 
as the suprem e m echanic, the prim e m over who accoun ted for its equilbrium . M otion in the 
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 T. JTracy (1969) esp. p23. 
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 See Haigh (1984) p17-28, for general histories of m edicine; Erwin   Ackerknecht (1955),  Lester S. K ing (1958) 
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PDFKLQHZDVH[SODLQHGWKURXJKWKHIOXLGVRIWKHERG\EORRGO\PSKZKLOHµDQLPDOVSLULWV¶DQG
WKHµVXEWOHIOXLGV¶ZHUHWKHSRZHUE\ZKLFKWKHVHQVLWLYHVRXOLPSUHVVHGLWVHOI)rom  this m odel, 
health is given to fluent and wel ordered m ovem ent s and death ensues when corporeal m otions 
EHFRPH WHUPLQDWHG DQG +RIIPDQ¶V Fundamenta M edicina (1695) exem plifes a dilem m a of  
iatrom echanism  by reducing to an interm ediary subst ance the interface between m ater and spirt; 
this was a m echanism  that appeared as a contained a nim ism . 435  +HUPDQ %RHUKDDYH¶V -
1738) iatrom echanism  described a nature of bodily f unctions through the concepts of pipes, 
sieves and presses, deliberately avoiding any specu lation on m ind/body relations beyond the 
pragm atic needs of a m edicine. By refusing to be dr awn into m etaphysical speculation on 
prim ary causes, 436  iatrom echanics could efectively give explanations  for a pragm atic need of 
localising organic functions; at he lim its of this  knowledge they defered any questions of 
purposeful activity in whole organism s. 
 
An organicist-vitalist hinking arose to prom inence  through Jan Baptist van Helm ont (1577-
1644) opposed a m echanistic reduction through an or ganicism  ascribed to a dorm ant archaeus, a 
form  of sensitve soul which both exercised dynam ic  control over the body and accounting for its
µVSHFLDO FKDUDFWHU¶ $V WKH ³JRYHUQRU RI JHQHUDWLRQ´ WKLV SULQFLSOH RI WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ LQ PDWWHU
explained through an iatrochem istry that grounded o bservable phenom ena though vital concepts 
and was strongly influential for later physiologica l thought. 437  A  sim ilar perspective saw  Georg 
Ernst Stahl (1659-1734) rejecting m echanism  as inad equate for addressing the organism  as a 
whole and described instead the living body as a dy nam ic and reactive com plex. By taking the 
holistic perspective to explain purposive activity,  Stahl accorded the very qualites defining 
living bodies w ith the form  of Newtonism  that ook an existence of forces as in som e way 
LPPDQHQW LQPDWWHU/LYLQJIRUFHKDG WRH[SODLQ³WKHFRQVHUYDWLRQRIDQHPLQHQWO\FRUUXSWLEOH
ERG\ WKH IDFXOW\RI IRUFHZLWKZKRVHDLG WKHERG\ LV VKHOWHUHG IURP WKHDFWRIFRUUXSWLRQ´438  
once this force w as w ithdrawn, death ensues. But th is also needed a concept of conservation that 
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 $QRXWOLQHRI+RIIPDQYLHZVDSSHDUVLQWKHLQWURGXFWLRQWR/HVWHU6.LQJ¶VWUDQVODWLRQRIFundamenta M edicina 
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 Com m entary on Herm an Boerhaave in K ing (1958) p59- 121. 
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 M ain text isW alter Pagel (1982) 
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DµVRXO¶could direct hrough the activites of the living b ody and would also explained m otions 
given to unconscious and autom atic functions that w ere evident in habituated actions. 
 
Stahl exem plifed the epistem ological aspects em erg ing at a im e when the delim itations between 
a physiology and a physics were less clear. Taking m echanical description as inadequate to the 
WDVNRIHVWDEOLVKLQJDSK\VLRORJLFDOV\QWKHVLV6WDKO¶VDSSURDFKGUHZRQG\QDPLFSK\VLRORJLFDO
m odels integrating an epistem ological m odel from  ph ysics. An im portant justifcation for this 
strategy cam e from  Francis G lisson (1597-  ZKR GHILQHG D µOLIH RI PDWWHU¶ WKRXJK WKH
properties of irtabilty; this general property o f the constiutive fibres of the body self-subsiste d 
WKURXJK DQ LPPDQHQW HQHUJHWLFV 7KH OLIH RI WKLV PDWWHU ZDV SULPDO IRUFH D µELDUFKLD¶ RU
µELRXVLD¶439  possessing properties that ofered the useful pote ntial for explaining latency in 
functional faculties of perceptions and reactions, pleasure and pain, and general bodily m otions. 
The concept of irtabilty accounted for a power o f spontaneity to act and react, 440  and 
substiuted for the term s of actio and passio, clas sical term s of lie and m otion in al nature, 
redeployed to accord with the m ore contem porary ana tom ical ground. 441  The ireducibilty of 
PDWWHUDQGLWVSURSHUWLHVOHQW*OLVVRQWRDWKHRU\RIµDQLPDOILEUHV¶WKDWZHUHGLVSRVHGWRPLFUR-
m ovem ents: as an account for the latency evident in  physiological responses this could be 
associated w ith m em ory. W hen Principia was publishe d it felo post-Newtonian theorists, uch 
as Stahl, to suggest an obvious paralel in the lin k between concepts of inherent iriabilty and a 
universal gravity. 
 
*OLVVRQ¶VLUULWDELOLW\ZDVDOVRtaken up by Albrect von Haler in The Sensible and Irritable Parts 
of the Body (1749). W hat was signifcant here w as t hat Haler specifcaly em phasised 
diferences between localy visible irtabilty an d universal atributable force to which a 
historical concept of the vital could atribute pre dispositons of contraction and predispositon to 
feeling. Hence his anatom ical and experim ental work  analysed the nature of these forces 
although in a consciously lim ited way, 
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³7KHWKHRU\DVWRZK\VRPHSDUWVRIWhe body are endowed with these properties and 
som e are not Ishal not m eddle with...for Iam  per suaded that he sources of both lie 
beyond the reaches of the knife and the m icroscope,  beyond which Ido not chuse to 
hazard any conjecture, and have no desir HWRHDFKZKDW,DPLJQRUDQWRIP\VHOI´442  
+LVHQVXLQJORFDOLVDWLRQZDVWRDQµDQLPDOIDEULF¶WKDWUHWDLQHGFHUWDLQFRQFHSWXDODQGKLVWRULFDO
precedents, although in a lim ited way. Starting fro m  a historicaly problem atic concept atributed 
WR OLIH +DOOHU¶s experim entation m oved towards the vital parts of the body through a 
m ethodology that established, on the basis of his o bservations, what could be localised by 
system atic analysis which then ofered explanation thorugh these vital properties. On the other 
KDQG6WDKO¶VG\QDPLFYLWDOLVPOHQWLWVHOIWRDGLIIHUHQWPHWKRGRORJ\he analysed phenom ena in  
the whole as they w ere apprehended around an idea o f what vitalism  atributed to life. This 
shifted the problem  to the lvel of the concept. 
 
W hile the form er localised the properties of the bo dy through WKHDQDO\WLFDSSURDFKWKHODWWHU¶V
wholism  retained what was atributed to the vital i dea of the whole as the problem  of the 
synthetic elem ent. In this way the disciplina of ph ysiology operated on two levels an d w ere the 
intelectual traditons which French m edical circle s of the Enlightenm ent were im m ersed. Later 
these inform ed the Science of M an that culm inated a round the revolutionary era. 
 
M ontpelier M edicine and the Hippocratic Revival  
 
In additon to the contem porary m edical debates, Fr ench physicians also drew on the 
philosophical debates of the era including those of  M aupertuis and Condilac. The fam ed 
M ontpelier School of M edicine was established in 1 220 and already had an ilustrious history 
which it m aintained through the late Enlightenm ent period. Individual physicians had contributed 
to the Encyclopaedia project, as M ontpelier m edici ne gained a reputation of driving a 
H ippocratic revival. 443  From  a contem porary physiological context this to od against m echanistic 
reduction of m edical thought hrough the VWURQJLQIOXHQFHRI6WDKO¶VYLWDOLVP0RYLQJEHWZHHQ
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 The Sensible and Irritable Parts of the Body Londo n (1755) p2, cf Thom as S. Hal (1968) p14. 
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 Denis D iderot was already drawing on the idea of a  m edicaly inspired anthropology for his Elements o f 
Physiology (1773-1774) This extended through the c RWHULH'¶+ROEDFKZKLFKSOD\HGDVLJQLILFDQWUROHLQWKH)UHQFK
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6WDKO¶VQHR-H ippocratic dynam ism  and the doctrine of sensibil ty, M ontpelier m edicine ofered 
two things; firstly, the SK\VLFLDQ¶VVHQVLWLYLW\DV the disciplinary particularity that was practiced 
in the new doctrine in sensibilty. Secondly, throu gh a conceptual em phasis on hum an experience 
in general, this could be extended in itspossibil ties to an expanded hum an knowledge. Itw as the 
com m itm ent o a w ider discipline of knowledge, desp ite any specifc interelations not being 
clearly defined, that gave the am biton for contrib uting to a future science which fed into the 
general Enlightenm ent thinking; one exam ple appears  in the project for the encyclopaedia. 444   
 
This gave the context for an  inter-disciplinary perspective on a Science of M an  looking for new  
approaches to physical and social observations. For  exam ple, by accounting for the distribution 
of hum an types through a m edical dem ographic or ant hropology, the controversial practice 
pursued through interpretations of physical feature s such as gender, constiution and race, was 
seen from  the m edical perspective as the sensitvit y to diference. Paradoxicaly such a new 
approach was intended to resist an idea of universa ls as a feature of the m echanistic/Cartesian 
notions of the body, through the concern w ith the f unction of living organism s in a general sense. 
The dynam ic approach was opposed to  static studies of structure, holding the idea of unction in 
relation to the w ider environm ent which was only m e taphysicaly grounded and therefore subject 
to dispute. But he neo-Hippocratic dynam ism  had an  epistem ological com m itm ent o Newton 
which, like for H aler and Stahl, m eant only the pr om ise of a m odern grounded science. -
³2QHVHHVKRZHYHUPDWKHPDWLFLDQVZKRXVHWKHOHWWHUV;DQG<WRGHVLJQDWHXQNQRZQ
quanties, and with so m uch greater success that hey discover by such m eans truths 
LQDFFHVVLEOHWRRWKHUSKLORVRSKHUV´445  
This was an epistem ological value given by the exem plary M ontpelier theoretician Boissier de 
Sauvage (1706-1767), a trained botanist who brought  to m edical theory itsrules of classifcation, 
as wel as being a confirm ed Newtonian who drew tog ether principles of George Ernst Stah O¶V
vital soul. This related the use of an abstract pri nciple for an unknown vital force, while aim ing 
to inform  observations of the pulse, of respiration  and other involuntary m ovem ents hat required 
m oderating in an inteligent way with a new theoret ical basis.  
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Folowing from  this, the m edical circles of M ontpel lier gave various form ulations of neo-
Hippocratism ; for som e itfolowed close to the cla ssical tripartie schem e encom passing the 
µSK\VLFDO¶ µPHQWDO¶ DQG µSDVVLRQDWH¶ IRU RWKHUV LW FRXOG EH UHGuced to bipolar relation of the 
µSK\VLFDO¶DQGWKHµPRUDO¶7KHUHZDVKRZHYHUQHYHUDVLPSOHUHODWLRQVLQFHWKHHPSKDVLVZDV
on the reciprocity which was a question of balance,  of econom y and norm s, that could com pose 
the w ider physiological synthesis. And this folowe d the prom inent awareness of m edicines 
historical relation to a Science of M an, to which t he idea of a holistic m edicine gave it  relation to 
society. However, itsa m istake to see this as a narow  ideological program ; what his social 
aspect of m edicine drew from  a particular reading o f the H ippocratic traditon, gave an 
understanding of health not as an individual afair  but one dependant on the social practices and 
m ileu to which one m ust practice an environm ental thinking. 446  
 
An influential M ontpelier physician was Theophile de Bordeu (1722-1776). He m ade distinct 
im pression on philosophical circles to the extent hat he appears as the principle character in 
'HQLV'LGHURW¶V/H5pYHG¶$OHPEHUW (1769). Bordeu held that he equilbrium  of two in versely 
proportional forces, ensibilty and m uscle m obilt y (irtabilty) was controled by the properties 
of a prim ary structure, such as the nervous system . 447  Like Haler, this divided properties into 
sensations and m otions through which Bordeu aim ed t o isolate the lim its of observable 
m ovem ents. The lim it was interpreted as defining wh ere m ovem ents produced from  
unobservable sensations, are balanced by involuntar y m ovem ents produced by the phenom ena 
given to sensations. Like Stahl, te living m ater, the actio and passio, was distinguished by this 
functional expression of m ovem ent; against his, ce rtain feelings and sensibilties could rem ain 
ODWHQW DQG XQH[SUHVVHG 7KURXJK WKLQNLQJ WKLV ODWHQF\ DV WKH µIHGHUDWLYH¶ FRQFHSW RI WKH ERG\
with centres of sensitvity subordinated to the bra in, individual characteristics could be atributed 
to the function of the equilbrium  between the cent res of sensitvity; the activity in the whole w as 
thereby a tension subsum ed and distributed it throu gh the nerve network. 448  This gave a view of 
the body that had no absolute unitary being, but was  a decentralized, sem i-autonom ous 
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com posite of organs to be interpreted through a com plex phenom enology which in no way could 
be deduced a priori from  known laws of a m echanica OSK\VLFV%RUGHX¶V IDPRXVPHWDSKRURI
this dynam ic im age w as the swarm  of bees,- 
³$VZDUPRIEHHVJDWKHUHGLQFOXVWHUVDQGVXVSHQGHGIURPDWUHHDVDYLQHHDFKSDUWLV
so to speak, not an anim al, but a kind of self-cont ained m achine which in its fashion 
FRQFXUVLQWKHJHQHUDOOLIHRIWKHERG\´449   
Transform ing an idea of a H ippocratic unbroken circ le into an active im age of distributed 
sensitvity through living m ater, this folowed a com bination of neo-H ippocratic em pircism  
ZLWK6WDKO¶VIRUPRIKROLVWLc vitalism . The vital concept of the living body wa s an im pulsive and 
dynam ic sensitvity. Through this innovative accoun t of the inner functioning of the body, the 
potential was for a higher activity of hum an life. This was w idely influential. 
 
Another strategy appears in the influential M ontpel lier physician Paul Joseph Barthez (1734-
1806). The til that cem ented his reputation expli citly announced itsam biton for a Science of 
M an. 1RXYDX[ HOHPHQWV GH OD 6FLHQFH GH /¶+RPPH w as first published in 1773 bu t was 
augm ented and republished in 1806. 450  Barthez, perhaps the m ost fam ous of the M ontpeli r 
physicians, produced the m ost influential synthesis  of vitalist hought. He arived in Paris in 
 PRYHG LQ '¶$OHPEHUWV FLUFOHV DQG ZURWH IRU WKH Encyclopédie. The signifcance of 
1RXYDX[(OHPHQWVGHOD6FLHQFHGH/¶+RPPHis n Barthez explaining an epistem ological value 
DVFULEHGWKURXJKDµYLWDOSULQFLSOH¶WKDWZDVQHLWKHUDPHWDSK\VLFDORURFFXOWIRUFH- 
³, QHYHU XVHG WKH WHUP YLWDO SULQFLSDO WR H[SODLQ DQ\ Rf the phenom ena of lie but 
[em ployed it] o m ake com prehensible certain new co nclusions in respect to the efects 
RIWKHVHSKHQRPHQD«´451   
7KH WHUPZDVXQGHUVWRRGDV D FRPSOHWHXQNQRZQ LQ WKH1HZWRQLDQ VHQVH:LWKQR µHVVHQWLDO
QDWXUH¶ LW VWRRG IRU D SRZer of explanation and represents his atem pt is to depart from  the 
obscurity of term s dom inating preceding m etaphysica l disputes. 452  The vital principal was the 
³QHFHVVDU\ DEVWUDFWLRQ´ UHTXLUHG WR PDNH FHUWDLQ VWDWHPHQWV DERXW REVHUYHG SKHQRPHQD RI
experienc H%DUWKH]GLGQRWDVVXPHDYLWDOSULQFLSDO WKDW³RUGHUVRUUHJXODWHV LWVDFWV´UDWKHULW
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SURSRVHGD³IDFXOW\DWWDFKHGWRWKHFRPELQDWLRQVRIPRYHPHQWVDQGPDWWHURIZKLFKWKHOLYLQJ
ERG\ LV IRUPHG´ ,Q WKLV ZD\ KH m akes a signifcant distinction from  St DKO¶V WKLQNLQJ RI WKH
VLQJOH SULQFLSOH RI µVRXO¶ ZKLOH DOVR GLVWLQJXLVKLQJ WKH YLWDO IURP VLPSO\ DWWULEXWLQJ VHSDUDWH
living forces to diferent properties such as irt abilty and sensibilty. Itwas considered m ore a 
³QDWXUDO DQGSKLORVRSKLFDO´SULQFLSOe according to Barthez, to atribute the unknown en tiy for 
the single principal that expressed itsefects in diferent w ays. The propositon was that,- 
³JRRGSKLORVRSKLFDOPHWKRGLQWKHVFLHQFHRIPDQUHTXLUHVWKDWRQHDWWULEXWHWRDVLQJOH
principle of lie in the hum an body, the living for ces that reside in each organ and are 
UHVSRQVLEOHIRULWVIXQFWLRQ´453  
%DUWKH]LVFDUHIXOWRUHIHUWRWKHµYLWDOSULQFLSDO¶DVDQDEVWUDFWLRQHPSOR\HGRQO\WRIDFLOLWDWHDQG
ground discussions in conceiving of living activit es whose inner dynam ics were not understood 
yet produced the singular efects observed.  The justifcation for this strategy is the m ethod o f 
induction taken from  Baconian enquiry into a natura l science which assum es that em pircism  
³FRXOG QRW WHDFK ZKDW WKHVH FDXVHV ZHUH LQ HVVHQFH´ UDWKHU WKH FHQWUDO DLP ZDV WR DEDQGRQ
ORRNLQJIRU µHVVHQFHV¶DQGµILQDOFDXVHV¶DQGIRFXVRQDSKHQRPHQRORJ\RIH[SHULHQFH454  But 
%DUWKH] DOVR UHDG 'DYLG +XPH¶V Treatise on Human Nature and agreed that we im agine  
succession to m ean cause and that this m agination was al that we could hope to achieve in the 
way of certainty. The elem ent justifed an abstract  idea to substiute for derived causes atributed 
to the variety of principles, forces, and faculties , al of which were unim portant ifhey w ere in 
their nature unknowable. In this sense, N ewton is t he real inspiration; Nouveaux Elements aim s 
to extend this lne through a privileged relation b y which m edicine can determ ine phenom ena of 
hum an experience. The later istphilosophical p rivilege which he atributed to H ippocrates.- 
³+LSSRFUDWHV LQ KLV JHQLXV VDZ WKDW KXPDQ QDWXUH FDQQRW EH IXOO\ XQGHUVWRRG E\
DQ\RQHZKRGRHVQRWSRVVHVVDQHQWLUHV\VWHPRINQRZOHGJHRIWKHKHDOLQJDUWV´455  
The relation given to this neo-Hippocratic practice  w ith the status of a new form  of em pircism  
for m odern practioners of m edicine, Barthez fram e d as ofering a new  scientifc language. But 
this depend ed  on a new  physiological synthesis. The new language  folowed from  taking the 
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abstract elem ent of knowledge as substiute for the  evident vital elem ent in observation; an 
am biton that clearly puts physicians in the precar ious positon. 456  
 
A t the heart of this m ethod was the observational p ractice of functional aspects of life 
phenom ena. For the M ontpelier physician of the 18 th  century, observing m eant displaying a 
sensitvity to the diferences in these living phen om ena, nd integrating their signifcances in an 
im age of lie. From  the m edical perspective this m e ant he organic body displaying sym ptom s 
and qualites indicative of the sym pathies and syne rgies of the organic whole. The holistic 
m ethodology proceeded by the progressive analysis t o the lim it of the observable; but since the 
lim it of observation was an epistem ological barier  that necessarily w ithheld phenom enal 
com plexity, the organic phenom ena could not be redu ced to determ inable laws. 457  The physician 
had therefore to account for both internal and envi ronm ental influences on the organism  under 
the term s of vital sensibilty. For Barthez, this a bstracted vital principal w as intended to give an 
open variable by which living phenom ena could expre ss signifcance without being directly 
epiphenom enal. Observed diference was interpreted as the m odifcation under the vital principal 
whose transform ation index ed  the varying circum stance of the organism . The sign ifcance of the 
vital principle was in substiuting for direct caus al thinking while retaining the set of possible 
relations to describe what was becom ing evident in a living econom y. 
 
As a concept of observable diferences, this also s tood as an expression of orces. These were the 
organic forces that dem and various regim es of m anag em ent which require further hypothesising. 
In fact, Barthez was fam ously careful in the use of  this m ethod, but the paradoxical nature which 
his vital principle tried to em body readily lent it self to anthropological speculation. By opening 
to the im portance of natural diversity, DVDQRUGHURIGLIIHUHQFHWKDWFRXOGDOVRLPSO\DµQDWXUDO
RUGHU¶ as  dynam ic LQWHUSOD\ RI µYLWDO IRUFH¶ DQG SK\VLFDO VWDWHV, this could be conceived as  a 
social typology that extend ed  to ideas of race and class. 458  M ontpelier vitalism , however, 
rem ained relatively apolitcal although the vital p rincipal im plied to m any a dangerous atheistc 
m aterialism . It also opened the am biton for an aut onom ous knowledge which prom ised to 
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extend towards a w ider Science of M an. In this way M ontpelier physicians gave the m edical 
context for a new em pircism  by which a true m ethod  should hypothesise w ith the prom ised of 
breaking out of dogm atic system s of the past, alho ugh the m ethod was clearly fragile and prone 
to reciprocity. 
 
Revolutionary Influences on Paris M edicine  
 
From  1770 onwards, Parisian physicians already init iated the task of the reform  of French 
m edicine inspired by wider Enlightenm ent hem es and  the idea for tansform ing m edicine in 
accordance with a general Science of M an. This is c haracterised by its am biton to unify the 
sciences under new considerations of the hum an spec ies in itsrelation to nature. In France this 
project ook up the reform  of national institutions  by focussing on the hospitals and folows 
advancem ents in  the m edical science s.  Renowned anim al and hum an anatom ist and physician 
)HOL[ 9LFT G¶$]\U has be en  credited w ith being the m otivation behind m edical reform s and 
broadening the scope of their investigations to inc lude environm ental factors, such as 
PHWHRURORJ\ZDWHUTXDOLW\SXEOLFVDQLWDWLRQ'XULQJ¶V9LFT'¶$]\UJDYHIUHHOHFWXUHVDW
the Colege Royale; here it was m edical theory that  represented a µFHUWDLQPHWKRG¶IURPZKLFKD
proper pedagogical m ethod would naturaly folow an d which w as atractive to the politcaly 
m inded physicians in Paris. 
 
Reform s m eant a broader perspective on the m edical task which aim ed to account for disease 
DFURVV WKHQDWLRQ ,Q)HOL[9LFT'¶$]\U WRRNXSDSRVW DV WKH&RPPLVVLRQHU-General of 
Epidem ics at he newly form ed Société Royale de M éd ecine  et Epidem ics , a rival scientifc and 
adm inistrative body to the older Colege Royale. Th e new Société w as com m issioned to explore 
the causes of epidem ics and com pile a m edical topog raphy of France and was also given 
responsibilties for distribution and sale of the m ineral and m edicinal waters and the licensing 
and sale of patent m edicines. 459  This provision of m edical services led the instiu tion to have a 
powerful national profile through itshandling of e pidem ics, and assessing the abilties of local 
physicians. Paris also had a reputation during this  tim e as the hom e of scientifc charlatanry in 
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the m edical field and producing fashionable m edicin es as new form s of m edical knowledge. 
%RUGHX KDG QRWHG RI 3DULV WKDW ³PRQH\ URXJH EUDJJDGRFLR DQG ODGLHV IDYRXUV DUH DOO WKDW LV
UHTXLUHGRIDSK\VLFLDQ´460  and it was perhaps against this tandard of practi ce that the figure of 
H ippocrates tood for a m ethod of self-critcism  by  which, along with the proper application of a 
m ethod, a popular and hum oral m edicine could be deb unked. But )HOL[9LFTG¶$]\UZDValso a 
folower of Condilac and wrote a Nouveau Plan de C onstiution pour la M edicine en France to 
be subm ited to the constiutional assem bly in 1790  to  initiate a new clinical approach that 
stress ed  WKHQHHGIRUDQHZODQJXDJHWRIL[IOHHWLQJFRUSRUHDOSKHQRPHQDDQGVXSHUVHGHDQµROd 
ERRNLVK¶DSSURDFKWRPHGLFLQHHowever, by 1793 this project was overtaken by the conditons 
of the revolution. 461   
 
The turning point for the reform  of m edicine in Fra nce cam e in 1794. In the w ake of the 
revolution, signifcant instiutional changes saw  o ld regim e m edical establishm ents which had 
previously dom inated the dissem ination of a theoret ical practice replaced by clinical training in 
three hospitals, the Ecole de Santé, in Paris, M ont pelier and Strasbourg. Itishe Paris school 
which has gained a reputation folowing the revolut ionary changes and w hich m arks the start 
of a m edical practice whose legacy has rem ained the  subject of debate. A  num ber of points can 
be m ade to indicate broadly the outcom e of a wel d ocum ented shift rom  18 th  century m edical 
theory to clinicaly based m edicine at he start of  the 19th. 462  Firstly, the practice of clinical 
observation m eant surveying large num bers of patien ts aim ed at a µOLYLQJHQF\FORSDHGLD¶ that 
drew on the w ider eaches of m edical experience des cribed above. 463  Secondly, along with the 
LPSRUWDQFHDFFRUGHGWRD³QRVRORJLFDOILHOG,´was the use of statistics in  relate to case histories 
of individual patients. 464  Thirdly, this also cam e under an extension through  various new 
techniques and technologies that afe cted  practice and diagnosis; this is exem plifed by Ren e 
/DHQQHF¶V VWHWKRVFRSH WKH QHZ VXUJHU\ RI 3LHUUH 'HVDXOW DQG ;DYLHU %LFKDW DQG -HDQ
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&RUYLVDUW¶V QHZ PHWKRG RI GLDJQRVWLFV465  Finaly, in additon to new techniques and m ass 
observation, cam e an em phasis on the study of patho logical anatom y as the new m ethod of 
localising the study of diseases. In this way the c linics becam e transform ed into places of 
research into what constiuted states of sickness a nd health. 466   
 
It is from  this broad basis that he 18th century a m biton for a Science of M an drove new  
standards dom inat ed  by French m edical thinking during the first half o f the 19 th  century until it 
was displaced by a laboratory based practice. 467  A long with the clinical shift in the wake of the 
Revolution, it was the m ental dispositon of m edica l practioners that was being transform ed; 
DV RQH FRPPHQWDWRU QRWHV ³WKH\ ORRNHG QR ORQJHU EDFNZDUGV EXW IRUZDUGV´468  although 
others have noted that Paris M edicine had a reputat ion as a polem ical m edicine, 469  but these are 
elem ents which should not be taken as exclusive in the context of a nascent Positvism . 
 
Concept and M ethod in  a New Science of M an  
 
7KHHDUO\OHFWXUHVRI9LFTG¶$]\U
VDW WKH&ROOHJH5R\DOHZHUHDWWHQGHGE\D\RXQJSK\VLFLDQ
Piere Jean Georges Cabanis. He exem plifed these e m pircist influences in an early essay of 
1788 which GHVFULEHGXQVDWLVILHGQHHGVDVQDWXUHPDQLIHVWLQJ³KHUGHVLUHVLQ WKHPRVWSRVLWLYH
PDQQHU´DVVXIIHULQJWUDQVIRUPHGWKURXJKLQVWLQFWLQWRWKHFDXVHRIDXWRQRPRXVPRYHPHQWs. 470  
Instinct was seen as WKH³VHFUHWJXLGH´E\ZKLFKSULPLWLYHSHRSOHVREVHUYHWKHKHDOLQJIRUFHRI
nature, instinctively resting and eating less durin g ilness, which was a positve tendency. Yet 
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this declines as intelectual faculties developed. But his tendency could be reinforced through a 
true system atisation of m em ory and, in m edical term s, would include the classifcation of disease 
sym ptom s. By noting durations of crises, of regim en s and tem peram ents, he basis of his practice 
was to bring to ful m aturity a process of rational ising the em pircal practices.  
 
Cabanis was looking to supplem ent an em pircal prac tice w ith the statistical theory of M arquis 
GH&RQGRUFHWIRUDSSUR[LPDWLQJUHODWLRQVKLSVWKDWKROGWUXHE\µGHJUHHVRIEHOLHIDQGDVVXUDQFH¶
The possibilties in  WKHQHZPHGLFDOGLVFLSOLQHVZHUHDQH[DPSOHRIWKHµLQGHILQLWHSHUIHFWLELOLW\¶
of m an; 471  WKLVLV5RXVVHDX¶VWHUPLQKLVSecond Discourse  ( 1754), but Condorcet had used this 
as a justifying principle in the posthum ously publi shed Sketch for a H istorical Picture of the 
Progress of the Human M ind (1793). 472  Condorcet ook this as the principle accounting fo r the 
tw in tasks necessitated of historical progression: firstly, the transm ission of colective 
experience, and secondly m aintaining the possibilt y of overcom ing dogm atic thought. But by 
foregrounding the observational m ethod, Cabanis was  folowing Condilac in this quest for a new  
language to be translated into the m edical fram ewor k which was now looking to localise elusive 
pathological phenom ena.  
 
&DEDQLV¶H[HPSOLILHGWKHLPDJHRIWKHSK\VLFLDQLQKLVPLVVLRQDVµFRQVROHURIWKHVLFN¶EH\RQG
wealth and fam e, driven by a social conscience and patriotic duty to em ancipate the public from  
superstion, which accords closely w ith Enlightenm ent hinking and understood as a task that 
was prom oted as a true Science of M an. But he revo lutionary turbulence gave this project an 
instiutionalising turn by questioning the role of the state in  m edicine and education. Addressing 
the urgent need of the ignorance of the people led to an em phasis on intervention and the 
am biton to restore a natural equilbrium  required,  paradoxicaly, im plem enting a legislative 
intervention against false claim s to knowledge. The  necessity w as for grounding knowledge in 
the face of an im m anent need, not only against spur ious m edical practice, but extended to an 
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DFWLYH UHJXODWLRQ RI RWKHU WUDGHV DV ZKHUH WKH SXEOLF QHHGHG SURWHFWLRQ IURP WKH ³VZDUPV RI
LPSRVWRUV´DQGTXDFNHU\473   
 
This was the background to the Science of M an as  Cabanis approached it through the plan of 
learning described in Coup d'oeil sur les révolutio ns et sur la réforme de la médecine (1804). H e 
drew together diferent scientifc disciplines for the purposes of efective intelectual revolution 
in the new socialised state. Because m edical power w as the direct source of utilty for 
FRQVWLWXWLQJDEDVLVRIJRRGUDWLRQDOSKLORVRSK\XQIROGLQJDV³WKHODZVRIWKHOLYLQJPDFKLQH´
WKH QHHG ZDV IRU µSHUVRQV FRQYHUVDQW ZLWK WKH DQLPDO HFRQRP\¶ WR LPSOHPHQW WKH WDVk of a 
purifcation of great cites where great num bers of  people were crow ded together. Beyond 
advancing health and avoiding disease, these extend ed as physical-m oral relations into ethico-
politcal possibilites as Cabanis pictured an im ag e of physical m an struggling with the dynam ic 
forces of the world of which the basis of future sc iences are the indispensable tool for 
µQDWXUDOLVLQJ¶VRFLHW\474   
 
Such physical-m oral relations gave two principle br anches envisaged behind the system atic 
union of knowledge by which an anthropological hist ory could be transform ed into a general 
science of hum an nature, -
³IURPWKHLQGLFDWLRQVRIWKHQXPHURXVSRLQWVLQZKLFKWKH\DUHFRQQHFWHGDQGUHODWHGWR
one another, esults what m ay be caled the Science  of M an or the Anthropology of the 
*HUPDQV´475  
The object of such an anthropological m edical scien ce was to determ ine the rules of a regim en, 
as a m oralist striving to ofer m axim s of conduct a nd the legislator increasing prosperity for 
society generaly. H ere the physiological m odel for m ed the groundwork of the discipline whose 
knowledge extended as the im portant branch of natur al history understood through an anim al 
econom y under the acute observation of the healthy and the diseased states of the system . 476  In 
the w idest sense this integration looked for physio logical roots for general psychological 
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phenom ena which proceeded according to a principle that placed value on sensibilty drawn from  
DFHUWDLQDSSOLFDWLRQRI&RQGLOODF¶VWKRXJKW477   
 
Sensibilty and Ideology in the M edical Project  
 
7KH SK\VLRORJLFDO V\QWKHVLV GUHZ RQ &RQGLOODF¶V Logic and the idea-sign as the m odern 
philosophical practice to be taken up from  the phys iological perspective. Cabanis understood 
philosophy and physiology to always have inform ed e ach other through inform ing the relation 
between the physical and the m oral: a rational anal ysis of the anim al econom y and its organic 
functions would delim it he interm ediary space for designating how m oral sym pathy w as the 
field in which the power of signs could di VWLQJXLVK LPSUHVVLRQV WKDW FRPPXQLFDWHG µVHQVLEOH
EHLQJ¶ 
 
7KLVZDVDGRPDLQRIPRUDOK\JLHQHWKDWFRXOGLQIRUP&DEDQLV¶PDWXUHYLVLRQIRUD6FLHQFHRI
0DQZKLFKQRWRQO\UHIOHFWHGPDQ¶VPDVWHU\RIVHOIEXWLWVH[WHQVLRQDQGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDURXQG
social being and even the species. Transform ing phy sical habits, strengthening certain bodily 
organs, could extend the faculties and the senses o f the soul to produce a new form  of m an. -
³DPDQVXVFHSWLEOHWRLPSURYHPHQWLVWZRPRGHVKLVSK\VLFDOHGXFDWLRQDQGUegim en, 
in the m ost enlarged sense of these words, erve to  develop the actions of diferent 
organs, rouse his dorm ant faculties, and in som e m e asure create new sensitve powers. 
And when these instrum ents have acted upon several successive generations, cæ teris 
paribus PHQDUHQRORQJHUWKHVDPHQRORQJHUWKHVDPHUDFH´478   
The extension of th is  m edico-philosophical project into a political task  found itsw idest reaches 
around the am bitons for interdisciplinary revoluti onary sciences converging in the practice of 
Ideology. 479  But he object for analysis and possible science w as fundam entaly a problem  of 
physiology which, from  which the m edical perspectiv e, gave a com posite object expressing 
sym ptom s over a duration and needed further difere ntiating into their fundam ental 
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phenom ena. 480  7R&DEDQLVPLQGVLQFH&RQGLOODF¶VHUDSUDFWLFDOSURJUHVVKDGEHHQPDGHDJDLQVW
WKDWZKLFK³SUHVHQWHGLWVHOIDVREVFXUH´481  -
³The new question that presents ielf isto know wh ether it isue, as Condilac and the 
others have established, that ideas and m oral deter m inations are wholy form ed and 
GHSHQGXQLTXHO\RQZKDWWKH\FDOOVHQVDWLRQ«DQGZKHWKHUFRQVHTXHQWO\LGHDVFRPHWR
us from  our senses and exterior objects; or whether  internal im pressions contribute 
equaly to the production of m oral determ inations a nd ideas folowing certain 
ODZV«ZKRVHFRQVWDQF\ LV UHYHDOHG WRXVE\ WKH VWXG\RI WKHKHDOWK\DQG WKH VLFN DQG
ZKHWKHU«REVHUYDWLRQGLUHFWHGE\WKLVQHZSRLQWRIYLHZZLOOQRWDOORZXVWRUHFRJQLVH
here too the laws of QDWXUHDQGVWDWHWKHPZLWKH[DFWLWXGHDQGFODULW\´482   
A new perspective on vital phenom ena, digestion, ci rculation, secretions depended on a principle 
RI DFWLRQ ZKRVH GHWHUPLQDWLRQV ZHUH µFRQIRXQGHG¶ LQ WKHLU HIIHFWV )ROORZLQJ D ORFDOLVLQJ RI
inner im pressions, it  presented the new frontier which a new m edical an guage took up the 
am biton for an expanded general Science of M an. 
 
The term  Ideology, introduced in 1796 by D estut de  Tracy to the newly form ed Class of M oral 
and Politcal sciences, distinguished between a phy siological and a rational ideology. W hen 
Destut focussed on the science of ideas itdrew  he avily on the perfecting of language, while 
Cabanis looked to the physiological synthesis groun ding a knowledge to be refined for social and 
politcal ction. 483  Destut told the instiute that physiology require d a, -
³YDVW NQRZOHGJH EXW LQ WKH SUHVHQW VWDWH RI RXU HQOLJKWHQPHQW >FDQ RQO\ KRSH@ IRU WKH
destruction of m any erors, and the establishm ent o f som e precious, but silcatered and 
incoheren WWUXWKV´484   
By these tw in approaches, a rational Ideology w as t he provisional knowledge for direct 
DSSOLFDWLRQ WR EH H[WHQGHG WKURXJK DQ HPHUJLQJ SK\VLRORJLFDO NQRZOHGJH DV ³UDWLRQDO
SKLORVRSK\DQGSK\VLRORJ\KDYHDOZD\VDGYDQFHGWRJHWKHU´485   
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Reform  of a theoretical knowledge of the soul folowed in the f ootsteps of Condilac and Diderot 
but extended with new and signifcant diferences i n post-revolutionary France. Addressing the 
newly founded Instiut National, Cabanis looked for w ard to the establishm ent of a Science of 
M an as an autonom ous cience of hum an behaviour on the verge of itsam biton of extending the 
hum an faculties  necessary for the conservation of life. 486  -
³$UHZHQRZLQDVWDWHWRPDNHGHSHQGDQWFHUWDLQSURSHUWLHVFRPPXQLFDWHGLQDOOOLYLng 
beings...and tied in to the fundam ental aws of sen sibilty?.... nteligent judgem ent and 
WKHZLOO¶VGHVLUHVH[HFXWHVLWVIXQFWLRQVPRUHRUOHVVQHFHVVDU\LQWKHFRQVHUYDWLRQRI
life. [..] The diverse states which afect one ano ther are diferent considerations of the 
physical and the m oral...the operations of the inte ligence and the wil confounded at 
their origin, with the other m ovem ents of lie: thi s ithe principle of the m oral sciences 
that goes back to the physical dom ain: a branch of the na WXUDOKLVWRU\RIPDQ´487  
Taking its  practical approach from  the historical knowledge o f m an had a double signifcance; 
firstly, physiological Ideologues relying on the pr inciple given to sensitvity which 
SKLORVRSKLFDOO\IROORZVWKH6HQVDWLRQDOLVWHSLJUDP³from  the m om ent we feel, we are aware of 
RXUH[LVWHQFH´488  In turn this equated processes of the intelect w i th the processes of lie, and in 
which al sciences could ultim ately EHFRQVLGHUHG³EUDQFKHVRIDVLQJOHVWHP.´However, since 
VHQVLELOLW\ZDV³WKHODVWHQGRIWKHSKHQRPHQDZHFDOOOLIH´what was apprehended by the idea-
sign w as an original diference appearing behind im pressions inform ing about the organic source 
and nature of their causes. This was never understo od as a sim ple relation and Cabanis reflected 
WKDW LW ZDV ³DW OHDVW UHODWLYH WR RXUVHOYHV WKDW LV UHODWLYH WR WKH JHQHUDO PDQQHU RI IHHOLQJ RI
KXPDQQDWXUH´QRWLQJWKHVHFDQQRWDOZD\VEHWKHVDPH489  Cabanis, therefore, took the doctrine 
of sensibilty as inform ing both specifc local phe nom ena experienced of lie and the general 
concept of living nature; both folow ed  a historical developm ent. Secondly, a gap betw een what 
is physiologicaly observed and its subsequent phil osophical analysis could becom e 
progressively filed ifboth the source of ideas an d observed vital m ovem ents, which em erge 
from  this am e source, FRXOGEHPDLQWDLQHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHPHWKRGRIDµWUXHVFLHQFH¶It ishis 
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science that needed balance. However, since rationa l philosophy fel short and physiology w as as 
yet SURYLVLRQDO&DEDQLV¶ WDVNIRU WKHIXWXUHVFLHQFHZDV WREULGJH WKLVgap and uphold as  tw in 
positons the rational and physiological. To do thi s Cabanis conceptualy conflated what others 
observed as diferences; irtabilties becam e the consequence of general sensibilty, and vital 
DFWLYLW\WKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIOLIH:KLOHWKLVPD\VHHPOLNHDQLQWHOOHFWXDOµVOLJKWRIKDQG¶LWLV
worth em phasizing what Cabanis was aim ing to m ediat e: betw een internal and external 
im pressions on the one hand, and m oral ideas and in clinations on the other, w as the drive to a 
m ore positve knowledge of hum an life.This am bito n relat ed  the m onism  of the individual to an 
im age of m an in general. 490   
 
7KLVIXWXUHVFLHQFHZDVWKHYLVLRQEHKLQG'H7UDF\¶VDGGUHVVWRWKH,QVWLWXWHLQ 1802. Itsood as 
a general judgm ent passed on the prejudices of old schools-based doctrines, while he saw  
Germ an philosophy as also retaining the old doctrin es since they did not practice the new  
techniques of the French m odel. This should be unde rstood to m ean not regarding the hum an 
m ind as an abstract hing, but aken for an evaluat ion that distinguished itself by progressive 
practices to be refined around the diferential m et hods derived from  calculus and a conjectural 
origin of languages and the idea-sign. 491  
 
Cabanis: Rapports and the Future Science  
 
The broad picture of this Science of M an w as presen ted by Cabanis in the first volum es of 
5DSSRUWVGXSK\VLTXHHWGXPRUDOHGHO¶KRPPH LQEHIRUHWKHµ&ODVVHGHV6FLHQFHV0RUDOV
HW3ROLWLTXHV¶,WVWRRd as his contribution to the w ider analysis of phys ical and m ental experience 
in its relation to acquired tem peram ents although c overing m uch of the sam e ground as earlier 
Philosophes. But Cabanis had a diferent relation t o the philosophical and m edical traditons 
through an interdisciplinary approach drawing on th e wave of scientifc developm ent around the 
revolutionary period (Pinel, Lavoisier, Volta, M alp ighi, Bichat, Lam arck). M ore than the 
Enlightenm ent Philosophes, Cabanis could be encoura ged in what future disciplines could ofer a 
Science of M an. Despite an awareness of the contem p orary lim itations in anatom ical research 
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looking to deeper accounts of physiological princip les, the elem ents now being theorised 
m ethodicaly through the physiological unknown of v italism  retained certain possibilties for the 
em erging sciences. 492   
 
Cabanis was not alone in holding with this form  of vitalism  that extended as a principle of law  
behind form s of natural m easure. But he held a phys iological unknown as the new technical 
DSSURDFK E\ ZKLFK WKH µVWUDQJH LQYHUWHG 1HZWRQLVP¶ FRXOG GLVWLQJXLVK LWVHOI IURP JHQHUDO
historical principles atributed to an unfolding se quence of phenom ena in the body. A tractions, 
directly determ ined in the laws of the prim ary com b ination, b HFDPH WKHPHGLDWHFDXVHRI³WKH
sequence of subsequent phenom ena proper to each cir cum stance: ´ this grounded a dom ain to be 
developed around what he Sensationalist m ethod loo ked to diferentiate in bodies in general. 
The am biton was to diferentiate stages of organiz ation through the lim its of knowledge, 
although these lim its ZHUHWKHPVHOYHVVKLIWLQJZLWKLQWKHQHZVFLHQFHV&DEDQLV¶ZDVDTXHVWLRQ
of possibilty, -
³ZLOO WKH RWKHU DWWUDFWLRQV EH H[SODLQHG E\ VHQVLWLYLW\ RU ZLOO WKH VHQVLWLYLW\ DQG WKH
in term ediaries between the two term s explain gravity? ....by the present state of our 
knowledge its im possible to foresee...but a possi bilty for future experim ent and 
UHVHDUFK´ 493  
In the observations of Harvey, M alpighi, Haler, Ca banis looked for analogy betw een anim al 
sensibilty, nstincts, afinites of sim ple atrac tions such as gravity, exerted between al parts of  
m ater. In three orders of phenom ena; variable laws , states of elem ents and circum stances under 
which they interface, w ere the possibilties of exp lanation that appeared through discovering 
properties m anifest of diferent com binations. W hat  rem ained for a future positve physiological 
NQRZOHGJHZDVWRXOWLPDWHO\µOLIWWKHYHLO¶FRYHULQJWKHP\VWHU\RIVHQVLWLYLW\494   
 
One m ust consider the context for the H ippocratical ly inspired m edical writer from  the  
perspective of the signifcant conceptual shift ha t occuring around the m eaning of the term  
µDQLPDWH¶DVLWRFFXUUHGLQWKHODWHth  century. 495  7KLVRYHUODSSHGZLWKWKHWHUPµRUJDQLF¶DQG
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indicated a vital status that contrasted w ith the i nert. In discussions on life, this m eant what was 
evident behind the goal oriented activites in the organised body. Such organic activites were 
understood around the com plex functioning of the in ter-relationship of m aterial parts into which 
was brought conceptual discussions on the nature of  life indicated by the relations of organs 
serving a soul. In this context, the concern w ith o rganisation and its properties, ubstiuted for 
discussions of an organising elem ent itself. 496  7KHQDWXUHRIµRUJDQLVDWLRQ,¶w hich was the central 
aspect of the physiological debate, was an explanat ion given through a concept atributed to 
general properties of lie. But in this era, organi c phenom ena were also being localised in the 
body. This folowed a GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµXQRUJDQLVHGERGLHV¶PHUHµDJJUHJDWHV¶RIFKHPLFDO
elem ents and dead m ater - which, while governed by  the law of afinity (as Lavoisier had 
shown) which VWRRGLQFRQWUDVWWRµRUJDQLVHGERGLHV¶7KHODWWHUZHre conceived as governed by 
unknown laws of the whole while delim itng living p roperties in the face of the unknown was a 
OLPLW DJDLQVW ZKLFK &RQGLOODF¶V 6HQVDWLRQDOLVW PHWKRGRORJ\ ZDV UHWDLQHG %XW ZKHQ Rapports 
WRRN WKHVH RUJDQLF SURSHUWLHV DV ³D JHQHUDO IDFW RI OLYLQJ QDWXUH´ DQG VHQVLWLYLW\ ³WKH XOWLPDWH
WHUP RQH DUULYHV DW ZKHQ VWXG\LQJ µYLWDO¶ SKHQRPHQD´497  Cabanis w as looking beyond 
&RQGLOODF¶VLGHDRIVHQVLWLYLW\WRGHYHORSWKH³DQDO\VLVRILQWHOOHFWXDOIDFXOWLHVDQGDIIHFWLRQVRI
WKH VRXO´498  The assertion was that Condilac had touched on an  idea of instinctive 
determ inations which could now be system ised throug h physiological facts. Y et, one m ust 
assum e that Cabanis w as aware of the central physio logical dificulty of taking the observational 
m ethod inherited from  the philosophicaly oriented M ontpelier m edicine. 
 
Condilac did not develop this as a physiological p rinciple and the sensation that inform ed Essay 
on the Origins of Human Knowledge depended on a SULQFLSOHRIUHODWLRQEHWZHHQµODQJXDJHRI 
DFWLRQ¶ DQG intelectual ideas; - ³DOO WKDW SHUWDLQV WR WKH KXPDQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ LV UHGXFHG WR D
VLQJOHSULQFLSOH´499  This principle rested on the argum ent for the orig in and progress of language 
as a process to explain the social interelation de veloped over tim e by a repetion of the 
IRUPDWLRQ RI KDELWV 7KLV SKLORVRSKLFDO SUREOHP &RQGLOODF KDG IRXQG LQ /RFNH¶V HVVD\ DV WKH
problem  of treating ideas as preceding relations to  words when folowing a strict Cartesian 
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m ethod; he then went on to im ply that words took an  active role in form ing ideas. 500  Because 
Locke, like Descartes, held understanding as the pri vate endowm ent o be expressed in words, 
what Condilac intended was to see understanding an d knowledge as m ore socialy conditoned, 
w ith em otion and passion as necessary residual acce ssories to such com m unication. 501  These 
were LUUHGXFLEOH µDFFHVVRU\ LGHDV¶ HYLGHQW LQ YRLFH IDFLDO H[SUHVVLRQV JHVWXUHV and were the 
natural signs that LQIRUP WKH FRUH SUREOHP IRU &RQGLOODF¶V WKRXJKW +H DGGUHVVHG WKHVH LQ
consecutive txts and sum s up the problem  as folow s, -
³P\HQWLUHV\VWHPFRPHVGRZQWRWKLVPDWWHUVRFLDO LQWHUFRXUVHJLYHVRFFDVLRQ WR
change the natural cries into signs; (2) to invent other signs which we cal rbitrary, and 
that these signs (both the natural and the arbitrar y) are the first principles of 
GHYHORSPHQWDQGSURJUHVVRIWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHPLQG´502   
Idea-signs intended to explain invention and transf orm ation of a second nature, while avoiding 
explanations of m ental life as speculation about wh at goes on in the m ind of the isolated 
LQGLYLGXDO$VKDVEHHQVKRZQDERYHWKHKHDUWRI&RQGLOODF¶VZRUNOLHVLQWKHEssay, preceding 
Treatise on Sensation and Logic, which folows an a nti-Cartesian notion of the sign as generated 
within, and as a result of, a w ider social integrat ion given to the conceptual practice atributed to 
hum an life.
 
For Cabanis, the physiological extension of this ar gum ent unfolded through an unknow n 
particularity ascribed to a concept of lie in gene ral. This concept held as  signifcant he aspect 
m ade evident as  the physical-m oral ink to socio-politcal ife. B ut he am biguity of the future 
physiological synthesis was the am biton for discov ery of the localised elem ent whose specifcity 
inform ed his am bitons for a Science of M an.-  
³3K\VLFDOVHQVLELOLW\LVWKHODVWWHUPDWZKLFKZHDUULYHLQWKHVWXG\RIWKHSKHQRPHQDRI
life and in the m ethodical work of their real im it . Itis also the last result, or seen 
diferently, the general principle which furnishes the intelectual faculties of the soul. As 
such the physical and the m oral are confounded at t heir source, or, the m oral isnothing 
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but the physical considered from  another point of v iew. This propositon dem ands to be 
GHYHORSHG´503   
Cabanis propositon was that a physiological concep t upheld the possible determ inations of an 
econom y of the body, but whose w idest perspective w as also a psycho-physical idea of lie. This 
was an am biguity that looked to a reciprocity betwe en anim al sensibilty, evident organisation in 
the instincts, and the elective afinites of chem i stry as sim ple as the atraction of gravity as the 
properties of m ater which, in this era, folowed p ossibilties that appeared m ore definite w ith 
new anatom ical observations. 504  
 
In Rapports, he categorised three orders of phenom e na; i)The tndencies of afinity according to 
open and variable laws of the vital; i) states giv en through the local elem ents and the 
circum stances in which they interface; and i) new  surplus properties that result from  new  and 
diferent com binations. Hence WKHSHUVSHFWLYHWDNHQIURP&RQGLOODF¶VEssay as  WKHµODQJXDJHRI
DFWLRQ¶saw the notion of sensibilty gain an enveloping co ncept appearing as an extended order. 
Cabanis delim ited this unifed m onistic dom ain in w hich prim ordial elem ents displayed evident 
efects understood through a capacity for tansform ation. The speculative physiology ofered this 
as a dom ain of conjectural knowledge of the body ac cording to three orders of sensibilty; i)
external sense, i ) a corporeal sense, and i ) the internal sense. These orders constiute the 
m aterial physical objects, the sensitve bodies and  m ental im ages, whose general dom ain 
describes the language of actions, the reactions an d their latencies necessary in the order of lie. 
It isa concept that explains the,- 
³DFWLYLWLHV RI WKH PHPRU\ RU WKH LPDJLQDWLRQ ZKRVH RULJLQDO LPSUHVVLRQV EHORQJ WR
one organ, whereas determ inations appear to react o itn passing, in order to direct 
WKHPVHOYHVHQWLUHO\WRZDUGVDQRWKHURUJDQ´505   
From  original im pressions, as the physical im pressi ons whose sensibilty is transform ed through 
the idea-sign, the dynam ic im age of m ental ife cou ld be m apped against a general sensibilty. 
The concept of the body therefore contained the dif ferential relations as centres of activity whose 
potential was of coordination through the µFHQWUHRIUHDFWLRQ¶)URPWKLV&DEDQLVFDQZULWH- 
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³ZKHWKHU WKHVH LPSUHVVLRQV KDYH EHHQ UHFHLYHG E\ WKH H[WHUQDO RU LQWHUQDO VHQWLHQW
extrem ites or whether their cause has acted within  the cerebral m ass, they always end in 
the centre of reaction that reflects them , in tende ncies, m ovem ents and functions in 
regard to the parts to which each of these generati ons are assigned. This action and 
reaction can often take place w ithout individ XDOKDYLQJDQ\FRQVFLRXVQHVVRILW´506  
This last entence indicates the im portance of the im age of the body, rather than m ind. Its general 
role is  m ediating action and reaction according to a m ean.  Cabanis uses physiological sensibilty, 
like the language of action, to explain the circula tion of an order of im pressions, w ith their 
possible synthesis and transform ation, into the org anised concept of body. Perhaps Cabanis saw 
WKLV REMHFWLYLW\ DV DLPLQJ DW µDQ H[KDXVWLYH WRWDOLW\¶ EXW WKH WKHRU\ RI VHQVLWLYLW\ necessarily 
assum ed a positve elem ent for knowledge and itsh e m ethod of analysis, and ofer ed  techniques 
capable of transform ation into a positve concept. 507  Despite this µUDULILFDWLRQ¶RI WKH VLJQ WKDW
caried itsem pircal reciprocity wel beyond Cond LOODF¶VSULQFLSOHRIWKHLGHD-sign, by folowing 
the physiological discipline Cabanis placed the con cept of the body before any dificulty 
associated w ith a Cogito. In this way physiological  ideology was poised between a historical 
concept of m an as the rational anim al, nd the new elem ent of the com posite to be anatom icaly 
determ ined. 508  
 
The New Anatom y  
 
The anatom icaly determ ined body w as recognized as extending m edical knowledge to present a 
local perspective on the physiological concept of b ody. This was what Cabanis understood of 
SK\VLFDO DQDWRPLFDO GHVFULSWLRQ JLYLQJ ³WKH EDVLV DQG JURXQG-work for al physiological 
LOOXVWUDWLRQV WKHQHFHVVDU\ EUDQFKRI WKH VFLHQFHRI DQLPDO HFRQRP\´509  In the context of the 
future science, at he end of the 18th century anat om y was alied to the expanding practical 
discipline of surgery developed as the active disci pline for giving the account of the body and 
LQIRUPLQJ SK\VLRORJ\¶V GLVFXVVLRQV RQ OLIH $ FRPSOHWH SK\VLRORJ\ folow ed  a com plex 
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functionings of an inter-relationship of parts whic h gave the conceptual description of the living 
body. This µH[KDXVWLYH WRWDOLW\¶ RI IXQFWLRQ VWLOO GHIHUUHG IRU KLVWRULFDO UHDVRQV WR WKH
physiologist o explain both WKH µVXE-YLVLEOH¶ FRQVWLWXWLRQ RI RUJDQLF PDWWHU and the m eans by 
which the soul caried out itsactions through the body as a whole. But signifcant developm ents 
LQWKHµDUW¶RIDQDWRP\GXULQJWKLVHUDPHDQWWKDWSK\VLFLDQVZHUHORRNLQJWR³QHZOLJKWWKURZQ
upon the anim al econom y: ´510  anatom y w as the active discipline for apprehending  the new 
m aterial knowledge of the body.  
 
This i exem plifed by W iliam  Harvey and his disco very of the circulation of the blood. W ith 
im portant im plications for a w ider, m ore philosophi caly oriented, physiological theory, itwas 
stro QJH[SHULPHQWDOHYLGHQFHWKDWLQGLFDWHGWR+DUYH\WKDWDOONQRZOHGJHRULJLQDWHGDVµHYHQWVRI
WKH VHQVHV¶511  To exam ine m eant, ³\RX PXVW EULQJ WKHP WR WKH VHQVHV DQG FRQILUP WKHP E\
MXGJPHQWRIWKHVHQVHV´512  In this w ay H arvey distinguishes a m odern practice  through the event 
of the experim ent and its integration into a physio logical schem a of explanation and set a 
precedent for the anatom icaly oriented work that f olowed. A lbrect von Haler, for exam ple, 
whose D issertation on the Sensible and the Irritabl e Parts of the Animals (1755) preceded his 
Elements of Physiology (1757-1766), fore-grounded a n experim ental practice prior to unfolding 
his physiology. This w as in contrast o G eorg Ernst  Stahl, so influential for the M ontpelier 
SK\VLFLDQVIRUZKRPWKHµJRRGSK\VLRORJLVW¶PHDQWXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHOLPLWVRIUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ
the anatom ical practice and the aim s of the physiol ogical discipline. 513   
 
'XULQJ WKH ¶V DQDWRPLFDO SUDFWLFHV ZDV H[WHQGLQJ LWVHOI WKURXJK QHZ WHFKQLTXHV RI
surgery. 514  There rem ained, however, a division between produc ing anatom ical data and 
unfolding the physiological interpretation of the f unctions of the soul; this was not yet an 
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experim ental physiology in any contem porary sense. Since the principle object of this 
physiology was a system atic view over the diferent  functions of the body which could be caled 
µQDWXUDO¶ZKLFKIRU&DEDQLVPHDQWWKHRQH³EHVWDGDSWHGWRWKHDVVRFLDWLRQRIRXULGHDV´515  this 
folowed the observational m ethod proceeding by deg rees from  the known to the unknown. 
&DEDQLV¶ 6FLHQFH RI 0DQ ZDV JURXQGHG LQ a concept of the hum an constiution to which a 
UDWLRQDO SK\VLRORJ\ HODERUDWHG WKH UHODWLRQ RI RXU ³LGHDV RXU SDVVLRQV RXU YLUWXHV DQG RXU
YLFHV´516  Such was itconcept handed down through the older  universites based physiology, as 
the disciplines higher caling traditonaly associ ated w ith the m ysteries of the soul. However, at 
the turn of the 19 th  century, this physiological overview  of itsuncti on confronted new practices 
in the hospital theat er s where surgeons dissecting bodies brought anatom ic al data together 
deducing function by a process of sylogistic reaso ning tp give new perspectives on the natural 
account of m an. O ften these were in conflict w ith a ccounts traditonaly associated w ith the 
university based physiological knowledge. An ensuin g confrontation appeared around what 
UHDVRQLQJFRXOGEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKHµQDWXUDO¶ZKLFKhad been philosophicaly taken up under the 
higher task. This was understood even by the m ore a natom icaly oriented physiologists of the 
era, such as Xavier Bichat. 
 
Xavier Bichat arived at Paris n July 1794 to fol ow a course at the hospice Hôtel-D ieu. 517  There 
Piére Joseph Desault ran a surgical clinic aim ed a t producing practicing surgeons by im m ersion 
in clinical observation and through daily exposure to surgical techniques. This practice had 
developed through the 18 th  century and was caried over virtualy unchanged i n the new  post-
revolutionary era of the Ecole de Santé. 518  Desault died unexpectedly in 1795 but w ithin a few  
years Bichat him self w as holding courses in anatom y , surgery and physiology, expanding his 
own ideas beyond those of Desault. Bichat w as  also a felow of the Société M édicale 
d'Em ulation and was folowing sim ilar them es to Cab anis and appears to have shared the 
am bitons for a Science of M an. In an early outline  for his physiology, D iscourse sur l'étude de 
physiologique KHGHVFULEHVERWKDKLVWRULFDODQGDSUDFWLFDODSSURDFKVLQFHWKH³DQFLHQWV
NQHZ RQO\ KRZ WR REVHUYH´ KH XSKHOG WKH +LSSRFUDWLF Oegacy of an observational physiology 
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while folowing m odern m ethods of am assing data nee ded to establish the new language of 
physiology. 519  In this respect, Bichat was influenced both by the  philosophical approach of the 
M ontpelier physicians and its neo- HiSSRFUDWLF WUDGLWLRQ EXW DOVR E\ +DOOHU¶V DSSURDFK RI
developing an efective anatom ical practice to give  the practical perspective that ancient 
m edicine lacked. 520   
 
%LFKDW¶VSK\VLRORJ\DLPHGDWDV\QWKHVLVGLUHFWHGDWRYHUFRPLQJDVSHFLILFSUREOHP,Q%LFKDW¶V
RSLQLRQ+DOOHU¶VH[SHULPHQWDWLRQKDGFHUWDLQDGYDQWDJHVIRUWKHVWXG\RISDUWLFXODUIXQFWLRQVRI
the body, such as digestion, respiration, secretion s etc, ifertain precautions could be upheld. 521  
These precautions folowed from  what he M ontpelie r doctrine took as the lim its of what an 
anatom icaly inform ed physiology could ofer to a s ensible doctrine of the body. Itwas a lim it 
EDVHGRQWKHLGHDWKDWH[SHULPHQWDWLRQRQOLYHDQLPDOVFRXOGQHYHUJLYHDµQDWXUDO¶ LPSUHVVLRQ
since it induced fear and stress which distorted ob served results and rendering invalid its 
evaluation for a general physiology. Bichat saw  thi s as the interpretive difculty associated w ith 
WKHµQDWXUDO¶VWDWH. It  necessitated a third perspective as aid to delim it  natural knowledge and this 
was the observation of the diseased state. How ever,  this trategy introduced a further problem  for 
the am biton of a m odern m edicine; as ancient m edic ine form ulated its general pathology 
through the hum oral doctrine, a task rem ained for m odern m edicine to develop its  anatom ical 
study of diseases to itsadvantage. Therefore, the third perspective m eant Bichat also took up the 
task of separating out, on a sim ple anatom ical basi s, the m odern analy tic  that inform ed  evident 
OLPLWVRIµRUJDQLFGLVWXUEDQFH¶IURPWKHFRPSOH[KLVWRULFDODGPL[WXUHRIµJHQHUDOIHYHUV¶522   
 
Xavier Bichat and a Rational Physiology  
 
The anatom ical basis nform ed an organic ground delim itng com parative structures and serving 
the am biton of %LFKDW¶VPHWKRG WRH[WHQGREVHUYDWLRQal practices to phenom ena of the higher 
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and m ore com plex level of the anim al econom y. The c om plex levels were reserved for the 
physiological discipline in its  role of physiologist-m etaphysician and this folow ed the rational 
discourse on sensibilties in itsextension linked to the ideological project, -
³«,VKRZHGWKHIRXQGDWLRQVRQZKLFKSK\VLRORJ\PXVWEHEDVHGDQGIURPZKLFK WKH
history of the phenom ena, or observational physiolo gy, m ust be drawn.  But the 
phenom ena m ust be coordinated, their totality m ust be sought out. The m ind of m an, 
QDWXUDOO\FXULRXVVHHNVFDXVHVWKXVUDWLRQDOSK\VLRORJ\VRRQFDPHLQWREHLQJ´523  
Beyond the practical im its of observation, Bichat defered to the physiological task connected 
ZLWKPHWDSK\VLFV LQKLVQRWHVKHZURWH³VSHDNKHUHRI&DEDQLV´7KHSUDFWLFDO OLPLWUHODWHGWR
m ethodical difculties of apprehending observable natural im pressions, while the physiological 
discipline was concerned with the problem  of their variable com positon w hich Bichat retained. 
In the physiological sense, the necessity of a pers pective on the physical and the m oral could 
form  a rational physiological synthesis which could  stand as a nature of m an. 524  
 
This was the early program  of the D iscourse, which saw Bichat prom ote the broad values of the 
physiology of his day, nam ely an aw areness that it supplem ents a general Science of M an at the 
avant-garde of what could constiute a m odern knowl edge. The historical knowledge was being 
encroached upon both by m odern physico-chem ical sci ences and natural history; Bichat 
understood this as grounded in the Newtonian revolu tion, who had DGGHGWKH³FURZQLQJWRXFK´
to what was considered secure science. The stated t ask was to ³H[DPLQH WKH GHJUHH WR ZKLFK
these sciences can advance the Science of M DQ´that m eant bringing elem ents together into the 
new concept w ithin the traditon that could extend itself to a Science of M an. 525  
 
Grounding the doctrine of sensibilty was taken up in his early work on synovial m em branes. 
Bichat delim ited and localised anatom ical features through observing the inflam m ation of luids 
contained within the synovial m em branes. This was d eveloped as visible evidence for an 
elem entary theory that could dem onstrate a natural unity of particular tissues in them selves. 526  
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The m ethod described in Traité des membranes (1800)  gave a classifcatory schem a for the 
observational analysis as the m odern technique supe rseding less sophistcated techniques of 
tissue analysis, nam ely physical m ethods such as bo ilng, distilng, desiccation etc. Bichat 
developed the m ethod by which elem ents could becom e  visible through observation of a natural 
inflam m ation as it pread first hrough the tissues  before advancing to afect organs then to the 
whole: the µQDWXUDO¶PHWKRGRIGLYLVLRQRIRUJDQLVPLQWRLWVSDUWVXQFRYHUHGµKLGGHQ¶RSHUDWLRQV
by which itsnature could subsequently be revealed.   
 
This  organic level inform ed from  Traité des M embranes ( 1800) was a theoretical base later 
expanded to the influential text Anatomie générale (1801). It  took the regional m ethod as the 
axiom atic for its am biton of the scientifc approa ch to organic laws as advancing on the 
historical lim its of physiology. 527  The philosophical m ethod of analysis had scientif c credentials 
as GHPRQVWUDWHG LQ /DYRLVLHU¶V FKHPLVWU\ and by folowin J &RQGLOODF¶V analytic the idea-sign 
gave a central concern to the µQDWXUDO¶QHFHVVLW\by w hich the observed organic properties in  the 
tissues could give the analogicaly delim ited space  for grounding the physiological synthesis. He 
did this w ith som e caution, noting an, -  
³HVVHQWLDO GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ WKH SK\VLFV DQG SK\VLRORJLFDO ODZVSK\VLFV LV
constant, vital properties are at every instant und ergoing som e change in degree and in 
kind...bafle al calculation and would require as m any form ulae as cases which 
occur....in their phenom ena nothing can be foreseen , foretold or calculated, we judge 
only of them  by their analogies and these are in th e vast proportion of instances 
H[WUHPHO\XQFHUWDLQ´528  
The sign therefore functioned to delim it an ordered  VSDFHRQO\ WR WKHH[WHQW WKDW LW µVSRNH¶ WKH
new organic language. The rational synthesis was re flected as a physiological discourse which 
appears in the first section of Reserche physiologi que sur la vie et la mort (1801). Bichat 
separated out diferent hierarchical evels of com p lex organisation, around degrees of certainty, 
the dem arcation that m irors the relation between t he investigating anatom ist and the 
synthesizing physiologist at he confluence of two hierarchical disciplines. Th is  intersection 
gives physiological discourse its  organic structures, considered in their sim ple org anic functions; 
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while on another level itfolowed the recom posito n that aim ed at rationalising higher anim al 
functions. 
 
 
The Organic and the Critcal: The Hom oeom erous Part s DQG%LFKDW¶V7LVVXHWKHRU\ 
 
7KHRUJDQLFJURXQGRI%LFKDW¶V WLVVXHVZDV LQSULQFLSOH VLPLODU WR$ULVWRWOH¶V µKRPRHRPHURXV¶
SDUWV VWDQGLQJDV FRQVWLWXHQWXQLWVRI WKHERG\ $ULVWRWOH
V FRPPRQ VXEVWUDWXPZDV D µPDWWHU¶
WUDQVIRUPHGXQGHUWKHµSRZHURIKHDWLQJ¶529  This power could induce m aterial bodies to interac t 
WKURXJK WKHLU LQKHUHQW TXDOLWLHV WR IRUP D WKLUG VXEVWDQFH ³IOHVK ERQH DQG WKH OLNH´530  The 
com posite was therefore held together under a physi ological principle that accounted for a 
process of be FRPLQJ D µPHDQ¶ 7KLV SULQFLSOH JURXQGHG WKH XQLW\ RI WKH KRPRHRPHURXV SDUWV
and in turn, com bined to give the organs (non-hom oe om erous) parts and finaly the 
organisational harm ony in the body displayed in the  higher phenom ena of life.
 
%LFKDW¶VWLVVXHWKHRU\ZDVWKHUHIRUHQRWWKHQHXWUDODQDWRPLFDOGHVFULSWLRQEXWDµWD[RQRP\RI
YLWDOSURSHUWLHV¶ZKHUHGLVWLQFWSURSHUWLHVIXQFWLRQHGZLWKDQRQWRORJLFDOVHQVHRIJHQHVLVEHKLQG
the structural relations of higher phenom ena. 531  ,QWKLVUHVSHFW%LFKDW¶VµWLVVXH¶GUHZXSRQWKH
/DWLQZRUGµWHOD¶DZHEUHIHUULQJWRDUHRODURUFRQQHFWLYHWLVVXHUXQQLQJEHWZHHQPDQ\RUJDQV
RI WKH ERG\ 7KLV DOUHDG\ FDUULHG WKH KLVWRULFDOO\ YDOXH DSSHDULQJ WR *DOHQ DV ³ILEUH EUDQFKHV
ILQHUWKDQVSLGHUVZHEV´532  DQGWR9HVDOLXV¶VDe humanicorporis fabrica DVLWVZRYHQ³IDEULFD´
:KHQ)UDQFLV*OLVVRQZDVVFUDSLQJWLVVXHDZD\IURPWKHOLYHULQKHGHVFULEHGDµIHOWZRUN¶
of ibres, the celular tissue read as a structural  m aterial by which the whole body appeared to be 
connected. 533  In the original Encyclopedie (1751) the notion of the fabric of the body w as 
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XQGHUVWRRG DV µWLVVX FHOOXODLUH¶ WKH V\VWHP RI ILEUHV WKDW LPSOLHG D µVWUXFWXUH¶534  a basic 
constiuent com ponent of a hum an body. 535   
 
7KH VLJQLILFDQFH IRU %LFKDW¶V SK\VLRORJ\ FDPe from  the paralel to the cel as described by 
Robert Hooke in M icrographia (1665). This related m inute structures of plants, later found by 
M arcelo M alpighi to be universaly present in bota ny, where the cel signifed a fundam ental 
unit, perhaps com m on to anim als and plants. 536  The m em branes form ed fundam ental elem ents of 
µDQLPDO IDEULF¶ UXQQLQJ WKURXJKRXW WKH ZKROH ZHUH SDUDOOHOHG ZLWK WKLV XQLW\ SULRU WR
diferentiation into organs. But it w as the precise  nature of the celular tissue becam e the subjec t 
of controversy. Tow ards the ends of the 18 th  century, Théophile Bordeu, the M ontpelier 
SK\VLFLDQORRNHGWRWLVVXHDVWKH³ILUVWPDWHULDOV´RIWKHHPEU\RZKLFKJDYHWKHVXEVWUDWXPIURP
which al other m aterials are derived. But, for Bor deu, itwas less elem ental tissue that was 
LPSRUWDQWEXWUDWKHUWKDWWKLVFRQWDLQHGWKHSDUWLFXODULQWHUQDOµHQYLURQPHQW¶DVWKHFRQWLQXLW\LQ
the m idst of which al the organs w ere im m ersed. Or gans were evidently insulated from  each 
RWKHUJLYLQJWKHDXWRQRP\³WKXVHQVXULQJDQH[LVWHQFHSHFXOLDUWRLWVHOI´537  Bichat drew heavily 
on this essential autonom y of the parts in Anatomie  Genéralé and described fibrous nature of 
celular tissue as,- 
³SODFHGDURXQGWKHRUJDQVWKHGLIIHUHQWSDUWVRIWKLVV\VWHPZKLFKDFWDWWKHVDPH tim e 
as a bond to connect, and as an interm ediate body t o separate them . Caried into the 
LQWHULRURIWKHVHVDPHRUJDQVWKH\HVVHQWLDOO\FRQWULEXWHWRWKHLUVWUXFWXUH´538   
+HUHZDVWKHLQWHUIDFHEHWZHHQHQYLURQPHQWDQGWKHµH[LVWHQFHSHFXOLDUWRLWVHOI¶Ds it extended 
through the organs. Tissues were fundam ental to liv ing structure and had the signifcance for 
Enlightenm ent physiology as the basis for organic l aws; these were fundam ental in an 
ontological sense, -  
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³«WKH PHFKDQLVPV E\ ZKLFK WKH SDUHQFK\PD Rf nutrion appropriate to them selves 
QXWULWLYHVXEVWDQFHVLVQRWDQLQVXODWHGSKHQRPHQD«EXWDFRQVHTXHQFHRIJHQHUDOODZV
RIWKHRUJDQLF´539   
This prim itve undiferentiated m aterial ofers to every part a com m on and a uniform  base, as the 
µPDWWHU¶ VXVFHSWible to transform ative developm ent of a generative system . Open spaces of 
FHOOXODU WLVVXH JURXQGHG µVLPSOH IXQFWLRQDO IROGV¶ E\ ZKLFK RUJDQV DSSHDU WR H[WHQG LQWR WKH
three dim ensional structures of the body. 540   
 
On this organic level, tissues m arked the m aterial lim it to anatom y but did not lim it physiological 
discourse. The rationalising discourse of Anatomie Génerale took tissues as an interface and 
point of exchange where fluids were assim ilated and  transform ed into the solid m aterials and 
equaly becom ing itsresidues. -
³7KHUHDUHWKXVIOXLGVFRUUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHFRPSRVLWLRQDQGRWKHUVEHLQJXVHGIRUWKH
decom positon. The solids are the term s of the firs t which com e from  the outside, and 
WKHVWDUWLQJSRLQWRIWKHVHFRQGVZKRJREDFN WKHUH«$OO WKHSKHnom ena of the living 
econom y show us the fluids in an alm ost passive sta te, the solids on the contrary, 
always prim arily active. In fact he solids receive  the excitation and which react under 
the trm s of this excitation. Everywhere, the fluid s are only e [FLWLQJWKHP´ 541  
Because tissues are the seat of an action and react ion, they have a capacity to be active and vital 
in relation to the fluids, which are essentialy pa ssive. Such a diferentiation leaves fluids 
constiuting an undiferentiated substance w ith the  tissue interface representing a new frontier 
between the lim its of a biological vitalism  and a p ositve physio-chem ical science. The 
Enlightenm ent perspective understood undiferentiat ed force as tanding beyond organised lim it. 
³&KDRV´DV%LFKDWw rote in Anatomie générale,- 
³ZDV RQO\ PDWWHU ZLWKRXW SURSHUWLHV WR FUHDWH WKH XQLYHUVH *RG HQGRZHG >DOO
PDWWHU@«ZLWK JUDYLW\ HODVWLFLW\ DQG DIILQLW\«DQG WR SDUW KH JDYH VHQVLELOLW\ DQG
FRQWUDFWLOLW\´542  
Properties w ere an active diferentiation: fluids w ere passive but hey w ere not inert, they w ere 
necessary for processes of lie and activity of the  tissues, as both the nutrive and the cariers of  
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foreign and harm ful substances. Bichat m apped this frontier into a taxonom y of twenty one 
prim ary tissues for Anatomie générale, as the organ ic structural base. In turn these could 
som etim es appear as disease, hence retained the pot ential for pathological eruption.  
 
V ital Force and the Idea-Sign in Reserches Physiolo giques  
 
The description of organic structural base atained  itsfunctional value as explanatory power for 
the m edical practice approaching unknowable propert ies of the body. Folowing the H ippocratic 
QRWLRQRIEDODQFHRU$ULVWRWOH¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHµPHDQ¶WKHOLYLQJHFRQRP\QHHGHGWRH[SODLQD
phenom enal continuity under particular conditons. HHUH%LFKDW¶VYLWDOLVPUHWDLQHGLWVFRQWLQXLW\
with the H ippocratic m edical egacy, grounding onto logicaly, im m anent properties of living 
bodies uch as a vis medicatrix, in the FRPSRVLWHRUµEOHQG¶that Aristotelian physiology gave as 
a doctrine of the m ean in explaining the concept of  norm al function. 543  Extended to the body as 
the notion of an essence (ousia) of the faculties, this left a historical legacy as m aster strategy fo r 
explaining physiological function. The exhaustive d ecom positon of the sensible activites of the 
body prior to a recom positon, explained insensible  activites, as vital m ovem ents in general. 
 
W hat was specifcaly intended to be explained as v ital m ovem ent difered during the 
developm ent of m edical thought. For exam ple, when i nsensible m icro-m ovem ents w ere 
atributed to a m ore fundam ental property, the powe r such as a vis m edicatrix, the later stood as 
an interpretive tool for a dynam ic explanation of a  functioning whole. But, during the 
Renaissance, this notion was to be avoided as a gen eral explanation of the body; for Jean Fernel, 
an ultim ate unknown was to be displaced by a local knowledge of the body for the purposes of 
establishing the specifc function of the parts. 544  This legacy was taken up in iatrom echanic 
m edicine by displacing the notion of soul to a tran scendent positon, as an ultim ate unknown and 
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the last erm  displaced from  the analytic series an d substiuted for localised and explicable 
repetious m echanism s observable in life. 545  On the other hand, Francis G lisson focused on the 
µPDWWHU RI OLIH¶ ZKHUH LUULWDELOLW\ ZDV WKH SURSHUW\ YLVLEO\ ORFDOLVHG LQ ILEUHV RI WKH ERG\ and 
im plied an im m anent property latent in the organic m ater itself. Such a property could explain 
m icro-m otions which also held the energetic reserve  atributed to the evident diferences in 
bodies that gave them  a predispositons for change.  An ontologicaly prim al m ater m aintained 
the fundam ental status between a physics and a phys iology, where active and reactive properties 
sh ould account for a latency of function in the facul ties (biousia or biarchia). It served 
strategicaly to explain the dispositon in the fac ulties for absorbing m icro-m ovem ent into an 
econom y of the body as irtabilty or sensibilty which then expressed evident diferences under 
a general concept of life.
 
The Sensationalist rategy of reducing the world t o elem ental properties, aw  Cabanis retain this 
property DVLQWHUQDOO\µFRQIRXQGHGDWWKHVRXUFH¶%XW%LFKDWJURXQGHGWKHµSURSHUWLHVRIOLYLQJ
PDWWHU¶in his tsue theory while retaining a SRZHUWRH[SODLQOLIH¶VSKHQRPHQDOFDSDFLW\QRZ
given as an index of itslatent force, to be ration alised in Recherches physiologique sur la vie et 
la mort as the m easure of life,- 546   
³7KH PHDVXUH RI OLIH LQ JHQHUDO LV WKH GLIIHUHQFH ZKLFK H[LVWV EHWZHHQ WKH HIIRUW RI
exterior power, and that of exterior esistance. Th e excess of the form er isan indication 
RILWVZHDNQHVVWKHSUHGRPLQDQFHRIWKHODWHUDQLQGH[RILWVIRUFH´547  
A concep t of living force subordinate to exterior resistance com es in the w ake of the 
HSLVWHPRORJLFDO VXFFHVV RI 1HZWRQ¶V Principia and what was originaly intended to displ ace 
ontological questions from  their occult qualites f or a m ore scientifc one. In this context what 
SUHVHQWHGLWVHOIDV WKHµVXPRIIRUFHV¶RI WKHERG\ZDVa µVWUDWHJ\¶IRUDFFRXQWLQJIRUH[LVWLQJ
forces universaly observable in al bodies, to whi ch a natural and distinct language could be 
developed by the m odern physiology. Therefore the id ea -sign w as now serving the progressive 
and positve stage of atributing relations to evid ent reactive properties of organism s in general , 
which, despite lim ited data, folowed a necessary s ynthesis driven by the practical ideas of a 
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m edicine. The rationale was in  giving the provisional groundwork that did not exc lude the 
prom ise of future explication as long as itcould r etain its necessary intensions in what was 
im plem ented. 548   
 
This a com prehensive synthesis for ational physiolog y proposed in the D iscourse appears in the 
first part of Reserches physiologiques sur la vie e t la M ort (1800). Here Bichat described two 
distinct lives of the body brought together from  a broad doctrine of tissue properties as a 
localisation of vital properties extended from  anat om ical structures through the rational 
physiology synthesis. V ital properties give the pot ential for a reaction to the physical world; the 
historical term s of sensibilty and contractilty h ave an  im portance w ithin this totality of relating 
forces, latent or explicit, to the rational account  of a phenom enal ife unfolding over tim e. A  
force in general isretained as the index of a vita l presence in the whole. 
 
The physiological concept of hum an life distributed  this as a presence between organic and 
anim al levels. Sim ple internal parts howed evident  practical functions and gave,-  
³KDELWXDOVXFFHVVLRQRIDVVLPLODWLRQDQGH[FUHWLRQ«it lives within itself, transform s into 
its proper substance the particles of other bodies,  and afterwards rejects hem  when they 
KDYHEHFRPHKHWHURJHQHRXVWRLWVQDWXUH´549   
This gave a groundwork for the com plex higher anim a l ife that related to an  explanation of the 
whole at diferent levels of itsexistence. On a hi gher level the anim al, -
³lives externaly, is an inhabitant RI WKH ZRUOG«IHHOV SHUFHLYHV UHIOHFWV RQ LWV
sensations, m oves according to their nfluence, and  frequently enabled to com m unicate 
E\LWVYRLFHGHVLUHVDQGLWVIHDUVLW¶VSOHDVXUHVDQGSDLQV´550  
Hence a prim ary dualism  between organic and anim al explained, firstly the internal, continuous 
ground of basic associative or dissociative process es of body functions in com posing structure. 
Secondly, the interm itent and externaly oriented activites that extend progressively beyond 
organs as afective habits, and develop at he leve l of the body as a whole. The body integrates 
th e organic function into the dynam ic bonds between t he vital organs; brain, lungs and heart; 
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WKHVHFRQVWLWXWH³WKHWKUHHFHQWUHVLQZKLFKDUHWHUPLQDWHGDOOWKHVHFRQGDU\SKHQRPHQDRIWhe 
WZR OLYHV´ 551  The dynam ic whole expresses the relation in its es sential and necessary vital 
function that ism ediating contrasting activites o f anim al nd organic lives. 
 
From  the dynam ic view  folows the classical distinc tion between a life of the soul and a 
YHJHWDEOHOLIHDKLJKDQGORZLQWKHSK\VLRORJLFDOVWUXFWXUH%XWWKHERG\¶Vdirect relation to an 
external physical world (m ileu) is tem pered by a d ouble dynam ic whose tension is between 
anim al life and organic life; as an account of the w il and passion, this puts organic needs under a 
µQDWXUDO¶UHODWLRQWRDµPHDQ¶The internal dynam ic works against an im m ersion in the external 
m ileu that exposes the organism  as a whole to the conditons of existence. 552  Bichat explains 
physiological variabilt \ WKURXJKDQLQFUHDVHGKDELWXDWLRQRIFHUWDLQµRUJDQLF¶IXQFWLRQVDJDLQVW
WKH UHOD[LQJ RI µDQLPDO¶ IXQFWLRQV RU YLFH YHUVD DFFRXQWLQJ IRU GLIIHUHQFHV LQ LQGLYLGXDWHG
bodies, both from  each other, and for itschanges o ver tim e, evident in a capacity to m aterialy 
redistribute vitality organicaly. - 
³WKHUHLVDVXSHUDEXQGDQFHRIOLIHLQWKHFKLOGLQWKHFKLOGWKHUHDFWLRQRIWKHV\VWHPLV
superior to the action, which is m ade upon itfrom  without. In the adult, action and 
reaction are in balance; the turgesance of life is gone. In the old m an, the reaction of the 
inward principle islessened, the action from  witho ut rem aining unaltered; it ishen that 
life languishes, and insensibly advances towards it s natural term , which ensues when al 
proportion ceas HV´553   
The explanatory benefit n this tension between the  two system s is to displace a Cartesian 
m ind/body dualism  for a com posite of active and rea ctive forces distributed between the lives 
w ithin the body. Rather than an internal/external d ivision, itm eans Bichat distinguishes the 
bod \¶V activity from  any sim ple m onism , while retaining t he classical im age of three centres, the 
lungs, brain and heart, w ith the physiological inte riority now radicaly separated from  an 
exteriority of purely physical conditons. 
 
The term  vital can be now be seen to relate on the organic level to  a constiutive idea in the seats 
of the properties, but on the anim al level it explains WKH ³WULSOH IRFXV´ ZKLFK KLVWRULFDO
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configurations atributed to a living m ean. In Rech erches physiologique th e vital as m ean w as a 
theory behind what is observed in the sym m etry of o rgans of anim al ife, its pairs of lobes, or 
RUJDQV GLYLGHG DORQJ D PHULGLDQ E\ ZKLFK %LFKDW ³VXSSRVHV D SHUIHFW EDODQFH RI IRUFHV DQG
DFWLRQ´ EHWZHHQ WKHLU VLPLODU parts as visual aspect of the higher ideal order f olowed by the 
body,- 
³KDUPRQ\LVWKHFKDUDFWHURIWKHDQLPDOGLVFRUGDQFHWKDWRIWKHRUJDQLFIXQFWLRQV´554   
However, vital organic function also m arked the abs olute lim it between living and dead m ater. 
Yet organic function rem ained distributed throughou t the body as the ground which could never 
be interupted. Itexplains what anim al life, under  cerebral efects for egulating the econom y of 
IRUFH KDG WR EULQJ XQGHU D µPHDQ¶ E\ LWV GLVFLSOLQDU\ HIIRUWs of habituation. The process of 
reducing pleasure or pain over tim e w as alied to t he physiological docrine which was to im prove 
disciplined judgem ent. 555  From  this perspective, a second dynam ic appears fr om  an interior 
RUJDQLFSHUVSHFWLYH³WKHVHDWRI WKH LQZDUGWUDFW´ZKHUHHOHPHQWDU\QDWXUHVRI WKHWLVVXHVDQG
m ucous m em branes are the seat of an irtabilty. T he RUJDQLF SHUVSHFWLYH UHDFWV WR ³ERGLHV
IRUHLJQ WR RXU QDWXUH´ DV VWLPXODWLRQV WR an  organic life produces efects needing to be 
subordinated or assim ilated by the anim al life. 556  However the inward tract RU µSDVVLRQDWH¶
organic life can also intervenes in a w ay antagonis tic into the anim al ife in itssubordination to 
the brain. This oppositons gave a picture of the a nim al ife com peting w ith an organic life for 
m astery of the higher m oral dom ain.  
 
Finaly, such the concept of the body accom m odates the division of orm al versus the expressive 
by describing tem peram ental habituations as relatio ns of brain, of m uscles and senses. The efort 
of the w il needs to practice its capacity for m odi fication of the body and its possibilties of 
specialisation or im provem ent in function. This is the vital capacity that is retain ed  by the 
necessity for balance from  the broader perspective which Cabanis schem a absorbed as evidence 
RILPEDODQFHVQRWHQWLUHO\³QDWXUDO´LQWKHVHFRQGDU\HIIHFWVRIVRFLDOLVHGKDELWV0RGHUQVRFLHW\
³FDOOVIRUWK´FHUWDLQQHZIXQFWLRQVDVDUHVXOWRI WKH³VWDWHRIFLYLOLVDWLRQ´WKHVHDUHDFWXDOLVHG
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through habituations of the body, how ever any exces sive discordance in basic organic functions 
ZRXOGDSSHDUDVIOXFWXDWLRQVRIYLWDOSRZHULQWKHZKROHµ([FLWDWLRQV¶UXQWKURXJKWKHERG\ERWK
as strengths or w eakness, hence a constancy which a nim al ife displays in the face of physical 
poZHUVZKLFK³SUHVLGHRYHUH[WHULRUERGLHV´JLYHVthe FRQFHSWRIKXPDQOLIH³DOOLHGDWRQHWLPH
ZLWKWKHEUXWHDWDQRWKHUWLPHZLWKVSLULWXDOQDWXUH´ +HUHZDV%LFKDW¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHERG\DV
the m odern conditons of life as the constant srug gle for a m ean. 557   
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter situated the legacy for a French Scien ce of M an with the em erging m edical sciences 
DQG H[SODLQHG KRZ &RQGLOODF¶V Logic defined the disciplinary practice that could further the 
am bitons of a rational physiology. This practice e xtended to an em erging Science of M an 
leading up to the revolutionary period. A t the end of the 18 th  century, Xavier Bichat gave a new  
rational physiology its relation between living bod y and powers that preside over it. The new 
rational physiology served to constiute a French S cience of M an and displace older doctrines by 
atributing intrinsic values both as positve and v ital. This practice Bichat extended through the 
m edical sign in the observation of disease to infor m  the lim it of what could be considered natural 
physiological knowledge. This is the lim it of a rat ional physiology which is the subject of the 
QH[WFKDSWHUZKLFKORRNVDW%LFKDW¶VLPSRUWDQFHIRU)UHQFK3RVLWLYLVPLQWKHHDUO\th  century.  
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Chapter 4 : Radical Positvism s  
 
Introduction  
 
A  Science of M an after the French Enlightenm ent looked to a rational physiology to account for 
OLIH¶VFDSDFLW\IRURUJDQL]DWLRQ and the last chapter showed how X avier Bichat gave  a paradigm  
for distinguishing vital EHLQJV IURP µPHUH¶ REMHFWV The sum  of the function of resistance 
distinguished tem poral biological beings but this a lso left Reserches physiologique with its 
central problem  of establishing the nature and lim i t of its  vital function and delim itng the higher 
m anifestation of its  capacity for organisation. Bichat retained a link to the legacy of &RQGLOODF¶V
idea-sign in  determ ing QDWXUDOUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQDQHFRQRP\RIOLIHDQGWKHµKLGGHQRSHUDWLRQV
of nature. ¶ This chapter looks at how new biological concepts of lie displace this physiological 
lim it.  
 
The last chapter also indicated that pathology was used to isolate an interm ediary state betw een 
life and death which served to determ ine the dynam i c im age of the concept of life.In this context 
the idea- VLJQZDVQRWDQDQDORJXHRIOLIH¶VIRUFHVEut he observational m easure that serv es  the 
interpretation of the historical idea of lie. Itw as an  LQGH[ WR ³WKH VXPRI IXQFWLRQVE\ZKLFK
death isresisted. ´It w il be shown that this ign served Bichat w ith heuristic values of m edicine, 
and not an apodictic science. Bichat atributed a p sychological awareness of m edicines practical 
relation to physiology %LFKDW¶VPHWKRGZDVtherefore predicated on delim itng the historical i dea 
of the vital rather than questioning representation al values as Kant did.  
 
In the am biton to rationalise physiology, patholog ical anatom y de lim it ed  the historical concept 
of lie, but as an index to function. A t he start of the 19 th  century an em erging Positvism  
retained the am biton for a Science of M an which wi l be clear through the works of Saint 
Sim on. H is 1813 text M emoire sur la science de l ¶homme explicitly states this through an 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI9LFT'¶$]\U&DEDQLV%LFKDWDQG&RQGRUFHW%XW it  no longer grounded in a 
concept of  life as in the era of revolutions which lost i status in the early 19 th  century. The 
chapter shows therefore how  Saint Sim on looked to w ider sources to m ediate sim ilar concerns 
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and that his Positvism  re tained certain values held of a socio-politcal dis course . But what 
becom es clear is that 6DLQW 6LPRQ¶V SULPDU\ FRQFHUQ after 1814 now  becom es legitm ated 
through the WXUQWRµLQGXVWULDOYDOXHV¶H ere isa m ark ed  shift aw ay from  grounding a Science of 
M an through physiology: what now becom es expressed as PDQ¶V LQQHU GULYHV, of hum an wil, 
an d the struggle between m odes of being, has now beco m e a class truggle. P K\VLRORJ\¶VORVVRI
a vitalistic base, and a shift to the paradigm  of b iological function in the early 19 th  century, saw  
Saint Sim on turn to a µconcept of labour ¶ to ground an excessive m aterial force, som ething 
psychic that now  necessitated a practical knowledge  to uphold values that were identifed w ith 
the older Science of M an. 
 
This was a dilem m a in the legacy left by %LFKDW¶V SK\VLRORJ\ for early 19 th  century debates 
surounding the possibilty of a Science of M an. Bi chat could be critcised by M aine de Biran as 
introducing the psycho-physical paralelism  that as sum ed  natural function as positve knowledge 
of m an. But he Positvism  of Auguste Com te saw an epistem ological project m oving explicitly 
against philosophical defenders of an  idea of m an. The chapter explains in what sense a µWUXO\
SKLORVRSKLFDO¶UHYROXWLRQwas ascribed to Bichat. Cours de philosophie posit ve contended this as 
FRQVWUDLQLQJELRORJLFDOREMHFWVWRUHJLRQVµSURSHUWROLYLQJERGLHV¶But &RPWHUHMHFWHG%LFKDW¶V
FRQFHSWRIOLIHDVWKHµVXPRIIXQFWLRQVWKDWUHVLVWGHDWK¶and accept ed  a contem porary idea of 
biological existence prem ised on a function of inte gration. Cours has therefore a paradoxical 
relation to Bichat; he is exem plary in m ethod but i ncom plete as a Positvism . W hat his shows 
WKDW ZKLOH &RPWH¶V Positvism  stood against a regressive m etaphysics, it substiuted 
contem porary biological concepts to represent he d iferential order that gave the philosophical 
possibilties delim ited by a PRGHUQ NQRZOHGJH &RPWH µPDSSHG¶ vital concepts which 
GHPRQVWUDWHV WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK VWUXFWXUDO WKLQNLQJ RYHUWRRN KLV 3RVLWLYLVP &RPWH¶V
subordin ed  the broad er  historical physiology to  anatom ical studies of his era an d the new 
biology. This served a critcal epistem ology but ab andon ed  the pathological perspective in 
driving the am bitons for a socio-politcal Positv ist project. Itdisplac ed  an  18 th  century debate 
over the Scie nce of M an  while furthering the spirt of an idea.  
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Life and D eath in the New Physiology  
 
A t the turn of the 19 th  FHQWXU\;DYLHU%LFKDW¶VGHYHORSPHQWDOKLVWRULHVEHWZHHQWKHWZROLYHVDQ
RUJDQLFJURXQGDQGWKHDVVHPEODJHRIµDQLPDO¶IXQFWLRQV, ofered a basis for expanding the new 
Science of M an in France. Life seen as a double ser ies, opening a hierarchical relation between 
discord and order, to produce individuation of the body. This represented the transiton from  
determ inable physico-chem ical aws to the tem poral stabilty in the vital sphe re ; conversely 
KLJKHU IXQFWLRQV WUXO\ EHJLQ ZKHQ WKH VHQVHV DUH H[HUFLVHG $OWKRXJK %LFKDW¶V SK\VLRORJ\
UHWDLQHG VRPHWKLQJ RI WKH +LSSRFUDWLF LPDJH RI OLIH¶V SRZHU it  now  represented the power to 
resist the disorder of physico-chem ical forces thre atening to overwhelm  it.There are three 
consequences of this hift. 
 
)LUVWO\ IURP WKH HDUO\ ¶V *HRUJ 6WDKO RIIHUHG D SHUVSHFWLYH RQ GHDWK DSSHDULQJ DV WKH
reversion to a physico-chem ical sphere and subject to laws of ordinary m ater. V ital phenom ena 
diferentiated them selves from  these laws and appea red exceptional rather than a fulfim ent of 
WKHSRWHQWLDORIQDWXUH%LFKDW¶VFRQFHSWRI OLIHGLVWLQJXLVKHG WKLVDVDQ µLVODQGRIYLWDOLW\¶ WKH
opening lines of Reserches physiologique sur la vie  et la mort controversialy form ulated this as, 
³OLIH FRQVLVWV RI WKH VXP RI IXQFWLRQV E\ ZKLFK GHDWK LV UHVLVWHG´558  Itwas a distinction that 
UHWDLQHG VRPHWKLQJ HYLGHQW LQ OLIH¶V FDSDFLW\ IRU RUJDQL]DWLRQ QRZ SLFWXUHG as  the sum  of 
functions to be m aintained only for a lim ited tim e as the resistance against dispersion was 
ultim ately only tem porary. Th is  sum  of this function of resistance distinguished t em poral 
ELRORJLFDOEHLQJVIURPµPHUH¶REMHFWVEXWOHIWReserches physiologique with its  central problem  
of establishing the nature and lim it of the vital f unction delim ited as the higher m anifestation of 
the capacity for organisation. 559   
 
The second half of Reserches physiologiques sur la vie et la M ort sets out o establish the 
thresholds and lim it to this concept of the body; i n turn, this needed the tem poral concept of the 
organisational capacity that the aw akening anim al f unction m ust learn to coordinate. This was a 
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vital concept in the sense that it had potential to  a corect balance, to progress by extending the 
organic life through the diferentiation of functio ns characterised by natural capacites of the 
body, and to be m aintained for m axim um  period until  death. Then as the anim al functions fade, 
im agination and m em ory dim s and visible life retrea ts back to the organic ground, which 
continues for a tim e before also reverting to the l aws of ordinary m ater. 560   
 
Secondly, it was from  observations of the µQDWXUDO¶OLIH that Bichat gave his rational physiology 
DJDLQVW WKHVH SURJUHVVLYH µGRXEOH¶ GHDWKV¶ RI RUJDQLF DQG DQLPDl. U ltim ately these delim it he 
G\QDPLFUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQRUJDQVDQGDQDWXUDOHFRQRP\RIOLIHWKDWVWRRGDVµKLGGHQRSHUDWLRQV
RIQDWXUH¶ ,QReserches physiologique Bichat focussed on the inte rm ediary states between life 
and death, as opening a new frontier for investigat ion of vital im its whose threshold was the 
im m anent return of physico-chem ical aws. These wer e the interm ediary phenom ena that could 
equaly appear in the guise of the pathological nd  therefore overlap w ith the concept of a natural 
death. In reality, in this era, death from  m ere old  age rem ained elusive; as Haler com m ented, 
³YHU\PDQ\SHRSOHZHUHFDUULHGRIIEHIRUHWKLVWLPHE\GLVHDVH´561  Bichat highlighted the lack in 
the concept of disease in itsrelation to the pheno m ena of dying,-  
³YHU\VHOGRPFDQZHGHSDUWIURPWKHNQRZQSKHQRPHQDRIWKHOLYLQJDQLPDOZKHQZH
undertake to inquire into those which itexhibits i n its dying m om ents; itwould be 
QHFHVVDU\WRNQRZWKHLQWHUPHGLDU\VWDWHEHWZHHQKHDOWKDQGGLVHDVH«EXWZKHUHVKDOO
we find the physician who wil assert fom  that act ual data of his art, he understands in 
VXFKDQLQWHUPHGLDU\VWDWHWKHSURIRXQGO\KLGGHQRSHUDWLRQVRIQDWXUH"´562  
As aid to observation of this interm ediary state, t he zone of diferentiation between life and 
death, Bichat distinguished a new category of patho logical phenom ena. D istinct from  the 
historical pathology, this was incom m ensurate w ith the general practice of the physiological 
discipline serving the historical tsk of theorisin g the natural way to thinking about the body. But 
the expanding anatom ical practices im plem ented a sh ift through itsnvestigations as to the status 
of pathological relations w ithin a physiological do m ain. Since anatom y now underpinned the 
physiological discipline, the pathological view dem anded a system atic localisation of diseases to 
be excluded from  the µnatural ¶ body. A  m odern pathological traditon also aim ed t o diferentiate 
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itself rom  the historical concepts uch as hum oral ism s, and itsource for producing explanations 
of disease was the dissection of corpses. Bichat, w ho was grounded in tissue theory and surgical 
training, also took this as the basis from  which to  expand a new  pathology as the perspective for 
advancing into this interm ediary zone. Hence phenom ena which we re  an adm ixture of lie and 
death folow ed  WKHH[WHQVLRQWKDW*UHHNPHGLFLQHDOZD\V³LGHQWLILHGZLWKWKHLUVHPLRWLFV´563  
 
A t he turn of the century Bichat w as working to is olate a new phenom enal class of organic 
diseases, categoricaly distinguished from  h LVWRULFDO µGLVHDVHV LQ JHQHUDO¶ Organic phenom ena 
could localise external sym ptom s and be identifed w ith internal esions as revealed through 
post-m ortem  exam inations. Bichat noted that before the 18 th  century PHGLFLQH³YHU\VHOGRPKDG
recourse to the po st -PRUWHPH[DPLQDWLRQ´E\FRQWUDVWKHLGHQWLILHGSRVW-m ortem  as the m odern 
practice that could distinguish categories of dying , and by extension be related to natural m odes 
of lie. 564  %LFKDW¶VSDWKRORJLFDODQDWRP\GLVWLQJXLVKHGWKUHHWHPSRUDOIRUPVRIGHDWh; i)a sudden 
death (asphyxia, syncope, poisoning, etc), the subj ect of Reserches physiologique, i)death from  
DFXWHGLVHDVHSHVWLOHQWLDOIHYHUFRYHUHGE\KLVWRULFDOSDWKRORJLHVDQGLLLDµWKLUGNLQGRIGHDWK¶
resulting from  chronic organic disease. It was the later which he identifed w ith protracted 
deaths which appeared as reversing the order of nat ural death as described towards the end of the 
first part of Recherches physiologique. Chronic dis ease advances from  discord in the organic 
order as t KH VHDW RI PRUELG DIIHFWLRQV DSSHDULQJ DV ³WHWWHUV V\SKLOLWLF HUXSWLRQV DQG
LQIODPPDWRU\SXVWXOHV´565  From  the level of the tissues this expressed itsel f upwards against the 
organisational m odes of lie, the visible form  of a n undiferentiated external force. H ence the 
am biton of grounding a new system atic pathology fo low ed from  the form  of future science 
whose extension lent itself to the study of anim al functions in Anatomie Génerale. Here Bichat 
had atributed originary phenom ena of diseases as a xiom atic for a new  physiology in the am biton 
to  finaly overcom e the legacy of the past,  
³:HKDYH,WKLQNUHDFKHGDQHSRFKZKHUHPRUELGDQDWRP\LVDERXWWRUHFHLYHDQHZDQ
unexpected im pulse.....W ith the exception of certai n types of fever and nevous 
afections, everything in pathology is in the reach  and the grasp of this science. How 
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idle and insignifcant do we find the opinions of p hysicians, and m any tw o high 
endowm ents and great repute, when we exam ine them  n ot in their books but in the dead 
ERG\´566  
This shows how the new category was intended to suppl em ent an older pathological theory. 
%LFKDW¶VVWXG\DSSHDUHGSRVWKXPRXVO\DVCours de d'anatomie pathologique (1825) and this wa s 
com piled from  lecture notes folowing the m odel of Anatomie Générale. By m iroring its 
m ethod, starting from  the seats of disease and m ovi ng towards higher anim al pathology through 
a phenom enology of disease, this text appears to ou tline the controversial practice of the 
anatom o-clinical experience. 567  This i the context in which Bichat has been seen to folow the 
practices of his epoch in aim ing to contribute to t he new positve order of classifcation by 
delim itng the historicaly vague notion of living being, along with others uch as Jean Corvisart 
and Rene Läennec.  
 
Thirdly, it ishis later positon which iscom pli cated by the consideration of the values that were 
atributed to this pathological view. In this sense , Bichat retained som ething of the H ippocratic 
LPDJHRI OLIH¶VSRZHUDVSRZHU WR UHVLVWSK\VLFR-chem ical forces threatening to overwhelm  it, 
and that a living econom y looked to anim al phenom en a to distinguish itsm odes of existence. But 
on this level, it  was accounted for by observed bonds existng betwe en brain, lungs and heart, 
and this physiological concept ook these dynam ic r elations as the term inus of the secondary 
SKHQRPHQDRIWKHWZROLYHVUHVROYLQJLQWRWKHKLVWRULFDOWULSOHIRFXVZKLFK³SK\VLRORJLVWVKDYHDW
DOOWLPHVEHHQDFTXDLQWHGZLWK´568  From  this perspective, what Bichat historicaly re tained was a 
concept of norm al variation not e VVHQWLDOO\GLIIHUHQWIURPDQ$ULVWRWHOLDQLGHDRIȝİıȩĲȘȢRUWKH
m ean). This w as the state between extrem es and seen  as the lim it of oscilations around a point. 
The m ean is not fixed but indicates the norm al degr ees of variations by which distributed 
sen VLELOLWLHVFDQEHPDLQWDLQHGLQDG\QDPLFDOHTXLOLEULXP)RU$ULVWRWOHWKH³JHQXLQHSK\VLFLVW´
determ ines these lim its by considering both the psy chic and physical aspects of sensation or 
em otion. 569  :KLOHWKHWHUPȝİıȩĲȘȢ570  does not suggests im ple m athem atical abstraction,  it does 
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indicate the dynam ic equilbrium  of opposing physic al parts or powers which is inform ed or 
DFWLYDWHG E\ D VRXO )URP DQ REMHFWLYH SHUVSHFWLYH WKH ȝİıȩĲȘȢ LV PDLQWDLQHG E\ D YLUWXDO
concept existing for an organised body, this ser YHV WRFRQVWLWXWH WKHG\QDPLFRI µKHDOWK¶ LQ WKH
anim al. Both a physiology and a psychology refer to  this dynam ic aspect through the explanation 
of distinctive powers or sensibilties to which the  body reacts or esponds proportionately; either 
to particular stim uli or w ithin general conditons of existence. Conversely, pathological variation 
points to excess or deficiency beyond this concept of the m ean, indicating a threshold or lim it 
beyond which itsdistortion produces a change in na ture or a diference in kind. In an absolute 
sense, these are exclusive. Bichat reflected on a g eneral pathology in his early D iscourse as 
diference in kind,-  
³LPSRVVLEOH WRUHODWHWKHP>JHQHUDOGLVHDVHV@WRNQRZQODZVRIVHQVLELOLW\WKH\DUH
al diferent, and are di YHUVHO\PRGLILHGLQGLYHUVHSDUWVDQGLQGLYHUVHDIIHFWLRQV´571   
But an atention to the dynam ic threshold would ref lect a fundam ental relation betw een 
physical and physiological phenom ena; a diference between a constancy and a norm al 
variation that isechoed later in Anatomie G énérale ,- 
³SK\VLFV LV FRQVWDQW YLWDO SURSHUWLHV DUH DW HYHU\ LQVWDQW XQGHUJRLQJ VRPH FKDQJH LQ
degree and in kind...(..)..we judge them  only by  their analogies and these are in the 
vast proportion of instances extrem ely uncertain ´572   
Absolute forces of nature have a relation to the or ganic order conceived of as through the 
dynam ical relation to the anim al order, whose conce pt is the virtual sum  of orce. This virtual 
sum  gives it vital im its by oppositon to a physi cal concept of nature. And this distnction is 
m ade evident in diferentiating a vital order, in i ts constancy, from  the physico-chem ical lws. 
 
The new pathology starts at he organic level. It akes the sign of diference as indicating a 
physical constancy whose natural relation is to ext erior forces. A  threshold is observed in the 
fluids and solids as the practical lim it of observa tion; fluids are understood to be m ore physical, 
m ore passive than the solids which are m ore active and dynam ic in their resistance. The 
difculty for an observational m ethod was the prac tice of natural com parison which Bichat 
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pursued by considering three perspectives; first w a s the observation atributed to vital properties 
(concept of sensibilty), secondly pathological obs ervation (concept of the pathology view ), and 
WKLUGO\ WKH REVHUYDWLRQ RI G\QDPLFDO µERQGV¶ RU V\PSDWKLHV EHWZHHQ RUJDQV RI WKH ERG\ WKH
physiological concept of the body). Itis the late r whose lim its Bichat determ ined by anim al 
experim ents on the functional whole in the second p art of Reserches physiologiques ur la vie et 
la M ort. 573   
 
A lthough Anatomie Pathologique grounded itself in t he signifcance of alterations of bodily 
fluids and the inflam m ation of tissues, what is als o signifcant is that Bichat urges caution in 
interpreting the status of such alterations because  of the difculties associated w ith the 
observation of diferent m odes of lie. These are t he relative values that m ark the historicaly 
distinct disciplines of the anatom ist and the physi ologist as a separation of observation and 
interpretation, -
³7KH PDQQHU WR SURFHHG LQ DXWRSVLF H[DPLQDWLRQV PXVW GLIIHU DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH
diferent kinds of disease we have established; com m only it is prosecuted in an 
anatom ical order, but it isnot he best m ethod to give precise ideas on the subject; in 
general diseases, it isagreat deal beter to fol ow the order of unctions: in this m anner 
ZHDUULYHDWDNQRZOHGJHRIWKRVHZKLFKDUHLQMXUHG´574  
Hence µSUHFLVH LGHDV¶ UHTXLUHG RI DQ HPSLULFDO VHQVH RI PHDVXUH DUH incom m ensurable w ith 
sim ple observation. 575  The reason why Bichat isunderstood not to have us ed a m icroscope isfor 
the sim ple fact hat his was a technique understoo d as having inherent practical problem s for 
interpretation. A  pathological m ethod also held dif ficulties for com parative analysis when 
ORRNLQJ IRU HYLGHQFH RI OLIH¶V FDSDFLW\ IRU RUJDQL]DWLRQ at  the level of the body. 576  The 
interpretation of dynam ic relations in observable a natom ical elem ents of an organic body was 
where the idea-sign confronted a diference in kind and where the em pircists discip line m ust 
proceed with caution tow ards a physiological view .  
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In The Birth of the Clinic, M ichel Foucault w rites of how, rem oved from  the interface of the 
tissues, extending tem poral consideration of pathol ogical phenom ena through space becom es 
ever m ore com plicated. 577  7KLVGLIILFXOW\ZDVDWWULEXWHGWRWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI&RQGLOODF¶VLogic 
as the analogical m odel am plifying the elem ental do ctrine of signs in confronting cerebral 
aflictions, convulsions, and m ental m aladies etc. These were diseases associated w ith function. 
The tem ptation of a pathological anatom y of organic  elem ents was to reciprocaly explain the 
sum  of unctions which resist death; but at his dy nam ic level, sym ptom s were distanced from  
interm ediary states between health and disease. The  claim  is that Anatomie Pathologique 
inherited an  ordinal value for the sign of lie from  the elem en tal tissue properties. W hen this 
inform ed Anatomie G énérale these w ere atributed to  a corpse rather than localising sym ptom  
within life. By m aking this pathological seat a fun dam ental fact and extending this by reference 
to anim al function, the new pathology served to fix ed an idea of constant relations in the body, 
which becam e both a technical nd im aginary m astery  of the concept of the body. 578   
 
However, it can also be shown that what Bichat inte nded of his physiology difered through a 
basic physiological concept of living function that  he atributed to the higher strata of 
organisational capacity. The idea-sign served to di stinguish the three diferent approaches to 
observational m easure, i)the idealy stable form s of physicaly analogous forces, i)the stabilty 
of an organic system , given in relation to evident physical constancies observed as natural 
relations, and i)functional stabilties represen ting conceptualy m ean rhythm s atributed to 
notional physiological bonds, uch as heart beat an d respirations. A t he physiological evel the 
sign upheld this threshold of diference that could  dem onstrate a m ean concept and itsperiodic 
returns w ithin apparent param eters of a necessary c oncept of the physiological body. The idea-
sign served the am biton of the UDWLRQDOLVLQJ GLVFLSOLQH ORRNLQJ WR GHVFULEHV OLIH¶V IXQFWLRQDO
capacity. Itwas understood that he Sensational m e thod ofered inherently provisional solutions 
to this dea.  
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Observation of the Norm al nd the Pathological  
 
In observing vital phenom ena in the whole the sign discerns thresholds of diference. Bichat is 
therefore folowing the concerns of the M ontpelier  physicians for whom  sensitvity to 
diferences in a dynam ic equilbrium  was inform ed b y their caution over vivisection. A  concern 
w ith surgical intervention into the living body was  that it produces a pathological type alteration 
leading to a qualitative alteration that distorts he functional capacity of the body. This aspect of 
the M ontpelier doctrine m arks the practical indete rm inism  which Bichat w il be shown to 
uphold. It distinguishes his approach from  that of Haler, who prioritsed the anatom ical 
approach to isolating physiological properties hist oricaly given as ensibilty and irtabilty. H is  
aim  was defining m ore clearly how particular vital properties actualy appeared in the body as 
visible evidence that served the purpose of system i sing a progressive general physiology. 579  
Bichat understood him self as doing som ething distin ct from  Haler, but nor did not see him self 
upholding the vitalism  in the sense that m ade Stahl  so influential for M ontpelier physicians. 
Bichat distinguished a m ethod from  both these prede cessors, whom  he thought had not properly 
analysed vital properties: in Anatomie Générale he indicates the danger to,- 
³DSSO\ WKH VFLHQFH RI QDWXUDO SKLORVRSK\ WR SK\VLRORJ\ ZRXOG EH WR H[SODLQ WKH
phenom ena of living bodies by the laws of inert bod ies. Here then is a false 
principle...In this respect m y work difers in its general tenor fom  those of physiology, 
and even from  those of the celebrated Haler. The w orks of Stahl have powerfuly 
inculcated the inestim able advantage of laying asid e al these colateral aids, which 
overwhelm  the science that hey purport o support.  This em inent physician, had not 
analysed the vital properties, and, therefore, was inadequate to explain the phenom ena 
in their eal aspect. Nothing is m ore vague, and sa tisfactory than these words, vitality, 
YLWDODFWLRQYLWDOLQIOX[HWFZKHQWKHLUVHQVHLVQRWDGHTXDWHO\GHILQHG´ 580   
This  problem  of the vital necessitated e [SODLQLQJSKHQRPHQDLQWKHLUµUHDODVSHFW,¶which m eant 
it needed a positve approach. Bichat saw  the disci pline of observation, and specifcaly the idea-
sign, as developing a new language in m oving betwee n the anatom ical approach of H aler and 
WKH FRQFHSWXDO SRLQW RI YLHZ RI 6WDKO 2EVHUYDWLRQ RI ³WKH VXP RI WKH Iunctions which resists 
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GHDWK´ZDV DSRLQWRIYLHZ WKDWGHOLPLWHGSK\VLFDO GLIIHUHQFHV DW WKH OHYHO RI DQLPDO IXQFWLRQ
Recherches physiologique integrates this perspectiv e into the rational physiology by confronting 
the indeterm inate anim al concept hrough tests by a n experim ental m ethod as recounted in the 
second part of the book. 
 
Because observation w as an analytical discipline w i th its own norm s of practices, Bichat 
XQGHUVWRRG KLPVHOI DV GRLQJ VRPHWKLQJ GLVWLQFW IURP WKH ³DQLPDWHG DQDWRP\´ RI +DOOHU 7Kis 
disciplinary practice took the perspective of em pir ical sensitvity as the lim it of anatom ical 
intervention in its useful relation to a general ph ysiology. The m ethod folows 
Condilac/M ontpelier in two things; firstly, prior itsng a natural m ethod of division m eaning 
UHVWULFWLQJLWVHOIWRYLVLEOHDOWHUDWLRQVDVFRQWDLQHGLQFRPSDUDEOHUHJLRQV%LFKDW¶VSHUVSHFWLYHof 
pathological observation to delim it tissues into th e workable language w as to be integrated into a 
general physiology; his awareness w as that natural com parison w as theoreticaly contained only 
w ithin a stable system  of observations. Secondly, t he extension of this practice through a 
pathological m ethod introduced a shift n focus w it hin epistem ological problem s of observation. 
Because observational analysis caries w ithin it th e disciplinary techniques of natural 
com positon, it relied on the corect distribution of phenom ena prior to an interpretation. 
Therefore the problem  was to define a regional awar eness prior to that which could contain 
phenom enal lterations that were signifcant. 581   
 
In the logic of Traité des M embranes this folowed organic units which naturaly isolated tissues 
inform ing a ground or m atrix for interpreting obser vable relations to the organs. Anatomie 
Générale then interprets this against he level of the body as the m atrix for developing a future 
science. The central thinking of Traité des M embran es and Anatomie Générale was to inform  a 
FHUWDLQOHJDF\RI%LFKDW¶VWKLQNLQJZKLFKJLYHVWKHVHQVHRISRVLWLYLVWLFRSWLPLsm  extended to the 
future m edical sciences . Anatomie Générale caried this over into the provis ional aim s of 
%LFKDW¶V Cours d'Anatomie pathologique; WKLV WH[W SURPLVHV WKH V\QWKHWLF µGpWRXUQHPHQW¶ RI
hum oralism  in m oving towards an exhaustive concept of the body, - 582  
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³$OO LV WKXV LQGLFDWHGWKDW GLVHDVHV UHODWH WR XV LQ WKH VROLGV DQG IOXLGV WR FODLP WKH
opposite would no longer adm it the conscensus unis,  conscientia omnia which binds the 
whole m achine, and joins together al the forces of  the life for concerted resistance to 
GHDWK´583   
This sense of purpose has a polem ical value consist ent w ith a later Positvism , but elsewhere 
Bichat m akes a m ore cautious claim s of the extent o which his tis sue m ethodology should 
actualy relate to a general pathology and itscons equent signifcance for physiology. 
 
,WKDVEHHQVXJJHVWHGWKDWIRFXVVLQJRQWKLVOHJDF\QHJOHFWVWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRQ%LFKDW¶VPHWKRG
which extends from  Reserche Physiologique (experim e nting on the whole) to &RXUVG¶$QDWRPLH
Pathologique (observation of the lim it). 584  But in fact, this approach w as already 
SURJUDPPDWLFDOO\RXWOLQHGLQ%LFKDW¶VHDUO\Discourse through the disciplinary m ethod by which 
observational physiology should proceed. Bichat was  sensitve that pathological observation 
presented increasing dificulties for the analytic m ethod in its am bition to displace hum oral 
m edicine. This reflects on the w ider am bitons for im plem enting the synthesis of the rational 
physiology. The historical background to the pathol ogy text indicates how Bichat m ay have 
reflected on the use of the observational m ethod by  suggesting that the discipline should restrain 
itself to the m ore heuristic values of a m edicine.  
 
Textual Considerations of Anatomie Pathologique  
 
%LFKDW¶V SDWKRORJLFDO DQDWRP\ FRXUVH VWDUWHG in Septem ber 1801 and com prised of 80 lessons 
given over a six m onth period. The period im m ediate ly preceding this saw  him  prepare the 
Anatomie Générale text which was produced on the ba sis of an intense flourish of work of 
clinical observation folowing his appointm ent on t he 26th January 1801 at he Grand Hospice 
G¶+XPDQLWp$FFRUGLQJWR%LFKDW¶VDFFRPSOLFH0DWWKLHX)UDQoRLV5pJLV%XLVVRQWKLVLQYROYHG
over 600 autopsies over the few  m onths that the wor k took to produce. 585  The enthusiastic work 
of the Anatomie Générale period left litlchance to consult w ith texts of those who preceded 
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him  in the field; 586  this changed as he had m ore tim e to reflect on the  im plications of his findings 
during the period of the pathology course. For the new pathological anatom y course Bichat 
adopted a diferent approach. 
  
The editon of Cours de Anatomie pathologique publi shed in 1825 by François Gabriel Boisseau 
was colated from  a m anuscript edited by Piere Aug uste Béclard. Even at he tim e this was a 
contested docum ent b \RWKHUIROORZHUVRI%LFKDWQRWDEO\-HDQ&UXYHLOKLHUDQRWKHURI%LFKDW¶V
VWXGHQWV ZKR WKRXJKW WKDW WH[W GLG QRW DFFXUDWHO\ UHIOHFW %LFKDW¶V GLVFLSOLQDU\ LQWHQWLRQV WKLV
was of developing a sym ptom atology. 587  In this context, an alternative perspective appear ed in a 
m anuscript of notes for the course recovered by the  Grenoble M edical School in 1902. The 
m edical historian Jean M onteil, writng in 1964, sa w  it as signifcant that the Anatomie 
pathologique QRWHV FRPH DIWHU %LFKDW¶V PDMRU DFKLHYHPHQWV DQG FRXOd therefore be seen as a 
recapitulation of his oeuvre, despite the fact hat  this production was com pressed into only two 
years. M ore im portantly perhaps, the Grenoble notes  com plem ent other individual accounts of 
%LFKDW¶VSDWKRORJLFDODQDWRP\FRXUVH LQFOuding those of Jean Cruveilhier, in its reflections  on 
the schem atic form  and lim its describing the anatom ical project. In this respect Jean M onteil 
considers the Grenoble text to particularly highlig ht som e of the difculties that get efaced from  
Anatomie générale. 588   
 
As Bichat scrutinized his data from  the overal con cerns of a didactic, reflecting on the hasty 
V\QWKHVHVZKLFKDSSHDUHG³IURPWKHDPSKLWKHDWUH´DGLIIHUHQWHPSKDVLVDSSHDUVDVWRWKHVWDWXV
of pathological anatom y. Prim arily this is fram ed a s a m edical practice rather than a grounded 
science. In em phasising the necessity of being a pr ovisional knowledge, this concurs w ith what 
&UXYHLOKLHUZKRDWWHQGHGWKHSDWKRORJLFDODQDWRP\FRXUVHXQGHUVWRRGDV%LFKDW¶VLQWHQWLRQ,Q
the notes from  the 1902 text, M onteil quotes,- 
³,W LVKHUHHVSHFLDOO\ZKHUHRQHKDVVHHQWKHZHDNQHVVRIPHGLFLQHDQGWKHQHHGIRU
folowing it w ith the torch of the pathological ana tom y, the torch which one shines with 
that of observations which precedes and which guide s. Thus open corpses, see the 
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patients. In the room s of private clinics and am phi theatres, here are the books which you 
m ust consult, the authors according to whom  you m us t act. It isby seeing the diseases in 
the living, the devastations after death that we wi l be able to know them , to prevent 
WKHPDQGFXUHWKHPIRUWXQDWHO\´589   
The m ethod therefore em phasises only that by seeing  and experiencing diseases in living bodies 
can sym ptom s be related to a pathological perspecti ve. This interpretive threshold of living 
experience reflects a consistency that folows what  one m ay identify as %LFKDW¶VYLWDOLVP. From  
the earlier D iscourse, the pathological em phasises the constant confusion of tem poral separations 
between phenom ena and sym ptom s, inherently disrupti ve of any unifed point of view. 
Awareness of the sym ptom  is an index to diference in kind, the dom ain which the physician 
approaches at  WKHOHYHORIWKHµWRUFKZKLFKRQHVKLQHV,¶ the pathological view . This context could 
be seen as Bichat m aintaining a fidelity to the dis ciplinary techniques defined by holding the 
idea-sign isthe guide to the fringes of the physio logical concept of the living. 
 
The problem  of the idea-sign w as in  defining a region for interpretation that excluded  al 
instances less understood, the uncom m on phenom ena l ikely to lead to hasty conclusions for an 
analogical m ethod. Bichat seem s to accept hat he pathological was truly an unknown without 
denying or educing these as phenom ena.- 
³,W LVQHFHVVDU\ WREDQLVKWKLVGLVHDVHRIWKHQRVRORJLFDO IUDPHQRWEHFDXVH LWGRHVQ¶W
LQWHUHVWEXWEHFDXVHLWLVXQNQRZQIRUXV´590  
This ndicates how the pathological view intended t o ofers a functional evaluation for m edicine 
to be taken up in a task against a µWKHUDSHXWLF DQDUFK\¶591  As w ith Cabanis, the study of 
physiology represented a future of science, but Bic hat gave ithe aw areness of a threshold at 
which the present science overeaches itself. Here he retain ed  his physician values through 
interpreting sym ptom s according to an idea of life.  
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The Threshold of a Physiological Concept of Life  
 
The interpretation of the interm ediary state betw ee n health and disease gave a specifc problem  
which Anatomie pathologique appeared to equivocate in itshopes of a unifed knowledge.- 
³LI IRUHDFKV\PSDthy, itwere necessary to im agine an explanation, t housands would 
hardly be enough. There isone of the laws of the w hole, which one should not seek to 
reason in the series of parts. 592   
But he task of the inquirng physiologist was a pe rspective on the function of the living body. 
Notably the second part of Recherches physiologique  saw Bichat turn his atention to this 
physiological function and its lm its. He approache d this through violent intervention into the 
conceptual bond betw een heart, lungs and brain as a  form  of experim ental analysis on the 
functional concept of the body. Ithas been noted t hat it would m erely requires an inversion of 
conceptual priorites -from  observed sensibilties  in the whole to observing functional relations 
of parts -o open the breach to what lter becom es  understood as experim ental physiology. 593   
 
This was an inversion, however, that Bichat seem ed reluctant to m ake. The reason m ay be given 
as  the perspective from  which he insisted on retainin g a vitalistic concept of the w hole. The 
subordination of parts m aintained a relation to the  observation of this concept of the whole m ay 
be the FRUHYDOXHLQ%LFKDW¶VYLWDOLVP7KLVVKRXOGSHUKDSVQRWWREHXQGHUVWRRGLQWKHVHQVHRI
an idea held a priori to inform ing his observations , but rather in a conceptual aw areness that 
aligned with the disciplinary function of a knowled ge to be obtained. The principle of knowledge 
and its strategies expressed behind %LFKDW¶V WKUHH OHYHOV RI REVHUYDWLRQ D VHQVLELOLW\ D
pathological view, and th H FRQFHSW RI µERQGV¶ RU V\PSDWKLHV WKDW WKH ERG\ H[SUHVVHV DV D
functioning of the whole, aves the last concept s tanding over the accum ulation of data ensuring 
the productive reasoning of the contem plating physi ologist com posing the new knowledge. This 
m ay also explain Bichat ¶V reluctance to abandon a doctrine of sensibilty si nce itretain ed  this 
DZDUHQHVVRIWKHSK\VLRORJLVW¶Vearlier ole.   
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Bichat appears to m aintain a com m itm ent o such wid er practices of a physiology in his day. 
Unlike surgeons such as Piere Desault, who had a n egative opinion of the discipline of 
physiology, Bichat took tissue theory as erving as  a guarantee of the scientifc status for a w ider 
physiological discipline, grounding itsfundam ental  kinship w ith other sciences. Yet beyond this, 
he also reserved com m itm ents o the historical phys iological discipline as Cabanis did explicitly 
in his am bitons for a w ider Science of M an. Folo wing the Ideologues conception of hum an 
knowledge as an interdisciplinary system , open to p ositve extension. This was the sense used by 
Destut and Cabanis for whom  the history of the m ea ns of knowing paraleled the system atic 
integration of new knowledge which they w as m ethodi caly related to the activites of 
psychological awareness of the sign. In this sense physiology retained its prim ary objective 
relation to the knowledge of m an in the functional sense, rather than as strictly producing the 
representational value critcised by Rousseau or K a nt.  
 
W hat was pursued under a positve physiology wa s therefore the functional concept of the 
physical and the m oral in its broad sense. Com m enta tors noted that Bichat, he physiologist, 
³KDQJV DV D ZUDLWKOLNH LQWHOOHFW RYHU LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG DWWLWXGLQDO FKDQJHV RI KLV GD\´594  often 
m eant in relation to subsequent m edical history. Bu t this was a legacy also of the radical 
am biton that extends through a certain idea for a Science of M an, nam ely for those who sort to 
unify the disciplinary m odes under the am biton for  developing a new language adequate to 
PDQ¶V world. Paradoxicaly this is characterised by produ cing a new  scientifc discourse, 
positvely dissociated from  an old knowledge. Howev er ifan 18 th  century vitalism  represented 
this as a reciprocity between two m odes of knowledg e, in the wake of the revolution and its 
dispersive social politcs, these becam e conflictin g tasks that left he m ark on French 19 th  century 
Positvism .  
 
The Science of M an in Crisis  
 
In the early decades of the 19 th  century there w as a loss of belief that a Science of M an could 
deliver the unifed am bitons of a future science. However, the im pact of its  legacy , as an 
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unfulfied task, also left itsm ark. For exam ple, Bichat also im pressed as an orator in conveying 
WKH QHHG WR WDNH XS D µVSHFLDO UHDVRQLQJ¶ DV LV HYLGHQW DPRQJVW Kis students. Philbert Roux 
com m ented,- 
³%LFKDWKDVPHWDPRUSKRVHP\\RXWKWKURXJKLQVSLULQJPHZLWKWKHWDVWHRIVFLHQFHDQG
WKHORYHRIZRUN´595   
This is  perhaps one exam ple of why the idea of a Science o f M an reached wel beyond the 
m edical program . The si gnifcance as conveyed by Cabanis and Bichat is not ably felt by Henri 
de Saint-Sim on who expressed his sentim ents in 1813 , in a handcopied M emoire sur la Science 
VXUO¶KRPPHHe had concretely understood this as a tsk folowi ng,- 
³WKHQH[WPRVWLPSRUWDQWstep which would folow on directly from  those take n by V icq 
G¶$]\U&DEDQLV%LFKDWDQG&RQGRUFHWZDV WRGHDOZLWK WKHZKROHRI WKLV VFLHQFH LQ
RQHVLQJOHZRUNE\FRPSOHWLQJWKHPDWHULDORIWKHVHIRXUJUHDWPHQ´596  
By 1813 Saint-Sim on had already established that h ese were m ethods of Positvism . Itm eant a 
com positon of biology, m edicine, and history while  he sharply atacked those who tried to 
subordinate a Science of M an to m athem atics, calin g them  the brutieres DQG ³«VRUU\
calculators who hide behind WKHLU UDPSDUWV RI ; DQG =´597  %URDGO\ VSHDNLQJ &RQGRUFHW¶V
statistics were seen as the technical tool by which  to m ultiply the pow ers of the hum an m ind, 
displacing superstion and eror, dem ocratizing an d liberating but im portantly by 1813 Saint-
Sim on already saw him self as distanced from  m any as pects of Philosophe thought. 598  W hat could 
appear to Condorcet as epochs of history described as increm entaly progressive, was described 
by Saint-Sim on in Introduction aux travaux scientif iques de xix siecle (1807-8) as an active 
struggle between forces, organic and critcal, whic h were expressed in the overlapping system s 
of knowledge, ach grow ing out of the contradiction s of the other. 
 
Internal tensions necessitated the overturning of t he old order so that the µQHZ¶FRXOGEHEURXJKW
into being. There w as an undercurent of historical  force that inform ed  Saint- 6LPRQ¶VFRQFHSWRI
progress, he saw  forces that needed negotiating as ultim ately they dom inate history. This was 
what al m odern knowledge ultim ately has t RFRQWHQGZLWKWRµEHFRPHSRVLWLYH¶LQNQRZOHGJH
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was a task undertaken in the face of this dynam ic c risis of change, against which knowledge 
could never be absolute but always provisional. The  future science w as displaced by knowledge, 
now functional and relative only to a phase of hist ory. The historical m eant what was 
fundam entaly understood of a general organic m ovem ent, and this saw  Saint-Sim on reflecting 
on these physiological influences, as som ething con ditoned by m odes of synthetic or analytical 
knowledge. H istorical oscilations between syntheti c and analytical m odes were described as 
³V\VWROHDQGGLDVWROH´DSSHDULQJDVWKHDSULRULDSRVWHULRULGLFKRWRP\D³EUHDWKLQJLQDQGRXW´
ZKRVHRULJLQVZHUHLQ WKH³YHU\ILEUHVRI WKHQHUYRXVV\VWHP´599  In this context, the nature of 
science itself w as now described as perspectival,- 
³RXU H\HV JURZ WLUHG ZKHQ ZH ORRN DW WKLQJV IRU D ORQJ WLPH IURP WKH VDPH SRLQWRI
view. W e then stop discovering am ong them  new relat ionships. W e even stop 
perceiving clearl \WKRVHUHODWLRQVKLSVZHKDGRQFHVHHQ´ 600  
It is also notable that Saint-Sim on ¶V FRQFHSW RI knowledge was an active struggle in which 
Descartes w as the first ynthesiser of the m odern e ra, com posing from  particular discoveries of 
Galieo, Copernicus and Kepler, but hat his m ode of knowledge was historicaly relative to its
epoch. Relativity w as Saint-Sim on ¶VVWURQJLGHD$SSURDFKLQJKLVWRULFDOPRYHPHQWUHTXLUHGDQ
DFWLYLW\RIµVHHLQJ¶the new epochal tsk of the 19 th  century. This m ay be seen as inherited from  
the Science of M an now in the need for a synthetic knowledge of the world. 
 
Saint Sim on: The Physico-Politcal Task  
 
It has been claim ed that Saint-Sim on was the first m odern thinker to see a dynam ic concept o 
which history w as that change itself, sw eeping hum a n society along. 601  It m ay seem  
anachronistic to propose he folow ed am bitons in a n Enlightenm ent Science of M an, but by 
LQYHUWLQJLWVµWHQGHQFLHV¶DQGVHHLQJ it as divergent forces, prone to distortion, he dis tinguished 
him self IURP&RQGRUFHW¶s rational politcal action, ultim ately under the p ossibilty of µVFLHQWLILF¶
control. In contrast Saint-Sim on reflected a historical force that DFWHGIURPµZLWKRXW¶LPSRVLQJ
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change upon m an and that these were conditons of h istory. A  radical m odern response took up a 
task of confronting and absorbing its changes in m a intaining a m ean, by puting into efect an 
autonom ous m odern knowledge.  
 
Saint-Sim on ¶VHDUO\GHYHORSPHQWJLYHVVRPHLQGLFDWLRQDVZKDWKHWRRND6FLHQFHRI0DQWREH 
Prior to 1813, Saint Sim on was engaged in a self st yled politcal project folowing in the wake of 
WKH VFDWWHULQJ RI WKH µWURRSV RI WKH EQOLJKWHQPHQW¶ $IWHU WKH GLVVROXWLRQ RI WKH &ODVVH GHV
Science M orales et Politque in 1803, and the denig ration of itsntelectual circles by N apoleon 
%RQDSDUWH 6DLQW 6LPRQ¶V UHIOHFWHG RQ ,GHRORJXH LGHDV GXULQJ WKH &RQVXODWH SHULRG +H
proceeded to develop an am biton for a new encyclop edia project during the early Em pire, 
drawing on the w ider eaches of a serious tudy of science taken up in 1798. 602  Saint Sim on was 
atending lectures during this tm e, firstly at the  Ecole Polytechnique and then three years later at 
the Ecole de M edicine, where he becam e fam ilar w it h the works of X avier Bichat and Piere-
Jean Georges Cabanis, and personaly acquainted wit h a num ber of the physicians, notably Jean 
Burdin who went on to exert a great influence on hi m .603  0HPRLUHVXU/D6FLHQFHGH/¶KRPPH
form ulated these ideas as a basis for Saint- 6LPRQ¶VµSK\VLFR-SROLWLFDOFDUHHU¶604   
 
From  Cabanis legacy, Saint Sim on appears to have ab sorbed the possibilties of uture sciences 
that were stil defining their lim its, and of which  a contem porary Science of M an w as drawing on 
indiscrim inately. Itdiferentiat ed  itself IURPWKHµPHFKDQLFDO¶GLVWULEXWLRQVWKHth  cen tury, and 
ORRNHGIRUZDUGWRPRUHµRUJDQLF¶FRQFHSWRIKXPDQNQRZOHGJHµ2UJDQLF¶DSSHDUVWRKDYHEHHQ
understood by Saint Sim on as reflecting the holisti c thinking of the H ippocratic m edical writers, 
and their ntegration of a broad vitalism  into a Sc ience of M an. 605  However, in the new era, a 
crisis folowed the fragm entation of scientifc kno wledge, sciences appear ed  to propel 
them selves as narowly specializations which no lon ger gave a perspective on an interdependent 
world. 
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The web of knowledge defined GLIIHULQJLQWHOOHFWXDOUHJLRQVSHUKDSVLQWKHPDQQHURI%LFKDW¶V
tissues; he was conversant w ith tissue theory throu gh his friend Dr Burdin from  the D irectory 
period, as recaled in the M emoire. Saint Sim on had  DEVRUEHGDQLGHDWKDW³DOOVFLHQFHVEHJDQE\ 
EHLQJ FRQMHFWXUDO WKHLU GHVWLQ\ LV WR EHFRPH SRVLWLYH´606  In this text, Dr Burdin outlined a 
physiological vision for the Science of M an, being as yet conjectural but em bodying the prom ise 
to em erge as positve during the 19 th  century. W hen Saint Sim on writes of im portant ques tions of 
SK\VLRORJ\ GHDOW ZLWK E\ 9LFT G¶$]\U &DEDQLV %LFKDW DQG &RQGRUFHW WKHUH DUH FHUWDLQ
UHVHUYDWLRQV GHYHORSHG LQ WKH LPDJH RI WKH KXPDQ PLQG LQKHULWHG IURP &RQGRUFHW¶V Equisse. 
Perhaps as a consequence of the later crisis in the  post revolutionary period, Saint Sim on now 
identifes a bifurcation at the heart of a general knowledge. 607   
³7KHUHDUHWZRNLQGVRIVFLHQWLILFVWXG\the search for facts and the reasoning based on 
WKRVHIDFWVWKDWLVWKHLPSURYHPHQWRIJHQHUDOWKHRU\«.Locke and Newton assum ed a 
new appoach: they found new facts in abundance. One  found the force of gravitation the 
other the fact of the hum an m inds perfectibilty. T he school becam e the Newtonian-
Lockean. For alm ost a century it has utilsed the a pproach bequeathed to them  by these 
WZRPHQ,WKDVEHHQSUHRFFXSLHGE\IDFWVDQGKDVQHJOHFWHGWKHRU\´608  
The neglected theory was Saint- 6LPRQ¶V FRUH SUREOHP. This m eant the synthetic function 
understood to be lacking from  sciences of the 18 th  century. These m ade striking analytic 
progress, yet failed in their central task of trans form ing the world of m an. In the wake of 
Descartes, positve philosophy branched into physic s of the inorganic and the physics of the 
organic, while failng to find a unifying law. 609  Saint-Sim on now reflects the m ood of his own 
epoch. By invoking a return to the spirt of Descartes, he m eant finding a suitable distributive 
principle to substiute for the deficiency in the i dea of God,-  
³7KHLGHDRI*RGODFNVXQLW\WKHLGHDRI*RGEHLQJGefective, al the uses of this dea 
are thus equaly defect....physicism  has none of th e drawbacks of deism .....The universe 
is a lim itless space filed with m ater in m otion.. ..m ater exists in two form s: solid and 
fluid, phenom ena caled physical are caled phenom e na of solid m ater. Phenom ena 
WKDWDUHPHQWDODUHWKHSKHQRPHQDRIIOXLGV´610  
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7KLVµVROLGDQGIOXLG¶GXDOLVPLVLGHQWLILHGZLWKDQRWKHUWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ, the historical m ovem ent 
of ideas from  polytheism  through deism  ZKLFK ³ODVWHG IURP 6RFUDWHV WR 3DXO´ WR D PRGHUQ
µSK\VLFLVP¶ZKLFKPDSVDGLVSHUVLRQJLYHQWRDQDEVWUDFW³VROHFDXVHRIDOOSK\VLFDODQGPRUDO
SKHQRPHQD´611  The signifcance is that by 1813 Saint Sim on was m oving beyond a 
physiological debate and was now  looking to integra ting wider sources to m ediate sim ilar basic 
concerns as an earlier Science of M an. 
 
One source was 'H/¶2ULJLQHGH7RXV&XOWHV(1798) writen by Charles D upuis which had been 
popular am ongst liberal readers through itsdebunki ng of Catholicism . Dupuis held that science 
should displace religion which was a tool of repres sion and that he com m on people should 
abandon itfor reason. This im pressed Saint-Sim on, although he took the opposite view. He 
WKRXJKW UHOLJLRQ VKRXOG DGDSW LWVHOI WR WKH QHZ VFLHQFHV EHFRPLQJ ³D VHW RI applications of 
JHQHUDOVFLHQFHE\PHDQVRIZKLFKHQOLJKWHQHGPDQFRXOGJRYHUQWKHLJQRUDQW´612  This i both 
an extension of Ideologue thought but also a difer ence since itequated religion with being a 
politcal tool. Saint Sim on was integrating ideas d rawn from  the Counter-Revolutionaries, 613  and 
displayed an  adm iration for the way that Chateaubriand had port rayed Catholicism  in the m iddle 
ages in Le G enie de Christianisme (1802). Chateaubr iand particularly em phasised the aesthetic 
nature of m edieval religion in  itsafect it on political and social unity and th is aesthetic nature of 
the socio-politcal dom ain indicated a signifcant shift. 614  Italso partly reflects the context in 
which the writng of Louis de Bonald resonated w ith Saint-Sim on. De Bonald blam ed anarchy in 
French society on aesthetic individualism  of the En lightenm ent m aking its efect on the 
destruction of a social order. 615  
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Ideology, Language, Nature  
 
Louis De Bonald has often been associated w ith the r eaction against the legacy of an 18 th  century 
FRQFHSW RI µQDWXUH¶ ,Q WKLV FRQWH[W it  m eant the principle that lent itself to the popula r 
sovereignty through IRUH[DPSOH5RXVVHDX¶VVRFLDOFRQWUDFW. But equaly he held Philosophes to 
be in eror for exam ple in the legacy of Condilac who accounted for an intelectual artifce 
introduced as a false concept of m an. 616  %RWK 5RXVVHDX¶V QDWXUDO PDQ DQG &RQGLOODF¶V VWDWXH
were an ilusory hum an nature that atributed socie ty to being a m ere convention. De Bonald 
thought hat his displac ed  another principle which understood the social cont ract in term s of a 
religious principle and any idea of radical interve ntion only prevented society from  naturaly 
constiuting itself and achieving a natural stabil ty.  
 
De Bonald thought that a concept of society existed  under the union of two aspects, he politcal 
and the religious, to which civil society was a pri nciple of m ediation. The associative principle 
IRUHJURXQGVWKHµMXVWRUGHU¶LVµQHFHVVDU\¶RQO\WRWKHH[WHQWWKDWKLVWRU\has dem onstrated that it 
could not be otherwise. The distortion of natural c om positon of a society dem onstrates the eror 
in the Philosophes doctrine on hum an nature; they g ave the Republic an idea of m an as an 
abstract intelectual construction. 617  The principle which De Bonald atributed to histor y folows 
the language argum ent as Condilac had earlier. Lang uage is seen as the exem plary m edium  of 
social cohesion but a dom ain of discourse is neithe r arbitrary nor m ere conventional; this was 
what De Bonald seem s to have understood Condilac t o be proposing. Rather, the em phasis on 
the notion that he linguistic sign im plies an a pr iori socialised thought - social convention 
necessarily presupposed speech. This was a necessar y relation between signs and speech that 
gave a natural expression of exchange of values. Fr om  this perspective, the idea-sign w as an 
arbitrary construction, not an essence atributable  to hum an nature. Essence grounds the prem ise 
IRUWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWLQWHUYHQWLRQLQWKHPDQQHUDVSLUHGWRE\&RQGLOODF¶VµQHZODQJXDJH¶SXWV
µHQGVEHIRUHWKHPHDQV¶618  Exam ining this as a question of priority reveals t hat here can be no 
such thing as a µQHZODQJXDJH¶VLQFHWUXWKDOZD\VDSSHDUVH[FOXGHGDWWKHOHYHORIWKHLQGLYLGXDO
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,QGLYLGXDO µWUXWK¶ ZRXOG therefore be discounted as a m oral im possibilty si nce the m oral can 
only be expressed at the level of the social throug h a colective conscience. 619  Colective 
knowledge is understood as the capacity, the gift o f history, handed down in the face of the 
dangers of a frivolous individualism . Against this history DQLQKHUHQWODFNLQDQ\µQHZODQJXDJH¶
is em bodied by the central problem  of eror by which the m odern w orld dangerously extends 
destructive risk in m aterial technologies that pene trate the very fibres of the social body. 620   
 
W hen Saint-Sim on argues for the organic unity of th e m iddle ages, he draws on De Bonald at 
source. But he difers in reversing any unity atri buted to the m iddle ages for a grounding of the 
com ing scientifc revolution. Galieo, Bacon, Desca rtes, Newton, Locke and the Encyclopaedists 
al contributed to a critcal overturning of such a  m edieval society w ith the new knowledge 
initating the dynam ic m odern world based on the ne w physicism . It is this world that his 
scientifc integration intends to envelop as a Scie nce of M an. 621  
 
From  0HPRLUHVXU/D6FLHQFH'H/¶KRPPH to a New Anthropology  
 
In 1813 Saint Sim on was stil outlining such an int egration in relation to the discipline of 
physiology. The discussion with physician Jean Burd in in M emoire sur La Science 'H/¶KRPPH 
explores the idea that a general knowledge becam e l ess conjectural w ith experience as an organic 
developm ent m oving from  the sim ple to the com plex. A  science of ideas developed from  a future 
science.- 
³3V\FKRORJ\LVEHJLQQLQJWREHEDVHGRQSK\Viology and to rid itself of the prejudices 
RQ ZKLFK LW ZDV IRXQGHG«3K\VLRORJ\ GRHV QRW \HW GHVHUYH WR EH FODVVHG DPRQJ WKH
positve sciences but it only has to take one m ore step in order com pletely to rise above 
the conjectural sciences. 622  
In this respect, physiology was seen as the prim ary  dom ain of knowledge that the educated m an 
should explore as it was understood to  em body the general idea by which an elite could gu ide 
society. Such an LQIRUPHG 6FLHQFH RI 0DQ GLIIHUHQWLDWHG EHWZHHQ PRGHV RI EHLQJ ³E\ WKe 
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FRPELQHG LQWHOOHFWXDO SRZHU RI WKH SK\VLRORJLVW DQG WKH SKLORVRSKHU«´ which im plicates the 
program m atic task for the physiologist/philosopher.  0HPRLUH VXU OD VFLHQFH GH O¶KRPPH 
DSSURDFKHG WKLV DV WKH ³VHULHV RI SURJUHVV RI WKH KXPDQ PLQG´ D IXWXUH VFLHQce that appears 
consequential of itspast and Saint-Sim on gave this  as a historical account of em erging m odes of 
knowledge from  his aleged discussion with Jean Bur din. W hat he expounds is a theory of 
knowledge by which the new society can m ediate its own transform ation, by the diferentiation 
of social class like an organic body where intelig ence was taken as proportionate to the degree 
of developm ent evident in their phenom enal existenc e.  623   
 
This lead to an  am biton that the clergy be reconstiuted as a sci entifc corps upheld through the 
VWUHQJWKRIDVSHFLDOLVHGNQRZOHGJHDQGLWVPHGLDWRUV³DVORQJDVWKHSULQFLSOHVWKDWLWNQRZVDUH
XQNQRZQWRWKHFRPPRQSHRSOH´624  Signifcantly Saint-Sim on objects to Condorcet uph olding 
5RXVVHDX¶VFRQMHFWXUDOLGHDRI WKHµQREOH6DYDJH¶By equating a universal history w ith a hum an 
life cycle, 0HPRLUHVXU OD VFLHQFHGH O¶KRPPH also drew on the new anthropology experience 
seen as inform ing the stages of a developm ent of m an. The basis for this w as that he thought that 
recent anthropological evidence of explorers uch a s Jam es Cook, Louis Antoine de Bougainvile 
and Jean-François Le Perouse had positvely supersed ed speculative historicism . 625  Because it
FRXOG QRZ EH GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW ³D QRQ LQWHUUXSWHG VHULHV RI REVHUYHG IDFWV´ IROORZHG IURP
prim itve m an to European societies, Saint-Sim on ex tended the physiological idea of m an into 
the field of cultural anthropology. 626  H is euro-centrism  gave a progressive vision that ook its 
tw in aspects from  societies abilty to civilse the  individual through a colective language, and 
the fact that European societies were seen as cien tifcaly advanced.  
 
However, a notably darker vision appears in the tex t Travail sur la gravitation universele,  
writen in the sam e year but w ith the urgency of a program  for civil reconstruction. This was now  
a response to the crisis of the N apoleonic w ars which  left Saint Sim on seeing a society faced 
ZLWK IRUFHV WKDW FRXOG ³SOXQJH WKH KXPDQ VSHFLHV EDFN LQWR WKH VWDWH RI QDWXUH ZKLFK LV
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FRQWLQXRXV ZDU´627  This dem onstrated his conviction that progress was  only periodic, 
transitonal and even cataclysm ic; Travail sur la g ravitation universele describes an apocalyptic 
vision of the gradual desiccation of the globe as m ankind fals backwards through a series of 
stages until regressing into the brute w ith an im ag inative vision of the last m an having drunk the 
final drop of w ater before reflecting on the pathol ogicaly m orbid realisation of m ankind finaly 
disappearing from  the face of the earth. 628  A t the lim it of the old physiological debate, this  shift 
can be ilustrated by pointing to the new  anthropol ogy that was em erging during the early 19 th  
century. A lready when /H6RFLHWqGHV2EVHUYDWHXUVGHO¶KRPPHwas founded in 1799, a debate 
was unfolding that caled IRU³SURIRXQGPHWDSK\VLFLDQVDQGSUDFWLFLQJSK\VLFLDQVWKHKLVWRULDQ
DQG WKH YR\DJHU´ WR MRLQ LQ ZLWK WKH FRPSDUDWLYH VWXG\ RI PDQ629  Those who stood forward 
included biologists Cuvier, Jussieu, Geofrey Saint  H ilaire, Lam arck, physicians Cabanis and 
Pinel, chem ist Foucroy, explorers Bougainvile and François Le V ailant and Linguists Destut 
de Tracy and Roch-Am broise Sicard; this was an inte rdisciplinary group who m et for tw ice 
weekly lectures on the natural history of m an. But a notable event occured in 1800 when two 
ships, Le Géographe and Le N aturaliste, em barked on  an expediton to m ap the coast of 
$XVWUDOLD2QHRIWKHWDVNVWDNHQXSE\WKH6RFLpWpKDGEHHQWRSUHSDUHLQVWUXFWLRQVIRUµVWXG\LQJ
VDYDJHV¶IRUWKHDFFRPSDQ\LQJQLQH]RRORJLVWVDQGERWDnists. 630   
 
7KH µREVHUYDWHXUV¶ WKDW URVH WR WKLV RFFDVLRQ WR ³SHUIHFW DQWKURSORJ\´ ZHUH -RVHSK 0DULH
Degérando and George Cuvier w ith m arked diferences  in their approach.  Degérando brought 
w ith him  the traditon of the Classe des Science M o rales et Politque and the Ideologue m ethod 
of com parative analysis aim ing at a Science of M an.  He proposed learning locals languages as 
FUXFLDO WR EHFRPLQJ OLNH WKHLU µIHOORZ FLWL]HQ¶ DQG RSHQ DQ H[SORUDWLRQ WKURXJK ,GHRORJLVWV
SV\FKRORJ\ 6DYDJH DUWLFXODWLRQ ZDV ³QR GRXEt com posed of sym bols as arbitrary and 
FRQYHQWLRQDODVRXURZQ´\HWWKH\HTXDOO\FRXOGSUHVHQWWKHLQVLJKWLQWRD³EHJLQQLQJIURPWKH
ODQJXDJHRIDFWLRQ´'HJpUDQGRZDVWKHUHIRUHVHHNLQJDEULGJHIURPERG\WRPLQGRQWKHEDVLV
of sensationalist heory. Observations of social in teraction inform ed the im portant problem s of 
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questions of liberty and the status of organised re ligion. 631  The LPDJH RI WKH µYR\DJHXU-
SKLORVRSKH¶WUDYHOOLQJLQWRWKHSDVWDFFRUGVZLWK6DLQW6LPRQHDUOLHUDPELWLRQRIUHVROYLQJWKH
querele des anciens et moderne through a progressi ve politcs. By contrast, Cuvier epresented 
the em erging life sciences positon developed under  his com parative anatom y, the new 
taxonom ia. H is approach displaced the language deba te and em phasised bodies and their 
VWUXFWXUH &XYLHU¶V LQWHUHVWV VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH YR\DJHUV VKRXOG PDNH VXUH WR YLVLW WKH SODFHV
where the dead were buried to obtain skeletons, and  m arked the signifcant diference in 
approach em phasising the epochal shift hat happene d during these years. 632  In the event, it was 
François Peron who joined the expediton. He noted how racial diferences in the com bined 
geological and zoological data indicat ed  that Tasm ania and Australia had split geographical ly 
before they becam e populated. This led to  a radical interpretation through the view that rac es 
ZHUH µDERULJLQDOO\¶GLVWLQFW WKHUHE\ IRUHJURXQGLQJ WKH UDFLDOGLIIHUHQFH WKDWPDUNHG WKHHQGRI
WKH P\WK RI WKH QREOH VDYDJH DV WKH VHDW RI D µP\VWHULRXV KLVWRU\¶633  The advent of a new 
anthropology and can be associated w ith the reactio n against he egalitarian optim ism  of the 
Revolution.  
 
This gave the new anthropological basis grounded in  theories of anim ality and inform ed by 
YLVLRQVRIGHJUDGDWLRQRUµDERULJLQDOGLIIHUHQFH,¶and were new theoretical choices that appeared 
to the early 19 th  century earlier sustained by the Ideologues approa ch. The possibilty that 
suggested itself through the new anthropology was p olygenism  and a theory of innate diference 
that ook its evidence from  the study of skeletal s tructures equating visual cranial diferences 
w ith m ental diferences opening a central problem  f or anthropology until redirected under 
Darwinian theory. 634  However Cabanis physio-psychological approach was prim arily a cultural 
concern and this distinction was precisely why Degé rando was content o leave questions of 
SRO\JHQLVP µOXPSHUV¶ DQG µVSOLWWHUV¶ XQDQVZHUHG 6XFK PRWLYDWLRQV ZHUH HYLGHQW of the 
traditon of a Science of M an, to which cultural an thropology retained itsfunction as a reform ers 
science against the cultural legacy of the past. 635  W hat the new anthropology explains ithe loss 
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of a way of thinking, which iswhat Saint Sim on con fronted with an apocalyptic vision; after this 
he took up Positvism  in a m odifed form . 
 
Taxonom ic Biology and V italist Physiology  
 
A  sim ilar m otivational shift olowed in questions of biological organisation when confronting 
the heritage of M aupertuis, Bufon and Linnaeus. In  debates on natural history at he M uséum  
G¶+LVWRLUH1DWXUHOOHLQ3DULVIURPDURXQGÉtienne Geofroy St H ilaire, H enri Ducrotay de 
Blainvile and Georges Cuvier convinced felow  natu ralists o take the m odel of organisation in-
itself, as distinct from  the specifc configuration s of living bodies, to be the central notion of a 
zoological taxonom y. 636  In the 1793, Cuvier brought this concept of organi sation to a 
classifcation in natural history by em phasising how specifc configuration of living b odies 
obeyed principles evident as necessary com binations  of organs. Necessity now appears as a 
structural lim it evidently im posed externaly and w as read against an internal purposiveness; the 
general ogic of the organism s activity w as therefo re inscribed on its m aterial form . For the 
nascent biological sciences, these organic form s we re read as the µYRFDWLRQVRIOLYLQJEHLQJV¶LQ
an order of nature, the innate integration of unct ion into biological structures that indicated a 
FRRUGLQDWLRQRUVXERUGLQDWLRQRIOLIH¶VDFWLYLW\. This dem and ed  naturalists revise older concepts 
of life.
 
A  revision of natural history through an  im age of anatom ical structure gave the new biologi cal 
dom ain its  FODVVLILFDWLRQLQWHUPVRIµDVVHPEODJHVRIIXQFWLRQV¶to be integrated into the concept 
of the organism . Rather than interpreting the whole  as a juxtapositon of organs, the organised 
whole prioritsed function over any other direct re lations of visual anatom ical structures. W hat 
Cuvier prioritsed in his analysis of structure now  substiuted for the discipline that relied on a 
visible resem blance in  the parts; his efected an inversion that priorit ised functional diferences,- 
³GLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQRUJDQVRI WKHVDPHNLQGare precisely the object of com parative 
anatom y...we are going to take each one of the func tions which we have discussed and 
exam ine...the particula UPHDQVE\ZKLFKDUHHIIHFWHGLQGLIIHUHQWDQLPDOV´637   
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However, this classifcation according to functiona l diference was not unique to Cuvier; it was 
an em erging paradigm  of the day. In fact, Bichat al so lectured on how one organ alone does not 
cary out a function, and that function was the res ult of the labour of several organs.- 
³,QWKHDQLPDOHFRQRP\WKHUHDUHDJUHDWQXPEHURIRUJDQVZKLFKDSSHUWDLQWRVHYHUDO
DSSDUDWXVHV´638   
Bichat also indicated that a purely topographical a natom y w as prim arily for the use of surgeons 
and artiss, im plying that advanced physiology of h igher anim al function fore-grounded a 
µFRPSRVLWHIXQFWLRQ¶7KLVGLVWLQFWLRQSDUDOOHOHGWKH0XVHXPGHEDWHZKLFKIRXQGLWVDVFHQGDQF\
from  the turn of the 19 th  century where com posite function served to confron t he theoretical 
problem s associated with the doctrine of vital prop erties in organic m ater.  
 
Com posite function was the new theoretical paradigm , but his em bodied further conceptual 
choices w el iustrated from  the perspective of th e m useum  debate. Jean-Baptiste Lam arck 
joined M uséum  national d'H istoire naturele as a pr ofessor of zoology in 1793. W ritng in 
Hydrogéologie (1802) he used the term  biology folo wing the Greek ȕȓȠȢrefering to a m ode of 
life (a fulfied life) and indicated a status of t he living through itsactions or vocation. But he 
early biologists were stilcontending with the her itage of Greek science which derived ideas of 
life from  the sign of lie com m on to m an and anim al s; ȥȣȤȒ, as ilustrated by what H om eric 
heroes risked in their struggles. 639  This later term  lent a richness of m eaning beyond  any 
individual presence. But w ith the em ergence of m ore  positve Greek sciences needing greater 
precision after BC 550, they JDYH WKH WHUPȗȫȘ WRGLVWLQJXLVK OLIH as soul. This was m eant as 
evidence of activity that distinguished itfrom  the  opposite, inanim ate passivity. 640  It  was a 
distinction that helped explain the dynam ic idea of  the transform ation of m ater in the world 
from  an activity standing behind appearances. For A ristotle, he m ore positve paradigm  was to 
see the anim al as a m achine possessing a soul and, drawing on his m edical knowledge, as 
som ething possessing vitality, m eaning ³DWKLQJFDQQRXULVKLWVHOIDQGJURZDQGGHFD\´641  In the 
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m odern era, biology that aim ed at expanding its sci entifc language beyond the legacy of the 
Greeks, returned to the problem  through an  intensifed study of natural history tow ards the e nd of 
the 18 th  century. 642  The problem  of classifcation was a conceptual pro blem  around the difculty 
of atributing function to the activites of lie. The physiological discipline already confronted 
this from  the m id 18 th  FHQWXU\DV*HRUJ6WDKOORRNLQJWRJURXQGSK\VLRORJ\¶VHOHPHQWDOQRWLRQV
proposed a concept of lie appearing as a power to suspend itsdestiny of coruptibilty. In this 
way 6WDKO¶V YLWDOLVP SURSRVHG VHHLQJ RUJDQV DV EHLQJ WRROV ZLWK VSHFLILF HQGV EXW in which 
organic function was the unknown m echanism  that at ained these ends. 643  An idea of unction 
already looked beyond the sim ple oppositons of pre sence and absence of ȥȣȤȒ; m odern vitalism  
looked to index functions that relate to activites  defined through a concept of natural being. 
W hen Kant drew on this he saw  the organised body as  both m achine and organism , but 
distinguished an organic m achine further through it s need to possess a form ative energy on the 
grounds that an organised body w as not just organis ed but self-organising. 644   
 
,Q WKH 0XVpXP G¶+LVWRLUH 1DWXUHOOH WKH QDVFHQW ELRORJ\ ORRNHG WR PDWUL[ RI WKH ERG\ for a 
concept of natural life. Lam arck outlined his exem p lary study of orm  in Philosophie Zoologique 
(1809) as derived from  the distension or coagulatio n associated w ith celular tissue. In an 
accum ulation and assim ilation in this structureless  gel, Lam arck saw here the origins of organic 
structure that extended as to a discourse on m an wh ose transcendent nature explained why 
GRPLQDQW UDFHV VSUHDGV RXW ³LQWR DOO WKH KDELWDEOH SODFHV VXLWDEOH IRU WKHP´645  From  this 
anthropological basis, Philosophie zoologique im agined the naturalist as the voyager m oving into 
the past, betw een the natural and the artifcial, a nd beyond the restrictions of language on a 
conjectural basis. 646   
 
Lam arck w as answering the question of the observable  order of nature, from  the point where 
nature sets life in m otion and how it isorganical y m ediated. Lam arck does not appear unclear 
DERXWWKHOLPLWVRIVXFKDFRQMHFWXUDOPHWKRG³LIVFLHQFHQHJOHFWVSKLORVRSK\LWVSURJUHVVZLOO
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QRWEHUHDO´7KH]RRORJLFDOREMHFW UHPDLQVSURYLVLRQDOO\VLWXated betw een a productive source 
and the knowledge which m ediates this. He confronts  this as a specifc problem , evident in a 
proliferations of secondary characteristics in anim als, through a decom positon of the anim al 
series in which he looks for two opposite factors w orking together to produce the anim al form s. 
But one m ust understand /DPDUFN¶VSUREOHPas not explaining a sim ple spontaneity of anim al 
appearance but he historical evidence of events th at have disturbed a regular unfolding of the 
organism . 647   W hat was to be atributed to the observable difere nce that index ed  unknown 
µFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶EHWZHHQPLOLHXDQGRUJDQLVP"In this, /DPDUFN¶VWKRXJKWUHWDLQHGthe potential 
for instabilty in the equilbrium  of living form s which philosophicaly was a problem  of 
representing anim al developm ent in relation to the concept of world. This necessitates a 
diferential concept, or open variable, rather than  a principle that inform s the sim ple rational 
order of a productive of resem blance. 648  
 
There is therefore, a µK\EULGFRQFHSW¶WKDWLQIRUPVPhilosophie zoologique. 649  This m ay be seen 
as folowing from  the task of form ulating a new lan guage from  a perspective of an 
anthropocentric biology whose value precedes the ob servation of form . 650  But like Cabanis, 
Lam arck also takes habits as transform ed through rea ctions as m oral values, although he takes an 
inverted approach to its  value in relation to physical form s, -
³DWWKHLUVRXUFHWKHSK\VLFDODQGWKHPRUDODUHQRGRXEWWKHVDPHWKLQJ%\VWXG\LQJ
the organic structures of the diferent orders of k nown anim als we can provide the m ost 
LPSUHVVLYH HYLGHQFH IRU WKLV WUXWK«7KH LQIOXHQFH RI WKH SK\VLFDO RQ WKH PRUDO KDV
already been recognized. But iseem s to m e that we  have not yet given suficient 
atention to the m oral on WKHSK\VLFDOLWVHOI´651   
The question that Lam arck appears WR EH H[SODLQLQJ LV KRZ SK\VLFDO DFWLRQV ³KDELWXDO DQG
HQHUJHWLF´ FDQ FRRUGLQDWH D SRZHU WR WUDQVIRUP - WR ³VWDQG LQ RSSRVLWLRQ WR KHUVHOI´ ,Q WKLV
sense, itwould be false to atribute to Lam arc N¶V ELRORJ\ DQ H[SODQDWLRQ RI WUDQVPLVVLRQ RI
acquired characteristics, this was a new biological  problem  that appears for Darwin with 
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biological hereditary. 652  By contrast, Lam arck isanswering the question of t ransm ission of traits 
which rem ains tied to a m oral question, and never b ecom es fuly divorced from  the question of 
KLVWRU\/DPDUFN¶V7UDQVIRUPLVPFRQIURQWVthe historical problem  of an archetypal O riginal Si n, 
as wel as the inherited experiences of Greek think ing, rather than the future scientifc problem  
derived from  Darwinian hereditary. 
 
Lam arck therefore shares w ith the writngs of Condil lac a sense of science confronting the 
weight of the past. This m eans both a critque and extension of Cartesian rationalism  whose 
am biton is to extend a querele des anciens et des  moderne through the radicalism  in positve 
knowledge. From  this SHUVSHFWLYH/DPDUFN¶VDGDSWDWLRQLVSUHFHGHGE\an  HYLGHQFHRIDµQHHG¶
and cannot be restricted to what we would now consi der a biological or physiological concept. 
Rather it  is ted to an idea of a task or project hat relat es to a w ider social idea against which 
m odern science had to m ake its stand. The nascent b iology w as stilcharacterised through an 
LGHDRIQDWXUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHGHEDWHRI$GDP6PLWK¶VWKLQNLng of supply and dem and. In the 
wake of the Revolution and before industrialism  too k root on a large scale, the rhythm  of 
workers and the function of m oney was, in France, p receded by an idea of a natural order in the 
politcal and econom ic sphere, this wa s upheld by the Physiocrats under a doctrine of the l and. 653  
Adam  Sm ith had been known in France since 1777, and  four tanslations of The W ealth of 
Nations had been published betw een 1779 and 1802. S uch ideas were further spread in France by 
Jean-Baptiste Say through 7UDLWp G¶pFRQRPLTXH 3ROLWLTXH of 1803 and this shared the cultural 
EDFNJURXQGLQZKLFK/DPDUFN¶VELRORJ\w as a developing discourse. This discourse confront ed 
the problem  com pacted into a debate over what const ituted µnatural ¶ being. As the Science of 
M an was already fragm enting into the new positvit es during the first quarter on the 19 th  
century, it leftan inherent conflict in the ground ing of a w ider socio-politcal knowledge and this 
appears paralel to  what was taken up by Saint Sim on after 1814. 
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Saint Sim on, Socialism  and Nouveau Christianisme  
 
The context of 1814 was that Saint Sim on m et August in Thiery and began working together on 
their ndustrial system . The problem  was how to sub m it a politcal system  to an autonom ous 
knowledge which could act independently of national  governm ents. Saint-Sim on now cam e to 
see the econom y as dynam icaly transform ing societi es and relegating governm ents o secondary 
im portance, a radicality he associated w ith the dyn am ism  of em erging industry, autonom ously 
establishing new divisions in oppositon to old feu dal structures. The principle idea behind this 
was that hum an productivity links the world through  a power of spontaneous organisation. 654  In 
the wake of the N apoleonic crisis, w ith a politcal  necessity in the face of loom ing catastrophe, 
Saint-Sim on no longer took liberty as an individual  quality. A t issue was the force by which the 
group could represent hem selves, the quality that expressed the µDVVHPEODJHRI IRUFHV¶ LQ WKH
colective group. On this level, the question of m e diation becam e an im portant m oral question of 
representation. 
 
Saint-Sim on is a m oralist but one fram ed by the rel ativity in hum an knowledge. M oral actions 
are social activites rooted to specifc historical  situations. W hile there was no classless society 
for Saint- 6LPRQ QRU VWULFWO\ DQ\ µQDWXUDO¶ PRGHV RI GLYLVLRQ LQ UHODWLRQV EHWZHHQ LQGLYLGXDO
society and environm ent, there was the m oral m an. T o be in tune with the forces of history, not 
m erely a speculator of ideas, but rather som eone wh o acts w ith the corectness of a historical 
consciousness, like an intra-organic function withi n the social body. Social classes w ere not 
static, but folowed life cycles related to their e poch and passed from  birth through to death 
under a dom inant class. A  dom inant class represents  the m ode of being for the whole of society 
through their deas and desires, expressed through their pow ers of organisation. This m arks a 
break with Ideologue thinking as  Saint-Sim on focuses on the struggle of idea s now  becom e a 
class struggle. Itis a distinction that reflects h ow dynam ic m odes of m odern industrial society 
becom e stripped of scientifc specifcity for Saint -Sim on. The m odern individual appears 
dissolute in the flow of history. H is Positvism  fi nds its task of realising an assem blage of 
knowledge of the world which can m easure up to the forces of history. In the crisis ociety Saint 
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Sim on saw class m em bership as driven by a variety o f unnatural, random  and extraneous 
circum stances, derived from  inherited wealth or spu rious birth rights. Under these conditons, the 
value of a synthetic philosophy acts against he di spersion of history. Society run through with 
GLYHUJLQJ\HWµQDWXUDO¶IRUFHVDUHVRPHWKLQJWRZKLFKDOODUHH[SRVHG655  
 
On this basis, ndustrial values were cham pioned as  the H[SUHVVLRQRIPDQ¶VLQQHUGULYHVVHHNLQJ
an outlet hrough an exploration of the world and t he transform ation into non-hum an objects 
subjected to an im positon of the hum an wil. In 18 19, Saint Sim on was working on 
/¶2rganisateur w ith Auguste Com te as his ecretary. Th e struggle betw een m odes of being was 
the class struggle and a concept of labour now  appe ars as an  excess of m aterial force, as 
som ething psychic, against which the idler seem s de stined to enfeeblem ent and death. 656  This 
not, however, to be taken in any narow sense since  /¶2UJDQLVDWHXU also discovers that hese 
industrial values extend to the poets, m usicians an d painters. Such aesthetic roles are 
com plem entary, even necessary, as a supplem ent to s cientifc knowledge which has a dangerous 
tendency to particularise. The artis upholds an ae sthetic power which Saint Sim on understood as 
a capacity distinct from  the analytical power of m a them atics and the physical sciences. Perhaps 
this reflects his eem ing disappointm ent in scienti sts lack of vision as com m ented on in M emoire 
VXU OD VFLHQFH GH O¶KRPPH and Travail sur la gravitation universele. Equaly  a generation of 
rom antic poets, not blind to an encroaching crisis of m odern tim es, articulated the capacity that 
ZDVFUXFLDOO\VHQVLWLYHWRPDQ¶VPRUDOKHDOWKDQGWKHORRPLQJGDQJHUVRIKLVWRU\6DLQW-6LPRQ¶V
response to th is  quest for the problem atic knowledge to confront th e m odern situation, like m uch 
of 19 th  century French thought, was the search for m ediati on between synthetic and analytic 
m odes of history. Saint Sim on represents this as th e residual task under a legacy of the Science 
of M an. 657  
 
6DLQW 6LPRQ¶V HDUOLHU VHFUHWDU\ DQG FROODERUDWRU $XJXVWH &RPWH ODWHU HPSKDVLVHG KLV RZQ
version of Positvism , delim ited to the transform at ion of m etaphysics through the prom ise of a 
m ore autonom ous know ledge. This was a later diverge nce from  the interest in the industrial 
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system . Saint-Sim on, however, does not ultim ately a ppeal to logic but o a faith, at least as an 
aesthetic principle of unity. 658  W hat Saint-Sim on turned to industry to provide bec am e, tow ard 
WKHHQGRIKLVOLIHDFKLHYHGRQO\WKURXJKDQLPDJLQDWLYHµTXDVL¶P\WKLFDOIRUPRIDQHZUHOLJLRQ
An em pircal precedent can be identifed here. In t he wake of the revolution Saint Sim on had 
seen the proliferation of various religious cults, indeed m any leaders of such revolutionary cults 
were known to him  personaly. He had observed first  hand how synthetic religions wept into the 
void left by the Catholic church. From  this observa tion, an anthropological principle which 
needed som ething m ore suitable than the haphazard i deas of the cults, a Science of M an 
recognised the provisional and functional tool, ik e a universal gravity, of representing the 
suitable psychological structure for hum an consciou sness.  
 
In his final years Nouveau Christianisme (1825) too k up a concept of the greatest universality 
³ZKLFK PDQ KDYH HYHU SXW LQWR SUDFWLFH´ )ROORZLQJ D GLDORJXH EHWZHHQ D FRQVHUYDWLYH DQG D
reform er, this w as understood as som ething of which  the 18 th  FHQWXULHV KDG DQ ³H[DOWHG
FRQFHSWLRQ´ VRPHWKLQJ GHPDQGHG RI WKH KXPDQ UDFH ZKLFK ³LV QRW FRQILQHG WR LPLWDWLRQ´659  
The social physiology of 0HPRLUHVXUODVFLHQFHGH/¶KRPPH addressed a unity as a scientifc 
project, bu t abandoned this n his later career in favour of a m ore explicitly aesthetic principle. I t 
was a shift that looked necessarily to techniques e xtended as a politcal tool and this grounds the 
FRQWLQXLW\LQ6DLQW6LPRQ¶VWKLQNLQJ 
 
The Two Cultures: The Cri WLTXHRI%LFKDW¶V3K\VLRORJ\ 
 
A  further shift beyond the physiological traditon cam e from  François-Piere M aine de Biran , 
however he stildiscussed the possibilty of a Sci ence of M an now seen as an  experience of 
w il. 660  A lthough M aine de Biran died in 1824, this legacy was also the source of dispute w ith 
SDUWLFXODU VLJQLILFDQFH IRU &RPWH¶V 3RVLWLYLVP GXULQJ WKH SHULRG RI WKH -XO\ 0RQDUFK\ -
1848). By experience of w il m eant the production o f evident actions and reactions expressed as 
laws of the body, these were to be presented as a p sychology which som e understood to be a 
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VFLHQFHRI WKHVRXO'H%LUDQKDGHDUOLHUFRQFOXGHG WKDWDQ³LPPHQVHJDS WKDWVXEVLVWVDOZD\V
EHWZHHQ WZRVFLHQFHV´QDPHO\ WKRVHFRQFHUQLQJ WKHSK\VLFDODQG WKRVHRI WKHPRUDO661  As an 
early ideologue, he had exchanged ideas w ith the m e dical circles frequented by Cabanis, D estut 
de Tracy and Bichat in the years around 1800, and i n 1803 and was even awarded a prize by the 
µ&ODVVHGHV6FLHQFHV0RUDOVHW3ROLWLTXHV¶IRUhihs text /¶LQIOXHQFHGHOµKDELWXGHVXUOHIDFXOWp
de penser. 662  %XWE\ WKH¶V'H%LUDQUHMHFWHG the contem porary m edical discourse seen as 
GRPLQDWHG E\ ³FHUWDLQ SK\VLRORJLVWV´ who GHULYHG D PHWKRG RI GLYLVLRQ IURP %LFKDW¶V
classifcations. This was because such m ethod s w ere seen to eface internal realites of unctions  
of the w il; the physiological m ethod of division l ed to arbitrary distinctions of an increasingly 
abstract haracter.  
 
M aine de Biran therefore prioritsed autonom ous ta tes of experience in relation to what he geld 
as a unique source of knowledge. Such a source, in his 1812 text Essai sur les Fondements de la 
Psychologie  DSSHDUHG LQIOXHQFHG E\ +XPH¶V SUREOHP RI FDXVDWLRQ \HW 'H %LUDQ ZDV DOVR
folowing a vitalist traditon after M ontpelier m edicine. 663  )URPWKHODWWHU¶VOHJDF\KHheld as a 
physiological unknown, as an elem ent of which expla nation always fals short, which grounded 
his em pircal priorites by fore- JURXQGLQJ D µIDLW SULPLWLYH.¶ 7KLV UHIOHFWV the special 
epistem ology that describes a physical causation, b ut also understood as an internal experience at 
the level of the body. W hat De Biran approached as a Science of M an was therefore a µQHZ
ODQJXDJH¶given to relations of exterior im pressions to inter nal experience and which was et out 
as  a critcism  of Ideology.  H e m oves w ithin a broader em pircal traditon with va lues atributed 
WR WKHµIDLWSULPLWLYH¶DW WKHRULJLQVRI LQWHOOHFWXDORSHUDWLRQV, consequently holds the particular 
status in relation to the question of the m oral and  the physical. 'H%LUDQ LPSOLHV WKDW WKH µIDLW
SULPLWLYH¶FDQEHWKHUHDOEDVLVIRUVFHSWLFLVPLQUHODWLRQWRNQRZOHGJHRISK\VLFDORUJDQLVDWLRQ
of the anim al sensitvity as evident life beyond th e particular. This w as given to Descartes as a 
point of aith, and posed by Condilac from  the poi nt of view of the receptive subject. But he 
VWDWXVRIDµIDLWSULPLWLI¶LQKXPDQNQRZOHGJHZDVWKHREMHFWRIan understanding for his Science 
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of M an despite ultim ately rem aining inaccessible to  a form alis ed  knowledge. 664  7KH µIDit 
SULPLWLYH¶ZDVtherefore initaly introduced negatively by dem ons trating against Cabanis a lim it 
to the experience of the physical through intelect ual relations to phenom ena, and for critcising 
Bichat as confusing the term s of sensibilty and co ntractilty in relations to a subjective 
functioning of an ego. This critque focused on the  question of what is atributed to physical 
properties in their equivalence to psychological ph enom ena. H ence, 'H %LUDQ WDNHV %LFKDW¶V
classifcations as purely nom inal, em phasising the confusion around the use of the sign in  
designating vital properties. 665   
 
This m arks a distinction between a sim ple afectati on, w idely associated w ith the legacy of 
&RQGLOODF¶VVWDWXHDQGWKHSHUFHSWLRQas  a pow er for action. D e Biran saw this as a questio n over 
WKH XVH RI &RQGLOODF¶V VLJQ and a general confusion specifcaly associated w i th the legacy of 
%LFKDW¶VFODVVLILFDWLRQVRIKDELWXDWHGIXQFWLRQV Recherches physiologique sur la vie et la mort 
described the awakening anim al m aintained through d egrees of sensible diference derived from  
a continuous organic base as two diferent states o f sensibilty. 666  De Biran looks to explains 
what an ego perceives as a distinct experiences of two orders of perception, voluntary and 
involuntary. 
 
Bichat prem ised experience as originating either in  organic sensibilty as an exterior force 
relation, or w ith the possibilty of a judgem ent de rived from  within an animal sensibilty. This 
was com plicated, however, by the classifcation whi ch further divides into two reactive orders of 
organic contractilty and animal contractilty; the  later is identifed w ith voluntary m uscular 
m ovem ent, alhough left as a generic term  intended to explain the seat of sensory-m otor action as 
understood to be produced under cerebral influences .667  'H %LUDQ¶V SRLQW LV WKDW %LFKDW¶V
classifcation splits any system atic unity behind a  single principle of action am ong the various 
functional diferences apportioned to the parts of the body by his anatom y %\FRQWUDVWWKHµIDLW
pr LPLWLYH¶UHSUHVHQWVDSRZHUWKDWcan initate and continue autonom ous m ovem ents, and  behind 
this assertion he foregrounds the free potential of  the anticipations of the consciousness of the 
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m ind which is necessarily atributed to broader fac ts of the organism  in general. De Biran is 
suggesting WKDW %LFKDW¶V JHQHUDO PHWKRG RI GLYLVLRQ VXERUGLQDWHV SHUFHSWLRQV LQ the hum an 
consciousness as potentialy analogical to physical  properties in the m aterial body. From  this he 
asserts hat the physiological m ethod islm ited in  relation to general form s of hum an knowledge. 
It is a lim it that is m aterial and the physiological discourse is  sim ply unable to span it. 668  De 
Biran defines, as a GLVWLQFWGRPDLQDQµHPSLUHRIWKHVRXO¶WUDQVFHQGing %LFKDW¶VFODVVLILFDWLRQV
of properties in Recherches physiologique which im p ly the psycho-physical paralelism  between 
two essentialy diferent natures. 
 
De Biran points out in Nouveles considerations sur  les rapports du physique et du moral de 
l'homme, an essay from  around 1920, that in the ear ly 19 th  century physiologists were atributing 
WRPXVFXODURUJDQVSURSHUWLHVXQGHUVWRRGDVµVSHFLDOPRGHV¶RIVHQVLELOLW\DQGWDNHQDVHYLGHQFH
of universal facts of natural life. Physiologist us ed these facts to explain transm ission and 
continuation of im pressions and ofered them  as ont ological notions unfold ed  from  a concept of 
the organic life of sensation. T KH µIDLW SULPLWLYH¶ XSKHOG D OLPLW against such a notion of 
sensation, but M aine de Biran ¶V legacy was to open a dom ain which could stand as a  m odern 
doctrine of the spirt. 669  
 
Radical Positvism : Auguste Com te  
 
0DLQHGH%LUDQ¶VFULWLTXHZDVtherefore seen to open the dom ain for DSV\FKRORJ\RIWKHµKXPDQ
spirt. ¶ This was understood as  a particular notion of freedom  taken up against physi ological 
reasoning. The philosophical legacy w as taken up du ring the period of the July M onarchy (1830-
1848) by $XJXVWH &RPWH¶V QRWDEOH DGYHUVDU\, V ictor Cousin who associated this w ith a true 
Science of M an,-  
³DQ\ VRXQG SKLORVRSK\ LV WKH VWXG\ RI KXPDQ QDWXUH«WKH 6FLHQFH RI 0DQ
SV\FKRORJ\LVFHUWDLQO\QRWDOOWKHUHLVWRSKLORVRSK\EXWLWLVWKHIRXQGDWLRQ´670   
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As Cousin understood it, this was a Science of M an that had been obscured by the successes of 
the physical sciences as the scientifc spirt had overstretched its authority. But by exam ining 
reflections of phenom ena from  the perspective of th e hum an m ind, Cousin fram es the practice of 
µSV\FKRORJ\¶ DV WKH SUHOLPLQDU\ VWXG\ PHQWDO SURFHVVHV LQ WKH GLVFLSOLQH RI REVHUYDWLRQ. This 
em phasised the distinction between soul and body. T here was, however, also a cultural 
signifcance during the period of the July M onarchy  as Cousin was a liberal defender of 
constiutional m onarchy which he approached in the spirt of com prom ise between absolutism  
and dem ocracy. Cousin becam e a sym bol of the educat ional establishm ent o which he took up 
WKH WDVNRI WKH ³UHVFXLQJRI WKH \RXWK´RI)UDQFH IURPSUHFLVHO\ IURP WKHH[FHVVHVRI DEVWUDFW
scientifc reasoning. 671   
 
Auguste Com te specifcaly took up an antagonistic relation to such psychologist-philosopher 
defenders of a Science of M an. H is basis for this w as an epistem ological practice to which al 
individual iberty appeared as som ething of a m irag e. In this respect Com te also folowed a 
Cartesian strategy, one which understood science as  a universalising form  of praxis m oving 
EH\RQGZKDWKHVDZDVDQRXWPRGHGSUDFWLFHRIFRQWHPSODWLRQ&RPWH¶VSULPDU\VWUXJJOHFDQEH
characterised as th is  transform ation of his perceived pre-scientifc leg acy, to  which his Positve 
phi ORVRSK\ PHDQW WDNLQJ D KLVWRULFDO UHODWLRQ WR VRFLDO WKLQNLQJ ³ZH DOZD\V ODERXU IRU RXU
GHVFHQGDQWV´ VD\V &RPWH ³EXW XQGHU WKH LPSHWXV RI RXU DQFHVWRUV´672  &RPWH¶V SUREOHP ZDV
prim arily historical, and he ZDV VXVSLFLRXV RI &RXVLQ¶V SV\FKRORJ\ DV VXEGXLQJ the radical 
im plications of m odern scientifc knowledge on the basis of spurious ontological claim s. 
 
Com te was particularly contentious over claim s m ade  for observational experience and the value 
atributed to a practice of observation. In this re spect, Cousin reserved certain privileges for 
philosophising, nam ely prioritsng the study of ex perience over a strictly theoretical approach to 
physical laws which should be understood in relatio n to the values outlined by D escartes 
M editations. 673  But Com te saw  WKLV DV µV\PSWRPDWLF¶ RI D GHHSHU FRPPLWPHQW WR D SULYLOHJHG
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m etaphysical notion of m an. A gainst his, the radic al aspect of m odern thought w as understood 
as  scientifc m ethod, the tool for pursuing another t ask, nam ely th at  aspect of Descartes whose 
praxis seeks elim ination of a residual and outm oded  m etaphysics. Descartes invested critcal 
powers in the standards of a praxis and, from  this perspective, &RPWHIRXQG&RXVLQ¶VSV\FKRORJ\
WR EH D UHJUHVVLYH µPDQRHXYUH¶ GHOLEHUDWHO\ RSSRVHG WR WKH WRROV RI VFLence which he thought 
ZHUH HPSOR\HG DJDLQVW WKH ³JURXQGZRUN RI JURVV DQG PLVFKLHYRXV TXDFNHU\´  7KH WUXH
im plications were of a radical Positvism . 674    
 
The radical dim ension was an epistem ological strate gy that aim ed  for a m ore autonom ous 
µRUJDQLFDSSURDFK¶675  After 1822 Saint Sim on and Auguste Com te started w orking together on 
Du systéme industriel and were focussed on the cont em porary social debates of the day. Saint 
6LPRQ¶V DSSURDFK WR 'H %RQDOG WKH &RXQWHU 5HYROXWLRQDULHV DQG D ODLVVH] IDLUH FULWLFLVP
lim itng intervention of the state has been discuss ed above. By way of contrast, Com te wrote that 
³WKHUHLVQROLEHUW\RIFRQVFLHQFHLQDVWURQRP\SK\VLFVFKHPLVWU\DQGSK\VLRORJ\«´676  He was 
certainly IDPLOLDUZLWK6DLQW6LPRQ¶VHDUOLHUM emoire essay, and %XUGLQ¶VWKHRU\RIWKHVFLHQFHV
going through a conjectural phase; &RPWH¶VSHUVSHFWLYHLQDu systéme industriel was to ground 
positve ideas in what lter becam e fam ous as the l aw of three stages.-  
³%HFDXVH RI WKH QDWXUH RI WKH KXPDQ PLQG HDFK EUDQFK RI hum an knowledge is 
necessarily obliged in its advancem ent to pass succ essively through three diferent 
theoretical stages: the theological or the fictive stage; the m etaphysical or the abstract 
VWDJHDQGILQDOO\WKHVFLHQWLILFRUWKHSRVLWLYHVWDJH´677   
It  isthe law of the three stages which isntend ed  as a dynam ic perspective on the distinct regions 
of knowledge which in them selves can only be descri bed from  a static point of view. 678  &RPWH¶V
G\QDPLVPWKHUHIRUHPDSVDKLVWRU\WKURXJKWKH³IDPRXVWKHRORJLFDl and m etaphysical dogm as of 
RSWLPLVP´ ZKLFK KDG HDUOLHU RIIHUHG ³YHU\ XVHIXO ZD\V RI UHDVRQLQJ´ :LWKRXW H[SOLFLWO\
identifying a value to  µXVH¶&RPWH¶VGHILQHGthe batleground for this Positve reasoning. 679   
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Com te was a m ore accom plished reader of science tha n Saint Sim on and also wel versed in the 
M ontpelier taditon of m edicine. W hat constiuted  an organic approach divided them  during the 
writng of Du systém e industriel as Com te favoured stricter scientifc grounds for overcom ing 
diverse intelectual and ideological politcal reas oning. In this respect, his epistem ological 
approach can be seen as aim ed against individual po litcal m anoeuvring, but w ith a practical 
aspect that retained an ethical value atributed to  a living whole. Such ethical necessity appears to 
UHTXLUH D FHUWDLQ UHVLVWDQFH WR HIIHFW D IXOO GHYHORSPHQW WRZDUGV D µQDWXUDO RXWFRPH,¶ which 
PHDQW &RPWH¶V FRQFHSW RI D PHDQ VHHQ DV D µUHJXODULVDWLRQ RI VSRQWDQHRXV HYROXWLRQ¶ LQ WKH
series of oscilations around a m iddle line. 680  In this way, Com te was straddling contem porary 
theories from  the life sciences and m ediating dife rent m odels for an approach that aim ed  at 
delim itng a m ultiplicity of unknown variables whic h appeared as philosophical problem s. 
 
As a philosophical strategy, this sum s up an am bit on to substiute a scientifc relation for a 
m etaphysical relation. Like Saint Sim on, Com te also understood philosophy as a synthesis that 
presided over a hum an point of view and in this res pect he sim ilarly folows the legacy of an 18 th  
century project for a Science of M an. But &RPWH¶V tools are prim arily drawn from  the new life 
sciences w ith the aim  of producing a philosophy of superior concepts, against philosophies 
atributing readym ade concepts to an innate source in the hum an m ind. But it  is specifcaly 
taken up against he contem porary philosophies of c onsciousness (Cousin) and Com te folows 
this w ith a particular line of post-Cartesian epist em ology, as diferential theories of science as 
m iror of an approach rooted in m ind. Both approach es are therefore look beyond pure sciences 
that ofer non- KLVWRULFDO ORJLFDO RU VWULFWO\ XQLYHUVDO SULQFLSOHV &RPWH¶V GLVWLQFWLRQ QRWDEO\
focuses on the new bio-m edical sciences, identifed  as radicaly distinct dom ains progressive 
overturning any strictly m athem atical physics. 681  On this basis, it has been suggested that 
&RPWH¶VGLIIHUHQWLDO WKHRU\ LQDXJXUDWHVDQHSLVWHPRORJLFDO WUDGLWLRQ LQ)UHQFK WKRXJKW and can 
be seen as replacing a search for ontological groun d with problem s atributed to the processes 
that inform  concept form ation. 682  Com te tried to define this both historicaly and r egionaly 
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through taking sciences as a privileged m ode of pro duction of knowledge both for developm ent 
of m ind and extending to w ider social politcal dis courses. 
 
Cours and the Project for a Positve Philosophy  
 
&RPWH¶V Cours de philosophie positve is prem ised on the ra dicalism  of Descartes because 
historicaly this m arks an epistem ological shift aw ay from  ancient hought WRZDUGV WKH µUHDO¶
Com te also folows the historicism  of Condorcet in his FODLPWKDW³WKHKXPDQPLQGVSURJUHVVLV
WKH SURJUHVV RI WKH LQGLYLGXDO PLQG«D GLUHFW HYLGHQFH RI WKDW RI D JHQHUDO PLQG´683  Abstract 
epistem ology, unifed as a colective m ind, prom ise s a transform  intelectual ife against an 
³LQWHOOHFWXDODQDUFK\´RIKLVWLPH684  This  UDGLFDOVKLIWPDUNVDGLIIHUHQFH³EHWZHHQXVDQGWKHP´
PHDQLQJDQFLHQWVDQGPRGHUQVZKHUH³QHZDQDO\WLFDOYLHZV´UHVXOWHGLQWKHV\PEROLFSUDFWLFH
of m odern science which m arks the transform ation of  representation and the sign. 685   
 
Cours takes this prim ary distinction from  the m oder n concept of orce, as abstracted from  an idea 
RIPRWLRQLWVHOIZKLFKLVLWVHIIHFW7KHPRGHUQFRQFHSWJLYHVWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI³FRPSRXQG
PRYHPHQWV´ GLVWLQJXLVKHG IURP WKH DQFLHQW idea of supernatural agency: m odern science 
understood virtual velocites through a m athem atica l sign that grounds a diferent cosm ological 
view. But he m odern problem  is  com plexity at he lim it of what m echanics could es tablish as 
abstract laws, the problem  of m odern m echanics was therefore lack of knowledge. W hat Com te 
was tackling therefore w as a need for special knowl edge to displace this lack which an older idea 
DWWULEXWHG DQ µDFWXDO¶ LQHUWLD 0RGHUQ PHFKDQLFV ODFNHG WKrough its failure to define other 
³LQKHUHQWIRUFHV´HYLGHQWLQthe VSRQWDQHRXVDFWLYLWLHVRI³a range of substances up to those at the 
KLJKHVW RUJDQLVDWLRQ´686  Such thinking distinguished the belief that hese would be displaced 
through the future sciences and Cours retained this  belief as the principle driving its central 
problem atic. W ith inertia, m odern dynam ics had the im plicit recogniton that he principle of 
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LQHUWLDPDUNHGWKHVKLIWWRWKHµQHZODQJXDJH¶RIPRWLRQ,687  but his i intim ately tied in w ith a 
principle of relativity, des SLWHEHLQJLVH[SUHVVHGLQ1HZWRQ¶VPrincipia as a lw . 688   
 
The cosm ological science described by Galieo incor porates the observer w ithin the µHVVHQWLDOO\¶
m athem atical approach. For sim ple observations, ine rtia appeals to actual concrete phenom ena, 
yet as a law , it  SUHVHQWV LWV SURIRXQG SKLORVRSKLFDO SUREOHPV :KLOH 1HZWRQ¶V WKLUG ODZ RI
dynam ics describes a lim ited reciprocity observable  as equal action and reaction, the first law 
(inertia) is the conceptual tool, whose abstraction  is given in its sym bolic aspect. 689  Kant ook 
this principle to ground any observational statem en t but this m eant that, pproached em pircaly, 
it should be taken as a psychological fact rather t han a physical one, a purely inductive principle 
whose value w as that of an interpreta WLRQ7KLVZDVZKDW*DOLOHRLQWHUSUHWHGRIµWKHJUHDWERRN
ZKLFK OLHVEHIRUHRXU H\HV¶ZKLFK ZDVZULWWHQ LQPDWKHPDWLFV690  ,Q&RPWH¶V HUD LQHUWLDZDV
understood as the UHODWLYLW\WKDWQHHGHGDµVSHFLDOHSLVWHPRORJ\.¶To define an  inertial fram e, or 
fram e of reference, relied on a perspective, ideali sed in som e way, on the aggregate of bodies 
from  which to derive a positon of rest. This deal  gave the axiom  of know ledge in the relation to 
the system . &RPWH¶VHSLVWHPRORJ\DVSLUHGWRH[WHQGa m ore physiological principle as a form  of 
praxis. 
 
From  the Inertial Fram e to Re-linking a Series  
 
Cours addressed this as a problem  of organic phenom ena that folow ed  from  the historical 
dispute between m etaphysics and physics. A t he sta rt of the 19 th  century these entered a new  
positve phase; this m eant becom ing freed from  thei r relation to the m edical arts through a 
GHOLPLWHG FRQFHSW RI OLIH IUHHG IURP ³PHWDSK\VLFDO DEVWUDFWLRQV´691  Folowing the success of 
m odern dynam ics, the new threshold was between inor ganic/organic phenom ena. But his w as 
m erely seen as a regional diference, dependent on dom ain; as the inorganic sciences w ere less 
inter-dependant, sim ple organic properties of tissu es were seen as com plexly linked to their 
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m ileu. This indicates a relation that YDULHV DV RQH DVFHQGV ³WKH UDQNV RI WKH RUJDQLF ERGLHV´
m eaning in proportion to the diversity of their fun ctions. Reciprocaly, this indicated the power 
of the organism  in m odifying itsm edium  which also rose in proportion. 692   
 
Cours took the concept of reciprocity DV D[LRPDWLF IRU D ³WUXO\ SKLORVRSKLFDO´ UHYROXWLRQ H e 
credited Bichat w ith defining how  the SK\VLRORJLFDOREMHFWFDQEHFRQVWUDLQHGWRUHJLRQV³SURSHU
WR OLYLQJ ERGLHV´ DV PDGH HYLGHQW WKURXJK RUJDQLF IXQFWLRQV +RZHYHU &RPWH VDZ %LFKDW¶V
concept of lie - WKH µVXP RI IXQFWLRQV WKDW UHVLVW GHDWK¶ - as conceptualy problem atic and 
potentialy irational. 693  Rather he accepted biological existence w as prem is ed on an integration, 
rather than a resistance, and to this end QRWHGWKDW%LFKDW¶VGHILQLWLon suppressed certain elem ents 
³QHFHVVDU\WRWKHJHQHUDOLGHDRIOLIH´H ere is the general idea by which Cours dem onstrate s a 
curious relation to Bichat; he was seen as exem plar y in the field of m ethod, but described his 
definiton of life as an incom plete positvism . 694   
 
This curious plit reflects an assessm ent of the da y. Itisignifcant that Com te readily adopted as 
a m ore com plete definiton, one GHULYHGIURP6DLQW6LPRQ¶VIULHQGWKH]RRORJLVWDQGQDWXUDOLVW
Henri M arie Ducrotay de Blainvile. Com te had aten ded his course in com parative physiology 
from  1829-1830 695  DQGZDVLQIOXHQFHGE\GH%ODLQYLOOH¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIOLIHDVDµGRXEOHLQWHULRU
PRYHPHQWJHQHUDODQGFRQWLQXRXVRIFRPSRVLWLRQDQGGHFRPSRVLWLRQ¶696  In his 1822 text De 
l'organisation des animaux: ou Principes d'anatomie  comparée, De Blainvile described his 
views on the principle constiuents of a science of  organised bodies to be studied from  the tw in 
perspectives of the static and dynam ic. This Com te interpreted as a biology that com bined 
anatomy and physiology by distinguishing organic form s from  other inorganic objects; he static 
observes m ater in its com binations, i.e.t struc ture and the exterior form  as the efects of its 
m ater, while the dynamic looks to describe process es of com positon and accum ulations, 
decom positons and destruction. 697  'H%ODLQYLOOH¶VELRORJ\ZDVtherefore describing a concept of 
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bodies existing in nature whose diferences in dura tion resulted from  a com positon of elem ents 
which could resist decom positon.  
 
7KLVIROORZHGDQRULJLQDOLGHDRIWKHDQLPDOVHULHVGHULYHGWKHDQDWRP\RI9LFTG¶$]\Uan  idea 
that took organised bodies as displaying properties  of binary associations which represented their 
essential diferences from  inorganic bodies. W hat e m erged in the series was the display of 
harm ony in the continuity of itsexistence. From  ce lular tissue, m odifed at base, to production 
of organs as the structures existing in them selves,  these were the com positons atributed to a 
norm  of lie. Notably, D e Blainvile was an anatom i st and taxonom ist and also folowed Cuvier 
in seeing exterior form s as distinct and visible ev idence of dynam ic results of orces of nature. 
The FRPELQDWRU\ VWDWH ZDV D SRVVLEOH VWDWH VWUXFWXUDOO\ YLVLEOH HYHQ DIWHU WKH RUJDQLVP¶V
death. 698   
 
%ODLQYLOOH¶V UHVXOWLQJ V\QWKHVLV RI LGHDV VWURQJO\ LQIOXHQFHG &RPWH 7KH a priori concept of 
harm ony between organism  and m edium  indicat ed  the conditons of existence that m eant 
continuity w ith an  environm ent and understood as a possible state am o ngst ates,- 
³QHFHVVDU\KDUPRQ\«ZKRVHXQLW\RIVXEMHFWLVRQHRIWKHFKLHISKLORVRSKLFDOEHDXWLHV
RIELRORJ\´699  
This was an aesthetic value that related a strategic value derived from  the contem porary natural 
history as extended to an organic hierarchy. Com te understood the sign to index som e undefined 
SULQFLSOHRIXQLW\EHKLQGWKH³FRPELQDWLRQVZLWKLQWKHJUHDWGLYHUVLW\RIDFWXDOPRGLILFDWLRQV´700  
In Cours, the organic series gives this YDOXHWR WKHELRORJLFDOFRQFHSW³YHU\OLNHPDWKHPDWLFDO
analysis of th HLQGHILQLWHVHULHV´%LRORJLFDOFRQFHSWVILQGWKHLULVRPRUSKLVPZLWKGHYHORSPHQWDO
of com plexity, to represent its  idea in the abstract. 701  
 
As a philosophical positon, Com te related this pri nciple in life to a principle of knowledge. H is 
am biton was to define the lim its of what hum an kno wledge could atain in a cosm ological sense 
which was his transcendental aspect. H e equated this w ith a double interior series, m iror ing two 
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principle branches of natural philosophy - astronom y and biology - because these represented 
two types of m otion, which delim ited the virtual tr ajectories w ithin knowledge against which a 
creative m ind could expect to develop its praxis. T he philosophical justifcation for this 
reasoning was the historical evidence of orce behi nd ancient theological notions that related the 
vital to the celestial. Com te upheld this as a UXGLPHQWDU\ µPHWKRG¶ \HW he folowed it  as  a 
productive relation in considering it DVµSRVLWLYHIRUFH¶³DWWKHVRXUFHRINQRZOHGJH´702  It  was a 
positve source driving m odern knowledge which gain ed  power through m ore positve concepts 
extended as intelectual habits.   
 
&RPWH¶VUHDOWKHRUHWLFDOSUREOHPLVWKHPHGLDWLRQRIGLIIHUHQWHSLVWHPRORJLFDOVWUDWHJLHVGHDOLQJ
with the difculty of the biological object. This is exem plifed in his relations to the biology of 
Lam arck and itsorganic series that rac es  m ovem ents between identiy and diference. Lam arck 
folowed a strategy of recom positon, of re -linking a series of ideas in the continuous im age of its
transform ation, a strategy that drew  on a general concept of nature, which was m etaphysical, but 
XQGHUVWRRG DV D QHFHVVDU\ µIDEXODWLRQ¶ IRU H[WHQGLQJ FRQFHSWXDO XQLW\ WR DQ HYLGHQW ZKROH
Com te, in turn, saw  the strategy justifed although  outm oded as a m etaphysics of nature. 
/DPDUFN¶V PHWDSK\VLFV ZDV QR ORQJHU UHOHYDQW IRU WKH VWDUW RI WKH th  century as the 
m etaphysical struggles w ithin later biology and a g eneral theory of classifcations which 
Positvism  adopts ZDVWKH³ODVWEDWWOHJURXQG´EHWZHHQWKHROGSKLORVRSKLHV and the new. But the 
organic series w as the concept by which Lam arck succ eeded in the term s of his day; itwas a 
zone of abulation and conceptual synthesis that Po sitvism  would subject o a transcendental 
m ediation.  
 
Likewise, Com te also recognised as prem ature any def initve shift rom  a general anatom y given 
through a m odern taxonom y. Here, he was also folow ing the M useum  debates which was the 
reason why in Cours, a taxonom ic biology was seen a s a source of ideas of relations between 
organs and funct LRQV%XW&RPWHVDZWKLVXQGHUDWHQGHQF\³WRIDOOLQWRDVWDWHRIDQWLVFLHQWLILF
adm iration when they find that the conditons and t he ful fi l PHQWFRLQFLGH´703  Itw as the relapse 
into crude em pircism , open to baren and irationa l reaction, evidence of older theological 
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influences, which the Positvist project m oved agai nst. However the evaluation of a true 
synthesis of biological concepts harnessing a produ ctive source upheld a QHFHVVLW\RI³VFLHQWLILF
ILFWLRQV´ IRU LPDJLQLQJ RUJDQLVPV DQG the ideas of or JDQLVDWLRQ ZKLFK ZHUH ³LQFRQWHVWDEO\
VXSHULRU´7KLVODWWHUDVSHFWUHIOHFWVWKHSUHUHTXLVLWHRI&RPWH¶VWUDQVIRUPLVPDVDOHJDF\RIWKH
sciences of the revolutionary era. 704   
 
The legacy w as of productive recom bination and synthe sis of transcendental ideas. The value 
Com te ascribed to his positve m ethod indicates ZK\%LFKDW¶V WULXPSKZDVseen as his general 
DQDWRP\WKHH[HPSODU\VXFFHVVLGHQWLILHGDV³UDWLRQDOO\UHFRQQHFWLQJWKHQRUPDOFRQGLWLRQZLWK
DQRWLRQGHULYHGIURPWKHSDWKRORJLFDO´705  Bichat delim ited on evidence the tissues and re-li nked 
them  to the distinct functions in the organs of the  body. Com te took itsuccess as the production 
RI D G\QDPLF FRQFHSW ZKLFK FDQ SHQHWUDWH ³WKH HVVHQWLDO ZHE RI HYHU\ RUJDQLVP´706  %LFKDW¶V
regional approach to phenom ena w as an exem plary ana lysis of indistinctness, ³WKHVROHEDVLVRI
YHJHWDEOHDQGSHUKDSVORZHUDQLPDORUJDQLVDWLRQ´The decom positon into distinct and separate 
units &RPWH FDOOV D µELRWD[\¶ which precedes a general coordination of the series and its 
extensions towards ynthesising a logic of life.It  therefore stood as a VXLWDEOHPHWKRGRIµQDWXUDO¶
division for Positve philosophy. 707  &RPWH¶V LGHQWLILHG WKLV DV DQ H[HPSODU\PHWKRGEXWKDGD
selective appreciation of Bichat which avoided the lingering problem atic in his concept of life.
 
Biotaxic Philosophy: Anatom ical Events and Biologic al Norm s  
 
The organic paradigm  was derived from  an objective application of thought folowing the 
perpetualy increasing com plexity; this expressed an  inherent logic im plied of a biological series. 
It was a FRQFHSWXDOVRXUFHRIWKHµILJXUHV¶RIDFWLRQits  philosophical value extended beyond any 
strictly scientifc knowledge since the later w as susceptible to perpetual m odifcation. But 
conceptual justifcation for the biological analogu e was idealistic in a sim ilar w ay to a 
physiological norm . This was why Com te was looking for a figure or sign of a norm  which is,-
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³SHUIHFWO\ DQDORJRXV WR WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH LQGLYLGXDO DW OHDVW LQ LWV DVFHQGLQJ
SHULRG´708   
This is the re ason why, com pared to Lam arck, Com te discussed how C uvier could uphold the 
LGHD RI DQ RUJDQLF KLHUDUFK\ RQO\ LQ DQ ³LPSHUIHFW ZD\.´ Since for Lam arck, the prim ary 
SUREOHPZDV WKH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI WKHZKROH HQYLVDJLQJ WKH µLGHDRI WKH VHULHV¶SUHFHGLQJ WKe 
µLGHDRIVSHFLHV¶$OWKRXJKERWKZHUHGHSHQGDQWRQREVHUYDWLRQVRILGHQWLW\DQGGLIIHUHQFHWKH
universal series for Lam arck was prem ised on a conti nuity of function in the thought of the 
whole ± the series is itself an  im age of ascendancy. Com te im agined a long determ i nate 
succession of organic states, as the visibly produc tive aspect that faciltates a lim it ed  
transcendental thought for a general discourse. As YLVLEOHJURXQGRI³UHDOQDWXUDOODZ,´this was 
what Com te was looking to regulate from  a particula r philosophical perspective. 709  
 
W hen &RPWH FODLPHG WKDW /DPDUFN VKRZHG ³E\ IDU WKH SURIRXQGHU FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH RUJDQLF
KLHUDUFK\´ DQG WKDW &XYLHU PLVFRQFHLYHG LW,710  its a com m ent hat is LQVWUXFWLYH RI &RPWH¶V
am biton. This quite independent of the specifc  opinions on perm anence or variation of living 
VSHFLHV ZKLFK GLYLGH /DPDUFN DQG &XYLHU &RPWH¶V DUJXPHQW ZDV WKDW UHDGLQJ WKH VHULHV LQ
relation to a general knowledge, rather than its pa rticularity as a science, supported a form  of 
knowledge to which Com te has a philosophical com m it m ent. However he was scientifcaly 
GLVPLVVLYHRI/DPDUFN¶V WUDQVIRUPLVPREMHFWLQJ WR WKHGLYLVLRQE\DQDWRPLFDOHOHPHQWV UDWKHU
than its particular functions, and equaly WKH ³LPPHDVXUDEOH´ WLPH DVSLUHG WR E\ ELRORJical 
transform ism  was a problem  on the grounds that even  an inital disparity w ould be corected by a 
³ODZV RI WKH IXQGDPHQWDO HTXLOLEULXP´ $OWKRXJK &RPWH JURXQGHG KLPVHOI WKURXJK 'H
%ODLQYLOOH¶ RUJDQLF VWDELOLW\711  scientifcaly itwas Cuvier who he saw  folowing the m ethod 
SUHPLVHG RQ WKH HTXLYDOHQFH EHWZHHQ VSHFLHV LQ WKH DEVWUDFW QDPHO\ WKH µELRWD[LF XQLW¶which 
was an idea that FRQIRUPHG WR &RPWH¶V LGHD RI the biological analogue whose abstract 
characteristics em bodied the critcality of a m odern science. However, its /DPDUFN¶VPHWKRG
that caries the speculative idea of nature and whi ch lends its  philosophical com m itm ent for 
                                                          
708
 Ibid  p342- 343  
709
 Ibid p343 Canguilhem  describes Com te as a m an of t he 18 th  century who happened to be in the 19 th  century. 
Canguilhem  (1988) p94 
710
 Com te (1893) p343 
711
 Ibid p344 
217 
 
Com te in that it QHFHVVLWDWHVJRYHUQLQJ³WKHSDVVDJHIURPWKHDEVWUDFWWRWKHFRQFUHWH´H ere isa 
practical aspect of im plem enting the signifcance t hat reciprocaly could m aintain the stabilty of 
m odern discourse in the face of a regressive m etaph ysics. Both Lam arck and Com te shared the 
fight to which strategicaly biological concepts su pport a broader task. This also explains why it 
is the ascending diferential orders of organic and  anim al functions that give the m odality its 
philosophical potential which Com te wanted to exten d as conceptual possibilty. 712   
  
M odes of Action: V ital Science and Biological H isto ry  
 
&RPWH¶V SKLOosophy folowed this bio-dualism  as  an  idea-sign with a dialectical history. The 
analytic and synthetic traced out as a struggle bet ween vitalism  and m echanism  gave his 
philosophy its strategy of integrating possibiltie s of m apping the vital state in general. It 
IROORZHGDQDQDO\WLF³IURPWKH LPSXOVHJLYHQE\'HVFDUWHV´ WRVFKRRORI%RHUKDYHDJDLQVWD
synthetic activity evident in the school of Stahl, which Com te considered the m ost scientifc 
form ulation of a m etaphysical dim ension to a genera l physiology. The em erging idea 
DSSUHKHQGHG LQ WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQIURP9DQ+HOPRQW¶VµDUFKHXV¶ WR6WDKO¶V µVRXO¶ WR%DUWKH]
µYLWDO SULQFLSOH¶ UHSUHVHQWV ³VRXQG SKLORVRSKLVLQJ´ LW ODFNHG RQO\ ³IRU ZDQW RI WKH UHTXLVLWH
SUDFWLFH´ZKLFKZKDW%LFKDW¶VVXEVWLWXWLRQof properties for forces introduced. This i the ev ent 
where a SK\VLRORJLFDOKHULWDJHLQWHUVHFWVZLWKPRGHUQDQDWRPLFDOVWXGLHVRSHQLQJWKHµPDSSLQJ¶
of the vital to the Positvist enterprise. 713  
 
Com te was folowing the am biton of transform ing a spurious psychology through a 
FRQIURQWDWLRQWKDWIRFXVHGRQDSRVLWLYH³WKHRU\RIVHQVDWLRQV´WUDFHGEDFNWRWKHEUDLQ. This was 
DGRPDLQDV\HWLQWKHJULSRIWKHµPHWDSK\VLFLDQV¶714  To extend positvely a positve concept of 
YLWDOµPRGHVRIDFWLRQ¶PHDQWIRU&RPWe, a relation between anim al function to intelectu al and 
PRUDOSKHQRPHQD WKHKLJKHU IXQFWLRQVRI WKH µKXPDQ¶ ,Q WKLV FRQWH[W µKXPDQ¶GLVWLQJXLVKHG
itself rom  the anim al order, which FRQVWLWXWHG&RPWH¶VVWUDWHJ\RIFRQYHUJHQFHZLWKWKHROGHU
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Science of 0DQ ZKLFK KH GXEEHG µWKH QREOHVW VFLHQWLILF QRWLRQ¶ 7KLV ZDV a philosophical 
alignm ent w ith certain socio-politcal m bitons, a n am biton to efect a,- 
³«DWUDQVIRUPDWLRQZKLFKFDQVDIHO\EHFRQVLGHUHGDVSRVVLEOHRQO\E\WUDQVIHUULQJWR
the whole species, or at least ociety, the prim it ve end which in m ost cases of anim als, 
LVOLPLWHGWRWKHLQGLYLGXDORUDWWKHXWPRVWWKHIDPLO\´715  
This idea represents a capacity, betw een an intele ctual ideal and evident anim ality, which 
Positvism  looked to integrate a m etaphysics of m or als. A  recurent hem e for Com te was a 
perspective on hum an life as a dorm ant inteligence  which appears interm itently evident against 
its anim al dispositon. The later had spontaneous, im pulsive and energetic qualites that needed 
directing, less the rational anim al than an afecti ve anim al, whose positve aspects had a pow er to 
synthesis higher functions if form aly realised. Th e disciplinary task w as of transcending the 
brute; this m eant he transform ation of the ego. &RPWH¶V VWUDtegy to realise this capacity could 
now be atributed to biological existence.  
 
:KDW LV FOHDU LV WKDW &RPWH¶V ELRORJLFDO FDSDFLW\ DOZD\V UHWDLQHG a certain cosm ological 
perspective in itsconception. Biological being w as  both cosm ic and vital. Im m ersed in history, it 
em erged between the principle of inertia and a univ ersal afinity which aim ed to displace 
anim ality over a biological horizon. As the transce ndental horizon of an ego, it had m oral 
DWWULEXWHVWKDWUDGLFDOO\GHSDUWHGIURPWKHµLQQDWH¶6FKRODVWLc categories atributed to faculties of 
m em ory, im agination and their norm s of judgem ent. C om te was looking for functions that 
DSSHDU RQO\ DV GHJUHHV RI WKH ZLGHU QRWLRQ RI RUJDQLF SKHQRPHQRQ 7KHVH ZHUH ³QHFHVVDULO\
YDULDEOH´DQGD ³SURSRUWLRQDWHDFWLYLW\´ WKDW&RPWHZDV IROORZLQJ LQ WKH VHDUFK IRUDPRGHUQ
epistem e with a particular historical departure fro m  Cartesian thought. 716   
 
This history that retained a notion of artifce and  m odal separation which can be seen as derived 
from  certain extension of Co QGLOODF¶VVLJQ717  On the one hand, the sign was the tool from  which 
to form alise a transform ation of the ego and its fr ivolity; on the other, itwas to introduces a 
radical scepticism  which is the ethic that transfor m s the m oral aspects of Positvism . This 
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3RVLWLYLVP IROORZLQJ &RPWH¶V DPELWLRQ, em bodies a µSDUDGR[¶ GHULYHG IURP 'HVFDUWHV RI
VFLHQFHIRUPDOLVHGDJDLQVWWKHµROGSKLORVRSK\¶LQZKLFK&RPWHLQYHVWHGFHUWDLQYDOXHVGHULYHG
from  the lim ited physiological knowledge of his era , which was inherently tied to the legacy of a 
Science of M an. W hen Com te took these up as scienti fic values against hose who, in his 
opinion, intended to m aintain the older doctrine as  a particular form  of m etaphysics, the positve 
spirt m eant a long philosophical struggle from  Pla to onwards; in his own tim e, this was 
LGHQWLILHV DJDLQVW WKH ODWHVW PDQLIHVWDWLRQV RI µLQWHULRU REVHUYDWLRQ¶718  A gainst his thinking, a 
certain scepticism  operated to efect he separatio n prior to a transform ation opening a new and 
m ore positve dom ain.  
 
Com te atributed to Bichat he possibilties of suc h a dom ain from  the science of the body 
substiuting for a m etaphysics m an. Bichat ofered an  exem plary transform ation through his 
µVSHFLDO UHDVRQLQJ¶ an  epistem ological shift positvely unfolding the org anic source. W hen 
Com te looked to such µspecial reasoning ¶ itwas to transcend an  interm itent or discontinuous 
character in anim al life. The body displayed activi ties m ade into repetious habits which can be 
³VXIILFLHQWO\ SURORQJHG DW VXLWDEOH LQtervals. ´719  This interm itent character contrasted w ith the 
continuous nature of the organic phenom ena. But ani m ality w as also seen as progressively 
absorbing discontinuous ensations to efect the co ntinuous organic functions of living being and 
this gave an im age of habituated repetion that gr ounded an organic base. Com te took the 
concept of organic transform ation of voluntary acts  into involuntary tendencies as anim al habits 
EURXJKW LQWR WKH³UHPDUNDEOH UHJXODULW\´RI WKH LQRUJDQLFZRUOG7KHERG\EHFRPes like them , 
µSHULRGLFDO¶IURPWKHFRVPRORJLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH- ³WKHWKHRU\RIKDELWLVDVRUWRIDSSHQGL[WRWKH
WKDW RI LQWHUPLWWHQFH DQG OLNH LW GXH WR %LFKDW´ 7KLV FRPPHQW LQGLFDWHV WKH UHOHYDQFH RI
%LFKDW¶VDQDWRP\IRU&RPWHDVa prom ise of m apping the wider dom ain of vital phen om ena. 720   
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3RVLWLYLVP¶V1HZ$[LRP 
 
The Science of M an left the legacy that Com te was l ooking to substiute w ith a social physics or 
sociology. The epistem ological m odel w as based in D escartes but Com te saw that as an 
incom plete system  of positve philosophy. 721  ,W QR ORQJHU IROORZHG D &RGLOODF¶V Logic in the 
relation of V\QWKHWLF FKDUDFWHU RI D µVSHFLDO UHDVRQLQJ,¶ and GRZQSOD\HG %LFKDW¶V UDGLFDO
RSSRVLWLRQ µWKH VXP RI IRUFHV WKDW RSSRVH GHDWK¶ LQ IDYRXU RI GH %ODLQYLOOH¶V biological 
equilbrium , a µGRXEOHFRQWLQXRXVPRYHPHQW¶RIFRPSRVLWLRQDQGGHFRPSRVLWLRQ&RPWHQHHGHG
a m odel of continuity, of extending a harm onious wh ole, and the grand historical survey of 
science in Cours could further identify Joseph Vict or Broussais seen as uncovering a scientifc 
m edicine,- 
³7KH OXPLQRXV PD[LP RI 0 %URXVVDLV ZKLFK OLHV DW WKH IRXQGDWLRQ RI PHGLFDO
philosophy ± that he pathological state is m erely the prolonga tion of the phenom ena 
of the norm al state, beyond the ordinary lim its of variation ± has never been duly 
applied to intelectual and m oral phenom ena: yet it  is im possible to understand 
anything of the diferent kinds of m adness if they are not exam ined on this 
SULQFLSOH´722   
However, this prolongation was already som ething of  a com prom ise for Com te. The particular 
circum stances of this com m ent should be fram ed by hi s aim  of m ediating between the 
µPHWDSK\VLFLDQV¶ LH WKH SV\FKRORJLVWV DQG )UDQ] -RVHSK *DOO WKH ³LOOXVWULRXV *DOO´ ,W LV
signifcant that this ection appears in Cours tow ards the end of the section on biological sc ience, 
and im m ediately prior Com te introduces the discussi on of social sciences. Broussais appears in 
WKHWH[WDVLQWURGXFLQJDGHJUHHRIWKHRUHWLFDOSXUSRVLYHQHVVWR&RPWH¶VWKLQNLQJ 
 
%\WKH¶V%URXssais was m aking an im pact as the reform er of m edic ine w ith a new doctrine 
WKDW SUHVHQWHG D µSK\VLRORJLFDO PHGLFLQH¶ &RPPHQWDWRUV KDYH QRWHG KRZ WKLV PDGH D tabula 
rasa of what preceded him , but som e took this doctr ine as the future of science and Com te w as 
am ong them . 723  Broussais was proposing a new physiology liberated  from  a subservience to 
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visible anatom y; the specifc aim  was to avoid the pathological point of view  favoured by Bichat 
and the necessity of individual interpretation. Bro ussais developed a µV\VWHPDWLFSK\VLRORJ\¶WR
downplay aspects of visibilty in favour of a new t heoretical base. O f this new doctrine he could 
GHFODUH³WKHPRPHQWKDVFRPHZKHUHZHPXVWWHDUDZD\WKHYHLO«´724  This ntended to separate 
physiology from  the ³DEVWUDFWLRQRIZRUGV´DURXQGYLWDOSURSHUWLHVWKHvis medicatrix, which he 
FODLPHGµSDLQWHG¶DEVWUDFWLRQVRIWKHKXPDQLQWHOOHFW%URXVVDLVDOVRFODLPHGWKDW³VXFKDPHWKRG
RISKLORVRSKLVLQJPD\VXFFHHGLQSROLWLFVRUGLSORPDF\ LVQRWDOZD\VDSSOLFDEOHWRPHGLFLQH´
His WDVNZDVWKHUHIRUHWR³SURWHFWPHGLFLQHIURPWKHGDQJHUVWKDWWKUHDWHQKHUE\PHDQVRIWKH
SKLORVRSKLFDOVHFW´725  In this way, Broussais saw  him self definitvely br eaking with the line of 
figurative philosophy from  Condilac, Cabanis, Dest ut, whom  he considered belonged with the 
µUHYHULHVRIWKHRQWRORJLVW¶ZKR- 
³SURFODLP WKDW WKH 6FLHQFH RI 0DQ VXFK DV WKH\ FRQFHLYH LW WR EH DORQH KDV DQ\
pretensions to certainty; without having passed eve n ten years of their lfe in studying 
m an as a physicians, or knowing him , considered in his organs, living and dead, they 
think that he external observations of the grown m an, is suficient o explain al the 
phenom ena of the em bryo, the infant and the disease d, the deform ed and the dead, 
subm ited to anatom ical naly VLV´726  
To this end, Broussais delim ited his new physiologi cal dom ain by a m ethod where vital signs 
were interpreted as excitations and irtations ind exing external or internal stim uli. Such an 
excitatory dom ain no longer egarded disease as a f oreign elem ent, itw as a deliberately anti-
ontological theory now  giving signifcance to chang es in function, as lack or excess. H e 
succeeded in displacing a concept of disease as an independent entiy, giving physiological 
specifcity to change in function which was recogni sed as a signifcant event in the appreciation 
of disease and the new basis from  which to atribut e the possibilty of ounding m odern scientifc 
m edicine. This was notably recognised by the fam ed French neurologist and professor of 
anatom ical pathology, Jean-M artin Charcot. 727   
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%URXVVDLVKDVDOVREHHQGHVFULEHGDVKROGLQJ WKLVGRFWULQHDVDQ³LQVWUXPHQWRIZDUIDUH´728  In 
WKLVUHVSHFWWKHVLPLODULW\RI%URXVVDLVWR&RPWHLVLQVWUXFWLYH%URXVVDLV¶VSROHPLFZDVDLPHGDW
the ontologists of the m edical world as Com te was f ighting the ontologists of the philosophical 
world. This appears to have suited Com te as  Broussais ystem atic physiology was introduced in 
oppositon to a physiology of observation. From  thi s folowed certain consequences, notably 
those outlined by Georges Canguilhem . 729  But it was not the m edical consequences of Broussa is 
theory that seem ed to have struck Com te but his ou nd positve m ethod that produced the m odel 
he was looking to extend,- 
³7KH RQO\ HPLQHQW H[DPSOH NQRZQ WR PH RI VRXQG Kypothesis in biology is M . 
Broussais n proposing the m ucous m em brane or the a lim entary canal as the seat of the 
so caled essential fevers. W hether he was m istaken  or not is not he question. His 
hypothesising being open to unquestionable confirm a tion or subversion, it gave a great 
im pulse to the study of pathology in a positve m an ner and it w il stand in the history of 
the hum an m ind, as the first exam ple of a spontaneo us introduction of a sound 
hypothetical m ethod into the positve study of livi ng beings, a m ethod derived from  the 
UHJLRQVRIDVWURQRP\´730   
This cosm ological aspect folows an axiom  that can be traced to what Broussais lacked in basic 
conceptions of thresholds of biological system s. He  conceived as directly corelating in a 
continuous dom ain of excitations, the tw in influenc es of environm ent and brain. The ensuing 
difculty was in distinguishing qualitative efect s from  quantiative diferences. The 
consequence was that his distinguished itself rom  the earlier therapeutic m edicines that relied 
on interpretations through doctrines of pleasure an d pain. Canguilhem  has described this as 
HPEHGGHG LQ %URXVVDLV¶ GRFWULQDLUH PRWLYDWLRQ DJDLQVW %LFKDW ,W FDQ SULPDULO\ WUDFHG WR WKH
reception of Reserches physiologiques sur la vie et  la M ort which distinguishes relations 
between physics and physiology as continuous and di scontinuous phenom ena. 731  But, as 
&DQJXLOKHP SRLQWV RXW WKLV ZDV VXFFHHGHG E\ %LFKDW¶V Anatomie G énérale which he saw  as 
VHWWLQJµDWUDS¶LWRIIHULQJWKHV\VWHPDWLFSRVVLELOLW\RIHxtending qualitative variations in tissue 
activity from  the zero degree of intensity towards a whole organism . To see Bichat as an atem pt 
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to coordinate physiology as a physics, m otivated by  delim itng pathological variation in tissues, 
suggests he idea that l physical alteration shou ld be considered phenom enal nd signifcant. 732   
 
7KHZHLJKWRIKLVGRFWULQHJDYH&RPWH¶VODWHUSHUVSHFWLYHLQ System of Positve Politcs where a 
GLVFRXUVHRQPDQKDVEHHQZLWKGUDZQIURPWKHµPHWDSK\VLFLDQV¶RILQQHUVHQVDWLRn,733  There are 
two curious points that Com te caried forward into social thinking; firstly, that he should 
form alise a system atic from  the doctrine of Broussa is who specifcaly diferentiates his practice 
as physiological in a narow sense. And secondly, t hat he retains the concept of m ileu, taken as a 
VSDFHIRUGLIIHUHQWLDWLQJVWUXFWXUHDQGFRPSRVLWLRQZKRVHSDUDOOHOVLVZLWK/DPDUFN¶VLPDJHRI
nature despite Com te already identifying this as m e taphysical. But w ithout hese two aspects, 
&RPWH¶V3RVLWLYLVm  and itspossibilites of a progressive transform ati on, w ould not be possible. It 
points to the fact hat Com te had recognised biolog y as preserving som ething of a m etaphysical 
spirt over the inorganic sciences since that each living being always em anates from  another 
living being. 734  This suppressed perspective m akes clear why Com te seem s to have been no 
difculty in taking ideas atributed to concrete b iological structures, to inform  a structural realm  
of a social and politcal task. It  was an era of transcendental thinking w hich lacked  prior 
separation in constructing itsdom ains of knowledge . 
 
&RPWH¶VKLVWRULFDOSHUVSHFWLYHIROORZHGKLVVWUDWHJLFDLPVRIPHGLDWLQJDIXWXUHEHWZHHQFUXGH
m echanism s and a scientifc practice. A gainst m etap hysical notions, he extended a notion of the 
µFRQGLWLRQV RI H[LVWHQFH¶ IURP ELRORJLFDO EHLQJ and the highest expression of this bio-dualism  
extended to a new discipline of sociology. 735  This opposed both an extension of strict logic and  
sim ple reflections of phenom ena in a m ind grasping at essences. W hat isignifcant, how ever, is
WKDW &RPWH KDG UHMHFWHG %LFKDW¶V WKHRU\ RI GHDWK: this folowed De Blainvile in thinking that 
death did not seem  to be a necessity for explaining  the structures produced by living enties. He 
wrote in his System of Positve Politcs WKDWDWKHRU\RIGHDWK³DOWKRXJKIRXQGHGRQDWKHRU\RI
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 %LFKDW¶VAnatomie Générale iscited on p62 of The Normal and  the Pathological DVUHODWLQJWR%URXVVDLV¶PRGHO
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 Com te (1893) p375 
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OLIHLVHQWLUHO\GLVWLQFWIURPLW´GHPRQVWUDWLQJWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKa structural thinking penetrates 
&RPWH¶V LGHDV736  &RPWH¶V WUDQVFHQGHQWDOLVP EURDFKHV D WRWDOity of experience through a 
historical m ind projecting conditons of experience  over historical tim e. H is sociology retains 
this strategicaly to H[SODLQ ZK\ µEHFRPLQJ FRQVFLRXV¶ RI LQWHOOHFWXDO SURSHUWLHV JDYH KLP D
KLVWRU\RIWKHµKXPDQ¶DVDµUDUHILFDWLRQ¶737   
 
This took a perspective from  the old project of a S cience of M an which Com te im plem ented with 
a radicality self-consciously drawn from  the new bi ological sciences. The paradox that his 
em bodied a VKLIWIURPµDEVROXWHNQRZOHGJH¶WRa relative one, as  Cours had indicated, and m eant 
that its transcendental knowledge was to be displac ed progressively as the legacy of a 
m etaphysics. But Com te actualy extends a particula r m odel of inteligibilty (characterised by 
WKH µ%URXVVDLV HIIHFW¶ LQ ZKLFK VFLHQce w as seen as a SUDFWLFH DQG NQRZOHGJH ³VWLOO LQ LWV
infancy. ´738  Ithad a polem ical dim ension that sood as  future prom ise which m erely fed an  inner 
logic driving an em erging technological society in the 19 th  century. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter showed the OLPLWVRI%LFKDW¶VDPELWLRQIRUD UDWLRQDOSK\VLRORJ\W ithin its lm it, 
Bichat retained heuristic values of m edical vitalis m  as the practical application of the idea-sign. 
Physiology w as not an apodictic science but linked to a practical task of extending the idea of 
life as a practical concept. %LFKDW¶VYLWDOLVPHTXLYRFDWHGWKHVWDWXVRISK\VLRORJ\DVDQH[WHQGHG
doctrine on the nature of m an and left a devalued S cience of M an described here through Saint 
6LPRQ¶VSUDJPDWLFUHVSRQVHKLV3RVLWLYLVPZDVDVynthesis supporting the socio-politcal crisis 
ensuing in the w ake of Em pire. By contrast, A uguste  Com te pursued an am biton to extend 
biological discourses as driving a historical proce ss in the transform ation of the m etaphysics of 
nature.  
 
&RPWH¶VHWKLFo-m oral project had the transcendental am biton for  a dom ain coextensive w ith an 
idea of nature. But he chapter show ed the unresolv ed m etaphysics caried over into the early 
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19 th  century furthered the spirt of the idea as a phil osophical concept of life. In a way 
fundam entaly distinct from  Kant, this extended bio logical sciences over a discourse on m an. 
&RPWH¶V ZDV WKH UHIRUPLQJ SURMHFW GULYHQ E\ VFLHQFH WKDW HFOLSVHG WKH SUDFWLFHV RI %LFKDW¶V
generation. This chapter showed how the discipline of the idea-sign served to lim it equivocal 
relations between the vital and the positve. After  the m id 19 th  century, the experim ental 
m edicine of Claude Bernard defined an independent d om ain for physiological science separated 
from  a philosophical concept of lie. T KHODVWFKDSWHUZLOO ORRNDWKRZ%HUQDUG¶VHSLVWHPRORJ\
re -orientated the perspective on a historical Science  of M an in France at he turn of the 20 th  
century.  
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Chapter 5: The Concept of the Positve: Organic and  Critcal  
 
Introduction  
 
The early decades of 19th century saw a dissolution  of the unifed project for a Science of M an 
of the revolutionary era. Bichat represent ed  the lim it of ideological use of physiology in  this 
project. But after 1870, French philosophy of the T hird Republic recognised Claud H%HUQDUG¶V
experim entalism  as introducing a new paradigm  for p hysiology , clearly distinguishing betw een 
determ inable scientifc knowledge and what constiu ted a m edical practice. It  represents the 
break in  DSSUHKHQGLQJµWUXHIXQFWLRQ¶LQ WKHVWXG\RIWKH living. But here is also a paradoxical 
link between this new  experim entalism  and %LFKDW¶V REVHUYDWLRQDO SUDFWLFH This chapter 
exam ines how François M agendie approached the delic ate nature of experim ental procedures by 
constiuting a new phenom enology of living function . Subsequently %HUQDUG¶V H[SHULPHQWDO
m edicine gave this as the paradigm  for an autonom ou s physiology, separated from  philosophical 
ideas of life.
 
The link is paradoxical because SK\VLRORJ\¶V autonom ous dom ain suppress ed  ideal notions of 
norm al and pathological states, re -orienting these from  within. It  distinguished only certain 
functions of lie, nam ely those upheld under contro led µFRQGLWLRQV RI H[LVWHQFH¶ Laboratory 
m edicine was the radical science that distinguish ed  functions of the living from  historical ideas 
RI OLIH VXFKDV DQ DPELJXRXV OHJDF\ LQ %LFKDW¶V vitalism . But his radical separation was also 
understood as  folowing in a line of em pircism  from  Aristotle: a phenom enology that describ es  a 
dynam ic categorical schem a as  a co ncept of nature; this retains a link in  %LFKDW¶V
experim entalism . From  this perspective that he cha pter shows how Henri Bergson could claim  
that he signifcance of Bernard was to  integrate values held of nature as  an  activity of the 
intelect, in his estim ation a vital orientating fu nction of the intelect. In a late essay he describ ed 
Bernard ¶V µDQWLFLSDWLYH LGHD¶ DV the H[SHULPHQWDOLVW¶V GLVSRVLWLRQ which was a necessary 
counterpart o a µVXSSUHVVLRQ¶RIYLWDOLVP%RWK%HUJVRQDQG%HUQDUG ORRNHG WR IROOow precise 
m ethods. This chapter shows how %HUJVRQ¶VGHOLPLWs a new vitalism  in a distinction between a 
µQRUP¶DQGD µUHDO¶ through a tem poral order . But his was precisely to confront contem porary 
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Positvist in  the w ider context of an  evolutionary paradi gm where the problem  of norm al and 
pathological took on the perspective of true or fal se divergence. Bergson caried deeper 
im plications of the physical and the m oral behind t his  extended critque of Positvist historical 
form ations which pointed back to disputes w ithin a Science of M an. 
 
The question RIZKHWKHU%HUQDUG¶V physiological dom ain could serve a µQHZZD\WRD6FLHQFHRI
0DQ¶ also appears behind the rationalising m odel of (PLOH 'XUNKHLP¶V VRFLRORJ\ Having 
dem onstrated a paradoxical link between B LFKDW¶V H[SHULPHQWDOLVP DQG %HUQDUG¶V LQWHULRU
m ileu, the chapter looks at how Durkheim  broke wit h historical ideas of m an by substiuting 
µFRQGLWLRQVRIH[LVWHQFH¶of m odern life on the eviden ce  of loosening of rigid m etaphysics of the 
past. This indicat es  the alterity w ithin social ogic. But social form a tions historicaly showed an 
evident lack of objectivity although supporting a c olective order of things. Conversely, social 
logic rem ain ed  RSHQWRWKHLQWHUYHQWLRQE\DµVSHFLDOUHDVRQLQJ,¶a possibil ty  of substiution that 
presupposes a potential for autonom y. This grounds Durkheim ¶Vaccount of a capacity to invest 
w ith positvely grounded norm s. He equaly presuppo ses an  LQGLYLGXDO¶VFDSDFLW\IRUIOXLGIRUPV
of inteligibilty studied through deregulation or anom ie. D id 'XUNKHLP¶VQHR-positvism  folow 
%HUQDUG¶VEUHDNZLWKYLWDOLVP" 
 
This inform s a reading of what Durkheim  relat es  to a social system  of signs. Earlier epochs 
protected this as a theological idea and later expa nded into a philosophical project, this chapter 
shows Durkheim  associated this w ith the project for  Science of M an at he start of the 19th 
century. I ts  am biton was to re -evaluate a socio-politcal dom ain according to a s pecial 
physiology of sensation. But 'XUNKHLP¶V real dilem m a can be identifed in  folowing this as a 
YLWDOSUREOHPRIµQRUPV¶LQPRGHUQVRFLHWLHVW hat concept sustains the socio-politcal world in 
WKHDEVHQFHRIDQ\NQRZOHGJHRIWKHQRUPDOW\SH"'XUNKHLP¶VSHUVSHFWLYHon an Enlightenm ent 
Science of M an folows itam biton of apprehending  organic laws, which ifproperly interpreted, 
³FDQWHOOXVWKHVHFUHWRIWKHIXWXUH.´It  dem onstrates that in  the early years of the 20 th  century the 
positve and the vital rem ained open fields of stud y, open to a rarefication. 
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PoVLWLYLVP¶V1HZ0RGHOVRI7KRXJKW 
 
During the 19 th  century, Positvism  diversifed through various m o dels of inteligibilty. In the 
preceding genealogy, the system atic legacy of Brous sais was one m odel that was identifed as 
the doctrine ofered a physiological tabula rasa sh own to have particular consequences for the 
Positvism  of Com te. Epistem ological studies of Geo rge Canguilhem  and M ichel Foucault saw  
Broussais represent an  inversion of the observational practices of m edica l ideologues and its  
idea- si gn. By subordinating itsem pircal principle to the a xiom atic of localisation there unfolded 
a positvist dom ain of the sign. Foucault has descr ibed the m edical consequences of such a 
practice as  delim itng a physiology of ideas; by circum navigating the m ethodical vitalism , which 
Bichat engaged with around norm al and pathological anatom y, this reduced the body to a 
continuous dom ain in which ³GLVHDVH H[LVWV LQ VSDFH EHIRUH LW H[LVWV IRU VLJKW.´ The wider 
signifcance was IRU WKH ³VWUXFWXUH RI H[SHULHQFH ZKLch dom inated the 19 th  century, and to a 
FHUWDLQH[WHQWWKHWZHQWLHWK«´739  By V\VWHPDWLVLQJDµZD\WRVHH¶a priori such Positvism  gave 
the m edical gaze a status as new transcendental dom ain. W hen m edical discourse substiuted for 
a Science of M an, itwas through displacing the use  of idea- VLJQ LQ WKHVHQVHXVHG LQ%LFKDW¶V
generation. 740  Georges Canguilhem  goes further to describing this  as ofering a return to an older 
SKLORVRSK\ ³DOPRVW DV ROG DV OLIH LWVHOI´ ZKHUH D WUDQVFHQGHQWDO LGHDO RI WKH 3RVLWLYLVW
HVFKDWRORJ\ZDVH[WHQGHGWKURXJK&RPWH¶V6RFLRORJ\741  
 
Secondly, a quite diferent Positvism  appeared wit h Saint Sim on. August Com te caled him  a 
³GHSUDYHGMXJJOHU´742  Starting from  the practices associated w ith the li fe sciences, this form  of 
Positvism  efected its  departure from  the Ideological project under an  awareness of the shiftng 
process of representation during the epoch. The div ergence within scientifc knowledge , 
particularly the life sciences during this era, m ea nt a Science of M an could no longer ground 
itself therein. Itherefore adopted a m odifed for m  of practice necessary to m aintain what w as 
understood as inhenrent values. W hat Em ile Durkheim  credits Saint-Sim on with isthe pursuit of 
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a synthetic knowledge in the face of an unrealisabl e scientifc project. 743  Itm eant a crucial break 
with Encyclopaedia writers of the 18 th  century, as wel as &DEDQLV¶JHQHUDWLRQRI,GHRORJXHV who 
sustained their project by the possibilties of a n ew science. W hat Saint-Sim on realised was a 
Science of M an had dissipated as a project under th e diverging nature of positve science; but 
this left an equivocation at  the avant-garde of knowledge. 744  From  the perspective of a Science of 
M an, he read this a loom ing crisis. This is w here D urkheim  finds Saint- 6LPRQ¶V VWURngest 
invocation of what the task and vision is for a Pos itve philosophy; it isno longer lim ited to the 
system atisation of existing sciences but was redire cted into developing a synthetic knowledge to 
be im plem ented from  a practical perspective. W herea s Com te prioritsed theory, Saint-Sim on 
substiuted the functional concept for a theoretica l Science of M an. Functional extended to 
conflicting discourses over m oral, religious and po litcal belief. According to Durkheim , this was 
the DLPWR³OLEHUDWHWKHERdy of ideas on which the social structure should re st, ´nam ely liberated 
from  the lim its of science. 745  He saw 6DLQW6LPRQ¶VIRUPRI3RVLWLYLVPas grounding itself in this 
practical necessity prior to unfolding a synthetic knowledge at th is  lim it.  
 
Thirdly, folowing the dispersion of the unifed ph ysiological basis for the Science of M an, a 
new possibilty em erges through the contem porary e xperiences of the life sciences. H enri 
Bergson described this as a µFHUWDLQ LGHD RI QDWXUH¶ and gave its  interpretive operation as the 
central problem  for his Creative Evolution. But it centred on a discussion of m odern scientifc 
inteligibilty and he critcised contem porary Posi tivism  for having failed to truly apprehend its
µVFLHQWLILFREMHFW¶746  %HUJVRQ¶VWH[WDLPed  to  m ake evident as  an essential activity of science the 
condensation from  a theory of lie into a theory of  knowledge. 747  A  few  years, later Bergson 
FRXOG H[SUHVV WKLV LQ D PRUH FRPSDFW ZD\ LQ DQ HVVD\ FDOOHG µ7KH SKLORVRSK\ RI &ODXGH
%HUQDUG¶ +HUH KH UHODWHG WKDW ³QRWKLQJ LV PRUH IDOVH WKDQ WKH FRQFHSWLRQ RI KRZ V\QWKHVLV
ZRUNV´748  6\QWKHVLVZDVDOZD\V³VRPHWKLQJSUREOHPDWLF´\HW&ODXGH%HUQDUGZDVFUHGLWHGZLWK
UHWDLQLQJ WKLV SUREOHP WKURXJK KLV VWDQG DJDLQVW YLWDOLVP %HUJVRQ¶V RZQ IRFXV RQ WKH OLIH
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sciences was een through WKHSURGXFWLYHDVSHFWRIDµFHUWDLQLGHDRIRUGHU¶DWWDLQHGEHWZHHQWZR
ideas, the logic of m an and a logic of nature. He m ade a weighty claim  of Bernard; only tw ice in 
WKHKLVWRU\RIPRGHUQVFLHQFHKDV³WKHVSLULWRI LQYHQWLRQUHWLUHGZithin itself, to analyse itself 
DQGWKXVWRGHWHUPLQHWKHJHQHUDOFRQGLWLRQVRIVFLHQWLILFGLVFRYHU\´749  According to Bergson, 
these conditons produce two distnct form alisation s; firtly the abstract science of D escartes, and 
secondly, the advent of a m ethod associated in  experim ental m edicine. In both cases there was a 
confluence of two orders of problem s which he FKDUDFWHULVHVDQLQWHUVHFWLRQRIµDFHUWDLQLGHD¶
He identifed %HUQDUG¶VIRUPRI3RVLWLYLVPwith itsprecursor, François M agendie. Yet Bergso Q¶V
fidelity appears to com e from  a com pletely opposite  perspective, nam ely one he associated w ith 
a particular idea of vitalism . W hat constiutes the  positve and the vital in the new context? To 
explore this, the chapter w il focus on the m etholo gical shift which accom panies the em ergence 
of experim ental m edicine that occurs in the years b etween X avier Bichat nd François M agendie. 
 
Physiology itself saw  litleactualy change during  these years, neither in techniques nor in vital 
concepts. There was, however, a m arked shift n the  approach to problem s of observation and 
their interpretations which was subsum ed under the central problem  characterised as the 
pathological perspective of Bichat. Previous chapte rs described this as central to the 
diferentiation which lim its visible knowledge of p hysiological objects. Iwas also characterised 
in %LFKDW¶V VHOI-awareness in focusing on coordinating observations  and interpretations which 
was een as central to a m ethodology derived from  h is dea of vitalism . A  subsequent shift led to 
the distinction between m edical practice and scient ifc knowledge but by focussing on this 
m ethodology, the chapter dem onstrates the paradoxic al continuity w ithin the status of its 
discourse. 750   
 
Ideology, V italism  and Function in Bichat nd M agen die  
 
Folowing the years of Xavier Bichat ¶V IUHQHWLF ZRUN )UDQoRLV 0DJHQGLH¶V SK\VLRORJ\
represents both a break and a shift hat further se parat ed  physiology from  the Enlightenm ent 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHGLVFLSOLQH<HW0DJHQGLH¶VSK\VLRORJ\Hm erges precisely from  the circles in 
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which Bichat aught. He began training in 1799 in s urgery under A lexis Boyer, a student of 
Piere Desault and his form al m edical studies were com pleted in 1801 at the Ecole de M édecine 
de Paris. This m eant that M agendie w as one of the f irst generation to em erge from  the reform ed 
instiutions in the wake of revolution and, as a co nsequence, he had both clinical and practical 
H[SHULHQFH 0DJHQGLH¶V DWWHQWLRQ GXULQJ WKLV WLPH was focussed on sim ilar concerns to earlier 
physiological projects. H is earliest ext, from  aro und 1809, was Quelque idées generals sur les 
phénomenes particuliers aux corps vivans, expressed  the opinion that physiology did not yet 
deserve to be classed with the positve sciences. T his folow s in the long line of physiologists 
looking for a principle which could organise m ovem e nts by which bodies decom pose and 
recom pose, or explain their actions and reactions. Such a principle intended to account for the 
m eans by which living parts coordinated function th rough the disparate phenom ena of vital 
bodies.  
 
Folowing from  %LFKDW¶V WLVVXH WKHRU\ 0DJHQGLH ZDV ORRNLQJ WR WKH QXWULWLYH H[FKDQJHV WKDW
could ground such vital phenom ena, idealy achieved  at a m olecular level. 751  Crucialy, 
M agendie was unim pressed by the elaboration of tiss ue properties, particularly for their 
LPSOLFDWLRQV DW WKH DQLPDO OHYHO ³LW LV D JUHDW PLVWDNH WR DGPLW YLWDO SURSHUWLHV ZKLFK DUH
SDUWLFXODUWRFHUWDLQSDUWVRIRUJDQLVHGERGLHV´+HLGHQWLILHGWKDWWKLVUHOLHGRYHUO\RQa historica l 
doctrine, and w as not actualy based on observation  and ofered this new suggestion, -
³6XSSUHVVLQJ WKH WZR YLWDO SURSHUWLHV NQRZQ DV DQLPDO VHQVLELOLW\ DQG DQLPDO
contractilty, and consider them  functions instead,  would be a m ost advantageous 
reform  to accom plish in physiology; then there woul d be a single m anner of 
explaining the phenom ena of life and the study of s cience would be m uch 
HDVLHU´752  
This, in fact, overlaps w ith the later reflections of Bichat who was also considering the 
difculties of observing functional relations at a nim al level. Observing expressions of vital force 
in the organised body depended on apprehending som e thing directly. To this end, M agendie 
focussed on an assem blage of organic parts, to be d elim ited as the apparatus of particular 
function. For exam ple, sensation was the function o f nerve assem blage, digestion the result of 
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digestive organs. This he understood to be folow in g the new  way of classifcation in the living 
m achine. 753  It also reflected his prim ary concern for the disc ipline of observation; M agendie 
ZURWH WKDW ³LW ZRXOG SHUKDSV EH DGYDQWDJHRXV WR EHJLQ WKH VWXG\ RI SK\VLRORJ\ DW WKH LQVWDQW
ZKHQWKHSKHQRPHQDRIOLYLQJWKLQJVEHFRPHDSSUHFLDEOHWRRXUVHQVHV´But in this respect, he 
ZDVDOVRIROORZLQJ%LFKDW¶VDPELWLRQWRIRUHJURXQGDQµHYHQWRIWKHVHQVHV¶LQOLQHZLWK+DUYH\
down through Haler. The prim ary diference was fro m  the lim ited anatom ical data that Bichat 
was analysing, and his approach to interpreting a d ynam ical schem a to be integrated as a rational 
synthesis nto a functioning whole. 754   
 
In 1816 M agendie, wrote a textbook Précis élém entai re de physiologie in which he laid out he 
principles for the new  physiological discipline. Th is reads like a w el trodden path of positvist 
thinking; physiology ha GWRGLVSHQVHZLWKLWVPHWDSK\VLFDOWHQGHQFLHVZLWKZKLFKLWKDG³DORQJ
DQG WLUHVRPH URPDQFH´ DQG OLNH FKHPLVWU\ DQG SK\VLFV QHHGHG WR EH ³UHGXFHG HQWLUHO\ WR
H[SHULPHQW´755  This m ay have been a radical cal m ong those of p ositvist dispositon in 1816, 
but it was not at al clearly defined what this m eant. Com te had not yet m et Saint Sim on, and the 
FOLQLFVRQO\MXVWVWDUWLQJWRUHYHUEHUDWHXQGHU%URXVVDLV¶SROHPLFV$WWKLVWLPHWKHQRWDEOHULYDO
WR%LFKDW¶VSK\VLRORJ\ZDV$QWKHOPH5LFKHUDQGZKRVHElémens de Physiologie, first published 
LQ  H[SOLFLWO\ IROORZHG DORQJ WKH OLQHV RI +DOOHU¶V SK\VLRORJLFDO PRGHO UDWKHU WKDQ KLV
anatom y. It  is instructive that 5LFKHUDQG¶VWH[WERRNappeared in  successive publications into the 
¶Vto becom e influential IRU&RPWHGHVSLWH&RPWH¶VDPELWLRQIRUWKHPHWDSK\VLFDODVSHFWVRI
science to be expeled. 756   
 
0DJHQGLH DOVR UHWDLQHG DQ LGHD RI WKH SK\VLRORJLFDO PRGHO VHW IRUWK E\ ³PRGHUQ
m etaphysicians. ´This m eant he idea that phenom ena constiuting a h um an intelect were only 
m odifcations of the faculty of perception and PDQ¶VLQVWLQFWVFRXOGEHUHODWHGWRKLVFRQGLWLRQRI
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existence. Prim arily this m eant an anim al function,  but secondly it was also a IXQFWLRQRID³VWDWH
RIFLYLO VRFLHW\´0DJHQGLH¶VHDUO\ LQWHUHVWZas therefore to delim it he sign of these em pircal  
tendencies. This was the, - 
³GHVLUHWRKDYHDYHU\YLYLGFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIRXUH[LVWHQFHDIHHOLQJZKLFKWKHPRUHLWLV
indulged in the m ore difcult it iso satisfy bec ause our sensations becom e weakened by 
KDELWVKDOOZHVD\ZLWK%LFKDWWKDWWKHSDVVLRQVUHVLGHLQWKHRUJDQLFOLIH´ 757   
0DJHQGLH¶V Précis therefore, echoes the particular com m itm ents  which he relates to the 
discussions of sensibilty, m em ory, judgm ent. M agen die proceeds, -
³KRZHYHU Whis m ay be, the study of understanding does not at present constiute an 
essential part of physiology. The science especial y devoted to this,  caled Ideology. 
Those who wish to study this nteresting subject, i n extensio, m ust consult with the works 
of Bacon, Locke, Condilac, Cabanis, and especialy  the excelent works of M . Destut de 
7UDF\HQWLWOHGµ(OHPHQWVRI,GHRORJ\¶:HVKDOODWSUHVHQWFRQILQHRXUVHOYHVWRVRPHRI
the fundam ental principles of that science. The inn um erable phenom ena that constiute the 
hum an intelect are only m odifcations of the facul ty of perception [sensibilté]. Ifthey are 
atentively exam ined, this truth wil be easily ack nowledged, which is fuly set forth by 
PRGHUQPHWDSK\VLFLDQV´758  
The point isthat, lhough M agendie expresses doub t over the doctrine of vital properties, he had 
QRW\HWGUDZQIXOO\DSDUWIURPWKHSK\VLRORJ\FRPPLWWHGWRDµVFLHQWLILF¶FRQFHSWRILGHRORJ\ 
 
W hile condem ning phrenology as a pseudo science, M a gendie w as specifcaly focusing on a 
relation between sensations and m otions. This relat ion SUHFHGHGWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH³FU\
RU QDWLYH YRLFH´ DQG ³WKH DFTXLUHG YRLFH RU YRLFH SURSHUO\ FDOOHG VR´ 7KH DFTXLUHG YRLFH
com m ents M agendie, is a learned habit whose higher developm ent presupposes a state of social 
existence. This m arked a direct continuity w ith the  subject of his doctoral thesis which explored 
the physiology of the tongue, a study derived from  his ongoing interest in the rela tions between 
the physical and the m oral. To this end, M agendie w as also considering m ovem ents of 
H[SUHVVLYHJHVWXUHV µJHVWHV¶ DV DQ LQWLPDWH FRQQHFWLRQ WR WKH FRUSRUHDO RUJDQLVDWLRQ of habit. 
+DELWZDV³WRPRWLRQVZKDWFU\LVWRWKHYRLFH´DQGVHHQWRDSSHDUHLWKHUDVDFTXLUHGKDELWVRU
as social gestures. 0DJHQGLHZDVVWLOOIROORZLQJ&DEDQLV¶DQWKURSRORJLFDO WKLQNLQJHYHQWRWKH
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H[WHQWRIOLPLWLQJ%LFKDW¶VQRWLRQRISDVVLRQWRLQWHUQDOVHQVDWLRQV which he proposed w as eated 
exclusively in the organic life. 759   
 
There was, perhaps, the m ethological egacy o I &RQGLOODF¶V LGHD-sign, an  analytical traditon 
inherently opposed to system atic thinking but which  the D irectoire years lent, as an idea, to 
philosophy, physiology, m edicine and politcs to be  built anew on a reliable positve edifce of a 
rational analytic knowledge. One can say that M agen die retained this as a relation to an  open 
traditon and his Précis VHHPLQJO\KDGQRQHHG WRGHILQHDGHILQLWHVHDW WRH[SUHVVLYHµJHVWHV¶
since phenom ena of internal sensation could be atr ibuted either to the com bined actions of the 
nervous system  or to the brain by the analogy of an  acquired voice. 760  Such a task would com e 
with the future science. 
 
After 1816, in the wake of the Em pire w ith itsensu ing social chaos, a system atising turn appears 
to have favoured a cert DLQ DVSHFW RI %LFKDW¶V OHJDF\ 7KLV DVSHFW OHQW LWVHOI WR D V\VWHPDWLF
approach rather than the provisional approach that depended on experim entation. From  
0DJHQGLH¶V FRSLRXVQRWHV WR WKHHGLWLRQRIRecherches physiologique that he edited, one m ust 
conclude that Bichat appeared to him  DV D V\VWHPDWLVHU 0DJHQGLH¶V 3RVLWLYLVP E\ FRQWUDVW
aim ed at rem aining strictly w ith the analytic tradi tion, intended to m aintain a particular 
com m itm ent o the discipline under the observationa l approach and its m ethod for µQDWXUDO¶
synthesis. But notably this was departing from  the Ideologue legacy which gave the term s of a 
future general science, a unifed reason to which t he provisional knowledge was subordinate. In 
this sense, M agendie w as also influenced by the gen eration who, like Saint Sim on, increasingly 
saw such an am biton as lacking in credibilty. W he n he abandoned this specifc aspect of the 
revolutionary sciences, however, it opened a path t o a new  and lim ited form  of m edical 
positvism .  
 
Folowing 1830 and the July Revolution, Broussais c am e to represent he new m edical point of 
view, while Cabanis and Bichat were receding into h istorical m em ory. From  the perspective of a 
Science of M an, M agendie appears as both the link a nd break with the thought derived from  the 
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physiological project w hich inform ed his youth. Thi s project has been characterised by an 
analytic m ethod which prioritsed DµFHUWDLQLGHD.¶But it has also been shown to derive from  a 
particular interpretation of vitalism  in its relati on to the physiological object. W hile M agendie 
properly represents a shift n explanation from  vit alism  of properties towards force of unction, 
function m eant an expalntion of the power of com bin ed organic activites im ilar to what Bichat 
earlier atributed to a resistance. By analogy, M agendie was looking to acc ount for this power in  
an organism s nutrive activity,- 
³,ILWZHUHSRVVLEOHDWWKLVWLPHWRSURYHWKDWDOOSKHQRPHQDRIOLYLQJERGLHVFDQEH
related to nutriion or action, these phenom ena can  be regarded as produced by the 
VDPHIRUFH´761  
By a continuity in the idea of orce, M agendie coul d m ove away from  the status which vital 
properties held for the 18th century and the age of  the M ontpelier. This had served a m edical 
doctrine of sensibilty and sensation aim ing to acc ount for qualitative diferences in the whole. A  
study of function prioritsed distinct anatom ical d ivisions as equivalence of function which 
related to distinct dem onstrable activites, eviden t observable relations of orce, betw een internal 
parts. This gave the basis on which the new physiol ogy was being reconfigured. 
 
This also UHSUHVHQWVDµSDUDGR[LFDOOLQN¶EHWZHHQ0DJHQGLHDQG&XYLHU¶VFRPSDUDWLYHDQDWRP\
ZKLFK EHOLHV &XYLHU¶V RSSRVLWLRQ WR YLYLVHFWLRQ762  Both shared an approach to classifcation 
based on function intended to displace an older ana logical thinking by which the old anatom y 
equivocated the visible evidence with a vital idea of properties. 763  Like Cuvier and his 
com parative anatom y, as early as 1809 M agendie was looking for a µWUXHIXQFWLRQ¶- 
³,I IRU SUHFHGLQJ UHDVRQV ZH GR QRW FODVVLI\ DQLPDO VHQVLELOLW\ DPRQJ WKH YLWDO
properties, how shal we consider it? As a true fun ction. A  function isthe com m on 
HQGRIWKHDFWLRQRIDFHUWDLQQXPEHURIRUJDQV´764  
The question is whether this was signifcantly dif erent from  Bichat at his tim e. In a series of 
influential ectures of 1801-1802 he also LQIRUPHGKLV OLVWHQHUV WKDW³RQHRUJDQDORQHGRHVQRW
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FDUU\RXWDIXQFWLRQDIXQFWLRQLVWKHUHVXOWRIWKHODERXURIVHYHUDORUJDQV´765  Bichat it seem s 
was also concerned how in the past, descriptive ana tom y served as a topography for use by both 
surgeons and artiss. He acknowledged as progressiv e the study of the assem blage of several 
RUJDQV WKDW FRQWULEXWHG WR IXQFWLRQ KH QRWHG WKDW ³&LWL]HQV &XYLHU DQG 'XPHULO´ ZHUH QRZ
classifying according to function, 766  DQG HYHQ DQQRXQFHG WKDW ³, VKDOO IROORZ E\ WKH VDPH
SURFHGXUH LW LV WKHRQO\RQHZKLFKFDQEHDGRSWHG LQRXUSUHVHQWVWDWHRINQRZOHGJH´767  This 
served as an advance on theoretical problem s inheri ted from  the M ontpelier doctrine as 
WUDQVPLWWHGSHUKDSVYLD WKHDQDWRPLVW)HOL[9LFTG¶$]\URU IURPSK\VLFLDQ7KHRSKLOH%RUGHX
The later, for exam ple, m phasised that autonom ous  elem entary parts of the living body were a, 
³NLQGRIVHSDUDWHPDFKLQHZKLFKFRQWULEXWHVLQLWVIDVKLRQWRWKHJHQHUDOOLIHRIWKHERG\´768  
%LFKDW¶V DQDO\WLF SK\VLRORJ\ WRRN RUJDQV DV FRPSRVLWHV RI WLVVXHV in  w hich certain properties 
gave a practical system  of descriptive anatom y. It had im plied a basis from  which the study of 
physiological function could proceed. 
 
The historical am biguity is whether this was oferi ng an axiom atic for m ethodological 
recom positon of properties, or m erely stood as a p ragm atic guide to m ore general interpretation 
of unction. In this respect, one can take it hat when Bichat wrote that issue com posites were 
³WKHILUVWVWHSVLQWKHVWXG\RIWKHIXQFWLRQV´it  was understood as a contribution towards a new  
general physiology. 769  W ithout abandoning this am biton, M agendie m oved b eyond the doctrine 
of sensibilty and took this as the starting point for an analysis. In  defering properties to the 
m ore abstract notion of nutrive activity, he subs um ed the notion of unction to  a concept in 
itself. 770   
 
A  general concept of unction was dependent waVRQWKHµFRQGLWLRQVRIH[LVWHQFH¶and displaced 
sensibilty from  the physiological base. But left o general circum stances, w hat a priori could put 
the function into play. A  m ore general idea, theref ore, precedes a description of organs, and 
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substiutes for a sensational field of actions and reactions. By a m ore abstract notion of unction, 
WKH µFRQGLWLRQV RI H[LVWHQFH¶ lent them selves to be delim ited for experim entation , which is 
represented by the 19th century m ove away from  the hospital and into the laboratory. The 
experim ental approach is characterised by establish ing function through delim itng conditons 
and which no longer elied on the observable proper ties derived from  the vitalistic idea held of 
the general property of lie. Functions atributed to a restricted field of observation, becam e 
separated from  anatom ical deductions atributed to historicaly given physiological m odels. W ith 
the prim acy of unction in M agendie and Cuvier, the  physiological m odel of sensation, which 
was also the source of observational problem s, ZDVGLVSODFHG0DJHQGLH¶VSDUWLFXODUFUHGLWZDV
to have opened up new possibilties for a lim ited e xperim ental field as consequences of 
w ithdrawing the physiology of sensation which was a lso axiom atic for the contem porary Science 
of M an. 
 
Experim ental or Physiological M edicine  
 
)UDQoRLV 0DJHQGLH KDV D FXULRXV UHODWLRQ WR %LFKDW +H ERWK SUDLVHV KLP DV DQ µH[SHULPHQWDO
JHQLXV¶ ZKLOH ZRUNLQJ WR RYHUFRPH D GRFWULQDO DFFHSWDQFH RI KLV LGHDV771  For exam ple, when 
M agendie edited the 4 th  editon of Reserche Physiologique sur la vie et la  mort of 1822, he added 
an introduction which w arned against an uncritcal approach to Bichat; the accom panying notes 
FULWLFL]HG %LFKDW GLUHFWO\ IURP WKH EDVLV RI KLV RZQ ZRUN )URP WKH HDUO\ ¶V 0DJHQGLH¶V 
publications increasingly m ake clear that he study  of consciousness and ideology was to be 
separated from  his physiology, in favour of the obj ective study of the nervous system  through 
anatom ical, pathological and experim ental m ethods. In the notes to Reserche Physiologique, 
M agendie ofered a com m entary based his experim enta l work which he considered to be the 
m ore contem porary physiology. Exem plary of what he intends DUH WKH FRPPHQWV RQ %LFKDW¶V
exploration of the relation between the brain and l ungs. W hen Bichat set out he prem ise that a 
reaction of the brain is either m ade up of sensatio ns or they are influenced by em otion, passion 
and afection, M agendie intervened in the notes w it h his own sharp distnction, -
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³7KHVHZRUGVpassion, emotion, afection etc have, Iknow, real diferences in the 
language of m etaphysicians; but as a general efect  of the sensations which they 
express ialways the sam e on organic life; and thi s general efect iswhat concerns 
m e, and the secondary phenom ena are of no im portanc e, I use these words 
LQGLIIHUHQWO\IRURQHDQRWKHU´772   
This distinction between general concepts and evide nt prim ary phenom ena coincides w ith 
0DJHQGLH¶V  SXEOLVKLQJ RI KLV H[SHULPHQWV WR VXSSRUW WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW GRUVDO URRWV RI
spinal nerves are prim arily associated w ith sensati on, and the ventral roots associated w ith 
reaction. But in 1823 his work was stilfolowing a m ethod of experim ental observation that 
used pathological phenom ena identifed in the spina l cord prior to delim itng its relation to the 
brain. I Q0DJHQGLH¶VPHPRLUHVIURPKHQRWHVWKDWthe observation of cerebro-spinal fuid 
between the spinal cord and surounding m em branes ( the pia m ater and the arachnoid) could be 
an index to new discoveries, even a new axiom atic, if observed in its norm al state. Two years 
ODWHU LQ  0DJHQGLH HGLWHG %LFKDW¶V Traite des M embranes and held his own findings to 
contradict those of Bichat who had identifed the a rachnoid as the serous m em brane of the brain 
and spinal cord. But despite this, 0DJHQGLH¶V PHWKRGV RI GHOLPLWLQJ UHODWLRQV WKURXJK FOLQLFDO
observation and pathological findings were not esse ntialy diferent from  those of Bichat at his 
point. Even by 1838, when returning to this sam e pr oblem  to further his work on the nervous 
sy stem , M agendie returned to a clinical pathological m ethod that aim ed at delim itng norm al 
variation by using a pathological m odel to support ideas of excess and deficiency. The m odel 
was stil he m ethod intended to visibly delim it qu antiative variation through pathological 
alterations, as  guide to natural classifcation, since observation al pathology stiltaught doctors 
what to see. 773  
 
A  m arked shift n m ethod com es when M agendie return ed in 1839 to repeat he original 1822 
dorsal root experim ents. These results had since be en disputed and, upon returning to re-exam ine 
the problem , he introduced a diferent perspective in to his observational procedure. W hat had 
been thrown into dispute was the value derived of h is vivisection; this led M agendie along with 
his assistant, a young Claude Bernard, to rethink t he value of experim ental data through the 
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difculty of repeating their own experim ents. 774  This m arks the m om ent hat forced him  to 
rethink the delicate nature of experim ental procedu res and m oved experim entation towards being 
an unam biguous ource of acts. M agendie thereby af firm ed a new  procedure folowing a careful 
experim ental control of physical conditons in thei r relation to com plex and unpredictable 
organic phenom ena.  
 
A  new  restricted experim entalism  abandoned the path ological view for a lim ited phenom enology 
exclusively given to observing living function. The  future experim ental m edicine took 
afirm ation of a function atributed to the living as itnew priority and this displaced a general 
idea o f life. This represents a reversal of priority that led Claude Bernard to def ine a lim ited 
dom ain for a physiology LQZKLFKWRSUDFWLFHµH[SHULPHQWDOGHWHUPLQLVP¶ 
 
Claude Bernard: D efining the N ew Dom ain  
 
The new dom ain of lie, that Claude Bernard studied  was the inner environm ent, now distinct 
from  a cosm ic environm ent. I is this distinction o f interior m ileu led to a new  m odel of 
inteligibilty for the life sciences and separated  it from  the pathological view. Itis signifcant 
that %HUQDUG¶VAn Introduction to Experimental M edicine, first publi shed in 1865, propos ed  to be 
both folowing in the traditon of the anatom ists w hile having fuly abandoning their 
presuppositons, nam ely their concept of life now s ubstiuted by a concept of living function, -
³DIWHUGLVVHFWLQJFDGDYHUVZHPXVWQHFHVVDULO\GLVVHFWOLYLQJEHLQJVWRXQFRYHUWKHLQQHU
RUKLGGHQSDUWVRIWKHRUJDQLVPDWZRUN«DQGZLWKRXWWKLVSK\VLRORJ\DQGLQGHHGDWUXH
VFLHQWLILFPHGLFLQHZLOOUHPDLQOLPLWHG´775   
The signifcance appears in what he distinguished h is work from : in this respect, Bernard nam es 
Galen as the originator of vivisection but reserves  for M agendie the role of m aking a m odern 
physiology possible as a m ethod of study. H e m akes no m ention of Xavier Bichat. 776    
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Bernard intended to distinguish the m odern form  in oppositon to philosophical physiology on 
the basis that he later could only represent idea s of science, but was not a truly scientifc 
SUDFWLFH 5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ FRXOG QRW SURGXFH µUHDO¶ NQRZOHGJH RI QDWXUH %HUQDUG¶V distinction 
opposed philosophical system atising by a reduction and lim itation of what could be considered 
autonom ous scientifc practice, a distinction m ade between the lim it of a concept and the 
scientifc lim it of practice. 777  The later prioritsed the practical over a form al  conceptual im it. 
Such practical priority intended elim inating delusi onal efects hat becam e system atised through 
the em pircal reciprocity that folowed pseudo-scie ntifc practices. W hile opening the dom ain for 
practice, Bernard had to guard against he em pirca l delusions extended m ethodicaly, and this 
was done E\HVWDEOLVKLQJZKDWVFLHQWLILFIDFWVFRXOGEHWDNHQDVµUHDO¶A determ inable dom ain 
was therefore defined as the lim ited space of produ ction within which concepts could b e 
considered scientifc. 778    
 
According to the Introduction, the inversion to pra ctical priority had certain consequence for 
defining a scientifc production. Science FRXOGEHVHHQDVµVXFFHVVLYH¶ZLWKRXWEHLQJSURJUHVVLYH
LQ WKH ZD\ ZKLFK $XJXVWH &RPWH¶V 3ositvism  aspired to be. Experim ental practice guar ded 
against adverse efects of habituated concepts subo rdinated by a system atic thinking, and 
Bernard concretely distinguished this IURP &RPWH¶V SKLORVRSK\ A philosophical system  
produces form al lim its, held to have an ossifying e fect on any experim ental practice. 
&RQVHTXHQWO\ %HUQDUG¶V VFLHQFH ZDV GHOLEHUDWHO\ DQWL-system atic and w orked against what he 
GHVFULEHV DV DQ µHQF\VWLQJ¶ RI NQRZOHGJH779  %HUQDUG¶V therefore can be seen as a form  of 
Positvism  whose central task was to break with a p hilosophy of ideas, w hich he saw extended 
WKURXJK&RPWH¶VV\VWHP&RPWHLQWURGXFHGIRUPDOFRQFHSWXDOHOHPHQWVIRUH[DPSOHSULRULWLVLQJ
DFRQFHSWRIµLQWHJUDWLRQ¶UDWKHUWKDQµUHVLVWDQFH¶which had a negative efects on the space of 
scientifc production. Bernard condem ned such form a l elem ents as delusional, t worst leading to 
ideologicaly encroachm ent but certainly itwas an im position on the autonom y of scientifc 
thought.  
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Although wary of such form al elem ents, a Cartesian elem ent in  %HUQDUG¶VWKRXJKWLValso evident 
in  its  anti-dogm atic sentim ent held against problem s of e m pircism . This folows a rejection of 
WKHROGHUSK\VLRORJLFDOOHJDF\WRZKLFKWKHQHZGHWHUPLQLVPVWRRGIRURYHUFRPLQJWKHµTXHUHOOH
des ancien VHWGHVPRGHUQV¶and sym bolised in  the m ove from  library to  laboratory. Itserves the 
distinction from  that which Com te was stilntegra ting from  historical knowledge but which 
Bernard understood as other than science. Com te of ered a history of the transcendental m ind but 
failed to distinguish between the history of m an an d a true dom ain of scientifc production. 
Conversely, the separation also recognises a deeply  im personal aspect of scientifc practice - 
sim ilar to the anti-hum anist stance that Com te appe ars to folow  ± but %HUQDUG¶VHSLVWHPRORJ\
now gives this as a confrontation with the form alis ing obstacle that is he history of the hum an 
m ind. Ifthe laboratory VWDQGVIRUWKHWULEXQDORIWKHµUHDO¶Bernard now diferentiat es  this from  a 
continuous history of knowledge which isnot scient ifc. A  history of knowledge is  understood as 
form alised com m on sense which Bernard saw as a hist ory of opinion. 780   
 
In this respect, Bernard put forward his H[SHULPHQWDOPHWKRGDV WKH³QHJDWLRQRIDOOV\VWHPV´
Negating individual opinions m eans substiuting the m  with im personal and general theories and 
prom ises DQHVFDSHIURPµDZD\RIWKLQNLQJ¶This µway of thinking ¶ point ed  to a fatalism ,-  
³:H QHYHU DFW RQ DQ HVVHQFH RI QDWXUDO SKHQRPHQD EXW RQO\ RQ WKH DFWLQJ
ca XVH«WKLV GLIIHUV IURP WKH IDWDOLVP RQ ZKLFK ZH FDQQRW DFW«IDWDOLVP DVVXPHV
that the m anifestation of any phenom ena is necessar y and independent of its 
conditons, while determ inism  isthe conditon nece ssary to the phenom enon whose 
PDQLIHVWDWLRQLVIUHH´781  
In  the oppositon of determ inism  to fatalism  appears %HUQDUG¶V DPELWLRQV IRU a new scientifc 
language, alhough one pursued in the strictly lim it ed way. If there w as a distant relation to 
&RQGLOODF¶V DPELWLRQV IRU D QHZ ODQJXDJH WKHQ %HUQDUG¶V VFLHQWLILc determ inism  restricted it
phenom enaly to a dom ain controled by laboratory c onditons. Of this dom ain, Bernard can 
ZULWH³WKHUHDUHRQO\ZRUGVEH\RQG´782  The determ inable dom ain was eparated from  a zone of 
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undiferentiated opinions, a sharp distinction whic h now prom ised only a lim ited science but one 
finaly turned towards universality. 
 
W hat this m ethod rejected in relation to &RPWH¶V3RVLWLYLVPZDVits  intention to retain am bitons 
for a universalising project such as a Science of M an. Bernard dispenses w ith such a 
philosophical project for the sake of gaining an au tonom ous cientifc practice. -
³3RVLWLYLVP OLNH DOO SKLORVRSKLFDO V\VWHPV ZKLFK LW UHMHFWV LQ WKH QDPH RI
VFLHQFH«KDV WKH IDXOW RI EHLQJ D V\VWHP 1RZ WR ILQG D WUXWK«PHQ RI VFLHQFH
needs only to stand face to face with nature and in  folowing experim ental 
m edicine, question her with the help of m ore and m o re perfect m eans of 
investigation. In this case Ithink that he best p hilosophical system s consist n not 
KDYLQJDQ\´ 783   
Philosophicaly separated IURPWKHZLGHUDPELWLRQVIRUD6FLHQFHRI0DQ%HUQDUG¶VDXWRQRP\
now took, as a principle of scientifc necessity, VWDQGLQJIDFHWRIDFHZLWKµQDWXUH¶He described 
this as ³WKHVDFUHGILUH´RIWKHXQNQRZQ which accounted for a principle of autonom y upheld  as 
the drive behind experim ental practice. It is this drive that m ov es  knowledge towards a new  
value in  the GLYHUVLW\RIQDWXUH¶VSKHQRPHQD784  
 
Separating Experim ental Practice Through a D iferen tial Reason  
 
Faced with the diversity of natural phenom ena, an  autonom ous scientifc drive produces a 
dynam ic knowledge which Bernard defines around thre e further points; i)a m ental dispositon, 
i) the recogniton of real diference and i)the  separation into a knowledge according to an 
internalised reason. -
i) Firstly, through this dispositon, Bernard accou nts for a form  of positve m easure; it 
diferentiates m ental atitudes according to catego ries of thinking; rationalist, em pircist, 
experim entalist (characterised by Plato, A ristotle,  M agendie). A lthough this appears not unlike 
&RPWH¶VODZRIWKHWKUHHVWDJHVWKHWKHRORJLFDOPHWDSK\VLFDODQGWKHVFLHQWLILF%HUQDUGGRHV
not present hese m odels as progressive. They are r ather diferent m odes of knowledge. In this 
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they are trans-historical, ppearing in the patern s of hum an thought, as m odes of thinking which 
lend them selves to conflictual ways of being. It  is the diference that Bernard atributed to a 
necessary driving m otor for history. 785   
 
This m RGDOLW\ UHLQIRUFHG%HUQDUG¶VQRWLRQ WKDWDhistorical approach to philosophising was the 
ZD\ RI WKH µOLWWHUDWHXU¶ &RQVHTXHQWO\ KH SURSRVHG a polem ical perspective in  approaching 
history in the active and m iltant way. This m eant the dispositon to write history on the selective 
basis, drawing together elem ents to m ake history th e springboard for the future science. The 
em phasis on selective history was an activity disti nct from  science itself which functioned 
against an accum ulative knowledge. S HOHFWLYH KLVWRU\ WRRN VFLHQWLILF µPDWHULDO¶ IRU D
conditoning; conditoning was to accord with a ³KLGGHQSKHQRPHQDO IRUP´ZKRVH UHDO YDOXH
was in its  task of opposing an  unfolded logic rooted only in individual sentim ent  and opinion. 786  
6FLHQWLILFµPDWHULDO¶JLYHVKLVWRU\ZKLFKQHJDWHVDQ\LQGLYLGXDOVWDWHRf m ind. To this extent, it 
diferentiated itself both from  feeling and reason,  which were both negative elem ents from  the 
perspective of science. Science isnherently fragm entary and its  task is FRQWUDVWHGZLWK&RPWH¶V
project for the science proceeding b y an  integration of knowledge and serving to ground a 
Science of M an. 
 
i) This negative aspect gives the divergent m odel of knowledge that produces diferences in 
states of m ind. But since a general knowledge can n o longer be m aintained under a unity of 
privileged reason, Bernard saw his positve am bito ns for the restricted form  of knowledge 
re WDLQHG DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH PRYHPHQW RI DQ ³DQWLFLSDWLYH LGHD´787  The anticipative idea was 
understood as giving the a priori atitude for new practice. It  was neither spontaneity nor 
innateness, but rather accounted for the active pro duction of concepts in the observation of 
REMHFWLYHSKHQRPHQD %HUQDUGSLFWXUHG WKLV DFWLYLW\ DV µLQMHFWLQJ¶ an  anticipative idea into the 
chain of reasoning.  
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The difculty is  the status of %HUQDUG¶Vµanticipative idea ¶LWLVQRWµSXUHO\LPDJLQDU\¶EXWUDWKHU
a dispositon given to positve m easure through nec essary relations in  a phenom enal reality held 
of the concept of nature. He uses it o characteris e a particular and lim ited form  of em pircism  
through the dispositon that preced es  a conceptual form alisation. In this respect, the e xperim ental 
m ethod was understood to extract and transform  a pa rticular reason given only through an 
atitude of m ind which corectly defines the param e ters RI D µUHDOLW\¶ SULRU WR D VFLHQWLILF
experience. The concept is open in the face of the experim ental event, and functions for the 
experim enter as a suspension of philosophical judge m ents: i can constiute the µreal ¶ conditons 
by positvely grounding possibilties for a new  det erm inable concept. 788  But he determ inable 
concept rem ains relative to the internal relations of knowledge, as retained as m easure against 
the w ider possibilties of their own determ ination.  This  the sense in which the experim entaly 
µUHDO¶ZDVKHOG WRH[LVWDV³XQFRQVFLRXVDQGUHODWLYH´%\VXVSHQGLQJSKLORVRSKLFDO MXGJHPHQW 
DQGEHLQJRSHQWRDµVSHFLDO¶HPSLULFLVP%HUQDUGDLPs to displace the rationalism  that extends 
into speculative universals (such as essence of m at ter and spirt, or even inertia). %HUQDUG¶V
special em pircism  gave m eaning to what he described as  WKHµVDFUHGILUHRIUHVHDUFK¶ZKLFKFDQ
be read as a pow er of itsdispositon DQGDWWULEXWHGWRWKHµanticipative LGHD¶.789   
 
i) Finaly, this process defines the separation w hich saw experim ental determ inism  opposed to 
fatalism . W hile the later described a discourse co nditoned by an internalised reasoning, the 
form er activity was productive of a new form al lng uage whose status ian µREMHFWLYHV\QWKHVLV.¶
But it has a lim ited perspective that necessarily d istinguishes itself from  extended 
determ inations, uch as historical and philosophica l problem s like the contingency of the w il 
(Bernard associates these w ith the problem atics in the philosophy of Leibniz). 790  Experim ental 
determ inism  distinguished an  µREMHFWLYH V\QWKHVLV¶ as that which could not produce negative 
results in the restricted dom ain. This was seen by Bernard as  WKH SRVLWLYH µWULXPSK RI WKH
laboratory, ¶a sharp distinction of a dom ain free from  the unm an ageable teleological statem ents 
or discussions of freew il. W ithin the physiologica l dom ain, a laboratory practice sim ply 
dispensed with any wider argum ent to give repeatabl e results under lim ited conditon. 
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Conversely itcould also be considered positve in its efect of separating what constiuted 
transcendental judgem ents from  concepts em erging in  their functional positvity. 
 
The Positve and Vital n Experim ental Reasoning: T he Internal Lim its  
 
Experim ental m edicine therefore distinguished an  internalised dom ain from  what Sensationalist 
RU REVHUYDWLRQDO PHGLFLQH UHSUHVHQWHG WKURXJK D µSXUH¶ +LSSRFUDWLF PHGLFLQH Although the 
later, DFWV ³HVVHQWLDOO\ EOLQG,´ he understood it  to  GLVSOD\ µFHUWDLQ WHQGHQFLHV¶ WRZDUGV
experim entalism . 791  Experim ental practice aim ed at  separating out he productive aspects for a 
physiological knowledge whose dom ain rem ain ed  open to enquiry, self-critcism  and 
m odifcation.- 
³7UXH VFLHQFH VXSSUHVVHV QRWKLQJ EXW JRHV RQ VHDUFKLQJ DQG LV XQGLVWXUEHG LQ
looking straight at things that idoes not underst and....In m y opinion the true 
scientifc spirt s that whose high aspirations fe rtilze them  and draw them  on in 
search of truths which are stilbeyond them , but w hich m ust not be suppressed, 
because they have been atacked by a stronger and m ore delicate philosophical 
m inds. Has this aspiration of the hum an spirt any end, -wil it find itslm it? That I
cannot know; but m eantim e as aid above, m en of sci ence can do no beter than to 
SXVKVWHDGLO\IRUZDUG´792   
M edical science, th erefore, VXSSUHVVHG D µSXUH¶ PHGLFLQH ZKRVH QHFHVVLW\ ZDV IRU JLYLQJ
explanations. The task of science was a µSXVK¶WRH[WUDFWIURPHPSLULFLVPWKHHOHPHQWVWKDWFRXOG
stand a priori to verbalism s. Exam ples of such verb alism  c RXOGEHµYLWDOIRUFH¶RUH[SODQations 
JLYHQ WR µOLIH¶ LWVHOI, which stood as obstacles or prohibitons to doubt . Scientifc knowledge 
successively penetrates the nature of the living m a chine and science w as itelf now m eant as this 
dynam ism .  
 
This suppression has a specifc target highlighted by the m ove against he notions of the norm al 
and pathological states. M edicine retains an  em pircal tendency for discourse rooted in feeling s 
of com passion and m orality, an adm ixture that lent itself both to the vis medicatrix of the body 
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and extended to religious sentim ents. Bernard descr ibes the discourse on norm al and 
pathological states as diverging tendencies that se t up the internal dynam ics for experim ental 
m edicine which m arked a departure from  a purely em p ircal form . He identifed H ippocrates 
w ith LQLWLDWLQJWKHVFLHQWLILFDSSURDFKWKURXJKWKHGLVSRVLWLRQWKDWVWDQGVIRUDQµRULJLQDOGRXEW¶
and preceded the m edical understanding whose necess ity w as to dom inate and com bat nature. 
 
&RQYHUVHO\%HUQDUGXSKHOGWKHH[DPSOHRI3DUDFHOVXV¶DVsy m bolising PHGLFLQH¶VDPELWLRQIRU
a universal panacea which was characteristic of an  em pircal reaction against ranscendental 
dogm as held of expectorant m edicine. 793  This gave two perspectives that characterised what  
experim ental m edicine internalised as a dialectic; this disposition was grounded by the scientifc 
concept which internalised this diference. A  dife rential between states of knowledge was 
therefore a diference internalised by a m ental atitude, now a bstracted and rem oved from  an  
externalised fram e E\WKHµDQWLFLSDWLYHLGHD¶. 
 
The Introduction to the Study of Experimental M edic ine depicts an idea of vitalism  as standing 
IRU µWKHFKHDWRIZRUGV¶which Bernard was looking to overcom e this in the n am e of a radical 
science prom ising the open dom ain of the functional  concept. 794  But living being was also a 
FRQFHSW UHGXFHG WR WKH µRUJDQLVLQJ LGHD¶ RI LWV RZQ QDWXUH 7KLV FRQFHSW GUHZ RQ WKH
H[SHULPHQWDOGLVSRVLWLRQ WRGLVSODFH µZRUGV¶ WKURXJKZKDW LWV µDQWLFLSDWLYH¶ LGHDFRXOGXSKROG
TKH µDQWLFLSDWLYH¶ idea was therefore a VWUDWHJ\ ZLGHO\ UHFRJQLVHG DV WKH WUXH µOHLWPRWLI¶ IRU
%HUQDUG¶V SK\VLRORJLFDO SUDFWLFH HYHQ RXWVLGH WKH GLVFLSOLQH RI SK\VLRORJ\ 'LYHUVH
contem poraries, such as for exam ple philosopher/psy chologist Paul Janet and 
philosopher/histori DQ)HOL[5DYDLVVRQXQGHUVWRRGWKHµDQWLFLSDWLYHLGHD¶LQWHUPVRIWKDWZKLFK
HVFDSHGSHUFHSWXDOH[SHULHQFH\HWUHWDLQHGZKDWFRXOGVWDQGDVSRWHQWLDOO\µUHDO¶FRQGLWLRQV795  
Such a virtual concept was understood to have given  physiology its new approach, now  
definitvely disentangled from  a Newtonian epistem o logy. A  new concept of physiology could 
ultim ately defer its own knowledge with respect o an experim ental outcom e and, as a life 
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science, and this m eant relating knowledge to the g oal oriented activity whose historical 
difculty w as pecifcaly in form ulating an  adequate expression for a determ inable science. 796   
 
W hile the µDQWLFLSDWLYHLGHD¶LQWHUQDOLVHGa virtual lim it w ithin a conceptual schem a of itsdom ain 
of knowledge, the signifcance for the physiologist  was this lm it that focussed on the knowledge 
the body, rather than of ideas. The conception of t he µanticipative idea ¶ was therefore not quite a 
disinterested physics. It retains a form  of apperce ption in its necessity of producing a m ore 
efective scientifc practice, although separated f rom  an older m edical practice, which w as 
understood to  UHWDLQ D SRVLWLYHO\ µDQWKURSRORJLFDO¶ QDWXUH. As the negative elem ent, i is 
dispersive of particular ideas of order upheld as p hysiological norm s, but serves a historical 
separation as  a m ethod of production of positve concepts. 797  
 
7KHµanticipative idea ¶therefore retained the necessity that serves a judg em ent in the dom ain of 
knowledge. A lthough this was LPSOLFLWO\ FRPSDFWHG LQWR D µYLWDO SULQFLSOH¶ in  th e earlier 
physiological discourses, Bernard internalis ed  this as an epistem ologicaly lim it by a reversal of 
priorites. This introduc ed  the point where al a priori thinking rem ains susp ect, and from  this, 
Bernard defended the physiological autonom y against  any a priori subordination to externaly 
confered ideas on its  object. In this sense, his central concern was und erstood as the delicate 
nature of producing the positve concept. Bernard w as seen prim arily as  internalising a line of 
thinking which, like A ristotle, m eant privileging r elations to  the phenom enal aspects of lie prior 
to any discourse. 7KLVZDV+HQUL%HUJVRQ¶Vunderstanding of %HUQDUG¶Vµanticipative idea. ¶ 
 
According to Bergson, Bernard had achieved a suppre ssion of ideal relations between a theory of 
knowledge and the theory of nature. 798  For Bergson, he adopted a SHUVSHFWLYHRQSK\VLRORJ\¶V
SULYLOHJHGREMHFWWKDWFRXOGHQDEOHGKLPWRDFWDVLIDµFHUWDLQLGHD¶VWHSSHGLQ³WKLVLGHDLVQRWD
IRUFH VLPSO\ D SULQFLSOH RI H[SODQDWLRQ´ :KHQ %HUJVRQ ZURWH DQ HVVD\ µ7KH SKLORVRSK\ RI
&ODXGH %HUQDUG¶ IROORZLQJ D FRQIHUHQFH DW WKH &ROOHJH GH )UDQFH RI  KH GHVFULEHG WKLV
perspective as exem plary of KRZ³QRWKLQJ LVPRUH IDOVH WKDQ WKHFRQFHSWLRQRIKRZV\QWKHVLV
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ZRUNV´799  The underlying m essage LQ %HUJVRQ¶V UHDGLQJ ZDV WKDW V\QWKHVLV ZDV ³VRPHWKLQJ
problem atic. ´The perspective that Bernard adopted in  his stand against vitalism  was aim ed at 
GHWHUPLQLQJDµFHUWDLQLGHDRIRUGHU,¶and the internalised lim it indicated to Bergson pre cisely the 
idea of internalising the positve and the vital s pects as  a form  of m easure, and m oving beyond a 
sim ple separation of the logic of m an and a logic o f nature. 
 
Henri Bergson: The Problem  of Synthesis  
 
%HUJVRQ¶VRZQFRQFHUQV are also such values connected with the positve a nd the vital. As an 
ongoing exploration into how synthesis works, he fo lowed this in the relation betw een the 
theory of knowledge and a theory of lie and saw th is as the philosophical problem  characteristc 
RIµFHUWDLQLGHDRIRUGHU¶WKDW folowed. In his era, this was already identifed w ith Bergson when 
he was proposed for the chair of m odern philosophy at he Colège de France in 1899. The 
psychologist 7KpRGXOH5LERWFRPPHQWHGWKDWWKHTXHVWLRQRIV\QWKHVLV³ZRXOGVXEVWLWXWHIRUWKH
classical m ethod of the history of system s ZLWKDKLVWRU\RISUREOHPV´800  This eem s confirm ed 
ZKHQORRNLQJDW%HUJVRQ¶VFRXUVHWLWOHVIURPWKH\HDUVOHDGLQJXSWRKLVCreative Evolution of 
µ6NHWFKIRUWKHKLVWRU\RIa notion of tim e in relation to syste PV¶-µ(YROXWLRQ
RI WKH WKHRULHV RI PHPRU\¶ - µ6WXG\ RI WKH HYROXWLRQ RI WKH SUREOHPV RI
IUHHGRP¶-1905) 801  7KH TXHVWLRQ RI V\QWKHVLV UHIOHFWHG %HUJVRQ¶V UHDGLQJ RI a m odel of 
inteligibilty he was developing alongside the con tem porary life sciences. It  reflected on a 
history of concepts which Bergson approached from  a  psychological perspective and targeted 
with a positve m etaphysics.  
 
The question of concepts is posed initialy around what afective sensations assim ilate in to  
positve m agnitudes. Time and Freewil:  An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness 
gives this as a relation between an  intensive sensation ³im pregnated with the idea of necessity, ´ 
and itsextensive th ought, and introduced synthesis through an  order of succession as  duration. 802  
M ater and M emory then focused on the sensory-m otor  problem  of habituated actions as 
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extended into fictious conceptual problem s. 803  In the first chapter of Creative Evolution, he 
articulates concerns pecifcaly as  a relation betw een a theory of lie and a theory o f knowledge . 
Crucialy this took a physiological expression ques tioned in its  extension to a w ider application. 
The folowing extended passage indicates how Bergso n w as considering the problem  of 
synthesis through term s o f a physiological idea of decom positon/recom positon . But his 
em phasis was on the activity of decom positon as de scribed in term s of the bio-energetics of the 
day, - 
³WKHRSSRVLWLRQRIWZRRUGHUVRISKHQRPHQDREVHUYHG LQOLYLQJ WLVVXHanagenesis 
and katagenesis «WKH UROH RI DQDJHQVLV LV WR UDLVH LQIHULRU HQHUJLHV WR WKHLU RZQ
level by assim ilating inorganic substances. They co nstruct the tissues. On the other 
hand, the functioning of actual ife (excepting, of  course assim ilation, growth and 
reproduction) isof the katagenetic order, exhibit ng the fal, not the rise, in energy. 
It isonly with these facts of a katagenetic order that physico-chem istry deals ± that 
is, n short, w ith the dead and not the living. The  other kind of acts certainly seem  
to physico-chem ical analysi, even ifthey are not anagenetic in the proper sense of 
WKHZRUG«7RVXPXSWKRVHZKRDUHFRQFHUQHGRQO\ZLWKWKHIXQFWLRQDODFWLYLW\
of the living being are inclined to believe that ph ysics and chem istry wil give us 
the key to biological processes. They have chiefly to do so as a fact, with 
phenom ena that are repeated continualy in the livi ng being, as in a chem ical retort. 
This explains in som e m easure the m echanistc tende ncies of physiology. On the 
contrary, those whose atention is concentrated on the m inute structure of living 
tissues, on their genesi and evolution, the histol ogists and em bryogenists on the 
one hand, naturalists on the other, are interested in the retort itself, not m erely its 
contents. They find that his retort creates itow n form  through a unique series of 
acts, that realy constiutes a history. Thus the h istologists, em bryogenists, and 
naturalist believe far less readily than physiolog ists in the physico-chem ical 
FKDUDFWHURIYLWDODFWLRQV´804  
This passage shows how  Bergson w as separating activ e and passive aspects of a determ inable 
knowledge to ilustrate a relation to itsynthetic  production. This division gives two perspectives 
on living function, as tw o orders of act; one orde r given in conceptual term s of the sciences of 
                                                          
803
 Bergson (1988) p16 
804
 Bergson (1944) p40- 42 
250 
 
the day (physico-chem ical analysis), the other w hic h necessitat es  an  adequate knowledge to be 
develop ed  (the synthesis explaining biological form ). Bergso n focused on the later. 
 
The signifcance behind this passage becom es appare nt when one reads Bergson as reacting to 
KLV FRQWHPSRUDU\ WKH SK\VLRORJLVW $OEHUW 'DVWUH D ZHOO NQRZQ HGLWRU RI &ODXGH %HUQDUG¶V
Leçon sur les phenom énes de la vie comm uns aux anim aux at aux vegetaux  ,Q 'DVWUH¶V RZQ
writngs, La vie et la mort, he passed on a rather m echanistic interpretation of Bernard. Despite 
the m any bio-sciences being discussed Creative Evol ution PDNHV QR PHQWLRQ RI %HUQDUG¶V
work. 805  ,QFRQWUDVW%HUJVRQ¶VODWHUHVVD\µ7KHSKLORVRSK\RI&ODXGH%HUQDUG¶HPSKDVLVHGWKDW
Bernard introduced a m ethod of analysis which under stood a dialogue between m ind and nature 
that could also conceptualise the general conditon s of scientifc discovery. 806  The signifcance 
can be understood as Creative Evolution being crit cal intervention against a positvist concept of 
nature. In doing this, it both upheld and extend ed  the diferences between the w ider 
physiological am bitons, and with a specifc theory  he intended to establish, nam ely a serious 
dom ain of enquiry beyond a strictly determ inistc s cience. Bergson pursued this by suggesting an 
unexplored reciprocity between experim enting and m e ditating. H e also identifed this w ith the 
SDUWLFXODULW\RISK\VLRORJLFDOUHDVRQLQJJLYHQLQWKH³TXDOLWLHVRIDGLVSRVLWLRQRIPLQG´DV they 
appear in the distinction between the physiologist and the chem ist/physicist n the passage cited 
above. Only later did he state that it was Bernard who had condensed such a distinction into the 
conclusion to Introduction to the Study of Experime ntal M edicine. It  is  precisely t he reciprocity 
EHWZHHQ VFLHQWLILF SUREOHPV DQG WKHLU VROXWLRQV WKDW %HUJVRQ¶V ODWHU HVVD\ FKDUDFWHULVHG DV D
suppressed vitalism . 807    
 
In the essay he described the vital as a dispositon which did not  separate observations from  their 
theoretical synthesis by intelectual construct. Th is was a dispositon towards knowledge that 
folowed a continuous integration of em erging signi ficance through a m ethod of upholding a 
dynam ic schem a, the µGLDORJXH EHWZHHQ PLQG DQG QDWXUH¶ %RWK KH DQG %HUQDUG ZHUH IDFLQJ
sim ilar em pircal problem s, although in diferent c ontexts; Bernard aim ed at  delim itng a precise 
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practice for a positve science, Bergson took this dispositon as  proposing a new philosophy of 
nature. 808  The concept of nature is  FHQWUDOWR%HUJVRQ¶VSKLORVRSK\through the values caried by 
the im m ediacy of experience, and this sim ilar to  that retained through an autonom ous principle 
that Bernard prioritsed in his µanticipative idea. ¶ Bergson, however, thought intuiton could be 
given a positve and functional m eaning without bei ng determ inistc. He characterised his 
DPELWLRQIRUVWXG\LQJLQWXLWLRQDV³WKHVFLHQFHWKDWFODLPVWRGLVSHQVHZLWKV\PEROV,´although 
this is  QRW VFLHQWLILF LQ %HUQDUG¶V WHUPV809  H is intuiton preceded the efort of interpretive 
operations in advance of  an intelectual separation and therefore retained its  necessarily pre-
scientifc status, yet %HUJVRQ FRXOG VWLOO LQVLVW WKDW WKLV ZDV µUHDO¶ The status of this µUHDOLW\¶
converged with the SRVVLELOLWLHVZKLFKHYHQZLWKLQ%HUQDUG¶VSDUDm eters, appear as  problem  of 
synthesis for particular elations that could be co nsidered as  natural or positve expressions.  
 
Bergson noted in his essay that 0DJHQGLHZDVVSHFLILHGLQ%HUQDUG¶VLeçons ur les phenomenes 
de la vie DVWKHRQHZKRµRSHQHGDEUHDFK¶810  7KLVµEUHDFK¶ZDVHVWDEOLVKHGE\EULQJLQJDQRUGHU
of physiology and pathology onto the sam e determ ina ble terain, m aking them  coextensive. The 
practice which ensued gave a new physiology. Bergso n took this as retrospectively justifying an  
experim ental approach for the new positve science through the knowledge that internalised what 
the earlier physiology held as a m edical necessity,  that is,t problem atis ed  the vital elem ent. In 
his critque of psychophysics in  Time and Freewil, Bergson ¶V argum ent centred on a relation 
between two diferent orders of act, qualitative a nd quantiative, and the process preceding their 
expression. H is sharp distnction between these pro cesses saw  Bergson value to what Claude 
Bernard was m ethodicaly refusing in  h is  dispute between vitalism  and positve function. Th e 
continuity w ith the passage in Creative Evolution a nd the later essay on Bernard is that hese 
texts are looking to exam ine how oppositons betwee n determ inable physiological phenom ena 
and their associated phenom enal equivalence bring i nto focuses the difcult problem  of 
synthesis. Bringing these together as positve and the vital aspects of the problem  of lie alowed 
Bergson to folow his w ider am bitons through the b iology of Creative Evolution. 
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The Lessons of D arwinism   
 
%HUJVRQ¶V DPELWLRQV for the problem  of synthesis folow the w ider produ ction of scientifc 
knowledge in particular the developm ents of contem p orary biology in Creative Evolution. In 
chapter one the central problem s of biological orde r are presented as problem s of conceptual 
diference to which %HUJVRQ¶V DUJXPHQW IROORZHG WKH ZLGH DUF LQWURGXFHG E\ WKH TXHVWLRQ RI
synthesis. The strategic division between a determ i nistic m echanism  and a priori fnalism  within 
the biological dom ain has D SDUDOOHO WR %HUQDUG¶V GLYLVLRQ PDGH EHWZHHQ GHWHUPLQLVP DQG
fatalism . But he strategic im portance becom es clea r in the final chapter of the book where the 
argum ent opens to the w ider problem s of a know ledge in general. The final chapter of Creative  
Evolution folows a configuration of thought aken up  from  within contem porary evolutionary 
debates to address a philosophical question posed o f how conclusively a Positvistic science can  
be seen to be separated from  itsAristotelian herit age hence there is  a critcal spect to this. 
 
Initaly the evolutionary argum ent centres on repe tive adaptations that produce living form s as 
the response to conditons of existence. But he pr oblem  of synthesis now focusses on the 
production of unexpected form s of living beings tha t em body an apparent teleological 
PHFKDQLVP ZKLFK EULQJ DERXW DQ ³HYROXWLRQ RI IXWXUH VSHFLHV´ which seem ingly converge, or 
becom e coextensive w ith, the w ider conditons of ex istence. But Creative Evolution does not 
fram e this problem  of orm  LQVWULFWWHUPVRIDUHSHWLWLRQEXWRIµUHSO\LQJ.¶Replying indicates a 
synthetic activity that equivocates betw een acciden t and inner cause, to the dynam ic schem a of a 
dialogue. It  equates am biguites of the discussion of active an d passive adaptation to  
interpretations of natural phenom ena that account f or a convergence of orm . 811  On the one hand, 
a passive interpretation was atributed to the Darw inian concept of chance. But another 
perspective sees a neo-Lam arckism  ascribed to an  apparently active pow er atributed to living 
being. 812   
 
The later is a power understood only through a psy chological register. In the w idest ense, this 
m eant the interpretive value given to an autonom ous  principle behind evident natural 
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developm ent. But Bergson also draws atention to th e shortcom ings of such an active principle 
when ascribing it to DµVRPDWLFHQYHORSH¶RUJLYHQof a µJHUPSODVP.¶Such a power was equaly 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFRIDPXFKEURDGHUQRWLRQZKLFKKHLGHQWLILHGZLWKµKDELW,¶and Bergson understood 
habit as o PHWKLQJµJLYHQ.¶The given could therefore stand DVDµQDWXUDOGLVSRVLWLRQ¶VLQFHLWZDV
necessarily contained under a principle of continui ty. 813  The unity of continuity was a priori for 
som atic cels seen as natural relation to what w as given. But in this sense, unity was a vital 
principle that m eant ³ILQGVLWVDSWLWXGH,´which can equaly be taken as the potential atribu ted to  
germ  plasm  in general. In turn, this can also be he ld as the explanation for what is form aly 
expressed through the germ .  
 
Here was the dificult concept of synthesis for des cribing term s of natural dispositon. It 
folowed from  what Bergson characterised as the ide a that a heory of knowledge and a theory of 
life are inseparable. The concept of natural relati on isalso m eant as a necessary relation and, like 
the lim ited vitalism , can be understood through its  relation to the µDQWLFLSDWLYHLGHD¶%HUJVRQ¶V 
idea focused on what becam e excluded from  concepts of intelectual equivalence (biological 
m echanism , predestination, Radical finalism , etc) b ut encapsulated what constiuted conceptual 
and logical thought as  a ³YDJXH QHEXORVLW\´ These are notions that precede what is actively 
conceptualised by the intelect. W hile the exam ples  from  biology see Bergson ilustrate his thesis 
of the orientation in ideas is associated through l iving efort, is efort which explains life 
extending ³FHUWDLQSRZHUV´as  what precedes an understanding. 814  This idea serves the basis for 
the general theory of synthesis and which stood pos itvely for intuiton in his theory of the m ind 
beyond itsdeterm inistc aspect. 
 
%HUJVRQ¶V OLPLWHG YLWDOLVP was therefore approached through this idea of the c onfluence of 
positve knowledge with a concept of lie. This avo ided restrictions atributed to Darwinian 
biology of passive tendencies to m aterial variation , but nor did he uphold a neo-Lam arckism  
theory of psychological cause, atributable to a co nscious power of an ego. 815  W hat Bergson was 
describing as WKH ³GHSWK RI HIIRUW´ wDV QRW VLPSO\ JLYHQ WR µZLOO,¶ EXW ZDV VRPething to be 
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accounted for at he level of unction. As a biolog ical function, this was conceptualis ed  as that 
ZKLFK³SURJUHVVHVDQGHQGXUHV´ by which Bergson gave it  the sense of the vital. But this was not 
lim ited to individuals or single responses, but rat her seen on the general level of the conditons of 
understanding atributed to organised bodies. Funct ion in vital bodies a priori presupposes an  
organising work in  their existence. But the presuppositon folow ed  the earlier exam ple in  
Creative Evolution of a katagenetic schem a to w hich  an understanding necessarily atributed its
evidence of higher positve function behind organis ed existence.  
 
In that passage, the anagenetic schem a raises energ y levels by construction. On the other hand, a 
functioning of actual life isatributed to a katag enetic order which exhibits a fal, not the rise, i n 
energy. Ifthe form er constiutes the functional su m  of organisation itself, it only as an  index to 
knowledge of organisation, the reality of the organ ism  in itself was not given though this 
associative principle, but was prem ised on the diss ociative activity a priori. Bergson took this as 
his central thesis; ³OLIH GRHV QRW SURFHHG E\ DVVRFLDWLRQ DQG DGGLWLRQ RI HOHPHQWV EXW E\
GLVVRFLDWLRQ DQG GLYLVLRQ´816  He qualifed this precisely by describing perception as such an 
activity that serv es  to  determ ine objects upon which it can act, by discri m ination from  those it 
cannot act on. This is now taken as evidence of the  categories of objects whose necessity is 
indicated by an a priori dissociative base develope d by a µFDQDOLVLQJ¶ YLVLRQ RI WKH ZRUOG
Categories are atributed to a sum  of ³REMHFWVDYRLGHG;´when Creative Evolution puts forward 
the fam ous exam ple describing the eye as organ efe cting this canalisation, i t is  seen as m aterial 
evidence of a m ediation between determ inable exteri or objects and their relation extended to 
higher anim al functions. U ltim ately what defines th e positve categories is  ground ed  in the 
concept of organised life.
 
The central argum ent in Creative Evolution folows this relation between an order of knowledge 
and a theory of lie. Positve values precede an ev ident synthetic function on the basis of an 
earlier physiological dissociation, but Bergson had  departed from  an account of associative 
functions earlier atributed a sensible soul. By extending his thesis through the m odern 
evolutionary paradigm , and retaining the necessity of selection between a true and a false 
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dissociation, he intended to  dem onstrate how an anticipative tem poral intuiton  gave selection its
w ider biological function. Function m eant diferent iat ing qualitative relations around the µIULQJH¶
of the m ental activity through atention to which B ergson had already introduced a notion of 
duration.  
 
The eviden ce  of  the dispersion of living form s through the evoluti onary paradigm  em bodies what 
is held of duration. It  accounts for the dispositonal function of an  anticipative idea which 
Creative Evolution gave as intuiton. One m ust assu m e that it was for philosophical reasons that 
the power atributed to this constiutive principle  took the discursive form  of the élan vital. On 
one level, the problem  of synthesis atributed to VRPHWKLQJ VLPLODU WR %HUQDUG¶V DQWLFLSDWLYH
notion of an experim ental idea, but extended throug h a discussion of evolutionary tendency to 
dispersion, m eant he élan vital extended wel beyo nd any determ inable biological dom ain. But 
the relevance rather, does extend to an  am biton for a perspective on the Science of M an t hrough 
its discourse on the physical and the m oral. To thi s end, there is a paralel between a biological 
perspective of a true or false divergence and what Bergson reintroduced as a psychological 
problem  of the norm al nd the pathological. 
 
The Norm al nd the Pathological  
 
%HUJVRQ¶VWKHory of the norm al and the pathological appeared alr eady in the earlier text of 1896, 
M ater and M emory which focussed on the psychologic al distinction m ade between extrem es of 
m ental states. It  drew  heavily on the pathological psychology of Pi ere Janet who represented a 
positvistic approach to the psychology associated w ith the French Spirtual traditon and the 
OHJDF\ RI 0DLQH GH %LUDQ %LUDQ¶V DSSURDFK WR WKH HJR ZDV DV FXOPLQDWLRQ RI UDWKHU DV
foundational to, a theory of consciousness. But a p ositvistic theory of self was m ore directly in 
debt to Théodule Ribot who had developed a theory o f partial m em ories from  within an 
evolutionary fram ework to  distinguish a hierarchy of m ental functions. The h ierarchy reflected a 
psychic order against which adaptive responses coul d be qualitatively developed. 817  Janet 
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folowed this approach to avoid physiological expla nations of psychological phenom ena on the 
basis that  physiology of m ental pparatus hould be defered as the task of a future science. 818   
 
It was an approach to consciousness prem ised on the  idea that languages and inteligent action, 
including organic habit and instincts, were signs o f a dom ain of an extended consciousness. The 
psychic dom ain indexed a sum  of undiferentiated ph ysiological functions as  synthesis of 
sensation in the body that gave elem ents from  w hich  a sense of self w as drawn. Consciousness 
was extensive but not uniform  and th e psychic dom ain reflected the m ultiple states of i ts 
com positon; from  sim ple sensations, through to com posite perceptions, to higher levels of 
FRQVFLRXVQHVV UHTXLUHG IRU LQWHOOLJHQW MXGJHPHQW -DQHW¶V DSSURDFK WR a field of subconscious 
activity was through a dom ain of synthetic activity , activity not itself positvitcaly defined by a 
determ inistic physiological form , but prem ised on V\QWKHWLFDFWLYLW\ZKLFK³XQLWHVPRUHRUOHVV
QXPHURXVO\ JLYHQ SKHQRPHQD LQWR QHZ SKHQRPHQD GLIIHULQJ IURP WKH HOHPHQWV´819  W hat 
distinguished psychological functions in  -DQHW¶V WKHRU\ was an  assim ilation of elem ents that 
required a FHUWDLQ DPRXQW RI µSV\FKRORJLFDO IRUFH¶ for an associative synthesis. Drawing on a 
m ultiplicity of sensations, this synthesis indicate d higher levels of function, while a lack of 
psychic force resulted in dysfunction and m ental il lness.  
 
Norm al function for Janet was conceived as  the balance of interpenetrating diverse psychic st ates 
held in an equilbrium  to avoid extrem es. By an  unexplained m ental apparatus of association, he 
m ade possible a m ove beyond the problem s of sim ple associationism , since the psych ic  dom ain 
supposed that m em ory was the function of unconsciou s partial recolections. W hen M ater and 
M emory exam in es  -DQHW¶V WKHRUHWLFDO DSSDUDWXV it  focusses on the selection process of this 
association seen from  the perspective of %HUJVRQ¶V problem  RIV\QWKHVLV³ZHQHHGWRGLVFRYHU
KRZ WKH FKRLFH LV HIIHFWHG´820  In this respect, Bergson w as delim itng synthesis from  its 
extrem e states ; dream ing instead of living activity (psychosis), an d of im m ediate acting instead 
of representing (autonom ism ). 821  Bergson saw  these prim ary facts of synthesis giving t he 
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undiferentiated ground of past perceptions, to w hi ch an active dissociation necessarily preceded 
any theory of recogniton. 
 
M ater and M emory proposes the synthesis of percept ion not be seen though si m ple relations to 
elem ents atributed to m em ory, but given through th e efort applied to the dissociation, or a 
power to diferentiate, he ³QHEXORXVPDVV´ of past experience,- 
³,I WKLV SHUFHSWLRQ HYRNHV LQ WXUQ GLIIHUHQW PHPRULHV LW LV QRW E\ D PHFKDQLFDl 
adjunction of m ore and m ore num erous elem ents which , while rem aining unm oved, 
it atracts around it, but rather by an expansion o f an entire consciousness, which 
VSUHDGLQJRXWRYHUDODUJHUDUHDGLVFRYHUVWKHIXOOHUGHWDLORILWVZHDOWK´822  
This  µspreading out ¶RI an  undivided order of psychic facts ensures that asso ciation can proceed 
from  the perspective of two interpenetrating m odes at he extrem es of perceptual function; a 
prim ary associations of simplicity that retrieves d irect relations, and a secondary associations of 
contiguity which bring the m yriad of coordinate act ions along with the first. D issociation 
functionaly separates these prior to grounding a d ynam ic schem a of possible sensory-m otor 
states which represent the functional distribution within the dynam ic lim its of degrees of 
association. Bergson atributes such a distribution  to  the theory of m ental dispositons, or to 
GLYHUVHµWRQHV¶RIDPHQWDOOLIH and itstensions. This indicates a distribution of states of m ental 
vitality but Bergson also identifed this w ith the potential for a m uch wider dom ain ofering a 
³ZKROH SV\FKRORJ\ DV \HW XQPDSSHG,´ WKURXJK Dn extended proper study of the pathology of 
associated m ental states. 823   
 
In the dynam ic work of norm al m em ory, which drew on  a historica l concept of the m ean to 
explain diferent shades of m ental ife, Pathologic al states defined a diference in kind at he 
threshold of dysfunction. But since what constiute d norm al function in  the m ind was atributed 
WR D FRQFHSW RI ³DWWHQWLRQ WR OLIH.´ The function of sensory-m otor equilbrium  folowed 
conditons of existence as m ediated by the body and  this constitutes Bergson ¶V dynam ic dialogue 
with the world as  adaptive capacity of balancing future and past per ceptions. Iti his adaptive 
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equilbrium  of states that indexes a w ider sense of reality extending beyond any determ i nable 
questions of m aterial or social world.  
 
Bergson in  this m apping RIµreality ¶ through m ental pathologies, therefore proposes som ething 
diferent from  Piere Janet. For Bergson, it  LPSOLFDWHGDIXQFWLRQGLUHFWHGWRZDUGVWKHµUHDO,¶was 
indicated at the ³SRLQWHGHQGRIPHQWDOOLIH.´ This placed the central difculty of the body and  its  
relation to a norm  within the living assem blage of sensation and its m ovem ents. A  positve 
ce rebral pathology aim ed to delim it a schem a by which  brain functioned to banished excess or 
deficiency of m em ory. But his was also a schem a that corelated w ith states to be avoided an d 
extended to biological success through its extensio n to a theory of knowledge of the world. 
Hence the concept of w orld appears as the functiona l result of states avoided, and which the 
power of lie dissociates as the ground of recognit ion. W hen M ater and M emory developed this 
as  an  ontological basis for the nature of duration, a ps ychic dom ain com plicated the relation of 
µnRUP¶ DQG µUHDO.¶ From  the perspective of the positve source  µQRUP¶ DQG µUHDO¶ com ingle or 
appear coextensive. But these are diferentiated LQWKHµIULQJH¶ of pathology of extrem es, where a 
failure of actualised states, which isa failure of  knowledge, ultim ately isndistinguishable from  a 
death of the body and itsworld.  
 
The Positve M etaphysics  
 
The reason why Bergson introduced the élan vital in  Creative Evolution can perhaps be seen to 
folow from  what ZDV UHWURVSHFWLYHO\ LPSOLFDWHG E\ WKH HVVD\ µ7KH SKLORVRSK\ RI &ODXGH
%HUQDUG¶7KLVVWDWHVWKDW%HUQDUGGRHVQRWH[FOXGHWKHµRUJDQLVLQJLGHD¶WKURXJKHODERUDWLQJDQ
experim ental m ethod and %HUJVRQ LQWHUSUHWHG WKLV DV ³UHVWRULQJ XQGHU DQRWKHU IRUP a vitalism  
WKDW KH ZDV FRPEDWLQJ´824  As a conceptual tool , Creative Evolution condensed this w ider 
philosophical argum ent into the élan vital which de m onstrat es  Bergson ¶V difering needs to 
those established by the various theoretical m odels  of lie given of contem porary scientifc 
concepts. Bernard, not m entioned in Creative Evolut ion, was later credited w ith successfuly 
DYRLGLQJDQRSSRVLWLRQEHWZHHQWKHµPHFKDQLVWLOOXVLRQ¶DQGWKHµYLWDOLVWLOOXVLRQ¶DWWKHOHYHORI
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m ethod. He substiuted this problem  for a diferent GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ D µGHWHUPLQLVP¶DQGD
µIDWDOLVP¶which Bergson did not dispute was the m ethod dem and ed of a m odern science. In fact, 
he adopted itsam biton to pursue a precise field o f knowledge. 
 
However, in grounding his intuitve approach throug h a synthesis of m em ory, Bergson 
reintroduc ed  the µIULQJH¶ EHWZHHQ such determ inism  and fatalism . H e took these as dif ferent 
m odes of knowledge, distinguished between an analyt ic part of inteligibilty DQGDQRWKHU³PRUH
HPSLULFDO WKDQ µWKRXJKWIXO´825  In this way, synthesis appear ed  both com patible w ith, and even 
essential to, a scientifc concept of lie. In the w ake of M ater and M emory, Bergson articulated 
his critque of contem porary life sciences through his understanding of Descartes criterion of 
inteligibilty. Descartes intention, he said, was the deepening of hum an experience rather than 
folowing the dream  of universal m aths which Bergso n subsequently took this up through the 
discussions of Creative Evolution. The new biologic al sciences in  the 19 th  century cam e in  the 
wake of both laboratory m edicine and the im pact of Darwinism .  
 
Bergson thesis was that there w as no incom patibilt y betw een a problem atic synthesis and 
'HVFDUWHV¶PHWKRGVLQFHWKHSUREOHPZDVPHUHO\RQHRISULRULW\LQWhe execution of m ethod. 826  
Both Bergson and Bernard aim ed at a m ethod of preci sion by dem anding a certain atitude of 
m ind before the object, but Bergson focussed on the  adaptation between experience and 
inteligibilty. Folowing his am biton to develop a wider theory of psychological states w as, i n 
his day, associated with the traits o which the sp irtualist traditon in the w ake of M aine de Biran 
pursued under a question of the superior faculties of the m ind. But in delim itng a positve 
m etaphysics , Bergson w as m oving towards the convergance of a pos itvist raditon with the 
spirtual one around an the extended question of th e physical nd the m oral. 827   
 
To this end, Bergson w as deliberately distancing hi s theory of synthesis from  a psychological 
concept of the unconscious, as wel as a fuly dete rm ined m aterial dom ain. 828  Rather than 
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GHVFULELQJ DQ XQFRQVFLRXV %HUJVRQ GHOLPLWHG D YLUWXDO µPLOLHX¶ through an  inversion of a 
spirtualist dualism  between personal experience an d higher thought. This folow ed  his 
philosophical am biton to exploit he strategic pos sibilties for thought in  corelation with the 
suppressed elem ent in Bernard. The virtual m ileu i nserts itself at he extrem es of experience 
where prim acy was given to the force of dissociatio n like a power of the anticipative idea. From  
%HUJVRQ¶V SHUVSHFWLYH, this served the problem  of synthesis when advanci ng into the w ider 
dom ain of the physical and the m oral. The psycho-ph ysiological perspective described a 
necessity of determ inism  by invoking the positve p ossibilties of analogical thought for the 
w ider necessites of action: but the virtual m ilieu  upholds the vitalist problem atic for an 
expanded knowledge in the face of new experiences t hat bear down on consciousness of beings. 
Two separate doctrine s to  be reconciled and accorded proper m easure. M ater and M emory took 
this as the starting point for an  accom m odation of interpenetrating psychological st ates which 
equaly necessitated an  indeterm ination prior to an active constiution of  consciousness . 
%HUJVRQ¶V D[LRPDWLF ZDV WKDW ERWK PRQLVP DQG GXDOLVP ZHUH VWHULOH LQ WKHPVHOYHV, they only 
becom e productive at the lim its where these two int electual tendencies touched.  
 
7KLV ZDV %HUJVRQ¶V perspective for a positve m etaphysics in which he saw the paralel of a 
m odern struggle for the psycho-biologist looking to  distinguish between consciousness and its 
organic support. Beyond psycho-physical paralelism , positively determ inable activites held of 
actual µPDWWHU¶EUXVKHVDJDLQVWa vital activites of th e m ind. M ater and M emory circum scribed 
to the work LQJV RI D µVHQVRU\ PRWRU VFKHPD,¶ where thinking diference ultim ately becom es 
subordinated to the clarity of a perception. How eve r, Creative Evolution took a m ore general 
view to confront what he perceived in  contem porary Positvists as self styled successors  to 
Descartes.  This explains why he folowed an extended critque of Positvist historical form ations 
around the project of m odern science to  confront what Bergson understood as  deeper 
im plications around the physical and the m oral. 
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Élan Vital and History as D issociation  
 
%HUJVRQ¶VSRVLWLYHPHWDSK\VLFVlent itself to a confrontation with Positvism ¶V perspective on the 
earlier Science of M an. Chapter four of Creative Ev olution diferentiates m odes of associative 
thinking from  the perspective of a history of disso ciation by which a positve m etaphysics relates 
a life of knowledge to the concept of life, im plicitl y through the élan vital. H is history 
characterises *UHHNWKRXJKWDVGRPLQDWHGE\D³SKLORVRSK\RILGHDV´the m ode of thought hat 
confounds µHVVHQFHV¶ZLWKLQWHQWLRQVEXWit does describe how efects of thought itself are like an 
µDQLPDO LQVWLQFW¶ PRYLQJ GLUHFWO\ IURP LPSUHVVLRQV WR µPHQWDO GHVLJQV¶ WKURXJK VLPSOH
recom positons. But the ce QWUDOFULWLFLVPRIWKLVµGLUHFWPRGH¶RIWKLQNLQJZDVthat it was evident 
³HYHQWRGD\´LQZKDW%HUJVRQIDPRXVO\GHVFULEHGDVWKH³FLQHPDWRJUDSKLFDOLQVWLQFW´829   
 
Bergson is therefore form ulating a critque of contem porary science as being inadequat e w ith 
respect to itsown positve am bitons. Having inven ted a m odern sign of relation, science retains 
the tendency to unfold a paralelism  which a posit ve m etaphysics intends to oppose. Such 
inadequacy relates perhaps m ore to what Auguste Com te characterised in a m odern science 
through the shift rom  observable genera to determ i ned physical aws. Claude Bernard, in his 
conceptualy lim ited way, m oves from  vital function s to physical lw  which rem ained signifcant 
for Bergson since itnverts the problem  of scie QFH¶V practical activity, and restricts its vital 
interests in relation to the lim its of knowledge. B ut Bernard was not m entioned in Creative 
Evolution. M odern science represents only the break  with a sim ple Aristotelian physics and its
inherent concepts of high and low , described in phi losophical term s closer to &RPWH¶V
Positvism . 830  .DQW¶V &ULWLTXH UHSUHVHQWV the solution of a m odern philosophy EXW %HUJVRQ¶V
am biton extends beyond a conditonal threshold by abstracting from  tem poral instants the 
positve signs for a m ore vital science.  
 
In this context, Bergson describes how itw as the m edico-philosophical project of the 18 th  
century that caried over into his era DQ³LQFRPSOHWH6SLQR]LVPRU/HLEQL]LVP´RUD³FUDPSHG
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&DUWHVLDQLVP´831  If this refers to various m anifestations of Posit vism  and the ir  problem atic 
legacy appearing ideologicaly trapped, this m ay be  because they fail to m ove beyond the 
DPELWLRQVRI&DEDQLV¶HUDRQWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKHSK\VLFDODQGWKHPRUDO-  
³:KDWLVWKHSK\VLRORJ\DQGWKHSDWKology actualy assigned to the ancient question of the 
relation of the physical and the m oral, to a spirt  without action, prior the speculations 
which deliver it to this point, and neglected, in t he afirm ations of the savants, al his that 
is not held p XUHO\DQGVLPSO\DVIDFW´832   
This neglected question on the physical and the m or al now reappears as Bergson real trget. This 
is what h e revisit ed  this through his thesis on duration, his term s of the norm al and the 
pathological, which are associated with a positve m etaphysics.  
 
Despite the difculties atributed to a principle of intuiton, and m ore explicitly the élan vital, he 
w ider discussion behind Creative Evolution folows this as a VWUDWHJLF µVFLHQFH DJDLQVW
scientism . ¶Intuiton, for Bergson did not present dissolution as a negative thesis ince it served a 
m odern am biton for ofering concepts susceptible t o positve verifcation within an expanded 
schem atic of knowledge. But he w ider im plications of the synthetic elem ent driving a m odern 
proj ect  of the physical and the m oral, and expanded the fr am ework of the new order, had 
particular dificulties extending to a social m ile u. Bergson did not directly engage with this for 
twenty five years after Creative Evolution til his  last book on The Two Sources of M orality and 
Religion. 833  
 
However, in the typology of psychological states an d its theory of synthesis, he did propose a 
vital atribute in relation to signs. In accounting  for the separation of diferent m odes of 
knowledge, and grounding his cr itque against a calculated unfolding of a µKLJKHU UHDVRQ,¶
duration grounded the earlier divergence betw een th e theory of knowledge and a theory of life. 834  
Here %HUJVRQ DUJXHG WKDW OLYLQJ H[SHULHQFH RI VXFFHVVLRQ DSSHDUHG DV D ³NLQG RI IRUFH´ RI
consciousness, like a theory of orce tid to an idea of m otion, -
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³«WKHXQLYHUVHXQIROGVLWVVXFFHVVLYHVWDWHVZLWKDYHORFLW\ZKLFKLQUHJDUGWRP\
FRQVFLRXVQHVVLVDYHULWDEOHDEVROXWH«ZK\ZLWKWKLVSDUWLFXODUYHORFLW\UDWKHUWKDQ
DQRWKHU"´835  
This perspective ap pears in term s of an internal perspective on what w as occluded from  the 
w ider dynam ic range im plicitly existing of other fo rm s of sensibilty. The wider difculties of 
%HUJVRQ¶V LQWXLWLRQDO NQRZOHGJH FRQYHUJHd under a unifed tem poral perspective propos ed  by 
duration. It was his FRQIURQWDWLRQ ZLWK WKH µZRXOG EH VXFFHVVRUV WR 'HVFDUWHV,¶ which for 
Bergson, m eant an  artifcial and baren unity of the res cogitans. B eyond the res cogitans, a 
possible unity of objective experience prom ised as future science gave its real problem  as 
shortcom ings of any present science. D issociation a s an active a priori principle, m ade history 
appear as ³DNLQGIRUFH´SXVKLQJLQWHOOHFWXDOXQLW\LQWRDSV\FKLFPXOWLSOLFLW\ and, one could say, 
gives the real target in retaining th e vitalist m ethod of inteligibilty as  Bergson ¶Vperspective on 
the older Science of M an. 
  
Durkheim : The Politcs of the Norm  
 
Em ile Durkheim  also fram ed his sociology around the  µDQFLHQW TXHVWLRQ RI WKH UHODWLRQ RI WKH
SK\VLFDO DQG WKH PRUDO¶ DVVLJQHG Wo a future science. H is starting point was the µVRFLDO
SK\VLRORJ\¶ derived from  Auguste Com te and Saint Sim on to be gr ounded as a form  of neo-
Positvism . But Durkheim  identifed Saint Sim on as the m odern response to the fragm entation of 
the Enlightenm ent Science of M an and the influentia l ink undertood as providing a general 
V\QWKHVLV LQ WKH IDFH RI µGLVSHUVLRQ.¶ W hen he ZURWH DERXW 6DLQW 6LPRQ GXULQJ WKH ¶V he 
described his trategy as the am biton WR³OLEHUDWHWKHERG\RILGHDVRQZKLFKWKHVRFLDOVWructure 
should rest; ´ 'XUNKHLP¶V RZQ SURMHFW WRRN WKLV DV D SUREOHP RI V\PEROLF RUGHU836  It  gave a 
perspective on a double articulation; that of an im m anent principle of continuity, but also one 
which could be constiuted as a social world. Again st he tendency to dispersion, the sym bolic 
order em erged EHWZHHQ D µZD\ WR IXQFWLRQ¶ DQG D µZD\RIEHLQJ¶ This shares w ith the earlier 
VRFLDO SK\VLRORJ\ WKH DLPRI FRQFHSWXDOLVLQJ³D FHUWDLQ VWDWHRI WKH FROOHFWLYHPLQG´837  which 
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now m eant an account of the social world as  an interpenetration of both a real and a rational 
order of things. It  was im portant that this be determ inable for a soci o-politcal form ations; to do 
this Durkheim  looked to reconfigure the m ediation o f the vital and positve aspects of a m odern 
knowledge in the wake of the new m odels of intelig ibilty. 
 
The positve sense that Saint-Sim on dem anded of a g eneral physiology was to  give a special 
epistem ology which prom ised to ground an order of t hings. But in his era this dem anded a 
necessary synthesis at he avant-garde of any posit ive knowledge. Durkheim  also drew on the 
life sciences for an epistem ology and also found it  paradigm atic that there w ere m ultiple 
VLPXOWDQHRXVRUGHUVRI µQDWXUDO¶NQRZOHGJHZKLFKPRGHUQPDQZDV IDFHGZLWK and accounted 
for a dissolution of a transcendental unity. 838  Durkheim ¶V VRFLRORJ\ SURPLVHG NQRZOHGJH RI D
new dom ain.- 
³8S WR WKH SUHVHQW WKLQNHUV ZHUH SODFHG EHIRUH WKLV GRXEOH DOWHUQDWLYH HLWKHU
explain the superior and specifc faculties by conn ecting them  to inferior form s of 
his being, the reason to the senses, or the m ind to  m ater, which is equivalent of 
denying their specifcity; or to atach them  to som e supra-experiential reality that 
ZDV SRVWXODWHG EXW ZKRVH H[LVWHQFH QR REVHUYDWLRQ FRXOG HVWDEOLVK«EH\RQG WKH
LQGLYLGXDO DV µILQLV QDWXUDH¶ LV WKH V\VWHP RI DFWLYH IRUFHV QRW QRPLQDOO\ RU
UDWLRQDOO\FUHDWHGDQHZILHOGRSHQVXS´839   
/RRNLQJEH\RQGWKHµILQLVQDWXUDH¶'XUNKHLPDYRLGHGDSV\FKRORJ\RIWKHVRXOE\HPSKDVLVLQJ
the alterity of social logic from  the individual co nsciousness. This would ³«RSHQDQHZZD\WR
WKH 6FLHQFH RI 0DQ´ WKURXJK the claim  that Sociology would bring to consciousne ss, a 
conceptual dom ain of hum an relations, between the l ogic of m an and a logic of nature. 840   
 
The m ain difculty faced by Durkheim  was for delim itng the order of phenom ena that could 
H[SUHVVVXFKDGRPDLQDQG%HUQDUG¶Vphysiological epistem ology gave the paradigm  of the  day. 
This was the experim ental m ethod but 'XUNKHLP¶VVRFLDOILHOG w as not open to experim entation 
and verifcation in the sam e way. Laboratory practic e gave theoretical control to 19th century 
physiology where the organic lim it of life determ in ed functions of the body in relation to 
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conditons of living existence. This determ ined rel ations between inner and outer m ileu; it
grounded an  experim ental science by delim it ed  laboratory conditons. W hen Durkheim  
developed his conceptual practice through the atem pt o delim it a dom ain of social facts, it  was 
despite lacking any m eans of externaly determ ining  the lim its to a social concept of lie. The 
question is,n what sense could this be seen as sc ientifc? 841  Like Saint Sim on, Durkheim  was 
aim ing for som ething closer to a therapeutic ideal rather than a fuly determ ined approach of 
Bernard. He w as m oving in an opposite direction to Bernard by a practice of delim itng a dom ain 
for interpretation rather than a determ ination. 
 
'XUNKHLP¶V3RVLWLYH'RPDLQ 
  
Durkheim  had identifed in the Ideologi VW¶V m ethod the am biton of escaping a purely socio-
politcal problem  through a KLJKHU LQWHOOHFWXDO V\QWKHVLVRID µZD\RIEHLQJ¶842  W hile the aim  
was elevating hum an activites beyond a reflective thought, Durkheim  saw this only upheld 
DFFRUGLQJ WR ³VRPH RYHUULGLQJ FRQFHSW´ ZLWK QR FRQFUHWH MXVWLILFDWLRQ843  The m ethod did 
diferentiate values derived of em pircal knowledge  and did litleo reveal inherent problem s of a 
rationalism  fed by an  analysis of inite knowledge. This, Durkheim  under stood, as the em pircal 
problem s which were inherent in delim itng a social  dom ain. He took this as the central problem  
which was to be given a new perspective. H is new am biton was identifying criterion to  be used 
to distinguish a determ inable practice from  an ideo logy. To this end he looked to define what 
constiutes ocial facts for an integration into a m odern functional approach, - 
³,QGHHGWKHIDFWVZKLFKKDYHSURYLGHGXVZLWKLWVEDVLVDUHDOOZD\VRIIXQFWLRQLQJ
they are physiological in nature. But there are als o colective ways of being nam ely 
social facts of an anatom ical or m orpho ORJLFDOQDWXUH´844  
The physiological paralel in  these facts i signifcant since Durkheim  was deli m itng his social 
GRPDLQWKURXJKUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQDµZD\RIEHLQJ¶DQGDµZD\RIIXQFWLRQLQJ¶7Ke im portan ce  
of the double articulation is the principle th at underpinned both his sociological science in its  
specifcity, but also opened its relations to w ider  conditons of lie in general. This gave the 
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m odality that appears initaly through two approac hes to thinking social structures proposed in 
The Division of Labour.  
 
In this text, Durkheim  describes two m odes of life, t he m echanical and organic. These 
distinguish diferent expressions of elem entary soc ial connections; the sim ple reflective relations 
of a m echanical solidarity, and a diferentiated m u ltiplicity of com plex organic solidarity.- 845   
- A  dispositon to sim ple realism  is lim ited by the soc ial principles accorded to the overiding 
colective consciousness. This gives the DSSDUHQW µZD\V RI EHLQJ¶ WKDW ERWK RUGHUV a world a 
priori but is also expe ULHQFHG DV WKH µIDEULF¶ RI D VRFLDOLVHG QDWXUH 7KLV PRGHO RI NQRZOHGJH
grounds a functionaly replicable and conceptualy external o rder of things. 846  This is the 
rationalist m odel which folows from  the classical system atising m odels, where social structures 
and health of societies historicaly given through socio-politcal form ations whose values had the 
criteria of the m ean and lim ited to an average. 
- Beyond this perspective, Durkheim  looks to µZD\V RI IXQFWLRQLQJ¶ JLYHQ LQ WHUPV RI WKH
interpretative m odel beyond a sim ple norm ative m ode l. W hen Durkheim  assesses ocial function 
it s though social efects which could not be excl usively accounted for under a historicaly 
given. S LQFHIXQFWLRQV³FDQQRWWHOOXVZKDWHQGVDUHWREHSXUVXHG´a functionalist reading could 
be related to perceived µVWDWHs RIEHLQJ¶RQO\LQDOLPLWHGZD\847  Here was the difculty of the 
interpretation which necessitated the grounding cri teria of  a science. In a grounded and 
coextensive dom ain of science, ³JRRGDQGHYLOGRQRWH[LVW´therefore the question of unction 
m ust serve both to displace individual opinions, wh ile equaly grounding an  originating 
em pircal elem ent, for a new language for the socio logist to interpret.  
 
It is the difculty of this functional elem ent ha t ZDVGHYHORSHG WKURXJK'XUNKHLP¶VPRGHORI
organic solidarity. From  the organic perspective, t he em pircal elem ent isbeyond direct relations 
to determ ined knowledge and social facts are fore-g rounded by socialy determ ined form ation 
which both m ediate elem ental diferences while also n delim itng the zone that exhibits a 
functional diferentiation. Th is  m ediating zone drew together the w ider inteligibl e social 
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phenom ena into the dom ain of facts under an overid ing principle. The question is how did 
Durkheim  address this principle? He looked to Com te  who took an underlying notion of 
µLPSXOVLRQ¶ WR LPSURYHFRQGLWLRQVwhich Durkheim  saw as inherently confusing function  with 
³VRPHWKLQJ DVFULEHG DV VRXUFH RU HVVHQFH´ which appeared fundam entaly problem atic - both 
philosophicaly and ideologicaly. As the basis for  &RPWH¶V 3RVLWLYLVm  in analysing hum an 
form ations through the historical m ethod, Durkheim  described this DV PDLQWDLQLQJ D ³WUXO\
PHWDSK\VLFDO HQWLW\´848  He m eant a concept of hum anity seen to be im peled to  surpass an 
anim ality, which appears to Durkheim  as  an invert ed  µSV\FKRORJ\¶RIWKHVSLULW¶849  By distancing 
KLVRZQPHWKRGIURP&RPWH¶VWUDQVFHQGHQWDOLVP'XUNKHLPWRRNDVthe central problem  how to 
delim it an  explanation of teleological elem ents w ithin a real ist fram ework. These w ere the 
GLIILFXOWSDUDPHWHUVZKLFKKHVXPPDULVHVRQO\XQGHUDµSHUVLVWHQFHRIOLIH;¶which is som ething 
UHJXODWHG WKURXJK µVRFLDO OLYLQJ.¶ In this way, a social dom ain can distinguished from  an  
LQGLYLGXDOµZLOO¶and m ake a cle ar  distinction betw een an individual nd general logi c. 850   
 
'XUNKHLP¶VDPELWLRQIRUsuch a SRVLWLYHDQGGHWHUPLQDEOHGRPDLQORRNHGWR%HUQDUG¶VLQWHULRU
m ileu as carying the new m odel of inteligibilty . The question is whether Durkheim  folows 
the break which Bernard efected with vitalism ? An older concept of lie could only conceive of 
the relation between an outer environm ent and the b ody through the idea that m ediated under a 
QRWLRQRI µYLWDOLW\¶ %HUQDUG¶V LQQHUPLOLHX LQVWLOOHGDQHZSK\VLRORJLFDO Foncept by which the 
m ost constant interior environm ent belonged to the higher form s of lie. 851  %HUQDUG¶VPRGHOWRRN
the inner m ileu and itshom eostasis as distinctive  of higher organism s and in ofering a freedom  
to life through m ore determ ined inner environm ents.  -
³7KHFRQVWDQF\RIDQLQQHUHQYLURQPHQWLVWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRUDIUHHDQGLQGHSHQGHQW
life...al the vital m echanism s, however varied the y m ay be, have only one purpose, 
that of m aintaining the integrity of the conditons  of life within the internal 
HQYLURQPHQW´852   
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%HUQDUG¶VKRPHRVWDWLFIXQFWLRQwas his overiding concept in defining life: Durkhe im  looked for 
a paralel concept at he threshold of ree and ind ependent life. W ithin this, ocial phenom ena 
were both expressive of unction and inteligible a s the social facts ³LQWKHUHODWLRQLWEHDUVZLWK
to som e social end. ´ Equaly, the causality behind these social facts co uld be restricted to 
³DQWHFHGHQWVRFLDOIDFWV´DVFULWHULRQGHPRQVWUDEOHE\social repetion. 853  W hat is m ade evident 
by these social form ations is strictly neither indi vidual nor general psychology, but som ething 
that Durkheim  equates w ith a zone of ree and indep endent life. Such a zone m ade evident a 
loosening of the rigid m etaphysics and was to subst itute for ideological or m etaphysical enties 
that sustained a FRQFHSWXDOµZD\RIEHLQJ¶ 
 
Powers of Association  
 
Social form ations internalise values atributed to the independence of life and Durkheim  
describes these as VXEVXPHGXQGHUµSRZHURIDVVRFLDWLRQ¶854  This power explains how a social 
m ileu stands under a constiutive principle and de fin es  its  substratum ; its the network of 
com m unication that extends WKURXJKDµG\QDPLFGHQVLW\¶ZLWKa potential o com m unicate across 
a w ide horizon that profoundly m odifes the condit ons of the colective life.
 
By folowing the new m odel of inteligebilty, D urkhe im  was delim itng this m orphology to its
RZQWHUPV&RQVFLRXVRIDYRLGLQJHPSLULFDOSUREOHPVVXFKDV&RPWH¶VODZRIWKHWKUHHVWDJHV
ZKLFK'XUNKHLPWKRXJKW³FDQQRWEXWEHHPSLULFDO´855 ) he dem arcated social lfe as a dom ain of 
analysis that aim ed  WRSDUDOOHO%HUQDUG¶VUHMHFWLRQRIYLWDOLVP:KDW'XUNKHLPwas rejecting was 
any historicaly given causal notions atributed to  nature to be substiuted by the social m odel, - 
³LI KLVWorical evolution is envisaged as being m oved by a v is a tergo (vital urge) 
which im pels itforward, since a dynam ic tendency c an only have a single goal, 
there can only exist one reference point from  which  to calculate utilty or 
harm fulness of social phen RPHQD´856    
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However, having displaced the tendency atributed t o the individual and the general w il, as an 
obstacle to thinking a social field, Durkheim  accou nted  for his reference point through the 
aggregate of functions that conditon ed  the dom ain. To this end, he surveys the diverse 
discourses as functions already identifed w ith two  opposing traditons of socio-philosophical 
theory. -
- Firstly, there isthose JLYHQWRWKHRULHVZKLFKSODFHGDµQDWXUHRIPDQ¶SULRUWRWKHVRFLDO. This 
he associated w ith Hobbes and Rousseau which saw th e concept of the social as a m echanical 
DUWLILFHZKLFKVKRXOGEHVXERUGLQDWHGWRWKHLGHDRIPDQ¶VZLOO; ³DPDFKLQHZKROO\FRQVWUXFWHG
by the hands of m an and which, like al the product s of this kind, isonly what it isbecause m an 
ZLOOVLWDQGVRDQDFWRIYROLWLRQFUHDWHGLWDQRWKHURQHWUDQVIRUPVLW´857   
- Secondly are theories of natural being which stoo d against giving prim acy to the w il. 
Durkheim  considered that these gave the idea ascrib ed to social life as im m anent and 
VSRQWDQHRXVKLJKHUHOHPHQWVRIWKHµQDWXUDOODQJXDJH,¶ZKRVHFRQFHSWH[WHQGHGWRD6FLHQFHRI
M an through inform ing his politcs, m orality and re ligious being. This would be closer to the 
legacy of Condilac and Cabanis.  
In such theories were condensed the natural and the  artifcial concepts of the social, ike a 
dualism  and m onism , but w ithin a dom ain restricted by a principle of association, suis generis . 
'XUNKHLP¶V m ethod aim ed at subsum ing both the im aginary/m ythi cal idea atributed to 
hum anity, but also notions atributed to a determ in ing wil. This w as an anti-hum anist tance in 
the sense that described functional activites in t he social dom ain by accordance with the 
physiological m odel of unction; but was delim ited through what w ere taken as w ider needs of 
an actual social organism . These were atributed to  µUHDO¶ UHODWLRQV LQGH[HG by laws of 
association. Durkheim  defended a functional approac h to social structure through atributing 
these relations to WKHµSHUVLVWDQFHRIOLIH¶WKLVVWRRGDVthe necessary axiom  for his ocial science 
yet rem ains dependant on how it  was ascribed to the whole. Itwas therefore caught  between a 
philosophical concept of nature and a scientifc do m ain. 
 
Since the whole was not given, and since he rejecte d vitalism  as explanation, the concept of the 
life of the whole could never be given in itself. D urkheim  reached this dificulty by interpreting 
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his central problem  as a sociological organism  and IROORZLQJ %HUQDUG¶V VWUDWHJ\. W here the 
physiological object could be given between two for m s of existence, an  exterior world and the 
interior m ileu developed against conditons of exi stence, the sociological whole - which was 
also a living whole ± w as confronted with the problem  of having no exter ior conditons for 
experim ental control. An inner m ileu, therefore, a lso had to stand for its own conditons of 
existence. Consequently, Durkheim  looked within thi s m ileu for a principle of association, 
som ething that could fuse both genetic and ontologi cal elem ents, accounting for both constiutive 
properties of the whole but also that by which the whole was evidently transform ed. Further to 
this, a principle of association would account both  for absorption of diferences, while also 
expressing wider conditons of existence.  
 
Howeve U'XUNKHLP¶VVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHVas described through organic or m echanical solidari ties, 
did presuppose a dynam ism  in social potential, as f orce against which its form s could appear. 
A lthough excluded from  the social dom ain as elem ent al phenom ena, this principle conditoned 
evident ransform ations behind a social fabric by giving a UHODWLRQ WR µQDWXUH¶ RU WKH µUHDO¶
Hence the theory of association relied upon this pr inciple as som ething a priori, which was 
neither psychology nor physicality as such, but w as , to a degree, expressive of both. This 
principle accounts for diferences socialy m ediate d, while elem ents in the inner m ileu 
reconstiute this diference through what individua ls negotiate through social form ations which 
are given on the basis of past conditons.  
 
To account for what his dynam ic expressed in  social form ations was the real difculty behind 
the associative principle. Durkheim  explored this i n his later texts, Primitve Classifcation and 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life, in the form  of a neo-positvist project of m apping out 
possible origins of associative functions. The aim  was to account for an order of classifcation by 
com parison of what prim itves m odes distinguished f rom  the m odern, according to an absence. 
Durkheim  took this absence as his perspective on an  µobjective synthesis ¶ that grounded 
historical order. 
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Science, Social Function and the Positve Cult  
 
H istorical order was a priori because Durkheim  atr ibutes associative function with the positvity 
of historical practice. He identifed a historical realisation of specifc di ferences w ith the 
em ergence of positve knowledge such as becom es evi dent w ith $ULVWRWOH¶VVFLHQFHThis m eans 
that positve practice m eant, for Durkheim , what de term ines separate causal relations w ithin 
general ideas, as m ade evident by prim itve form s o f knowledge. Prim arily such ideas are 
characterised by categorisation of the world and isevident behind sym pathetic actions or cosm ic 
influences that constiute a prim itve knowledge. P rimitve Classifcation of 1903, therefore 
pivots around $ULVWRWOH¶V FDWHJRULFDO NQRZOHGJH; ³$ULVWRWOH ZDV WKH ILUVW WR SURFODLP WKH
H[LVWHQFH DQG UHDOLW\ RI VSHFLILF GLIIHUHQFH´ DQG the study of prim itve cultures serves to 
dem onstrate how such logical categories have extra-logical origins. 858  Itdescribes the principle 
of association operating under fluid relations betw een heterogeneous inteligible phenom ena in  
giving the hierarchical order of things. But it  relat es  neither strictly to a m odel of the world nor 
to the individual m inds rather WRD³VSHFLDOUHOLJLRXVSULQFLSOH´'XUNKHLPDQG0DXVGHILQHGWKLV
as suis generis, the afective values w ithin a conc ept of the world, which serve to diferentiate 
the social dom ain. 859   
 
Social reality was this categorical objectifcation  which Primitve Classifcation tried to 
dem onstrate had originaly internalised itspositv e elem ents. This was taken as m ade evident in 
pre-abstracted analogies appearing in kinship group s. Since kinship confers unifed 
µLQWHOOLJLELOLW\¶VHHQDVa rudim entary canalising of a schem atising structur e of society, the study 
of m oeites, clans and m ariage groups m ade evident  the reciprocating structures of the world 
that served a colective inteligibilty as distrib uted through an  understanding of species and 
genre. Durkheim  and M aus claim ed this was an origin al form  of an idea w hich has a relation to 
contem porary determ inable scientifc concepts. Thei r study diferentiates states of knowledge 
through DµKLVWRU\RIDVVRFLDWLRQ¶where the historical perspective looks beyond stric tly contained 
logical horizons of m odern science. Outside these h orizons, it aim ed to explain a w ider function 
under ZKLFKFRQFHSWVRIWKHZRUOGFRXOGEHFRPHRUJDQLVHGDFFRUGLQJWRµWRWHPLF¶FHQWUHV. This 
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was a w ider perspective on an em erging function tha t becam e the m ind/m ater problem , an 
ordering principle of the world, now prim arily a m o ral order but also by im plication, a socio-
politcal order.  
 
In 1912 Elementary Forms of Religious Life grounded  a µKLVWRU\ RI DVVRFLDWLRQ¶ through an 
unstated em phasis on this w ider field. This dom ain overlapped with the fragm ented older 
Science of M an and took a historical perspective on  the em erging epistem ology that w as the link 
between Elementary Forms and The Rules, the advance m ent describe GRIWKHµSRVLWLYHFXOW¶860  
The positve cult specifcaly operates through a s ym pathetic m agic that could produce itsown 
µZD\VRIEHLQJ.¶'XUNKHLP¶VFODLPZDVWKDWXVHIXOHIIHFWVDSSHDUHGWKURXJKULWXDOLVWLFRUVRFLDO
cerem onies which acted as the equival HQWRI³H[SHULPHQWDOMXVWLILFDWLRQ´WKURXJKGHPRQVWUDWLQJ
HIIHFWV RI SDUWLFXODU SUDFWLFHV 7KH µUHDOLW\¶ RI VXFK SUDFWLFHV ZDV QRW OLQNHG WR DQ\ FRQFUHWH
efects since the specifc practices could sim ply b e substiuted w ithout having any direct efect 
on the outcom e; but he visible dem onstration creat ed the predispositon for belief. Durkheim  
described this as the channeling of positve expre ssions, not sim ply an intelectual process, but 
of olowing a predispositon for overcom ing inadeq uacies of hum an reason through colectively 
reinforcing propositons that individuals were bein g asked to accept.-   
³7KH PRUDO HIILFDF\ RI WKH ULWH ZKLFK LV UHDO FUHDWHV WKH EHOLHI LQ LWV SK\VLFDO
eficacy, which ism aginary, the eficacy of the w hole leads to the eficacy of each 
SDUWWDNHQVHSDUDWHO\´861   
Durkheim  further claim ed that there w as only a dif erence in degree between this and the 
experim ental practice of the m odern scientis. Laws  of science becom e endowed with the 
authority of the repeatable experim ent, but equaly  were renounced as soon as evidence to the 
contrary appears. In this way, by folowing the the ory of association, the m im etic cult describes 
the positve expression of the law  of causality in its pre-scientifc m anifestation m ade evident in 
anim ism . 862   
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Here was the power of explanation that could accoun t for cosm ic forces in conflict w ith the 
individual w il. This prim ary duality gave the conc ept of causality to  express colectively certain 
forces as objectifed feelings. These were necessar ily externalised and difused through space as 
µQDWXUDO¶SRZHUVWKDWRSSRVHGWKRVHFRQVWLWXWHGE\DVXEMHFWLQWXUQ, the subject sood as a power 
ZLWKSRWHQWLDORIDGHWHUPLQLQJIRUFHWKURXJKWKHVXEMHFW¶VRZQSK\VLFDOERG\,QWKLVZD\WKH
power of the individual, as given the potential of soul, was necessarily constiuted through the 
m ind/m ater oppositon. Yet, his w as also dependan t on a colective understanding of the 
distribution of force through WKH FRQFHSW ,Q WKLV ZD\ ³PDQ IHHOV WKDW KH LV D VRXO DQd 
consequently a force because he is a social being. ´863  The concept of causality is  the necessary 
link m ade between m om ents of a force in negotiating  the unfolding of events. Extended through 
the positve cult, this becom es the social concept that ofers a w ider potential for judgem ent.  
 
Positve knowledge m eans m ediating µQDWXUDOO\¶ It  m eans in the sense evident of colective 
experience, binding an understanding in advance of any proof, a priori. But this principal is not 
sim ply a tendency in the individual but is a colec tively conditoned norm . The norm  is the 
concept of the m ean that sands both as transcenden t and external to individual representations. It
also stands as a rule to which the subject is subor dinated. Durkheim  does not intend this to be 
understood as a m ental creation in the sense of an im agination, but as the associative efect, 
positvely developed through participatory rites, w hich serv es  a general m atrix of social 
existence. It rlates particular activites to actu al outcom es at the lvel of com m unity.- 
³7KH IUDPHZRUN JRHV EH\RQG WKH PDWHULDO DQG GRPLQDWHV LWLW JRHV EH\RQG WKH
LQGLYLGXDOPHPRU\LWLVDERYHDOOFUHDWHGWRDQVZHUWKHQHHGVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\´
864
 
On the perceptual evel, com m unity m ediates to indi vidual dispositon, but on the categorical 
level this regulates an understanding through the c olective ready-m ade. In the pre-scientifc 
com m unity DQµRUGHURIWKLQJV¶was RSHQWRLQWHUYHQWLRQE\WKH³ZLOORIWKHJRGV´a supernatural 
force that ofered a higher potential presupposed o f a special reasoning that was distinct from  the 
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LQGLYLGXDO¶VORJLF865  Such a special epistem ology is  what isretained for a positve knowledge of 
nature to be abstracted by scientifc law and appea ring to be determ ined from  beyond. 
 
'XUNKHLP¶V WKHVis on the pre-scientifc form s of positve knowledg e is that i operates through 
prim ary categorisations of the sacred and the profa ne. The sacred and profane is ground ed  as a 
religious principle but defin es  a qualitative relationship to the world as it ex tends through the 
binary order to predicates a classifcatory order. This dualism  ofers prim ary judgem ents on 
diferences in kind. Durkheim  saw this judgem ent as  radicaly exclusive and giving signifcance 
that extends throughout the social order through ho w a principle of force accorded to the 
µVDFUHG¶866  Equaly it  acts as a real force for the explanation of the na tural world. W hat beco m es 
evident from  'XUNKHLP¶V VWXG\ RI WKH WRWHPLF SULQFLSOH is  that religious origins inform  both 
philosophy and science in their explanations of or ce distributed throughout he world through 
physical, m oral nd m aterial enties. 867  These distributions, 
³ERWK UHVLGHV LQ PHQ DQG LV WKH YLWDO SULQFLSOH RI WKLQJV«WKH\ VWLPXODWH DQG
discipline consciousness but they also m ake pla QWVJURZDQGDQLPDOVUHSURGXFH´ 
The distribution of force inform s a PDWUL[ IURP ZKLFK WKH ³VHHGV RI KXPDQ FLYLOL]DWLRQ ZHUH
GHYHORSHG´868  An individual accords w ith itas if this law was grou nded in nature: social 
harm ony isprem ised on the equilbrium  of orces wh ich accords w ith a higher m oral power. This 
is  experienced as  a social realism  appearing objectifed through rel ations w ith external objects 
sacred to that society. H owever, Durkheim  was also developing the account of socialising logic 
that operat es  to  explain a dynam ic reconfiguration of social form at ions on the basis of the social 
function given to a new reality. 869   
  
Social function was categoricaly understood to ove rule the im pressions of the senses while 
'XUNKHLP¶V VRFLRORJ\ ZDV DOVR ORRNLQJ IRU DQ RULJLQDO µQHZ ODQJXDJH¶ %HKLQG the historical 
sym bolic languages which Elementary Forms gave a pe rspective on, new types of positve 
knowledge em erge as social function through what wa s com pacted into the idea of individuated 
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force. Force was no longer seen as a singular subje ct but as the function with the potential for 
autonom y. 870  Durkheim  held autonom y to be internalised or enclo sed, like a m onadic being, 
w ithin social form ations. Through activites uch a s the m im etic ritual or scientifc experim ents , 
the principle of orce could be invested with the n orm  and positvely grounded. U ltim ately this 
serves to regulating relations between the individu al and colective survival, but his is now 
given through the aesthetic side of representation which is subsum ed under any rationalisation. 
W hen evident new functions appeared, LWZDV WKURXJK µVDWLVI\LQJ¶a feeling that negotiates the 
profane life. 871   
 
In Elementary Forms it ihe aesthetic question th at LOOXVWUDWHV'XUNKHLP¶Vextended theoretical 
aspect behind social functions. The historical subt ext for Elementary Forms was a necessity for 
social transiton which was acknowledged as the dif ficulty of an  investm ent, whether through 
m im etic ritual or a scientifc dem onstration, and n eeds a leap of logic. W hat inform ed a theory of 
NQRZOHGJH SULRU WR WKDW ZKLFK ERWK ³ELQGV WKH PLQG DQG JRHV EH\RQG LW"´ It  atributed as  a 
question of aesthetics what could tentatively be re valuated according to individualised 
interpretation. 872  
 
Dérèglem ent and Anom ie  
 
For Durkheim , the sacred and the profane cary valu es of the positve and the vital through term s 
given as an  interpretative capacity. He understood this capacity as a µQDWXUDO¶ DSSHWLWH WR EH
satisfied and, as uch, isultim ately located withi n the individual. Ifth e task of the The Rules was 
to restrict a dom ain to which the sociologist could  derive discursive authority, Elem entary Forms 
looked to speculative origins of representation for  a theory of knowledge that em phasised non-
determ ined pow er elations for a general knowledge.  Its historical im age was an extended zone 
of transform ation, of w ider, difuse and vague asso ciations, experienced under an aesthetic 
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quality, folows a distribution of sensation into which social form s c ould intervene with a pow er 
of constiution. 873    
 
W hat constiutes such a power? Itisdom inated by t he force by which m an thinks of him self as 
m aster of a body, from  the perspective of a soul wh ich divides causes from  efects as two 
m om ents of force. According to Durkheim , here is  the proble m  w hich is atributed to 
em pircism . This could not explain why anticipation s in  the m om ents of orce could be upheld as 
a norm  with authority over the m ind. Durkheim ¶V concept of social for ce  engenders this power of 
association for im peratives of thought hrough µZD\V RI WKLQNLQJ DQG EHLQJ¶ as a concept of 
social values. This dea em bodies categories of cau sality, both of individual and the body (vital) 
and the colective ready-m ade understanding (posit ve) as the concept extends power to 
com m unal ife. It  expresses positve categories of objects for the w ider activites which the 
intelect m ust folow, and cannot suppress. For Dur kheim , this would be where im peratives of 
thought and im perative of the w il converge in a co ncept of the m ean, atributed to m a Q¶V
world. 874   
 
As a capacity this drew  on m ore factual studies of 'XUNKHLPV¶V HDUOLHU ZRUNV ,Q Suicide, a 
dispositon associated with social dissolution was evident as a loosening norm s of m odern 
VRFLHW\HQFURDFKLQJRQPDQ¶VµZD\VRIEHLQJ¶through a µORQJLQJIRULQILQLW\¶- 
³,W LV HYHUODVWLQJO\ UHSHDWHG WKDW LW LV LQ PDQ¶V QDWXUH WR EH HWHUQDOO\ GLVVDWLVILHG
constantly to advance, w ithout relief or est, towa rds an indefinite goal. The longing 
for infinity is daily represented as a m ark of m ora l distnction, whereas it can only 
appear within unregulated consciences which elevate  to a rule the lack of rule from  
ZKLFKWKH\VXIIHU´875   
The signifcance of initude and lack of rule is gi ven to the µXQUHJXODWHGFRQVFLHQFH¶and is the 
index to changing conditons of lie under a social  concept that no longer etains consistancy. A n 
aesthetic capacity m eans an  individual appetie awakened through less discipli ned passions in the 
state of deregulation or anomie. 
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However, less disciplined passions m eant both the d ivergent and convergent efect w ithin the 
w ider aesthetic capacity; - 
- Firstly, from  the perspective of the m echanical s olidarity such unregulated desire would appear 
DV D ODFN RI UXOH GpUqJOHPHQW¶ RU WKH WKUHDW RI GLIIHUHQFH WR a sym bolising order. A n alterity 
w ithin the order of representation which signifes the loom ing conditons from  which anom ie 
ensues.  
-Secondly, from  the perspective of the pre-scientif ic order depicted in Elementary Forms the 
orders of ritual life appeared through the m im etic cult of the totem  and VWDQGRQO\IRUDµZD\RI
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶6LQFHVWUXFWXUHs of inteligibilty are m ediated by the sign, an  order of things is 
only itssecondary structure. Sym bolic structure su pports the aesthetic capacity at  the origins of 
understanding, but is  open to the fluid relations from  within a colecti ve order.  
 
Fluid form s of inteligibilty necessitate the tote m  to stand for a condensed order of diference 
and substiute for the distributed order of the wor ld. Indeed, this the sacred order characterised 
by a particular epistem ological m odel at the heart of the positve cult. The positve m im etic order 
functions to reinforce associations between the sig n and referent -he idea and itsunderstanding 
-but this conversely also condenses the potential o profane that order. Since Durkheim  held pre-
scientifc form s of such associations as  open relations, fixed to the world only through 
interpretation, itw as this interpretation that was  open to experim entation and dem onstrable 
diference: the aesthetic form  as  dissociated form , open to a transform ation.  
 
This im plies that such order is a social-epistem ological order and ultim ately is not determ ined 
but m erely determ inistic. The social concept theref ore RQO\µJLYHVJURXQGV¶IRUDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ. 
In this sense, the relation between determ inable an d determ ined lends its  particular m eaning to 
DQRPLHDVDµZD\RIEHLQJ¶GUDZQIURPa specifc concept of the world. A  Christian theology of 
anomia finds the signifcance in itsranslation as  sin, not necessarily the w ilful transgression of 
norm s, but one that indicates m ental atitudes whic h lead to a profaning of the sacred. 876  In this 
context, biblical anom ia m eant lawlessness and exte nded as a m oral dispositon intended to 
indicate certain actions which consequentialy fol ow. For exam ple, old Testam ent gentiles were 
                                                          
876
 M estrovic &  Brown (1987) 
278 
 
anom ic since they did not have m osaic law; equaly for Christians, the antichrist was the lawless 
one since he is outside the law  of God. 877  This shows how anom ie caries a sense of hostilty  
against conceptions of G od which clearly has dific ulty finding a positvistic equivalent. Another 
perspective appears through WKH DQFLHQW *UHHN ȐȞȠȝȓĮ PHDQLQJ µODZOHVV¶ RU µLPSLRXV¶ ZKLFK
opens a m ore am biguous notion for the status of the  sign of anom ia. 878  In this sense, ȞȩȝȠȢ is 
linked to ȝȠݶȡĮ (m oira), a IDWDOLVWLF QRWLRQ KHOG RI ³WKDW ZKLFK LV ULJKW´ Its relation to ȞȩȝȠȢ 
appears less determ ined, rather m ore as the µGLVSHQVDWLRQ¶LQWKHVHQVHWKDW=HXVGLVSHQVHGODQG
to a people for their use. Later this becam e the di spensation of law accorded to the sovereign. 
Against such order, a fatalism  was retained behind the teleological tensi on of ȞȩȝȠȢ where the 
dispensations to rule was derived from  a right to r epresents colective values and to preside over 
their distribution.  
 
The relation between dispensation of land, of law  a nd the m odes of reason was drawn together 
under a sacred task, and em bodies this idea that it s m ism anagem ent could be held as 
VDFULOHJLRXV %\ XVLQJ DQRPLH LQ WKH VHQVH RI µGpUqJOHPHQW¶ WKH RSSRVLWH RI UpJOH 'XUNKHLP
m aintained an  oppositon that gives this tension of a WHOHRORJLFDO WKRXJKWRI µRXJKW¶This was 
grounded by the fatalism  behind the m oral sense of a prescriptive or egim en for a colective 
general health according to a w ider concept of natu re. 879  The suggestion is that Durkheim  took 
anom ie as describing the dispersal of colective li fe and its concept of the w orld. A  m odern 
dérèglem ent in the regim e of signs and itsm oral no rm s would be indicated by WUHDWLQJVRFLHW\¶V
sacred representations as profane and vice versa. 
 
W hile in an earlier epoch these signs had falen un der the protection of the theological, lter this 
was taken up as a philosophical project and becam e,  by the beginning of the 19 th  century, a 
regim e of signs associated w ith the pursuit of a Sc ience of M an. These were am bitons folowed 
by the special physiology of sensation and its  am bigous values atributed to the body. W hen the 
problem  of anom ie appears in The Division of Labour  it  stilcaried som e of this physiological 
legacy with it,- 
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³WKHVWXG\RIGHYLDQWIRUPVZLOODOORZXVWRGHWHUPLQHEHWWHUWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRUWKH
existence of the norm al VWDWH«KHUHDVHOVHZKHUHSDWKRORJ\LVWKHSUHFLRXVDQFLOODU\
WRSK\VLRORJ\´ 880  
According to The Rules ZH OHDUQ WKDW ³SK\VLRORJLVW VWXGLHV WKH IXQFWLRQV RI WKH DYHUDJH
RUJDQLVP VR GRHV WKH VRFLRORJLVW´ but unlike the physiological m odel the neo-positvi stic 
distinction through function was inherently problem atic for sociological m odel. Itcould not be a 
categorical value in any absolute sense of a determ ined lim it to lfe such as  in physiology. It  was 
WKHFHQWUDOSUREOHPIRU'XUNKHLP¶VVRFLRORJ\881   
 
M odern societies exhibit only diferences of degree  rather than pathological diference of kind 
(i.e. living or not living). Functional diversity c ontained under an apparent unity which The Rules 
FDOOHG WKHµSHUVLVWDQFHRI OLIH,¶ is scrutinised in The Division of Labour through fu nctional and 
m oral diversity of colective sentim ent. Durkheim  c ontended that m odern dynam ic societies 
becom e m ore powerless by degrees to contain their ³FHQWULIXJDOWHQGHQFLHV´'XUNKHLPGUHZthe 
socio-politcal paralel in  the equivalent of a philosophy incapable of m aintaining the unity in it s 
relation to m odern sciences. M odernity was this dyn am ic of knowledge being alw ays in 
m otion. 882  6FLHQWLILFVSHFLDOLVDWLRQVZHUHRFFXUULQJDWVXFKDVSHHGWKDW³WKHJUHDWV\QWKHVHV´DUH
always untim ely. This problem  was of the im possibil ity for a hum an intelect o suficiently 
grasp any knowledge through its  potential to fuly develop and deliver the régle t hat Durkheim  
equated with the project for a Science of M an. Dérè glem ent w as dissolution into m ere 
coexistence under the blur of determ inable and fata listic knowledge at the individual level. 883   
 
The Concept of the Positve as  Science of Co-Existence  
 
Such a dynam ism  in  knowledge has its  particular signifcance which Durkheim  registered as a 
diference betw een Auguste Com te and Saint Sim on. W hile Com te held that he future unity of 
the sciences could be assum ed, it was Saint Sim on w ho cam e to doubt this. D isunity appear ed  as 
an  ireconcilable whole, disruptive of any m odern ant hropology of colective consciousness. It  
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recedes rapidly as labour and social functions dif erentiate m odern experience, which appeared 
to Durkheim  as a m orbidity.  
 
He also understands that his cannot be pathological i n itself since apparently GLIIHUHQWµZD\VRI
EHLQJ¶ DUH Rnly dispersed form s of lie that FRXOG FRH[LVW DV µQRUPDO¶ SKHQRPHQD µ:D\V RI
EHLQJ¶DSSHDUas  repetions, DV³FKDQQHOVWKDWOLIHKDVGXJIRULWVHOI´884  The specifc difculty 
was to  distinguish these norm s from  the potential form s a waitng social expression. H e read 
social tensions as the phenom enal events whose prob lem  was in relation to general functions of 
society. In  contrast w ith the system atic m odel of &RPWH¶V delim it ed  norm s, the JHQHUDOµIDFW¶ for 
Durkheim  was WKDW ³VRPHWKLQJ VXVSHQGV KRVWLOLWLes for a while. ´ How ever, in  the industrial 
society such general function was the solidarity th at appeared only discontinuous or interm itent, 
ultim ately grounded by the state of anom ie. Anom ie indicates a fatalistic  em pircism , which 
could equaly appear as new conditons of existence , part of a process of being realised. 
 
The dilem m a for 'XUNKHLP¶V DPELWLRQV of a Science of M an w as the links to an  ideological 
m ethod itself atem pting to escape from  an  em pircal crisis. However, Durkheim  considered 
ideolog LFDO MXGJPHQW DV µSUH-IXQFWLRQDO¶ m eaning that i GHIHUUHG LWV RZQ PHDVXUH WR ³VRPH
RYHUULGLQJFRQFHSW´885  In contrast, Durkheim  was looking forward to a m et hod that would avoid 
µEDFNVOLGLQJ¶LQWRsuch ideology, while retaining itsam biton for a p ositve approach. This m eant 
the return to its  prim ary problem  of establishing objective criteria  for an interpretation of health 
from  disease as values in the world. 886  From  an individual perspective, an  organic society w as 
such an adm ixture w ith no discrete concep WRILWVZRUOGWRYLHZµPHQWDOO\;¶iQGLYLGXDOVFRXOG³QR
ORQJHUILJXUHRXWLWVOLPLWV«VLQFHLWLVVRWRVSHDNXQOLPLWHG´887  But he m odern dispersion was 
both the perspective on a crisis of social function  but also the evidence of the transform ative 
events whose elem ents lent them selves to becom ing a  determ inable science. 888   
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Distnguishing determ inable signs of the norm al and  the pathological w as the dilem m a of the a 
priori given to such YLWDO µQRUPV¶ 'XUNKHLP¶V VWUDWHJ\ defered this question through the 
aVVHPEODJHVRIVRFLRORJLFDOµHQWLWLHV¶GLVWLQJXLVKHGIURPWKRVHDQRPDORXVWRVXFKUHSHWLWLRQ889  
An underlying assum ption, from  the biological point o f view , was that norm s were able to be 
generalised throughout he species. Sim ple repeti on was the phenom enal fact explained by 
causal thinking. But hrough soci al  form ations, Durkheim  justifed individual persiste nce as 
repetious form s resistant to destructive historic al forces,-  
³KRZZRXOGWKH\KDYHEHHQDEOHWRVXVWDLQWKHPVHOYHVLQDYDULHW\RIFLUFXPVWances 
LIWKH\GLGQRWHQDEOHWKHLQGLYLGXDOWREHWWHUUHVLVWWKHFDXVHVRIGHVWUXFWLRQ´890   
Repetion was the norm ality where frequency indica tes superiority; but his could explain only 
static relations to the conditons of existence. On  the contrary, in the circum stances of transiton 
that characterise m odern social form s, the evolving  process w as ustained without any stabilsed 
and definite form  of the norm al type. W hat distingu ished the m odern world for Durkheim  w as 
that norm s always related to the past and could no longer elate to the new em erging conditons 
of existence. V isible evidence of norm ality and gen erality was therefore deceptive in m odernity. 
A  visible persistence of force of habit could no lo nger be the sign inherently linked to 
contem porary conditons of a colective existence, and this was further defined by the problem s 
distinguishing the sociologist from  the biologist: the sociologist rem ains at a loss to know  
whether the social phenom ena is norm al since he ult im ately has no m eans of determ ining 
reference points.  
 
In  XQGHUVWDQGLQJ'XUNKHLP¶VSURMHFW, one should note the signifcance of the text Soci alism and 
what he derived from  the industrialism  taken up by Saint Sim on. This was an  econom ic function, 
taken as an  auto-regulation of interests which was distinguish ed from  social controls im posed by 
m ere ideas. Its value appeared despite a ³WHQGHQF\ WR DQDUFK\,´ w as a principle Saint Sim on 
related to a dynam ism  of lie. He conceived this n  the m anner of a YLWDOSULQFLSOHGUDZLQJRQ³D
subs WDQFH RI FRPPRQ OLIH´ 'XUNKHLP UHODWHG WKLV G\QDPLVP WR the tendency for an 
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³HQIUDQFKLVHPHQW´ RI a µZD\ RI EHLQJ¶ WKDW RIIHUHG D PHDQV WR HVFDSH VXERUGLQDWLRQ RI DQ
untim ely idea. 891  
 
In this regard, Durkheim  notes how Saint Sim on neve r spoke of Plato or Rousseau, rather 
articulated his thinking by reference to Newton, Ca banis, Bichat and Adam  Sm ith. The 
signifcance w as that this could fore-ground the se arch for an im m anent principle of distribution: 
Durkheim  continues, -  
³7RDVVXPH WKDW WKHSDUWLFXODU VWate of subjection in which industry had form erly 
been held, would not be in agreem ent with the new c onditons of colective life, 
does not im ply that every other type of dependence would be devoid of reason. It
could wel be that he transform ation necessary doe s not consist n suppressing or 
subordinating but in changing form , not in m aking i ndustrial values a kind of 
unlim ited absolute beyond which there is nothing, b ut rather is lim itng in a 
diferent m anner and spirt han form erly...In fact , its the general aw  of living 
things that needs and appeties are norm al only on conditon of being controled. 
Unlim ited need contradicts ielf. For need is defi ned by the goal it im s at, nd if
XQOLPLWHGKDVQRJRDOVLQFHWKHUHLVQROLPLW´ 
Durkheim , who was also looking for a socio-politca l technique for egulating the capacity for 
developm ent, understood this through the concept gi ven under a µSHUVLVWHQFH RI OLIH¶ 7KH
counter- H[DPSOH WR WKHVH WHFKQLTXHV DSSHDUHG LQ WKH LPDJH RI WKH ³K\SHUFLYLOL]DWLRQ´ RI the 
Suicide text. Here an  anom ic tendency bred growing suicidal consequences  for efined nervous 
system s of the excessively delicate and those less capable of atachm ent to colective objectives. 
These produced the discontinuites evident as the l im its of colective forces from  the individual 
perspective. Durkheim  interpreted these as the diss olution of form er colective powers. This 
indicates two am bitons; -
-Firstly, to give the provisional concept o be exp lored through the analysis of two antagonistic 
forces confronting each other, a colective force t hat tries to take possession of the individual, the  
other individual force that repels it. 892   
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-Secondly, he retainins the am biton for a science whose technique isappropriate to describe the 
³VXSUD-organic ´VRFLDOOLIH7KLVDPELWLRQZRXOGJLYHIRUPWRWKHRUJDQLFODZZKRVHIXQFWLRQLI
SURSHUO\LQWHUSUHWHG³FDQWHOOXVWKHVHFUHWRIWKHIXWXUH´893   
For the individual psychology, such a technique wou ld open a negotiation in  the forest of signs 
that com bines GLYHUVHSV\FKRORJLFDOGLVSRVLWLRQVRIHJRLVPDOWUXLVPZLWK³DFHUWDLQDQRPLH´WR
ofset one another. The excess of one or other elem ent would be to the detrim ent of the others, 
but isequaly the case that a norm  of m oderate intensity in dispositon, such as the average 
m an, would becom e m ore rapidly dissolute in the fac e of the increasing transform ations of the 
industrial society. Perhaps this should be taken as the driving force behind 'XUNKHLP¶V
conception for a Science of M an , a failure he identif ie d as the dissolution in  the forces of 
fatalism  waitng on the m argins. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter exam ined the legacy for a Science of M an after experim ental m edicine separated 
the science of life from  the philosophical debate o n m an. Physiology internalised values 
atributed to the vital and the positve w ithin a f unctional dom ain. The chapter described 
%HUJVRQ¶VLQFRUSRUDWLRQRIWKLVHYHQWLQWRDKLVWRULFDOFRQWLQXLW\DVWKHVWUDWHJLFGXDOLVPEHWZHHQ
H[SHULHQFH DQG LQWHOOLJLELOLW\ %HUJVRQ¶V RZQ WKHRU\ RI psycho-physiological states substiuted 
WKH QRUPDOSDWKRORJLFDO GXDOLVP IRU µQRUP¶ DQG µUHDO¶ H[WHQGLQJ D EURDGHU TXHVWLRQ RI YDOXHV
KHOGRIYLWDO IXQFWLRQ7KLV VHUYHG%HUJVRQ¶V FULWLTXHRID3RVLWLYLVWKLVWRULFDO IRUPDWLRQV7KH
chapter described Em ile D urkheim  neo- SRVLWLYLVW PRGHO GHULYHG RI &ODXGH %HUQDUG¶V LQQHU
PLOLHX'XUNKHLP¶VVRFLDOGRPDLQLQWHUQDOLVHGWHQVLRQVDWWULEXWHGWR WKHSHUVLVWHQFHRI OLIH+LV
historical perspective on the order of things was o pen to a special reasoning, the positve 
concept, internalising tensions identifed w ith wha t earlier epochs protected under the notions of 
the theological. This was associated w ith an am bit on for a Science of M an and its intrinsic 
dilem m a around the problem  of determ inable norm s. D id Durkheim  fol RZ%HUQDUG¶VEUHDNZLWK
YLWDOLVP" 'XUNKHLP¶V ZDV DQ RSHQ DPELWLRQ IRU WKH IXQFWLRQDO FRQFHSW WKDW DGGUHVVHG WKH
dissolution of the Enlightenm ent Science of M an in his era. 
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Conclusion: The Vital and the Positive 
 
The thesis derived a contem porary context IURP )RXFDXOW¶V µFULVLV RI WKH ¶ which was 
contrasted w ith the µUDUHILHGIRUPRISRVLWLYLVP,¶as  Deleuze caled epistem ological analysis. H e 
referenced the em pircist raditon and IRFXVVHG RQ ZKDW 'HOHX]H¶ RZQ WKRXJKW GHOLEHUDWHO\
subjugated under a v LWDOLVP ,Q WKLV WKHVLV YLWDOLVP ZDV H[SODLQHG DURXQG WKH µDJH RI %LFKDW¶
which Deleuze proposed as culm ination of the Sensat ionalist m odel of the sign. By contrast, 
Foucault was approached through his engagem ent w ith  Kant. These were the two perspectives 
explored as an Enlightenm ent project hat develop ed  alternatively to the m odel of a critque of 
reason. 
 
W hen Foucault discussed the µDJHRI%LFKDW¶LQWKHBirth of the Clinic it gave a perspective on an 
Enlightenm ent Science of M an where m edical Positvi sm  saw the dissolution of its naive 
DPELWLRQ*LOOHV'HOHX]HGHVFULEHGWKLVHYHQWDVWKHµGHOLFDWHSUREOHP¶RIFRQVWLWXWLQJDSRVLWLYH
concept from  the broader socio-politcal perspectiv e of intrinsic values of the signs of lie. This 
had a paralel w ith h LVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI1LHW]VFKH¶VJHQHDORJ\DQGWKHVLJQVµWKDWKDYH\HWWRWDNH
KROG¶But he Enlightenm ent Science of M an was understood  through the idea of a science that 
was the FUHDWLRQRIPDQ¶VKLJKHUIDFXOWLHV this w as the am biton of creating new philosophical  
and scientifc languages ZLWK D SUDFWLFDO DSSOLFDWLRQ LQ PDQ¶V ZRUOG. W hile .DQW¶V UDWLRQDO
m etaphysics divided this am biton on the basis of a n 18 th  century m otif of power, he also looked 
IRU WKH µLQGLVSHQVDEOH VHUYLFH¶ H[WHQGLQJ EH\RQG WKH conditonality of the critcal m odel. This 
was the alternative folowed in the Opus Postumum s ystem aticaly laying out theoretical 
possibilties of apprehending a science of nature a s a logical system  of concepts. This gave the 
perspective from  which .DQW¶s late Anthropology was a dom ain where historical k nowledge 
com peted with natural science, as  the conflict of m oral and theoretical aspects of a  logic of m an, 
left to be judged by a principle of the future.  
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7KH µDJH RI %LFKDW¶ GHULYHG RI 0RQWSHOOLHU YLWDlism  and folowed the m ethodical engagem ent 
w ith what constiuted vital phenom ena. Bichat was i nfluential for this Science of M an extending 
to the physical and m oral whose m icropolitcs were influential for a nascent Positvism . 
Positvism  saw this in life ¶V FDSDFLW\ IRU RUJDQL]DWLRQ ZKLOH YLWDOLVP PHDQW WKH µKLGGHQ
RSHUDWLRQVRIQDWXUH¶ 7KLV WKHVLV IRXQGZKDW %LFKDWXQGHUVWRRGDVKHXULVWLFYDOXHVGHULYHGRI
m edicine took priority over WKH VSHFLILFLW\RI V\VWHPDWLF VFLHQFH WKH µDJHRI%LFKDW¶ H[WHQGHG
th is to a reading of Saint Sim on when itm oved beyond  a physiological debate to constiute a 
pragm atic knowledge for a socio- SROLWLFDO GRPDLQ 6DLQW 6LPRQ¶V HQWHUSULVH centred on the 
aesthetic nature of this dom ain, w ith biological th eories of anim ality and µDERULJLQDOGLIIHUHQFH¶
giving its central ontological problem s. H LV µLQGXVWULDO YDOXHV¶ JDYHH[SUHVVLRQ WRPDQ¶V LQQHU
drives as a class truggle and the concept of labou r was his 3RVLWLYLVP¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRQYDOXHVRI
an Enlightenm ent Science of M an.  
 
ThHOHJDF\RI%LFKDW¶VSK\VLRORJ\DOVRSXWWKHVHYDOXHVLQWRGLVSXWH&RPWH¶V3RVLWLYLVPsaw an  
epistem ological strategy resisting philosophical in terpretations of a Science of M an and Bichat 
was im portant because he constrained knowledge to i ts legitm ate dom ains. But his µLQFRPSOHWH
3RVLWLYLVP¶RSHQHG WRD VWUXFWXUDO WKLQNLQJ WKDWRYHUWRRNDEURDGHUSUDFWLFHRI6FLHQFHRI0DQ
after the 18 th  century. The new paradigm  for knowledge of lie ap peared with the experim ental 
m edicine of Claude Bernard and displaced an older v italistic understanding of lie, afirm ing 
IXQFWLRQV GHSHQGHQW RQO\ RQ µFRQGLWLRQV RI H[LVWHQFH¶ TKLV JDYH WKH µSDUDGR[LFDO OLQN¶ ZLWK
older question of values apprehended as  true function during the Third Republic. Folowing  the 
separation fr om  a philosophy of the life, the rarefied approach was a progressive adaptation 
between experience and inteligibilty, a stance se rving %HUJVRQ¶VFULWLTXHRI3RVLWLYLVWKLVWRULFDO
form ations. This precisely return ed  to a perspective on the norm al and the pathologica l which 
Creative Evolution upheld as  a neo-vitalism . 
 
The neo-Positve m odel in Em ile Durkheim  also ORRNHGWR%HUQDUG¶VLQWHULRUPLOLHXIRUa social 
m odel for DFROOHFWLYHµRUGHURI WKLQJV¶The values identifed w ith positve signs which ear lie r 
epochs protected under a notion of the theological,  and later taken up around the philosophical 
project, gave the perspective for a Science of M an in  the 18 th  century, where it was the loss of the 
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status of positve knowledge that Durkheim  saw as t he intrinsic dilem m as of legitm ating a vital 
µQRUPV¶ LQ PRGHUQ VRFLHW\ It  was precisely because the positve and the vital c ould not be 
sustained in relation to determ inable sciences, oc ial assem blages, or definite knowledge of the 
norm al type that subsum ed the positve and the vita l under a social concept. A t start of the 20 th  
century, this caried this paradoxical link w ith th e Enlightenm ent project. 
 
W hat rem ained of this project was to be constiuted  from  the sciences in the term s of the day. 
This would re IOHFW.DQW¶VDPELWLRQVIRUDIXWXUHPHWDSK\VLFVas w el as the historical physiology 
whose central role in  Enlightenm ent vitalism  gave the French perspective  on a Science of M an in 
this thesis. During the 20 th  century critque of values of hum anism , the post-w ar period focused 
on the construct of m an that folow ed  Enlightenm ent hought hrough the 19 th  century as it fed 
politcal argum ents of the 20 th  century. But he anti- KXPDQLVP DQG WKH µGHDWK RI PDQ¶ that 
em erged though new physical and biological sciences , along with im ports to France of 
phenom enology, em ergence of structuralism  and lingu istics, al served an  atack on the stable 
notion of m an as a progressive, oriented, utopian i deal of m an.  
 
The genealogy of the Science of M an has folow ed  the constiution of a history that already w as 
a post-Cartesian subject. It  constiut ed  a field around the values of positve and vital wh ose term s 
were historicaly resistant o being a determ inable  object of study. From  this perspective, the 
Science of M an in the Enlightenm ent was not a sim pl e hum anism , but he project which as this 
history shows at no point gave a clear idea of what  m an was. The signifcant aspect for a 
contem porary thought was of the broader socio-polit ical im plem entation that was already 
diverging from  a hum anism . This study ended prior to the First W orld  W ar; it started w ith the 
¶V GLVSXWH RYHU WKH KXPDQLVP - further research would focus the transform ation o f the 
positve and the vital through this intervening per iod from  which item erged for contem porary 
thought through such influential writers as Foucaul t and Deleuze. 
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